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Judgment
Heard Mr. GP Bhowmik, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. P Chetia, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. B Banerjee,
learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. C Mozumdar, Ms. R Choudhury and Mr. S Nath, learned counsel for the respondents.
The original appellant Brahmadev Prasad Bin was the plaintiff in Title Suit No. 214/1991 in the Court of learned Munsiff No. 1, Dhubri who
filed the suit against the main respondents No. 1 to 6 along with the proforma respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 as the defendants for declaration of his
right, title and interest as purchaser for valuable consideration without notice and possession over the schedule suit land, declaration to the effect
that the compromise decree of Title Suit No. 417/1966 obtained on 12.06.1969 is not binding and enforceable against the plaintiff being the bona
fide purchaser of the suit land, for permanent injunction and for correction of records of rights after cancelling the names of defendants/
respondents No. 1 to 4 etc. It is pertinent to mention here that the said sole plaintiff/ appellant died during the pendency of the present appeal and
was substituted by his legal heirs. Similarly, the defendant/ respondent No. 4 also died and was substituted by his legal heirs during the pendency of
this appeal and the name of the proforma respondent No. 3 was struck off during the pendency of this appeal. The plaintiff/ appellant pleaded that
he purchased the suit land from proforma defendants/ respondents No. 1 and 2 and one Raj Kanta Roy, the father of the proforma defendant/
respondent No. 3. Rajkanta Roy was the recorded tenant of the suit land under the main defendants/ respondents No. 1 to 4 and he transferred
his right, title and interest in part to the proforma defendant/ respondent No. 1 of the land measuring 2B 2K 10L by registered sale deed No.
4167/82 and land measuring 2B 2K 61/2 L by registered sale deed No. 10225/82 and delivered possession thereof to the purchaser. Proforma
defendant/ respondent No. 1 transferred out of her purchased land, 2K 10L to the plaintiff/ appellant by registered sale deed No. 692/89. The
proforma defendant/ respondent No. 1 also transferred her remaining part measuring 2B to the proforma defendant/ respondent No. 2 which later
on was sold to the plaintiff/ appellant in the year 1984 by the said proforma defendant/ respondent No. 2. Thus, the entire suit land remained under
possession of the plaintiff/ appellant on the strength of his bona-fide purchase from the original pattadar and subsequent vendors. The suit land has
all along been used for pisci- culture by digging model fishery and by paying revenue thereof. In March, 1991, the defendants/ respondents No. 1
to 4 tried to disturb and dispossess the plaintiff/ appellant from the suit land and in the first week of April, 1991 a proceeding under Section
107/144 of the Cr.P.C was initiated by the defendant/ respondent No. 1. From the said proceeding the plaintiff/ appellant came to know that the
suit land was the subject matter of a compromise decree dated 12.06.1969 between the defendants/ respondents No. 1 to 4 and Rajkanta Roy,
the father of the proforma defendant/ respondent No. 3 in Title Suit No. 417/1966. The defendants/ respondents No. 1 to 4 also obtained an ex
parte order from the defendant/ respondent No. 6 (Settlement Officer, Dhubri) for correction of records in respect of the suit land on the strength
of the said compromise decree. It is further alleged in the plaint that the compromise decree in Title Suit No. 417/1966 is collusive, fraudulent and
illegal and not enforceable and legally binding the plaintiff/ appellant. As such, the plaintiff/ appellant instituted the suit for declaration of his right,
title and confirmation of possession over the suit land as well as for the declaration against the compromise decree as stated hereinabove.
The defendants/ respondents No. 1 and 3 filed their written statement and the defendants/ respondents No. 6 filed a separate written statement.
In the written statement, leaving aside the routine pleas like non-maintainability of the suit, non-joinder of necessary parties, it was pleaded that
Rajkanta Roy had no right, title and interest and he was never a tenant under the defendants/ respondents in respect of the suit property and as
such he had no right to sell the suit land. The name of Rajkanta Roy was wrongly recorded in the settlement operation in 1961-62 and knowing the
fact of the said wrong entry, the defendants/ respondents No. 1 to 4 had instituted Title Suit No. 417/1966 against Rajkanta Roy for correction of
records which was decreed on compromise in the year 1969. Thus, the sale deeds executed by Rajkanta Roy are illegal and not binding upon the
defendants/ respondents No. 1 to 4. The plaintiff/ appellant got his name mutated by practising fraud which was later on rectified on the strength of
the compromise decree. Accordingly, they prayed for dismissal of the suit.
