P. Anand Rao and Others vs State of A.P.

C. Praveen Kumar, J.—This Criminal Petition is filed by A-1 to A-5 u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "the Code") seeking quashing of investigation in Cr. No. 60/2013 of Begum Bazar Police Station, Hyderabad, which was registered for offences punishable under Sections 323, 506 IPC r/w 34 IPC and section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short "the Act"). The allegations in the report lodged by the second respondent are as under:

The second respondent who is a builder involved in several construction projects, came into contact with a local builder by name Pilli Ananda Rao (A-1) and his family at Visakhapatnam and did several construction works. A-1 was chit subscriber of Margadarshi Chit Fund, Visakhapatnam Branch, for a sum of Rs. 25 lakhs. The second respondent who was also a subscriber stood as guarantor No. 7 to A-1. When A-1 committed default in payment of money, the authorities at Margadarsi collected a sum of Rs. 4,25,000/- by adjusting the chit amount of the second respondent. After adjusting the said amount into the credit of A-1, the second respondent demanded A-1 for repayment of the said amount by contacting him personally and through SMS but A-1 was procrastinating the same on one pretext or the other. After much persuasions, A-1 asked the second respondent to come to his family house at Malakunta, Hyderabad. On 10-3-2013 at about 2 PM, the second respondent along with his two common friends, namely, Ram Bhoopal Reddy and L. Prabhakar visited the house of the first petitioner. He found A-1, his wife-A-2, his brothers A-3, A-4 and A-5 in the house. When asked about repayment of the money due to him, the accused first asked the informant to sit and thereafter, all of a sudden, A-1 started abusing the informant in most filthy language by saying "Ma Entiki Enduku Vastaura Madiga Lanja Kodaka". Later A-2 and A-3 tried to manhandle the second respondent by uttering as "Madiga Munda Kodaku Gudda Palakotuthe Dariki Usthadu" and pushed him on to the floor. When the second respondent questioned their behaviour, A-2 who is the wife of A-1 also abused the informant as "Madiga Munda Kodukulakulanu Namma Kodadu" and A-5 as "Mee Madiga Mundakodukula Peddalu Evvaru Vachina Mayee Peekaleru". Seeing the incident, the common friends who were present there took the second respondent outside the house but the accused warned the second respondent with dire consequences if any report is lodged. Basing on these allegations, the above crime came to be registered against the petitioners.

The learned counsel for the petitioners mainly submits that even accepting the allegations in the report to be true, no offence u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act is made out against the petitioners as the incident did not take place within public view. He further submits that the present report came to be lodged because of business disputes between the parties. He placed on record the copies of plaint filed in OS No. 77/2011 on the file of X Additional District Judge, Anakapalli, and also order of this court in AS MP No. 455/2008 in AS No. 146/2008 to substantiate his plea. He further contends that the second respondent is due huge amount to the petitioners and in discharge of the said debt, he issued a cheque which when presented got dishonoured and a notice came to be issued on 4-3-2013 which was served on the second respondent on 7-3-2013. Immediately after service of notice, the present report came to be lodged on 14-3-2013. In support of his case, he relied upon the following judgments:

V. Sudhakar Vs. R. Ram Mohan Rao and another,

Asmathunnisa Vs. State of A.P. represented by the Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Hyderabad and Another,

Gorige Pentaiah Vs. State of A.P. and Others,

Daya Bhatnagar and Others Vs. State,

Balu Baji Rao Galande v. State of Maharashtra ALLMR(CRI) 2006-0-3197

Swaran Singh and Others Vs. State through Standing Counsel and Another,

On the other hand, Sri A. Satya Prasad, the learned Senior Counsel, representing the learned counsel for the second respondent would contend that the issue as to whether the said incident took place within public view or not is a disputed question of fact and the same has to be investigated by the police. In support of his contention, he relied upon a judgment of this court in B. Sudhakar Reddy v. Sho Unreported judgment of this court dt. 26-4-2013 in WP No. 13577/2012. He also submits that it is impermissible for the High Court to look into the documents filed along with the petition, as the acceptability of which is essentially a matter of trial and places reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Awadh Kishore Gupta and Others, in support of his plea. In view of the above, he submits that this court cannot invoke its inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C., and stall the investigation at the threshold.

