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Judgment
7 paragraphs · 730 wordsDixit, J.—This is an appeal from a decision of the Additional District Judge of Ujjain dismissing the plaintiff appellant''s suit for a declaration of his title to and possession of certain properties.
The plaintiff''s case was that one Rao Pratapsingh was a Jagirdar of Mouza Updi in Indore State. He also held lands in Kasba Kayatha as Inam and was also a recipient of Daml from the Holkar State. Rao Pratapsingh died on 29th August, 1934, leaving his widow Mst. Inderkunwarbai and a miner son Bijaysingh who died on 5th May 1943. After the death of Bijaysingh, Inderkunwarbai adopted the appellant. On the basis of this alleged adoption, the plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to the possession of the Jagir property which was under the Superintendence of the Court of Wards. The defendant State contested the suit inter alia on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit relating to a title to Jagir property. The learned Additional District Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that a Civil Court was not competent to investigate a claim relating to title to Jagir property.
When this appeal came up for hearing before us, Mr. Rege, learned counsel for the appellant, recognised that in view of the provisions of Ss. 17 and 34 of the Madhya Bharat Jagir Abolition Act, the decision of the learned Additional District Judge on the question of jurisdiction could not be assailed. The position before the Madhya Bharat Jagir Abolition Act was enacted was that in the former Indore State a suit in regard to a Jagir property could not be instituted in a Civil Court. This position was maintained by the Madhya Bharat Jagir Abolition Act which lays down that all questions in respect of title or right in Jagir lands resumed under S. 3 of the Act shall be determined by the Government, S. 34 provides that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle or decide any question which is by or under the Jagir Abolition Act required to be decided or dealt with by the Jagir Commissioner or the Board of Revenue or the Government. In regard to the Jagir lands, the appellant''s remedy Is, therefore, to make a claim before the Government that as an adopted son of the last Jagirdar he is entitled to receive the compensation payable in respect of the Jagir property.
Learned counsel for the appellant then made a prayer for the remand of the case to the lower Court for the investigation of the question whether the appellant is entitled to the possession of the non-Jagir property belonging to Rao Pratapsingh. This prayer must be rejected. The plaintiff''s suit was one essentially for a declaration of his title to and possession of the Jagir property. He referred to non-Jagir property only incidentally and In connection with the valuation of the suit. In the plaint there are no allegations to show as to how certain specific items of property which the State has taken into possession are not part of the Jagir property. It was then said that the plaintiff-appellant be granted leave to withdraw the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit. So far as the plaintiff''s claim relating to Jagir property is concerned, clearly, no leave can be granted when the suit has not failed by reason of any formal defect. In regard to the plaintiff''s claim for non-Jagir property, there is nothing to prevent the plaintiff from instituting a fresh suit in respect of his claim. Learned counsel for the appellant apprehended that a fresh suit In respect of non-Jagir property would not be maintainable as the decision in the present case would operate as res-Judicata. We have no such apprehension. In AIR 1940 222 (Privy Council) , it has been held that a Court which declines jurisdiction cannot bind the parties by its reasons for declining jurisdiction; such reasons are not decisions and are certainly not decisions by a Court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, the decision in the present case cannot operate as res-judicata on the question whether certain items of the property are or are not a part of the Jagir property, and whether the plaintiff-appellant is or is not the adopted son of the last Jagirdar.
For the above reasons, this appeal is dismissed with costs.
Samvatsar, J.
I agree.
