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Judgment
V.K.Shukla, J.
The present Intra Court appeal takes an exception to the order dated 18-01-2017, passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the writ petition filed
by the appellant against the order of dismissal from service after departmental inquiry and dismissal of appeal has been unsuccessful.
While assailing the order of the learned Single Judge, the counsel for the appellant raised contention that on similar set of charges, a criminal case
was registered against him and in the said case, he has been acquitted by the trial court. He referred the statement of Shri A.K. Bhoongaukar, the
then Divisional Manager of the Corporation and also referred the certain paras of the judgment of the trial court. In substance, he contended that
the departmental inquiry and criminal proceedings in the present case are based on same set of facts, charges, evidence and witnesses and there is
no evidence against him to hold him guilty, therefore, the order of dismissal is not sustainable. In support of his submission, he relied on the
judgment passed by the Apex Court in the cases of Capt. M. Paulanthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and anoher, (1999)3 SCC 679 and G.M. Tank
Vs. State of Gujarat and others (2006)5 SCC 446. He also submitted that after the decision by the learned Single Judge by the judgment
dated 26-10-2017, he has been acquitted by the trial court and relied on findings recorded in paras 68 and 69 that he was given charge of writing of
cash book w.e.f. 30-01-2004, therefore, the findings in the departmental inquiry are based on no evidence and perverse. It is opt to mention that order
of acquittal is not relevant for adjudication of the present case as the same was passed after decision by learned Single Judge.
The facts in short are that the petitioner was posted as accountant at Kundam Project Circle Katni from 24-09-2001 to 23-04-2007. A charge
sheet was issued to him vide letter dated 22-10-2005 alleging following allegations :
(i) Petitioner was posted then Accountant at Kundam Pariyojna from 24-09-2001 to 23-04-2007, Area Manager vide order dated 24-09-2001
authorized the petitioner to maintain cashbook, however, the petitioner had not written the cash book by himself hence, he had violated Rule 34(G)
of M.P.Civil Service Rule 1984 and committed misconduct.
(ii) When the petitioner was posted as Accountant, he entered into a criminal conspiracy and committed gross negligence due to which, a loss
of Rs.40624374/was caused to the respondents-Corporation.
By the order dated 17-01-2006, Enquiry Officer was appointed and he found the charges proved against the petitioner. Thereafter, a show cause
notice was issued against the petitioner on 21-06-2006 alongwith the inquiry report. He filed his reply but the same was not found satisfactory and
thereafter by the impugned order dated 14-12-2006, his services were dismissed.
Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order,departmental appeal was preferred, which has also been dismissed by the Managing Director vide order
dated 23-04-2007.
In order to appreciate the first submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that both departmental and criminal cases are on same act of
charges, therefore, the evidence recorded in criminal case ought to have been considered by the departmental authorities in the departmental enquiry.
It is condign to survey the judgments of the courts in the said field. The scope of departmental inquiry and criminal cases which have been
considered by the Apex Court in number of cases. The said issue is no longer res integra. In B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749
the Supreme Court has held as under:
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant
to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye
of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the
inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some
evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that
finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to
disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to
hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held
the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the
mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such
as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to
make it appropriate to the facts of each case. (emphasis supplied)â€
In Bank of India Vs. Degala Suryanarayana (1999) 5 SCC 762, it is held by the Apex Court as under:
“11. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. The only requirement of law is that the allegation against the
delinquent officer must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a
finding upholding the gravamen of the charge against the delinquent officer. Mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in
departmental enquiry proceedings. The court exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the
departmental enquiry proceedings excepting in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a
finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that finding. The court cannot embark upon reappreciating the
evidence or weighing the same like an appellate authority. So long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental
authority, the same has to be sustained. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel the Constitution Bench has held:
The High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the
evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This
approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned
conclusion follows or not.â€
In Lalit Popli Vs. Canara Bank, (2003) 3 SCC 583, Supreme Court has held as under:
It is fairly well settled that the approach and objective in criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings are altogether distinct and
different. In the disciplinary proceedings the preliminary question is whether the employee is guilty of such conduct as would merit action against him,
whereas in criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him are established and if established what sentence should
be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the
rules governing the enquiry and trial are conceptually different. (See State of Rajasthan v.B.K. Meena.) In case of disciplinary enquiry the technical
rules of evidence have no application. The doctrine of proof beyond doubt has no application. Preponderance of probabilities and some material on
record are necessary to arrive at the conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct.
While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is
circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural
justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority.
In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India the scope of judicial review was indicated by stating that review by the court is of decision-making process
and where the findings of the disciplinary authority are based on some evidence, the court or the tribunal cannot reappreciate the evidence and
substitute its own finding.
