P. Chandrasekara Gramani vs The Collector of Madras

Natesan, J.—This revision has been preferred by a claimant in land acquisition proceedings, a reference at whose instance u/s 18(1) of the

Land Acquisition Act, I of 1894, hereinafter referred to as the Act, has been rejected by the Court in the view that the conditions laid down in

Section 18 of the Act, had not been complied with to give jurisdiction to the Court to entertain the reference. The Petitioner herein was interested

in an extent of Ac. 1-82 of land in Kodambakkam village in the extended area of Madras acquired for the Madras City Improvement Trust. The

notification u/s 4(1) was published on 17th September 1958 and the present Petitioner as claimant appeared at the enquiry by the Land

Acquisition Officer and claimed compensation for his lands acquired at Rs. 1,200 per ground. There was no other dispute and the Land

Acquisition Officer assessed the compensation at the rate of Rs. 3,600 per acre. Aggrieved by the compensation offered, the Petitioner sought a

reference to Court u/s 18 of the Act. When the reference was sent to the Court, the learned City Civil Judge was of the view that the provisions of

Section 18(2) were not complied with on the application for reference and the Court could not entertain the reference. On the papers being

retransmitted to the Land Acquisition Officer, the Land Acquisition Officer returned the reference to the Court submitting that the matter had been

referred to the Court and the Court may reject it, if the application did not satisfy the conditions laid down in Section 18(2) of the Act, after giving

notice to the parties. When the matter came on for hearing before the Court after notice to the present Petitioner, the Court heard Counsel on both

sides and in the view that the application for reference did not comply with the requirements of Section 18 rejected the reference, holding that the

Court had no jurisdiction in the circumstances, to entertain the reference.

Though some of the High Courts have taken different views in the matter, so far as our High Court is concerned, it has been settled by the

division Bench in Narayanappa v. Revenue Divisional Officer ILR (1955) Mad. 1062 that it is within the inherent powers of the Court to find out

whether the matter that comes before it, is in proper form and in accordance with the requirements of statute. It has been held that the Court when

a reference is made by the Collector u/s 18 can reject the reference, if it does not conform to the requirements of Section 18(2) of the Act. Section

18 of the Act runs thus:

(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the

Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons

to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.

(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken:

Provided that every such application shall be made

(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of

the Collector''s award ;

(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector u/s 12, Sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the

Collector''s award, whichever shall first expire.

In the case Narayanappa v. Revenue Divisional Officer ILR (1955) Mad. 1062 above referred to the application of the claimant u/s 18 was

barred by limitation : proviso to Sub-section 2 was not complied with. The section requires for a proper reference by the Collector (i) a written

application ; (ii) the person applying should be one interested in the subject-matter of the reference and who does not accept the award ; (iii)

grounds of objection which are limited to (a) the measurement of the land, (b) the amount of the compensation, (c) the person to whom it is

payable and (d) the apportioning the compensation among the persons interested ; (iv) the application should set out the grounds on which the

objection to the award is taken; and (v) it should be made within the period prescribed under Clauses (a) or (b) of the proviso as the case may be.

In the present case there is no question that requirements 1, 2, 3 and 5 are f ally satisfied. It may also be stated that at the enquiry before the Land

Acquisition Officer so far as the claimant was concerned, there was no dispute about the measurement or about the person entitled to the

compensation. The Petitioner claimed compensation at a particular amount and the dispute related to the quantum of the compensation. But when

claiming the reference, the ground on which the objection was made, was not set out in terms in the application for reference. The reference was

claimed in these words:

I do not accept the award given by you. I request you therefore to refer the matter to Court u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.

The only matter in dispute at the enquiry being the quantum of the compensation, the Land Acquisition Officer who made the reference

understood the objection to the award as relating to the quantum of compensation. The reason for reference, when filing up the form of reference

to the Court the Land Acquisition Officer has stated, was that the awardee was not satisfied with the compensation awarded. The learned City

Civil Judge who refused to entertain the reference is of the view that there is a lacuna in the application for reference in that the ground on which the

objection to the award was taken was not set out in the application as required u/s 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. The question for

consideration in the revision is whether this failure to specify the objection to the award in the circumstances of the case vitiates the application for

reference.

