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Judgment
The issue involved in all the three writ petitions is common and by consent of both the counsel, all the writ petitions are taken up for joint
disposal.
The petitioner in W.P.No.18722 of 1994 is the owner of an extent of 1078.8 sq.ft in Survey No. 590/6A1N of Sevilimedu by virtue of
Document No.1712 of 1993 on the file of Sub-Registrar''s office, Kanchipuram.
The petitioner in W.P.No.18723 of 1994 is the owner of the land to an extent of 3 cents in Survey No.590/6B5 of Sevilimedu Village under
Document No.2049/89,dated 18.10.89 on the file of Joint Sub-Registrar No. II, Kancheepurarm.
The petitioner in W.P.No.18724 of 1994 claims to be owner the land to an extent of 3 cents in Survey No.590/4AID of Sevilimedu village. He
has not furnished the particulars with regard to the sale deed, in his favour .
The petitioners herein have filed these writ petitions to quash the notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act in G.O.R.No.177, dated
25.6.75 published in the gazette on 16.7.75 and the declaration u/s 6 of the Act in GO. Ms.No.107 9 Housing and Urban Development dated
13.7.78 published in the government gazette on 14.7.78 in so far as it relates to the petitioners lands.
On 13.3.2000 W.M.Ps.Nos.13917 to 13919 of 1998 filed by the petitioners in each of the writ petitions praying for the appointment of
advocate commissioner, were posted for disposal. On that date. Mr.Jothi, the learned counsel for petitioners represented that the acquisition
proceedings pertaining to the petitioners lands were quashed by this Court in the earlier proceedings and after such quashing of the land acquisition
proceedings the petitioners herein bona fidely purchased the properties and constructed the houses by raising loans. While so the Tamil Nadu State
Housing Board all of a sudden issued a letter dated 13.9.94 directing the petitioners to vacate and surrender possession, branding them as
''trespassers'' and the petitioners herein have filed these writ petitions to challenge the proceedings of the Housing Board.
The above W.M.Ps. have been filed seeking for the appointment of a Commissioner to inspect the area and submit a Report, so that this Court
can have the details with regard to the existence of several buildings apart from the petitioners houses. This Court dismissed those W.M.Ps on the
ground that the relevant date to give the benefit to the petitioners as bona fide purchasers would be the date of construction of, the building. If the
construction had been put up subsequent to the initiation of the acquisition proceedings, then the petitioners may not be entitled for any benefit and
as such under the writ proceedings the date of construction, involving the factual question, cannot be gone into. The mere existence of the building
will not enable the petitioners to claim any benefit and as such the physical features of the land as on date may not be of any help to the petitioners,
or any relevance for the disposal of the writ petitions.
After signing the said order dated 13.3.2000 I looked into the prayers in the writ petitions. As the petitioners have filed these writ petitions to
quash the 4(1) notification dated 25.6.75 and 6 declaration dated 13.7.78, a doubt arose as to how a second writ petition is maintainable to quash
the above said land acquisition proceedings when the learned counsel for the petitioners represented that the petitioners herein had purchased the
land subsequent to the quashing of the land acquisition proceedings by this Court at the instance of the original land owners, the vendors of the
petitioners. Hence I directed the matter to be posted for orders on 24.3.2000. The cases were listed on the said date.
I repealed the representation made by the counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners purchased the land subsequent to the quashing of the
land acquisition proceedings at the instance of their vendors and then the petitioners constructed the houses. The said representation had been
recorded in my earlier order dated 13.3.2000. Mr. Jothi, the learned counsel for the petitioners fairly represented that what was recorded in the
earlier order dated 13.3.2000 is correct. Thereafter I asked the learned counsel as to what for the writ petitions have been filed. Immediately he
replied that the writ petitions have been filed to quash the notice issued by the State Housing Board dated 13.9.94, directing the petitioners to
vacate and hand over possession branding them as trespassers, on the ground that the land vests with the Housing Board after the completion of
the acquisition proceedings. Then I asked the learned counsel to read the prayers in the writ petitions. After reading the prayers in the writ
petitions, the learned counsel expressed his apology and corrected himself that the writ petitions have been filed to quash the original acquisition
proceedings, Then I posed the question as to how the writ petitions are maintainable when in the earlier writ petition the impugned land acquisition
proceedings at the instance of the petitioners vend or had already been quashed. The learned counsel requested time to clarify the matter and the
writ petitions were listed on 31.3.2000.
The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that some of the land owners in respect of the lands forms part of the original notification u/s
4(1) as well as the declaration u/s 6 of the Act challenged the acquisition proceedings in W.P.No.1073 of 1987 as stated in the affidavits filed in
support of these writ petitions. The said writ petition was allowed and the acquisition proceedings of those petitioners were quashed. Hence the
petitioners herein are also entitled for such benefit and on the basis of the judgment in W P.No.1073 of 1987 the acquisition proceeding pertaining
to the lands of the petitioners are also liable to be quashed. He further represented that the writ appeal is pending against the said judgment in
W.P.No.1073 of 1987 and as such these writ petitions may be posted along with the said writ appeal for final disposal. I declined to concede to
the request of the learned counsel for the petitioners to club these writ petitions along with the writ appeal and directed the counsel to argue the
matter on merits. The learned counsel requested for time to look into the matter. As the question involved in these writ petitions is whether the
petitioners herein are entitled to the benefit of the judgment of this Court in W.P. 1073 of 1987, I directed the matter to be posted at 2.15 P.M.
granting time for the counsel for the petitioners to look into the legal aspect.
