High CourtsSingle Bench(1984) 03 MAD CK 0003

P. Andisamy vs The Government of Tamil Nadu and Another

Madras High Court · Decided on 5 March 1984 · Citation: (1985) ILR (Mad) 387

HON’BLE JUDGES
Nainar Sundaram, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Writ petition No. 732 of 1983

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Judgment

44 paragraphs · 1,001 words

Nainar Sundaram, J.—The Petitioner in this writ petition entered Government service in the year 1956 as lower division clerk in the pay and

Accounts Officer, Madras. His educational qualification is only a pass in the S.S.L.C. Examinations. On 9th November, 1976, by G.O. Ms. No.

3818, Public (Political) Department, the Petitioner, while he was working as the Sub-Treasury Officer of the Treasury and Accounts Service was

appointed temporarily as Additional Reception Officer in the Additional State Great House Maligai with effect from 17th November, 1976. That

post was a temporary post. On 31st January, 1978, he was selected for the post of Reception Officer in Public (Information and Public Relations)

Department with effect from 1st February, 1978 F.N. On 21st May, 1979 by G.O. Ms. No. 953, Public (Political-B) Department Rule 3(a)(i) of

the Special Rules was relaxed and the Petitioner was appointed regularly as Additional Reception Officer with effect from 17th November, 1976.

On 8th September, 1980, G.O. Ms. No. 2047 public (Information and Public Relations) Department on regular basis with effect from 8th

September, 1980 and there was a further relaxation of the rules in question. It was stated there that orders regarding his seniority wiliest separately.

As this judicature it most be pointed out that the post of Reception Officer, Public Information and Public Reception Officer Public (Information

and Public Relations) Department was (sic) as Information and Public Reception Officer on 8th December, 1980. On 5th November, 1982, by

G.O. Ms. No. 880, Information, Tourism (Tamil) Culture Administration Department to the order impugned in the writ petition had come to be

passed by virtue of which the Petitioner is sought to be rendered with (sic) effect to his parent department, namely, Pay and Accounts Officer

Madras. This was obliged the Petitioners (sic) Court seeking for the issue of a wait of certiorari quashes the said (sic)

2.

Mr. S. Ramalingam, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners would submit that after the Petitioner has been regularly appointed as

Additional Reception Officer 21st May, 1979 and as Reception Officer on 8th September, 1980 the Public (Information and Public Relations)

Department, there is no question of reason to the parents Department and the with ground order wholly inconsistent. According the learned

Counsel was a come of a substantive appointment to a permanent post and termination otherwise than i.e. the usual course of service exigencies

like superannuation etc., will attract the mischief of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, learned Counsel places reliance on a pronouncement of

a Bench of this Court, consisting of Ramanujam and Padmanabhan, JJ., in K. Ramachandra Prabhu v. Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax.

Writ Petition No. 3606 of 1977. Order dated 23rd October 1979 in support of his submission.

3.

It is true that a Government servant holding a temporary post and having a lieu on a substantive post may be sent back to the substantive post in

ordinary routine administration or because of exigencies of service. But after there had been a regular and substantive appointment to at permanent

post in the other Department there is no question of reversion to the original Department in the servant become entitled to what is known as a lien

on the permanent post to which he was substantially appointed whatever short falls the Petitioner had with reference to the satisfaction of the rules

in question, at the relevant point of time, had been erased by relaxation of the concerned rules. It is admitted before me that the post of Reception

Officer is a permanent post in the concerned Department and the appointment made of the Petitioner to that post is a regular and a substantive

one. Even otherwise, the concerned Government Order does not leave any room for ambiguity in the mind of this Court on this aspect.

4.

The question is as to whether a right to continue in the services to which he got engrafted, leaving the original service has accrued to him. A

substantive appointment to a permanent post confuse a substantive right to that post and the Government servant becomes entitled to what is

known as a lien on that post. If the twin elements or permanency of post and substantive ness of the appointment could exist, this lien will be

created. The facts disclosed before me make out the existence of the twin elements. If the post is temporary, it would be a different matter even

thought the appointment is either Substantive or on officiating basis. Such is not the case made out before me by the Respondents. It is true that

though the words, regular or regularisation may not connote permanence yet, in the absence of words indicating that the appointment was only

officiating or purely temporary which would militate against a substantive appointment, the use of the words appointed on regular basis would

indicate, substantive appointment. The language used in G.O. Ms. No. 2047, Public (Information and Public Relations-Administration Department,

dated 8th September, 1980 is to this effect. The Bench, in the decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, on the facts of the case

dealt with by it, opened that after the order of regularisation, the servant would be deemed to have been appointed to the concerned position a

regular basis and there was no question of reversion to the parent Department. On the facts of the present case, I find that it is a case of a

substantive appointment to a permanent post and that has conferred a substantive right on the Petitioner to the said post and in the contingency

there could not be an order of reversion to the previous Department and the Petitioner must be deemed to have lost his lien over the previous

service. In view of this Court sustaining this point urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, he is not urging any other point, though be would

like to urge them.

5.

For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is allowed. There will be order as to costs.