The defendant/ respondent No. 6 in his written statement took the plea that the suit is time barred and pleaded that they acted as per the
compromise decree passed by a competent court and prayed for dismissal of the suit.
On the basis of the pleadings, the learned trial court framed the following issues:-
Is there any cause of action for the suit?
Is the suit bad for non joinder of necessary parties?
Is the suit time barred?
Whether the plaintiffs have right, title and interest over the suit land?
Whether the compromise decree obtained in T.S. No. 417/66 is not enforceable and legally binding against the plaintiff?
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get decree as prayed for?
What relief, if any, the parties are entitled to?
Thereafter, the issue No. 5 is recasted as under:-
Whether the compromise decree obtained in T.S. No. 417/66 is collusive, fraudulent, illegal and not binding on the plaintiff?
The learned trial court held that the compromise decree dated 12.06.1969 obtained in Title Suit No. 417/1966 is illegal and fraudulent and
consequently decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff/ appellant. The defendants/ respondents No. 1 to 4 preferred Title Appeal No. 32/2006 in
the court of learned Civil Judge, Dhubri against the judgment and decree dated 08.05.2006 passed in Title Suit No. 214/1991 by the learned Civil
Judge (Jr. Div.) No. 1 at Dhubri. The learned first appellate court vide judgment and decree dated 18.08.2008 allowed the appeal by setting aside
the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff/ appellant preferred the present second appeal which was
admitted on 05.08.2009 on the following substantial questions of law:-
Whether the compromise decree obtained in Title Suit No. 417/66 is not enforceable against the plaintiff/ appellant as same being barred by
limitation as well as collusive, fraudulent and illegal?
Whether the impugned judgment and decree is bad for perversity in findings of fact?
Mr. Bhowmik, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, submits that the claim of the plaintiff/ appellant is based on the jotdary
Khatian No. 48, Exhibit-4 on the strength of which Khatian No. 49 was issued. On the strength of the said right, Rajkanta Roy sold the land to the
vendors whereafter the plaintiff/ appellant purchased the same. The said registered sale deeds are not challenged by the defendants/ respondents
and considering the same, the sale deeds are still in force. The learned first appellate court while deciding Issue No. 5 recasted the same but did
not examine the contents of the compromise decree as to whether the same was in conformity with the reliefs sought in Title Suit No. 417/1966.
Further pointing out the gross irregularity that the original Advocate engaged by the defendants/ respondents in Title Suit No. 417/1966 did not file
the compromise petition, rather the same was filed by another Advocate and that too, on an off date and that itself amounts perversity by not
holding such acts fraudulent. The learned trial court was wrong for not accepting the public documents filed by the plaintiff/ appellant under Section
74 of the Indian Evidence Act on the ground that acceptance of the said document at the belated stage would amount to introduction of fresh
evidence. Further, it was pleaded that the question of law and facts which go to the root of the case can be raised even for the first time in the court
of last resort and the same is to be entertained for the interest of justice. Finally urging that the learned first appellate court failed to exercise its
power under Order XLI Rules 31 & 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Mr. Bhowmik submits that the substantial questions of law are to be
decided in favour of the plaintiff/ appellant. In order to buttress his argument, Mr. Bhowmik relies on the following case laws :-
Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. v. Kavanagh, Privy Council, reported in J.C. 1892 para at page 480;
Ariane Orgachem Pvt. Ltd. v. Wyeth Employees Union & others reported in (2015) 7 SCC 561, para 36, 36.1 - 36.4;
Gurucharan Singh v. Kamla Singh & others reported in (1976) 2 SCC 152 para 11;
Giani Ram & others v. Ramji Lal & others reported in AIR 1969 SC 1144 para 11.