As seen above, the main ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that even accepting the allegations in the report to be true, the ingredients constituting an offence punishable u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act are not made out for the reason that the incident did not happen within public view. Relying upon certain documents, the counsel for the petitioners tried to contend that the petitioners are not living in the said house and that they were not present in the house on the date of incident and as such the entire incident is false and concocted. The second ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is with regard to falsity of complaint basing on voters card, marriage card, Xerox copies of flight tickets, Xerox copies of travelling invoices, telephone bills, sale deeds, and legal notices.

The Apex Court in Awadh Kishore Gupta (supra) held that at the stage of investigation, it is impermissible for the High Court to look into the materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial. While exercising jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C., it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it was a trial judge. In Smt. Chand Dhawan Vs. Jawahar Lal and others, , the Apex Court observed that when the materials relied upon by a party are required to be proved, no interference can be drawn on the basis of those materials to conclude that the report is unacceptable. The Court should not act on annexures to the petitions u/s 482 Cr.P.C., which cannot be termed as evidence without being tested and proved.

In view of the judgments of the Apex Court referred to above, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners were not present in the house on the date of incident cannot be accepted.

The only question which remains to be considered is whether the ingredients constituting an offence u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act are made out in the facts and circumstances of the case?

As stated above, the first accused fell due a sum of Rs. 4,25,000/- to the second respondent. Pursuant to his demand, A-1 is alleged to have asked the second respondent to come to his family house at Malakunta. When the second respondent along with his two common friends went there, he was asked to sit inside the house and thereafter, the accused are alleged to have abused him by touching his caste. At the intervention of the friends who were accompanying the second respondent, the second respondent was brought out of the house. While the second respondent was coming out of the house, the petitioners are alleged to have warned him with dire consequences if any report is lodged against them.

The undisputed facts, which emerge out from the above incident is that the incident took place within the four walls of the house. The said fact cannot be disputed as neither the second respondent can improve his case nor the prosecution can get any further material during the course of investigation in so far as place of incident. The question would be whether the abuses alleged to have been made by the petitioners in the house would fall within the meaning of "public view" as defined in section 3(1)(x) of the Act.

Before examining the submissions of the learned counsel, it is useful to refer to the scope of interference by this court u/s 482 Cr.P.C.,

The jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C., though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution. In exercise of the powers, the court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to an abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. Minu Kumari and Another Vs. The State of Bihar and Others,

The law laid down in State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, which has been followed in several other judgments by the Apex Court, is that interference is permissible in cases (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers u/s 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated u/s 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.'' The Apex Court further held that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection, and that too in the rarest of rare cases, the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint.

The Apex Court, in a number of cases, has laid down the scope and ambit of the High Court''s power u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute.

The law has been crystallized more than half a century ago in the case of R.P. Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab, wherein this Court has summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. This Court summarized the following three broad categories where the High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers u/s 482:

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings;

(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

In Smt. Nagawwa Vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others, , the Apex Court held that the process against the accused can be quashed or set aside:

(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused;

(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;

(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and

(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like.

The Apex Court in State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy and Others, observed that the wholesome power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice requires that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The court observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the Legislature.

Section 482 Cr.P.C., itself envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised by the High Court, namely,

(1) to give effect to an order under the Code of Criminal Procedure;

(2) to prevent an abuse of the process of court, and

(3) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.

These inherent powers of the High Court are meant to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. The exercise of inherent power would normally depend on facts and circumstances of each case, but as held in Sushil Suri Vs. C.B.I. and Another, the common thread which runs through all the decisions on the subject is that the Court would be justified in invoking its jurisdiction where the allegations made in the complaint or charge-sheet, as the case may be, taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged.