A preliminary objection has been taken for the Respondent, learned Counsel Mr. K. Gopalaswamy appearing for the Government Pleader

contending that an appeal is competent from the impugned order and so a revision u/s 115 of the CPC does not lie. Learned Counsel contends

that u/s 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, an appeal is provided from the award or any part of the award by the Court and that the effect of the

rejection of the reference would be to confirm the award of the Land Acquisition Officer in its entirety. On that basis the order in question it is

submitted is appealable. I am unable to agree with the contention. The rejection in this case of the reference is on the ground that the Court could

not entertain the reference. The power of the Collector to make the reference was questioned, and the Court has taken the view that it has no

jurisdiction to consider the reference, as a condition precedent, a proper requisition had not been made. It is as if the matter was not before the

Court at all and in my view in the circumstances it could not be said that there was any confirmation of the award by the Court. There can be no

judicial confirmation by the Court of a matter which the Court thinks is not legally before it.

In Narayanappa v. Revenue Divisional Officer ILR (1955) Mad. 1062, 1073 already referred to, the position when the reference is bad for

non-compliance of the statutory requirements u/s 18 is thus set out:

When there is such a compelling and binding proviso to the effect that the application for making the reference shall be made within the period

specified in the Act, it is difficult to see how a party who makes an application after the expiry of such a period can ask the Collector to make the

reference. The necessary sine qua non of the reference is the basic fact that the application for such a reference must be made in accordance with

the provisions of Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act and within the period specified in the first proviso to that section, and if these provisions are,

not complied with, there cannot be any valid application at all and necessarily, if such an application does not exist, a positive reference is incapable

of existence.

The reference itself in the view taken by the lower Court not being properly laid before the Court, it cannot be said that there is an order on the

reference that could be considered to be confirmatory of the Collector''s award and amounting to the award mentioned in Section 26 and made

appealable u/s 54 of the Act. There is no contention as there cannot be, that the order in the present case is otherwise a decree under the Code of

Civil Procedure. The reference according to the Court being non est the proceedings of the Land Acquisition Officer could not be considered to

be before the Court for orders on the reference. It may be that the view of the Court as to the invalidity of the reference is wrong but we are

concerned here with the character of the order as passed in spirit and substance, as the right of appeal is limited by the words of the Act.

Though the word award has not been defined in the Act, a reference to the several provisions contained in the Land Acquisition Act would

show that the term has been used in regard to the compensation for the land acquired or the disposal of the compensation, either awarded by the

Collector or as fixed by the Court on reference. The right of appeal is conferred by Section 54 of the Act in matters relating to compensation and

relating to the disposal of the compensation. In Dembeswar Sarma v. Collector of Sibsagar (1917) 39 I.C. 637 a division Bench of the Calcutta

High Court held that no appeal lay against an order of the District Judge dismissing a reference under the Land Acquisition Act on the ground that

it is barred by limitation. The Court treated the appeal as an application for revision. This view was approved by a division Bench of this Court, in

K.T. Muthuveerappa Pillai Vs. The Revenue Divisional Officer, this Court observing thus with reference to the case:

In the first of these cases, the application for reference was made beyond the time allowed. No reference ought to have been made in that case and

the District Judge refused to make an award on that ground. The High Court held properly that no appeal lay.

Learned Counsel appearing for the Government Pleader referred to the decision of this Court in Chengalvaraya v. Collector of Madras ILR

(1964) 2 Mad. 686 and contended that even though the present is a case of rejection of the award on the authority of the decision an appeal

would be competent. I have gone through that judgment very carefully and in my view the principle of that decision does not apply to the present

case. In that case, the validity of the reference in question was not found against by the Court. There were two items of land the subject of

acquisition in that case and though one Chengalvaraya Chetti had purchased one of the two items anterior to the Land Acquisition Proceedings the

fact was not known to the Land Acquisition Officer and Doraiswami Mudaliar the original owner claimed the entire compensation. On this

Doraiswamy Mudaliar contesting to the adequacy of the compensation there was a reference to the Court u/s 18. Shortly thereafter Chengalvaraya

