Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs Manphool Nath And Anr

The appellant insurance company has preferred this appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (for short 'WC Act') challenging the judgment dated 31.10.2000 passed by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, Bikaner.

The unfortunate accident happened on 16.1.1997 wherein while driving the truck no.RNS-72, the claimant Manphool Nath met with an accident and sustained injuries.

The substantial question of law raised by learned counsel for the appellant insurance company in the matter is only to the extent that the medical certificate issued by medical board/doctor shows 63% disability whereas the learned authority below has taken it to be 80% on account of shortening of leg.

Learned counsel for the appellant insurance company submits that two modes available under Section 4 in the present facts and circumstances would be either the disability and future loss indicated by qualified medical practitioner or as indicated in the Schedule-I appended to the Act. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that apparently in the present case, the medical certificate issued by the medical board indicates 63% permanent disability and thus, the learned authority below has wrongly taken it as 80%.

5 Learned counsel for the respondent/claimant submits that in normal course, mechanism of determination of compensation is laid down in Section 4 of WC Act but whenever there is a loss of earning which correlates with the nature of employment and directly indicates as loss of employment, then it has to be separately considered by the Court. Learned counsel for the respondent/claimant submits that the assessment made by the learned authority below to treat the disability as 80% was based upon the fact that the leg of the claimant was shortened and he would no more be able to drive the vehicle and thus, there would be future loss of livelihood. Learned counsel for the respondent/claimant has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Iffco Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Iqbal Aziz & Anr. reported in 2018(1) ACTC (Raj.) 279, relevant paras no.7 and 8 whereof reads as follows :-

"7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court recently in the case of Golla Rajanna etc. Vs. The Divisional Manager & Another, reported in 2017 (1) RAR 35 (SC) has held as under:-

"9. Section 30 of the Act provides for appeals to the High Court. To the extent, the provision reads as follows:

Appeals.-(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely:

(a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum;

[(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty Under Section 4A;]

(b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a halfmonthly payment;

(c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased workman, or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant;

(d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of Subsection (2) of Section 12; or

(e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions:

Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and, in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in Clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees: (Emphasis supplied)

The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, having regard to the evidence, had returned a finding on the nature of injury and the percentage of disability. It is purely a question of fact. There is no case for the insurance company that the finding is based on no evidence at all or that it is perverse.

Under Section 4(1)(c)(ii) of the Act, the percentage of permanent disability needs to be assessed only by a qualified medical practitioner. There is no case for the Respondents that the doctor who issued the disability certificate is not a qualified medical practitioner, as defined under the Act. Thus, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner has passed the order based on the certificate of disability issued by the doctor and which has been duly proved before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner.

Under the scheme of the Act, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner is the last authority on facts. The Parliament has thought it fit to restrict the scope of the appeal only to substantial questions of law, being a welfare legislation. Unfortunately, the High Court has missed this crucial question of limited jurisdiction and has ventured to re-appreciate the evidence and recorded its own findings on percentage of disability for which also there is no basis. The whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the competence of the High Court Under Section 30 of the Act.

(Emphasis Supplied)

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Saberabibi Yakubbhai Shaikh and Ors. vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., reported in 2014 (2) SCC 298 has held as under:-

"10. In view of the aforesaid settled proposition of law, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. The Appellants shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 12% from the date of the accident. No cost."

After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the record as well as the precedent law, this Court finds that the learned authority after considering all evidence from both the sides has arrived at the factual matrix which clearly indicates that the injury in question is causing 80% disability. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Golla Rajanna (supra) has held that once the view has been taken by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner which is based on factual matrix, then it was Parliamentary Legislative mechanism that thought it fit to restrict the scope of the appeal only to substantial questions of law rather to re-appreciate the evidence and record its own findings on percentage of disability. Thus, no interference is called for in the impugned judgment.

Resultantly, the present appeal is hereby dismissed.

All pending applications also stand disposed of.