Bearing in mind the limited scope of interference by this court to quash an FIR, I shall now proceed to deal with rival submissions made by the counsel.

Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to refer to section 3(1)(x) of the Act, which are as under:

Section 3(1)(x) of the Act reads as under:

3(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,-

(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view.

The ingredients of section 3(1)(x) of the Act gets attracted where a person who does not belong to Scheduled Castes or Schedule Tribes, intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate, a member of Scheduled Castes or a Scheduled Tribes in any place within public view. The expression "within public view" came up for consideration before various courts and it may be necessary to refer to few judgments.

In Swaran Singh v. State (supra) the Apex Court dealt with a situation where the first informant, was insulted by appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a ''Chamar'') when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. Learned counsel then contended that the alleged act was not committed in a public place and hence does not come within the purview of section 3(1)(x) of the Act. After referring to the provisions of the Act, the Apex Court opined that this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and as the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. The Court held that one must not confuse the expression ''place within public view'' with the expression ''public place''. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies. The Apex Court categorically held that there is a clear distinction between the two expressions.

In Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P. (supra), the Apex Court was dealing with a case where a Head Mistress in a school was informed by a neighbour about sound pollution from the school. Representations were made to the DEO, Hyderabad complaining about the same. Since the authorities have not taken any action in this regard, the informant therein approached the High Court and obtained an interim order on 3-10-1995. While the DEO was trying to implement the interim orders, the Management of the School has created more sound pollution. Unable to bear the sound pollution, they invited the press people, expressed their grievance and the same came to be published in the Newspapers on 9-2-2006. After reading the news, the appellant therein, ie., Asmathunnissa and her husband Mohd. Samiuddin went to the house of the informant. In his absence, Md. Samiuddin is alleged to have abused the wife of the informant (R. Sridevi) by touching her caste and the appellant ie., Smt. Asamathunnissa was also alleged to have abused. One Smt. Anuradha who was staying opposite to the house was said to be an eye witness to the incident. The offending words were made by the husband of the appellant against the respondent. After referring to the judgment of the Kerala High Court in E. Krishnan Nayanar v. Dr. M.A. Kuttappan and Others 1997 Cri. L.J. 2036 : (1997 Cri. L.J. 2036) the Apex Court observed that the words "in any place but within public view" would mean that the public must view the person being insulted for which he must be present and no offence on the said allegations would get attracted if the person is not present at the scene as the words used in section 3(1)(x) of the Act are in a place within public view and not public place.

In V. Sudhakar v. R. Ram Mohan Rao (supra), this court was dealing with a situation where the wife of the revision petitioner by name Smt. T. Bazarmma who was working as Bill Collector in Gram Panahcyat, Uppal Kalan, was having some disputes with the then Municipal Commissioner and also with some municipal staff which led to departmental action against her by withholding increments, future promotion, recovery of some amounts and surrendering her services to the Controller of Commissioner and Director of Municipal Administration. The Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal considered her case and issued a direction to the Commissioner, Uppal Kalan Municipality, to continue her in the same office. When the said order was not implemented, she filed WP No. 28148/1998 before this court and thereafter contempt case against the municipal authorities. Ultimately, she was transferred from Serilingampally to Uppal Kalan by the Commissioner and Director of Municipal Administration. When Smt. T. Bazaramma approached the first respondent therein along with her husband to submit a joining report, the revision petitioner ie., her husband asked the Commissioner about settlement of arrears due to his wife. It is alleged that the first respondent therein without any provocation grew wild and abused the complainant in un-parliamentary language by naming his caste in the presence of Dr. K. Muralidhara Redy and G. Ashok Reddy. A report came to be filed for an offence punishable u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act against the first respondent therein. The Police registered it as a case in Cr. No. 361/1999. But the version of the first respondent therein was that when the revision petitioner''s wife Bazaramma submitted a joining report, though he accepted the same and permitted her to join duty, the revision petitioner picked up unnecessary quarrel, intimidated him and obstructed him in discharging his public functions. On the basis of the said allegations, he gave a report to Uppal Police, which came to be registered as Cr. No. 367/99 under sections 186 and 506 IPC against the revision petitioner. The police investigated into both the reports, referred the case registered pursuant to the report of the revision petitioner as false, but filed the charge sheet against the revision petitioner. Further, the revision petitioner field a private complaint before the Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, East and North, Ranga Reddy District. After committal, the said case came to be numbered as SC No. 27/2004 on the file of I Additional Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District. The revision petitioner filed a private complaint, which was taken on file and was numbered as SC No. 24/2004. Pending said proceedings, the first respondent therein filed two discharge applications, which were allowed by the learned Sessions Judge. Aggrieved of the said orders of discharge, revisions were filed. This Court held that if any utterances are made by the accused in the chambers which is a closed place to which nobody has access except with the permission of the accused, it cannot be said that the offence was committed in a place within public view. The Court went on to add that even if it is considered that any such utterances are made by the first respondent it cannot be said that they were made in a place within public view, and as such the court held that an offence u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act was not made out against the accused.

In Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Mumbai and others Vs. Union of India and others, the Apex Court while dealing with quashing of FIR in a case relating to an offence u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act, held as follows:

Admittedly in the instant case the alleged offence has taken place in the chambers of the officers where there was no public and which was not within the public view, it does not even the contention of the 4th respondent that the events were viewed by the public on the days mentioned by him in the complaint. In such a situation, it would be very difficult for this Court to conclude that even though public did not view the event, yet, it has to be treated as a offence u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act.

The intention of the Parliament is very clear that this insult or intimidation should have been caused in a place within the public view. If it is committed in any place which is not within the public view, it would not be treated as an offence. Otherwise, the Parliament could have omitted the words within the public view.

While interpreting the provisions of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act vis-�-vis the object of the Act, a learned single Judge of Bombay High Court in Balu Bajirao Galande v. State of Maharashtra (supra) observed as under:

...It can there be seen that the presence of the victim, the offender and a member of the public are the essential ingredients of the offence referred to in clause (x) of sub-section (1) of section 3 of SC and ST Act. It appears that the third ingredient requiring that the offence should be committed within public view, is included to eliminate possibility of frivolous prosecution. While affording protection to the members of SC or ST prosecution is taken to discourage misuse of the provision.

True import of the expression "within public view" will have to be ascertained having regard to the legislature intent and the mischief sought to be cured....

After referring to various judgments of the Bombay High Court and Delhi High Courts, the Court held that the expression within public view must be construed to mean that the insult or humiliation must have taken place in the presence of or in the proximity of at least one independent person.

The interpretation of the word "public view" also came up for consideration before the Delhi High Court in Daya Bhatnagar and Others v. State (supra), wherein the learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court while agreeing with the earlier view expressed by a Bench of the said Court held that the "public view" envisages that public persons present there should be independent, impartial and not having any commercial or business relationship, or other linkage with the complainant. In fact the said judgment also holds that the persons having any kind of close relationship or association with the complainant would necessarily get excluded.

This Court in J. Sumana Endluri Aseerwadamma 2003(1) ALD (CRL.) 252 (AP) while interpreting section 3(1)(x) of the Act, held that "public place and public view" are different. Since the incident took place in the office, it cannot be said to be in "public view" within the meaning of section 3(1)(x) of the Act.

Basic ingredients for an offence u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act are as under: There should be intentional insult or intimidation by a person who is not a member of SC or ST. Insult must be with an intention to humiliate the member of the SC or ST. As the intent to humiliate is necessary, it follows that the accused must have knowledge or awareness that the victim belongs to the SC or ST, and the incident must have occurred in any place within the public view.

There cannot be any dispute that the offence can be committed in any place whether it is a private place or a public place but the same should be within the public view The requirement of "public view" can be satisfied even if the incident takes place in a private place where the public are present. Therefore, expression "public view" u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act has to be interpreted to mean that the incident taking place in the presence of public persons who should be the persons not having any kind of close relationship or association with the complainant.

