Osmansaheb vs Venkatesh Industries

A certain block of building consisting of eight separate tenements were in the occupation of eight separate tenants. The landlord-respondent in this Court needed the area occupied by the said tenants for the purpose of erection of a new building after demolishing the existing structure for running a sales depot himself. Since five of such tenants did not accede to the desire of the landlord, it led him to seek their eviction from the Court on the aforesaid ground of his personal requirement. The Trial Court allowed the application and ordered the eviction of the aforesaid five tenants. The appeal against the said order at the instance of the tenants, was dismissed. Out of the said five tenants three feeling aggrieved against the decision of the Dist Judge (Appellate Court), have come up to this Court and have filed three separate revision petitions. In all of them common questions of law and facts arise. So, they admit of decision by a common judgment and, accordingly, a common judgment is proposed.

Mr. U.L. Narayana Rao appearing in all the three petitions on behalf of the petitioners, has canvassed the proposition that since the landlord, in his petition, asserted that the premises in question are to be demo-lished and are to be replecad by a new structure, the case falls under the provisions of Cl. (j) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act''), which attracts the provisions of Secs. 26 to 28 of the Act envisaging various safeguards for the evicted tenants and that if it is held that the said safeguards would be available to the tenant, then the matter shall have to be remanded back for reconsideration to the trial Court as both the Courts had proceeded on the assumption that the case fell under Cl. (h) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 21 of the Act.

I find no merit in the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners. The respondent-landlord has clearly assarted in the petition that he wanted the premises for his own purpose and, since the present structure would not serve the said requirement, the same had to be replaced by a structure suitable for the purpose specified in the petition. The provisions of Clause (j) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 21 of the Act would be applicable only in the eventuality where the landlord does not require the newly erected premises for his own purpose. In that event, the rights of the evicted tenants are required to be safe-guarded as had been taken care of by the provisions of Secs. 26 to 28 of the Act. As already observed, such is not the case here; for, the landlord in the present case has taken the stand in the petition that the premises that would be constructed on the space occupied by the present structure would be needed by him for the purpose of running the sale depot.

Venkataswami, J., in Venkappiah v. M.S. Papanna, (1968) 1 Mys. L.J. 435, takes almost the same view when he observes at page 440 as follows:

"It is to be observed that Sri Shetty also made an endeavour to dislodge the case of the petitioner in regard to his claim under Clause (j) of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 21 of the ''Act''. There cannot be any doubt that when a landlord claims eviction in respect of a leased premises on the ground of personal use and occupation, and also pleads that he has to demolish and reconstruct the same to suit his convenience, both together constitute one and a single ground. It goes without saying that if a landlord were to claim eviction on the ground that the premises are required for his personal use and occupation, he need not further make a claim under Sec. 21(1)(j) of the ''Act''. The reason for this conclusion is that a landlord after securing the premises under Sec. 21(1)(h), he need not further ask for permission for demolishing and reconstructing the building which is not subject to any right of tenancy in favour of any other person. Stating this in another way, it means that a landlrod who secures possession of a leased premises on the strength of a decree for eviction has a natural and proprietary right to deal with the premises as he chooses in order to make it more convenient or suitable for his residence. In this view, it is unnecessary to deal further with the question arising under Sec. 21(1)(j), which relates to demolition and reconstruction of a premises when eviction is sought specifically for that purpose."

With respect, I concur in the said view.

The view that I have expressed above and that had been earlier taken by this Court in the decision afore mentioned, finds authoritative enunciation in Ramnilklal Pitambaradas Mehta v. Indradamon Amrotlal Seth, AIR. 1964 SC. 1676, Raghubar Dayal, J., speaking for the Court, while dealing with the provisions of Sec. 13(1)(g) and Sec. 13(1)(hh) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, (57 of 1947), which are identical with Sec. 21(1)(h) and Sec. 21(1)(j), respectively, of the Act, observed as follows:

".....The provisions of Sec. 13 are for the advantage of the landlord and the various grounds for ejectment mentioned in that section are such which reasonably justify the ejectment of the tenant in the exercise of the landlord''s general right to eject his tenant. There is therefore no reason why restrictions not mentioned in the grounds be read into them. We do not therefore agree with the contention that Clause (g) will apply only when the landlord bona fide needs to occupy the premises without making any alteration in them i.e., to occupy the identical building which the tenant occupies. There is no justification to give such a narrow construction either to the word ''premises'' or to the word ''occupies'' which have been construed by this Court in Krishanal Ishwwarlal Desai v. Bat Vijkor, Civil Appeal No. 804 of 1962 dated 18-1-1963.

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We are therefore of opinion that once the landlord establishes that he bona fide requires the premises for his occupation, he is entitled to recover possession of it from the tenant in view of the provisions of sub-clause (g) of Sec. 13(1) irrespective of the fact whether he would occupy the premises without making any alteration to them or after making the necessary alterations.

(16). The provisions of Clause (hh) cannot possibly apply to the case where a landlord reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation even if he had to demolish the premises and to erect a new building on them. The provisions of Clause (hh) apply to cases where the landlord does not require the premises for has own occupation but requires them for erecting a new building which is to be let out to tenants......."

As for the question of balance of convenience and hardship as envisaged in sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 21 of the Act, it must be observed that the question involved is a question of fact. Both the Courts below have concurrently held in favour of the landlord. Their finding of fact cannot be unsettled by this Court on the revision side when no impropriety in the said finding has been established.

For the reasons stated, these revision petitions are dismissed and the parties are left to bear their own costs. The petitioners-tenants are ordered to vacate the premises on or before 31st of December 1977.