The learned counsel put forth the following contentions:
(1) If the land acquisition proceedings i.e., the notification u/s 4(1) as well as the declaration u/s 6 of the Act is quashed at the instance of some of
the landowners, the benefit will enure to those landowners who did not come to court challenging the acquisition proceedings and as such the
vendors of the petitioners will be entitled for such benefit.
(2) When the vendors of the petitioners are entitled for the benefit of the quashing of the acquisition proceedings at the instance of some of the
landowners, they deemed to be the legal owners of the land and as such they have every lawful right to deal with the lands.
(3) Even assuming that the vendors of the petitioners are not entitled for such benefits, the petitioners being bona fide purchasers for value
subsequent to the acquisition proceedings without knowledge about the same to the acquisition proceedings, they have got a legal right to challenge
the impugned acquisition proceedings.
(4) If the land acquisition proceedings had been completed and the Housing Board had been handed over possession as stated in the counter
affidavit, then the laches on the part of the officials of the Housing Board i.e., the failure on their part to prevent the petitioners from putting up the
construction in the acquired land would confer a right oh the petitioners to continue to be in possession and thereby to challenge the impugned
acquisition proceeding.
(5) Similarly the petitioners being the bona fide purchasers for value and having invested huge amounts and constructed the houses, the laches on
the part of the officials of the Housing Board to prevent the petitioners would confer a right of equity on the petitioners to claim the property and on
this ground also the writ petitions are maintainable.
(6) In the counter affidavit, the respondents have raised the plea of laches on the part of the petitioners in coming to the court so belatedly. When
once the writ petitions have been admitted the question of laches cannot be permitted to be raised.
Before considering the questions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners it is necessary to recall the representations of the counsel and
the averments in the affidavit. Admittedly the representation made by the counsel for the petitioners at the earliest point of time is that the land
acquisition proceedings in respect of the lands of the petitioners were quashed and thereafter the petitioners had purchased the lands and put up
the construction is patently an incorrect statement. The admitted fact is that larger extent of lands had been acquired, out of which some of the
owners of the land, which forms part of the impugned land acquisition proceedings challenged the acquisition proceedings before this court in
W.P.No.1073 of 1987. The prayer in the same writ petition is for the issue of a certiorarified mandamus calling for the records of the first
respondent therein comprised in his proceedings in G.O.R.No.177, Housing, dated 25.6.75 and G.O.Ms.No. 1079 Housing and Urban
Development dated 13.7.78 and to quash the same in so far as it relates to the petitioners land therein and consequently direct the exclusion of the
lands of the petitioners in Survey Nos.590/4. 590/4 and 5, 590/4A, and 5A. 590/4-131/A, 590/4B. 590/5, 590/5-A. 590/5A-1. 590/6. 590/6A.
and 590/6B of No.58. Sevilimedu Village, Kancheepuram Taluk, Chengalpattu District.
By order dated 25.10.91 the learned Single Judge of this Court, following the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Tamil Nadu and another
Vs. A. Mohammed Yousef and others, allowed the writ petition and quashed the acquisition proceedings, so far as the lands of the petitioners''
therein.
Coming to the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the vendors of the petitioners are entitled for the benefit of the
order of this court in W.P. No.1073 of 1987 and by virtue of the said judgment the entire land acquisition proceedings are deemed to have been
quashed is concerned, it is difficult to appreciate the said contention. In fact the learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment
reported in M/s. Moghul Travels and Transport Co. (P.) Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Others, and reinforce his argument that when once the
notification u/s 6 is quashed at the instance of some one in the earlier proceedings, no separate writ petition by other landowners is necessary.
In the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is true that the notification u/s 6 had been set aside by the High Court in the
earlier writ proceedings at the instance of some of the landowners. When the said notification was in force against the other landowners who, did
not challenge the same on the earlier occasion, the petitioners in the said case challenged the notification u/s 6 on the ground that the dispute has
already been considered by a Division Bench of the said Court and as the notification u/s 6 in entirety had been quashed, the State cannot enforce
the same and the petitioner is also entitled for such benefit even though they have not independently challenged the said notification u/s 6. In fact in
the said case, the counsel appearing for the Government had conceded as follows:
Learned counsel for the respondents have conceded before me that certainly Tughlakabad was one of the 13 villages in respect of whom the
legality and constitutionality of the acquisition under various notifications u/s 6 of the Act was considered and it was found therein that it was not
noticed by the Lt. Governor in any of those notifications that the Land Acquisition Collector had not stated how much area was to be notified u/s 6
of the Act. It has similarly been conceded that the Division Bench had found the notifications to be bad for failure of stating any reasons of his
satisfaction by the Lt.Governor and for mindless exercise of power u/s 6 of the Act and consequently the matter in dispute would be covered by
B.R. Gupta, for the reasons stated therein. It is also conceded that Tughlakabad is one of the villages in respect whereof notification u/s 6 of the
Act, impugned in this writ petition, was specifically quashed.