Therefore, the provisions of section 3(1)(x) of the Act would get attracted only when an alleged incident occurs in any place within public view. In view of the interpretation given to the said provision, it can safely be said that section 3(1)(x) of the Act gets attracted only when the incident takes place either in a private place or in public place but the same should be in public view.

Admittedly, in the present case, the incident of abusing the second respondent in the name of his caste took place inside the house and in the presence of two of their common friends. As seen from the judgment of the Apex Court in Swaran Singh''s case (supra), the said provision gets attracted even if the remark is made inside a house but should be in the presence of some members of the public not merely relatives or friends. The presence of two persons namely, Ram Bhoopal Reddy and L. Prabhakar in the house at the time of incident is not challenged by the second respondent. The said two persons are admittedly known to both the families. They cannot be treated as members of general public. Therefore, it can safely be held that in a case of this nature, the ingredients constituting an offence u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act are not made out.

Relying upon a judgment of this court reported in B. Sudhakar Reddy (supra) learned counsel for the second respondent tried to impress upon the court that these are all disputed questions of fact which have to be adjudicated during the course of trial. It is true that the learned single Judge of this court relying upon a judgment of this court in Goluguri Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2005 (2) ALT (CRL) 401 (AP) observed that the issue as to whether the incident occurred place within public view is a matter to be adjudicated by the criminal court. In my view the said observation has been made taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of that case. It was a case where the incident took place at about 9 AM when the complainant was going to his land in Sathamrai for agricultural work. At that time, B. Sudhakar Reddy and his henchmen are alleged to have abused him in filthy language in the name of his caste as "Madiga Lanja Kodukulla". The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the said case was that the incident was neither committed in a public place nor within public view as the place of the offence was not identifiable. Since the identity of the place of occurrence was in dispute, this court held that the question as to whether the incident took place within public view or not is a matter to be decided during trial. For the aforesaid reasons, it has to be held that the ingredients constituting an offence u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act are not made out as the incident of abusing the second respondent took place inside the house and not within public view.

One of the grounds urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the present case came to be lodged as a counter blast to the notice issued by the petitioners to the second respondent. It may be true that the petitioners might have issued a notice demanding the second respondent to pay money when the cheque issued by him was returned unpaid due to insufficiency of funds. Even assuming that the petitioners have issued a notice, no material is placed before the court to show that the filing of any complaint was due to dishonour of cheque. Lodging of the report after receipt of notice cannot be a ground to quash the proceedings. It cannot be said that the act of lodging the report was done only with a view to wreck vengeance against the accused or with a mala fide intention. Each case has to be decided basing on the facts and circumstances of that case. In Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. and Others Vs. Md. Sharaful Haque and Others, the Apex Court categorically held that mala fide intention cannot be a ground for quashing the proceedings u/s 482 Cr.P.C., Similarly, OS No. 1092/2005 filed by the petitioners has nothing to do with the present case. It was a case where the petitioners along with the second respondent were shown as plaintiffs and AS No. 146/2008 was filed against the judgment and decree in OS No. 1092/2005. In the said AS, the petitioners along with the second respondent herein were shown as appellants and the said case was filed against Margadarshi Chit Fund. Therefore, the issue as to whether the present report came to be filed only because of the notice alleged to have been sent to the second respondent and the suit filed by the petitioners along with the second respondent and the defences available to accused during the course of trial and the same cannot be agitated in an application u/s 482 Cr.P.C.,

Merely because ingredients of sections 3(1)(x) of the Act are not made out in view of the interpretation given to the word "within public view", it does not mean that the entire incident is false. The allegations in the report that the petitioners are alleged to have threatened the second respondent with dire consequences if he gives a report, pushing him down and abusing him by one of the accused are issues which need to be investigated. It cannot be said that the allegations in the report are bereft of basic facts constituting offences punishable u/s 323 and 506 IPC. The Criminal Petition is accordingly allowed in part by quashing the investigation in so far as the offence punishable u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act is concerned. However, the said petition, in so far as offences punishable under Sections 323 and 506 IPC, is dismissed. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.