Countering the submission of Mr. Bhowmik, Mr. Banerjee, learned Senior Cousel, submits that the main relief sought for by the plaintiff/
appellant is the declaration that the compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 417/1966 is fraud and collusive. Surprisingly, the pleading is totally
silent so far the particulars of the fraudulent acts attributed to the defendants/ respondents are concerned. In addition to that, he further submits that
the appellate court can exercise its power under Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC only when there is an issue during the trial. But in the present case
there was no issue to the effect that whether filing of a compromise petition by an Advocate other than the one engaged by a party to a suit
amounts fraud as there is no pleading to that effect in the plaint at all. Under such circumstances, the learned first appellate court had rightly gave its
finding by reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court. The learned trial court passed the judgment by taking into
consideration the materials which were not pleaded at all by the plaintiff/ appellant. Under such circumstances, the submission of Mr. Bhowmik
cannot be taken into consideration that the learned first appellate court failed to exercise its jurisdiction under Order XLI Rule 31 and 33 of the
CPC. In support of his submission, Mr. Banerjee relies on the case law of Rameshwar Prasad & others v. Shyam Beharilal Jagannath & others
reported in AIR 1963 SC 1901. As such, Mr. Banerjee sought for dismissal of the second appeal.
Considered the submissions of the learned counsels for the parties to this appeal. It would be proper and relevant to look into the pleadings in
the plaint of the plaintiff/ appellant so far the compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 417/1966 and its enforceability are concerned. The
relevant portion is reproduced herein below:-
That the defendants who never possessed the suit land nor ever seen to possess the suit land before but on and from the month of March, 91
last illegally tried to disturb and dispossess the plaintiff. They even stolen fishes and caused theft of fishing apparatus and threatened plaintiff''s
workers and employees engaged in the suit land fishery for which Criminal case and proceedings have been filed against them. The plaintiff came to
know in the 1st week of April/91 from a proceeding U/S. 107/144 filed by the defendant No. 1 against this plaintiff and others where they
disclosed that the suit land have been decreed in their favour by a Compromise decree alleged to have been obtained in T.S. No. 417/1966 on
12-6-1969 with the father of proforma-defendant No. 3 and thereby obtained an ex parte attachment order of the suit land which was stayed by
the order of Session Judge, Dhubri on 4-5-1991 in C.M. Case No. 10(2) of 1991. The defendant went further to the extent of obtaining an ex
parte illegal order from the defendant No. 6 for correction of records in respect of the suit land without notice and hearing by virtue of the alleged
so called compromise decree and communicated his order to the defendant No. 7 under Memo No. GSR 14/87/160 dt. 18-7-91 with the
direction to correct the records in the names of defendants by cancellation of the name of plaintiff from the records of right in respect of the suit
land.
That, the plaintiff submits that, the alleged compromise decree in T.S. No. 417/66 is collusive, fraudulent and illegal and not enforcible and
legally binding to this defendant who is a bona-fide purchaser without notice in respect of the suit land. It is further submitted that the order of
defendant No. 6 to defendant No. 7 without hearing the plaintiff on notice, is not only illegal but it is against all norms of natural justice and hence
the said order of defendant No. 6 is liable to be declared as illegal and invalid. The defendants have no right to disturb/dispossession and interfere
in any way in the peaceful use and possession of the ''A'' Schedule land by the plaintiff which this plaintiff and its Vendors have been in use and
possession adversely with knowledge of defendant and all for more than 12 years and acquired valid and good title as a bonafide purchaser
without notice of the defendants alleged so called compromise decree. The illegal threat of dispossession and interference posed by the defendants
on and from the last part of March/91 and illegal order of defendant No. 6 to defendant No. 7 directing to correct the records in the names of
defendants by cancellation of the names of this plaintiff issued on 18-7-91 have caused a real threat and clouds in the right title, interest and
possession of the suit land of the plaintiff and hence this suit for declaration, confirmation of possession and permanent injunction against the
defendants.
The main defendants/ respondents in their joint written statement against the aforesaid pleadings of plaintiff/ appellant pleaded as follows:-
That contents of para-5 of the plaint is denied. The compromise decree in T.S. 417/66 is not collusive, fraudulent, illegal as alleged and it is
binding on Rajkanta Roy and his alleged purchasers.
On the basis of the said pleading amongst other issues, as referred hereinabove, issue No. 5 was framed as to whether the compromise decree
obtained in T.S. No. 417/66 is collusive, fraudulent, illegal and not binding on the plaintiff.