Chetty, the purchaser of one of the items, getting information of the proceedings applied to the Collector for adjudication of his right to the

compensation amount in respect of the item which he had purchased. The Collector in due course made a reference to Court concerning the title of

this Chengalvaraya Chetty to obtain compensation in preference to Doraiswami Mudaliar. Though the Collector had suggested to the Court that

the two references should be disposed of together, Doraiswami Mudaliar''s reference for enhanced compensation to which Chengalvaraya Chetty

was not a party was disposed of first and he obtained payment of the entire compensation amount. The reference of Chengalvaraya Chetty came

up for consideration later and the Court took the view that as the compensation had already been paid out to the second Respondent, the Court

could not consider the question of title between the rivals. Chengalvaraya Chetty was referred to an independent suit. Against that order

Chengalvaraya Chetty filed a revision petition and it is the maintainability of this revision that was challenged in Chengalvaraya v. Collector of

Madras ILR (1964) 2 Mad. 686. It is on this the division Bench observed that the adjudication on the question of title to compensation money

made by a Court under Sections 30 and 31(2) of the Act will amount to a decree and will be appealable as such under the provisions of the CPC

and that this right of appeal was independent of the one conferred by Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that case support for the

maintainability of the revision petition was sought by reference to the decision in Dembeswar Sarma v. Collector of Sibsagar (1917) 39 I.C. 637

above referred to. Learned Counsel drew my attention to certain observations in Chengalvaraya v. Collector of Madras ILR (1964) 2 Mad. 686

with reference to Dembeswar Sarma v. Collector of Sibsagar (1917) 39 I.C. 637 and submitted that the case has not been accepted by this

Court. Reading the judgment in Chengalvaraya v. Collector of Madras ILR (1964) 2 Mad. 686 as a whole, I am unable to agree that this Court

has differed from the principle enunciated in that decision and the decision in K.T. Muthuveerappa Pillai Vs. The Revenue Divisional Officer, and

held that even when a reference was not competent, there could be an appeal. As the rejection of the reference in Chengalvaraya v. Collector of

Madras ILR (1964) 2 Mad. 686 was not based on its invalidity the question in the present form did not arise for consideration then.

The decision in Nitai Dutt v. Secretary of State for India in Council ILR (1923) Pat. 304 which is followed in Chengalvaraya v. Collector of

Madras ILR (1964) Mad. 686 is also not a case where the reference itself was found to be incompetent. The view of the Court in Chengalvaraya

v. Collector of Madras ILR (1964) Mad. 686, if I may say so with respect is succinctly expressed in the following words at the close of the

judgment.

For the reasons indicated by us earlier, we are of opinion that where there has been a valid reference to the Court, whether u/s 18, 30or 31, any

order passed by the Court finally disposing of the matter in so far as it was concerned would be appealable.

It will be seen that there has to be a valid reference to the Court and an order passed finally disposing of the matter before an order thereon

could become appealable. In my view, the decision in Chengalvaraya v. Collector of Madras ILR (1964) Mad. 686 is not an authority for the

position that an appeal would be competent against the order rejecting a reference even when the Court finds, it may be wrongly, that the reference

is invalid and refuses to entertain it in the view that the Collector could make no valid reference. In such a case the Court proceeds in the view that

it has no jurisdiction over the matter. If it is the substance of the matter that counts and not the form it cannot be said that the Court in such a case

has passed a final order on the reference. Learned Counsel for the Respondent referred to the appeal ability of orders rejecting a plaint, but there

the Code itself by a deeming provision makes these orders decrees. The preliminary objection, therefore, fails.

Coming to the merits of the case, the question for consideration is whether the failure to specify in so many words the grounds of objection to

the award in the circumstances of this case vitiates the application for reference. It cannot be overlooked that the only dispute before the Land

Acquisition Officer was as to the quantum of compensation. When a request for reference was made refusing to accept the compensation

awarded, the Land Acquisition Officer properly understood that the reference was sought about the quantum of compensation and that the

claimant was not satisfied with the compensation awarded. We are here considering whether there has been compliance with the requirements of

an expropriator piece of legislation. The question is whether substantial compliance will not do. If it is a question of limitation the application for

reference being out of time there can be no question of substantial compliance. But in the present case the point for consideration is whether the

claimant for reference has made out on what ground he objected to the award. The officer through whom the reference was sought has understood

the objection of the claimant to the award as relating to the quantum of the compensation since it cannot be on other grounds. In Maddur

Krishnammal Vs. Collector of Coimbatore, the claimant wrote thus to the Land Acquisition officer:

I will not receive the amount, but will contest the matter in the District Court.

