AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
No AI summary yet
Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.
Judgment
51 paragraphs · 1,074 wordsThe petitioner before this Court has filed this present petition being aggrieved by the order dated 18.04.2017 passed by the trial Court on an application
preferred by the respondents/defendants under Order 7 Rule 11 r/w section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An objection was raised in respect of
misjoinder of the party and in respect of court fee and the trial Court has arrived at a conclusion that the suit property is valued at Rs.2,60,000/- as per
the sale deed of the year 1997, and therefore, court fee has to be paid keeping in view Section 7 IV (c)(d) of the Court Fee Act, 1870.
In the considered opinion of this Court, the trial Court was justified in rejecting the application preferred under Order 7 Rule 11 of the C.P.C.
The Apex Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in 2010 (8) SCC 329 in paragraph 49 held as under:-
49.  On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227
of the Constitution may be formulated:
(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under
these two Articles is also different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is
substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed
above.
(c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the
orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal
subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of
this power by the High Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High Courtsin exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this
regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles
in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court.
(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh(supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can
interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'.
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to
exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent
perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles
of natural justice have been flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than
the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised.
(i) High Court's power of superintendence underArticle 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of
the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261
and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.
(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code
(Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered
that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227.
(k) The power is discretionary and has to beexercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu.
(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide andunfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to
keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory.
(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of
justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that
the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the
functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court.
(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed
for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual
grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.
In light of the aforesaid judgment, as no patent illegality has been committed by the trial Court and the order passed by the trial Court neither suffers
from any jurisdictional error nor from any perversity, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the orderpassed by the trial Court dated
18.04.2017.
Accordingly, the present writ petition stands dismissed.
Certified copy as per rules.