Let me examine to what extent the plaintiff/ appellant and the defendant/ respondents had discharged their respective burden/ onus in order to
prove the pleadings on the basis of which the plaintiff/ appellant claimed his relief and defendants/ respondents denied such relief and its entitlement
by the plaintiff/ appellant.
The plaintiff/ appellant exhibited 11 documents in all. Surprisingly, no case record of Title Suit No. 417/1966 nor the compromise decree is
exhibited. In the evidence in cross examination, the PW 1, Brahmadev Prasad Bin (plaintiff/ appellant) deposed that in 1966 Rajkanta Roy and
Naren Nath Roy had cases between them, which was compromised but in his opinion the said compromise was not valid. Except this piece of oral
evidence there is nothing on record so far evidence of plaintiff/ appellant is concerned.
The DW 1, Narendra Nath Roy (defendant/ respondent No. 1) exhibited the certified copy of compromise decree in Title Suit No. 417/1966
(Ext. A) entered into by him and the said Rajkanta Roy, the vendor of plaintiff/ appellant. In his cross examination, he deposed that his father died
in the year 1960 and his mother brought him up. Title Suit No. 126/1965 was filed prior to filing of Title Suit NO. 417/1966. Both the suits were
filed by his mother. He had no knowledge about the result of Title Suit No. 126/1965 nor he could say if the fact of dismissal of said suit was
averred in the plaint of Title Suit No. 417/1966. The suit was filed by his mother on his behalf and his brothers. The name of the Advocate of the
plaintiff is shown as R.K. Ghosh in the compromise petition but name of the advocate for defendant was not mentioned. One Rabindra Choudhury
was their advocate and R.K. Ghosh was not the advocate. So it was suggested that the compromise decree was obtained fraudulently in absence
of the advocate misleading the court. This cross examination of DW 1 was done by the plaintiff/ appellant side but without there being any pleading
to that effect and how the same amounted to a fraudulent practice.
The plaintiff/ appellant through his advocate filed petition No. 3583 dated 02.06.2005 along with certified copies of decree passed in Title Suit
No. 126/1965 filed by Narendra Roy against RajKanta Roy, order of dismissal of Title Suit No. 126/1965 dated 16.02.1966, plaint in Title Suit
No. 417/1966, compromise decree in Title Suit No. 417/1966 and compromise petition No. 2776 dated 07.06.1969. By the said petition it was
prayed before the trial court to accept the same as evidence under Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act at the time of delivering the judgment.
The prayer in the said petition was rejected as evidence of both sides were closed and argument was partly heard. The said order remained on
record as the same was not challenged in the higher court.
The learned trial court on the materials available on record scrutinised Ext. A which consists the order dated 07.06.1969, the compromise
decree drawn under Order XX Rules 6 and 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ''CPC'') along with the joint compromise petition
No. 2776 dated 07.06.1969. It came to the finding that the present defendants/ respondents No. 1 to 4 and their mother filed the Title Suit No.
417/1966 (purportedly) against Rajkanta Roy for correction of records of right cancelling the name of Rajkanta Roy from khatian. Same was
compromised on 07.06.1969 on the basis of petition No. 2776. Accepting the deposition of DW 1 regarding admission of the petition No. 2776
being filed by an advocate other than the one authorised by the mother of DW 1 and also taking into consideration absence of any advocate from
the side of Rajkanta Roy, the defendant in Title Suit No. 417/1966 and further the said suit being fixed for summons on witnesses on 23.09.1969
as there was no compromise between the parties, the learned trial court held that there was ""foul practice"" by the defendants/ respondents in
obtaining the compromise decree. The defendants/ respondents pleaded that on the strength of the said compromise decree Rajkanta Roy had no
right, title and interest on the land so sold by him to the purchasers pleaded by the plaintiff/ appellant. The learned trial court having held that the
said compromise decree was obtained by ""foul practice"" and upon consideration of the plaint in Title Suit No. 126/1965 and order of dismissal
dated 16.12.1966 of the said suit, the relief sought therein being barred by law of limitation which was for correction of records of right by striking
out the name of Rajkanta Roy, similar to the one in Title Suit No. 417/1966 that too, between the same parties and same subject matter, held the
said decree of compromise in Title Suit No. 417/1966 as illegal and fraudulent. Consequently the source of claim of defendants/ respondents i.e.
the compromise decree being bad under the law and by holding that Rajkanta Roy was a tenant who rightly transferred his right, title and interest,
the learned trial court also took into consideration Ext. 6, the final khatian showing the name of Rajkanta Roy under the Goalpara Tenancy Act,
1929 and the defendants/ respondents having failed to dislodge the presumption prescribed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation so far
Ext. 6 is concerned, adjudicated and granted the reliefs prayed for in favour of plaintiff/ appellant.