As observed in R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab in paras 16 and 17 the scope of interference is rather limited and has to be exercised within the
circumscribed limits. It was noted as follows:
Before adverting to the first contentionof the appellant regarding want of material to establish the charge, and of nonapplication of mind, we will
have to bear in mind the rule that the court while exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority on the ground that the
evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the inquiring authority, it is not the
function of the court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. The inquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long
as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding and the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be
canvassed before the court in writ proceedings.
A narration of the charges and thereasons of the inquiring authority for accepting the charges, as seen from the records, shows that the inquiring
authority has based its conclusions on materials available on record after considering the defence put forth by the appellant and these decisions, in our
opinion, have been taken in a reasonable manner and objectively. The conclusion arrived at by the inquiring authority cannot be termed as either
being perverse or not based on any material nor is it a case where there has been any non-application of mind on the part of the inquiring authority.
Likewise, the High Court has looked into the material based on which the enquiry officer has come to the conclusion, within the limited scope
available to it under Article 226 of the Constitution and we do not find any fault with the findings of the High Court in this regard. [Emphasis
Supplied]â€
In M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India, (2006) 5 SCC 88, Supreme Court opined as under:
“25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there
should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial
i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the
documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record.
While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of
proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations
with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with.
[Emphasis Supplied]â€
The judgment of Captain M. Paul Anthony and G.M.Tank (supra) were again considered by the Supreme Court in Divisional Controller,
Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Vs. M.G.Vittal Rao-(2012) 1 SCC 442. In para24, the Apex Court considered the judgment of Captain
M.Paul Anthony(supra), and opined that this judgment is not of universal application. The judgment of G.M.Tank (supra) was considered in para-23
of the judgment. After considering this judgment and after taking note of the basic judgment of R.P.Kapoor (supra) , the Apex Court held that the
departmental inquiry and criminal case can run simultaneously despite the fact that the same are founded upon the same factual matrix. It was held
that facts, charges and nature of evidence, etc. involved in an individual case would determine as to whether decision of acquittal would have any
bearing on the findings recorded in the departmental inquiry. This view is followed by the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal and others Vs.
Sankar Ghosh(2014)3 SCC 610. In this case also, the Apex Court explained the judgment of Captain M. Paul Anthony and G.M.Tank (supra). In
para, 16,17 and 18 of this judgment, the Apex Court held that the proof required in the departmental inquiry is different than the proof required in a
criminal case. In Indian Overseas Bank, Annasalai and another Vs. P.Ganesan and others- (2008) 1 SCC 650, the Apex Court reiterated the same
principle. In Ajit Kumar Nag Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (2005) 7 SCCÂ 764, it was held as under :
“....The two proceedings criminal and departmental are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas
the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent
departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with service Rules….. (Emphasis supplied)
In the light of aforesaid, I am unable to hold that after acquittal of the petitioner, the respondents were not justified in conducting the inquiry.
Three Judges judgment in the case of State of Haryana and another Vs. Rattan Singh, AIR 1977 SC 1512 = (1977) 2 SCC 491, held that strict
rules of Evidence Act do not apply to domestic enquiries or before Administrative Tribunals. Even hearsay evidence is admissible in theÂ
departmental proceedings provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility.
Thus, the petitioner can not rely on the evidence adducedin the criminal trial, particularly when the department had examined the witnesses
namely Mr.D.P.Sharma, Mr.T.R.Chawra, Mr.A.K. Bhoongaukar and Mr.T.R.Koshta in the departmental enquiry. The petitioner was givenÂ
opportunity to cross examine the witnesses and he had also cross-examined these witnesses. The findings of the Enquiry Officer and the order of
dismissal, appellate order based on the said material cannot be faulted on the basis of evidence recorded in the criminal trial. The order of acquittal
passed on 26-10-2017 during the pendency of writ appeal would not invalidate the order of dismissal passed on 14-12-2006 and the departmental
inquiry. In the case of Ashutosh Pawar Vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh and another(2018)2 MPLJ 419, Full Bench held that the acquittal in a
criminal case is not certificate of good conduct to a candidate. In the case of R.K.Solanki Vs. Central Bank of India, W.P.No.780/2016, decided by a
Coordinate Bench of this court on 07-02-2018, held that criminal and departmental proceedings are entirely different. They operate in different field
and have different objectives. The acquittal or exoneration from criminal case cannot conclude the departmental enquiry and does not
mechanically exonerates the employee from the departmental enquiry/punishment.
In view of the aforesaid, we do not find any force in the contentions of the appellant that the order of dismissal from service is not sustainable in
view of the statements recorded by the trial court in criminal case.Â
The counsel for the appellant also submitted that certain relevant documents were not supplied to him. Upon perusal of the record, the learned
Single Judge has found that on 07-03-2006, the documents containing 1000 pages were supplied to the petitioner and further the counsel for the
appellant failed to show any prejudice caused to the petitioner because of non-supply of some documents.
In view of the aforesaid, we do not find any error in the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition. Hence no interference is
called for in the present Intra Court appeal.
Ex-consequenti the same is dismissed.