There was not even a request for reference specifically. No mention was made of Section 18. The District Judge was of the view that the

petition of the claimant did not amount to a request u/s 18. On revision, Ramesam J. took the view that though the section was not mentioned in the

petition, from the spirit of it, it ought to be construed as a petition u/s 18. The learned Judge makes a point that the Revenue Divisional Officer did

so construe it. The Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Gundugola Venkata Suryanarayana Garu, a case relating to Section 80 of the

CPC the provisions of which are equally mandatory observes (at page 15):

The object of the notice u/s 80 is to give to the Government or the public servant concerned an opportunity to reconsider its or his legal position

and if that course is justified to make amends or settle the claim out of Court. The section is imperative and must be undoubtedly strictly construed.

Failure to serve a notice complying with the requirements of the statute will entail dismissal of the suit. But the notice must be reasonably construed.

Every venial error or defect cannot be permitted to be treated as a peg to hang a defence to defeat a just claim....

In construing the notice the Court cannot ignore the object of the Legislature to give to the Government or the public servant concerned an

opportunity to reconsider its or his, legal position. If on a reasonable reading but not so as to make undue assumptions the Plaintiff is shown to

have given the information which the statute requires him to give, any incidental defects or errors may be ignored.

I am of opinion that these observations would be apposite to the present case u/s 18 of the 18. Now the scope of the enquiry before the Court

is limited by Sections 20 and 21, and while making the reference to Court, the Collector has to state certain particulars for the information of the

Court. He has inter alia to give the extent of the land with particulars of trees, building and standing crops thereon, the amount awarded for

damages and paid or tendered under Sections 5 and or 17, the amount of compensation awarded u/s 11 and if the objection be to the amount of

the compensation, the grounds on which the amount of compensation was determined. Section 25 of the Act lays down certain rules as to the

amount of the compensation that could be awarded by Court. When the claimant had made a claim to compensation pursuant to any notice given

u/s 9, the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not exceed the amount so claimed or be less than the amount awarded by the Collector. Also

when the Applicant has refused to make such claim or has omitted without sufficient reason to make such claim, the amount awarded by the Court

shall in no case exceed the amount awarded by the Collector and so on. Sections 30 and 31 deal with references to Court when there is dispute as

to apportionment or title in relation to the compensation amount. About the scope of the enquiry before the Court in Pramathanath Mallik v.

Secretary of State for India in Council ILR 1929 Cal. 1148, 1152 (P.C.) the Judicial Committee observed thus:

By Section 20 the function of the court upon a reference being made is ""to determine the objection"" and only persons ""interested in the objection

are to be summoned before it and by Section 21, the scope of the enquiry is to be ""restricted to a consideration of the interests of the persons

affected by the objection"".

Their Lordships have no doubt that the jurisdiction of the courts under this Act, is a special one and is strictly limited by the terms of these sections.

It only arises when a specific objection has been taken to the Collector''s award, and it is confined to a consideration of that objection.

From the above it is clear that the specification of the grounds of objection in the application for reference is to enable the Collector to give the

necessary particulars to the Court. If from the letter claiming reference the concerned authority can reasonably infer the objection on which

reference is sought, the object is achieved and the requirement of Section 18(2) as to stating grounds of objections should be held satisfied. It is

one thing to regard the requirements of Section 18(2) as imperative. Whether there has been an effective compliance with the requirements is a

different matter. It is a matter of construction of the letter and its purport. Where the purpose of the requirement is served, every venial defect or

omission will not invalidate the claim for reference. In the circumstances in which reference was claimed in this case, the Court would not be

making undue assumptions out of the way or unwarranted inferences, if the application for reference is understood as grounded on objection as to

the quantum of compensation. The learned City Civil Judge must be, therefore, held to have erroneously declined jurisdiction in the matter. The

revision is allowed with costs. The matter is sent back to the lower Court for disposal of the reference on the merits in accordance with law.