The learned first appellate court while reversing the findings of the trial court held that plaintiff/ appellant though pleaded that the compromise
decree was collusive and fraudulent but no evidence was adduced to that effect. It also held that the trial court discussed about the suit bearing
Title Suit No. 126/1965 but the existence of the same was never pleaded by either of the parties to the suit. The same being beyond the pleadings,
the findings of the learned trial court was held to be perverse. The learned first appellate court considered the compromise decree and came to the
finding that the act of transfer of the suit land to various purchasers by Rajkanta Roy is itself an act of fraud inasmuch as said Rajkanta was a
signatory to the compromise decree by way of which his right, title and interest on the suit land was lost in the year 1969. Holding further that there
was no plea of adverse possession by the plaintiff/ appellant, as such the possession of plaintiff appellant, howsoever long, could not be taken into
consideration. The first appeal was allowed thereby dismissing the suit of the plaintiff/ appellant.
On comparison of the findings of the learned courts below it is seen that the learned trial court held that ''foul practice'' was played on the court
while passing the compromise decree as the authorised counsel did not file the petition representing the present defendants appellants in Title Suit
No. 417/1966. The first appellate court reversed the findings holding that there was no pleading in the plaint to that effect in order to show such
allegation of ''foul practice'' nor there was anything to show that prior to filing Title Suit No. 417/1966, another Title Suit No. 126/1965 was filed
by the defendants/ appellants. Further, there is no pleading to the effect that Title Suit No. 126/1965 was dismissed on the ground of relief sought
therein was barred by law of limitation.
In Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal reported in (2008) 17 SCC 491, the Hon''ble Apex Court in a Civil Appeal was faced with a situation
wherein respondents as plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration of ownership and possession and recovery of possession from the appellant/ defendant.
The trial court decreed the suit in part holding the suit property to be part of plaintiffs'' property and as the defendant had constructed over the suit
land, instead of recovery of possession, the trial court directed to compensate the plaintiffs against the encroached portion in terms of money.
Being aggrieved the defendant preferred appeal and plaintiff filed cross objection. The first appellate court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove title
over the suit land and allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross objection. Plaintiffs preferred second appeal before the High Court which was
allowed. The High Court held that plaintiffs failed to prove title over the suit land but made out a case for grant of relief based on easementary right.
The High Court held that the case based on easementary right could be considered even in absence of any pleading or issue as the evidence
available was sufficient to make out easementary right. The Hon''ble Apex Court held that the High Court while rendering the judgment violated
several fundamental rules of civil procedure. In that context held the object and purpose of pleadings and issues as follows:-
The object and purpose of pleadings and issues is to ensure that the litigants come to trial with all issues clearly defined and to prevent cases
being expanded or grounds being shifted during trial. Its object is also to ensure that each side is fully alive to the questions that are likely to be
raised or considered so that they may have an opportunity of placing the relevant evidence appropriate to the issues before the court for its
consideration. This Court has repeatedly held that the pleadings are meant to give to each side intimation of the case of the other so that it may be
met, to enable courts to determine what is really at issue between the parties, and to prevent any deviation from the course which litigation on
particular causes must take.
Further, the Hon''ble Apex Court also held that no amount of evidence, on a plea that is not put forward in the pleadings can be looked into to
grant any relief.
The claim of plaintiff/ appellant for the relief is mainly on the basis of the title of Rajkanta Roy which he claimed to remain unaffected even if
there is a compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 417/1966 which was fraudulent and collusive in nature. Order VI Rule 4 of the CPC is
specific that in all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud etc. particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall
be stated in the pleading. In Bishnudeo Narain v. Seogani Rai reported in AIR 1951 SC 280, the Constitutional Bench of the Hon''ble Apex Court
held that an allegation of fraud must be proved substantially as pleaded and further held that when one kind of fraud is pleaded, another kind of
fraud, upon failure of proof cannot be substituted for it. The relevant ratio is reproduced hereinbelow:-
It is also to be observed that no proper particulars have been furnished. Now if there is one rule which is better established than any other, it is
that in cases of fraud, undue influence & coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars & the case can only be decided on the
particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of
which any Ct. ought to take notice, however strong the language in which they are couched may be, & the same applies to undue influence &
coercion.
