Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Nathu Ram and Others

D.C. Dalela, J.—The claimant-respondent Nos. 1 to 4 preferred a claim petition before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Alwar, u/s 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter called, ''the Act''), for the alleged loss suffered by them on account of death of Taradevi, who died in the accident that took place on 16.3.96. Along with the claim petition, the claimants also filed an application u/s 163A of the Act, for interim compensation. In the claim petition, the claimants alleged that the accident took place due to negligence of the driver and owner of the motor cycle in question, which was insured with the petitioner insurance company. The learned Tribunal, vide its order dated 18.11.1996, awarded a compensation of Rs. 99,300 in favour of the claimants, as interim compensation, u/s 163A of the Act. Feeling aggrieved thereby, this writ petition has been preferred.

I have heard the arguments of both the sides.

The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the learned Tribunal has no jurisdiction to award interim compensation u/s 163A of the Act.

Sections 165 to 168 of the Act provide that a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is required to adjudicate upon the claim for compensation, in respect of the accident, involving death or bodily injury arising out of the use of the motor vehicle and/or damage to any property of the third party, on the basis of fault, negligence or any wrongful act of the owner or/and driver of the vehicle. For the purposes of such adjudication, it is required to hold an inquiry into the claim and to make award, determining the amount of compensation, which appears to be just. The liability to pay compensation would be of the owner, driver and insurer of the vehicle, as may be directed by the Tribunal.

In addition to the claim of compensation as above, the claimant has a right to claim compensation in respect of death or permanent disablement, on the principle of ''no fault'' u/s 140 of the Act.

The claimant has also a right u/s 163A of the Act, to claim compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule of the Act, in the case of death or permanent disablement, without pleading or proving any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or the driver.

Section 163B of the Act provides that where a person is entitled to claim compensation under Sections 140 and 163A of the Act, he would file a claim under either of the sections and not under both.

Section 141 of the Act provides that the right to claim compensation u/s 140, would be in addition to any other right (based on principle of fault), except the right u/s 163A of the Act. From Sections 163A and 141 of the Act, it is amply clear that compensations, awardable under Sections 140 and 163A are alternative to each other. One may claim compensation either u/s 140 or u/s 163A. One cannot claim under both the sections, namely, Section 140 as well as Section 163A. Therefore, the right to claim compensation u/s 163A is an alternative to one provided u/s 140. Like the claim u/s 140, the claim u/s 163A, is in addition to the right to claim compensation under Sections 165 to 168 of the Act.

u/s 140 as well as u/s 163A, compensation is awardable on the principle of ''no fault'', because, u/s 163A also the claimant is not required to plead and prove the fault, neglect or wrongful act of the owner/ driver.

The compensation awardable u/s 140 is certainly an interim compensation. Therefore, the compensation awardable u/s 163A is in the nature of interim compensation. The amount may be adjusted against the total amount of compensation awarded under Sections 165 to 168 of the Act.

The Explanation to Section 165 clearly declares that the claim of compensation required to be adjudicated upon by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, includes the claim for compensation under Sections 140 and 163A of the Act. Thus, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate and award interim compensation u/s 163A of the Act.

In the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Others Vs. Trilok Chandra and Others, Hon''ble Supreme Court has pointed out certain defects and deficiencies into the Second Schedule of the Act. Yet, it has held that the Schedule can be used as guidelines. The learned Tribunal, in the instant case in hand, has assessed and calculated the compensation on the basis of the guidelines provided in the Second Schedule. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any defect in the assessment and calculation done by the learned Tribunal.

The petition does not seem to have any force. Hence, it is dismissed.