As referred hereinabove the pleadings of plaintiff/ appellant lacks pleadings, sufficient enough to know by the defendants/ respondents to meet the
challenge to enable courts to determine what is really at issue between the parties to prevent any deviation from the course of the litigation and the
dispute therein so far the allegation of fraud is concerned.
Further, the learned counsel for the plaintiff/ appellant submits that law and facts which goes to the root of case can be raised even for the first
time in the court of last resort for interest of justice. In support of the said submission, he relied (2015) 7 SCC 561 (supra) wherein the principles
laid down by Privy Council and the Hon''ble Apex Court in Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. v. Kavanagh reported in 1892 AC 473 (PC) and
Gurucharan Singh v. Kamal Singh, reported in (1976) 8 SCC 152 respectively were discussed. It was held that when a question of law is raised
for the first time in a court of last resort, upon the construction of a document, or upon facts either admitted or proved beyond controversy it was
not only competent, but expedient in the interest of justice, to entertain the plea. Mr. Bhowmik, submits that the Title Suit No. 125/1965 was
dismissed as the relief was barred by law of limitation and the reliefs were similar to those in Title Suit NO. 417/1966. Subsequent thereto, the
defendants/ respondents cannot take the plea of the compromise decree drawn in Title Suit No. 417/1966 and as such the learned first appellate
court went wrong. However, such submission were never pleaded by the plaintiff/ appellant in the plaint.
The said submission of Mr. Bhowmik cannot be accepted. The Hon''ble Apex Court in Shrimati Shamrao Suryavanshi & another v. Prahlad
Bhairoba Suryavanshi (dead) by LRs. and others reported in AIR 2002 SC 960 while considering whether in a suit brought by a transferor for
recovery of possession of the suit property, a defendanttransferee could defend his possession over the suit property obtained in pursuance of a
part performance on an agreement to sell under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, even if a suit for specific performance of an
agreement to sell had been barred by limitation held as follows:-
The matter may be examined from another angle. The established rule of limitation is that law of limitation is not applicable to a plea taken in
defence unless expressly a provision is made in the statute. The law of limitation applies to the suits and applications. The various articles of the
Limitation Act show that they do not apply to a defence taken by a defendant in suit. Thus, the law of limitation bars only an action in a Court of
law. In fact, what the Limitation Act does is, to take away the remedy of a plaintiff to enforce his rights by bringing an action in a Court of law, but
it does not place any restriction to a defendant to put forward any defence though such defence as a claim made by him may be barred by
limitation and cannot be enforced in a Court of law. On the said principle, a defendant in a suit can put forward any defence though such defence
may not be enforceable in a Court of law, being barred by limitation.
If we refer to the decision reported in (2015) 7 SCC 561 (supra), the question of law so mentioned must flow from the construction of a
document, or facts either admitted or proved beyond controversy which is not the case in hand. Mere filing of few documents without having its
basis on the pleadings cannot be treated to be proved documents until the relevant facts are proved by the plaintiff/ appellant and the same are
admitted by the defendants/ respondents and such admitted facts culminates as recordings of contents of such documents. Rajkanta Roy nor his
legal heirs had never challenged the said compromise decree which goes to show that protection as sought for by the plaintiff/ appellant as bona-
fide purchaser of the suit land against the obligation annexed to the ownership of the suit property by Rajkanta Roy by way of sale cannot be
accepted inasmuch as on the date of obligation so annexed to the suit property by Rajkanta Roy, he had no right to annex the obligation to the
ownership of the suit property in favour of plaintiff/ appellant for the compromise decree in which Rajkanta Roy was a party. So benefit under
Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be urged by the plaintiff/ appellant.
From the discussions, I do not find any merit in this second appeal and answer both the substantial questions of law against the plaintiff/
appellant. This second appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
Send back the LCRs.