The learned Judge has stated as follows:
In fact said notification already stands quashed in B.R. Gupta (supra) and the petitioner need not have claimed separate order of quashing thereof.
Notification as a whole stands quashed and the said judgment would be operative in respect of all lands referred to in the notification. No separate
writ need be filed by other land owners so much so that it would be operative irrespective of the fact whether the compensation has been received
by the owners or has not been received. The moment notification u/s 6 of the Act is quashed by the Court in one writ petition the entire land
covered by that notification would stand de-acquired forthwith.
From the above passage, it is clear that in that case, the learned Judge has found that the notification u/s 6 in entirely had been quashed. When
once the notification as a whole is quashed by the court, then it is not open to contend that the benefit of the order cannot be extended to those;
who are affected by such notification and failed to come before the court. Once the court set aside the notification, as a whole naturally the benefit
would enure to all.
But so far as the case on hand is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioners has not placed any material before this Court to establish
that in W.P.No.1073 of 1987 the court had quashed the notification u/s 4(1) as well as the declaration u/s 6, the impugned proceedings herein as a
whole. When the relief sought for in that writ petition which had been extracted above, is restricted only to the owners of the lands who are the
petitioners in the said writ petition, this Court has granted the relief only pertaining to the lands of the petitioners in the said writ petition and had not
quashed the entire notification, as such. This is because the rule nisi issued to the respondents is only to show-cause as to why the relief sought for
by the petitioners in the said writ petition cannot be granted. Hence the prayer is the relevant factor for the grant of the relief while the rule nisi is
made absolute. Only if the notification as a whole is quashed at the instance of a single person or collective. Persons then only the benefit of the
said order can be extended to the other affected persons even though they do not approach the court.
That is not the position in the case on hand. Here the land acquisition proceedings had been quashed only in respect of the petitioners in
W.P.No.1073 of 1987. Hence the vendors of the petitioners who did not challenge the acquisition proceedings in respect of their lands cannot
claim any benefit under the order of this Court in the said W.P.No.1073 of 1987.
The learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon yet another judgment in the case of Shenoy and Co., Represented by its Partner, Bele
Srinivasa Rao Street, Bangalore and Others Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle II, Bangalore and Others, for his proposition that if the
proceedings are set aside at the instance of some, the benefit is deemed to be extended to all even though the others have not challenged the
proceedings before court. The case relied upon by the counsel for the petitioners relates to the validity of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods
into Local Areas for consumption, Use or Sale Therein Act, 1979. In the said case the validity of the entry tax had been challenged and the court
held the levy of entry tax is invalid. The said principle cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case for the simple reason that when
once the levy of tax is set aside on the ground of want of jurisdiction of the State, then the State has no power to enforce the levy of entry tax in
toto. Hence it goes without saying that, the levy of entry tax in entirety is bad. Hence this judgment is also not of any help to the petitioners.
The learned Government Pleader pointed out the judgment, reported in Abhey Ram (dead) by LRs. and others Vs. Union of India and others,
and contended that when the declaration u/s 6 is quashed in respect of the writ petitioners alone, then the said decision operates only relating to the
writ petitioners and not the persons who were not the eo nomine parties to the decision. In the said judgment, the apex Court has held as follows:
The question then arises is: Whether the quashing of the declaration by the Division Bench in respect of the other matters would enure the benefit
to the appellants also. Though, prima facie, the argument of the learned Counsel is attractive, in deeper consideration, it is difficult to give
acceptance to the contention of Mr.Sachhar. When the Division Bench expressly limited the controversy to the quashing of the declaration qua the
writ petitioners before the Bench, necessary consequences would be that the declaration published u/s 6 should stand upheld.
It is seen that before the Division Bench judgment was rendered, the petition of the appellants stood dismissed and the appellants had filed the SLP
in this Court. If it were a case entirely relating to section 6 declaration as has been quashed by the High Court, necessarily that would enure the
benefit to others also, though they did not file any petition, except to those whose lands were taken possession and were vested in the State u/s 16
end 17(2) of the Act free from all encumbrances. But it is seen that the Division Bench confined the controversy to the quashing of the declaration
u/s 6 in respect of the persons qua the writ petitioners before the Division Bench. Therefore, the benefit of the quashing of the declaration u/s 6 by
the Division Bench does not enure to the appellants. It is true that a Bench of this Court has considered the effect of such a question in Delhi
Development Authority v. Sudan Singh, (45)1991 DLT 502 . But, unfortunately, in that case the operative part of the judgment referred to earlier
has not been brought to the notice of this Court. Therefore, the ratio therein has no application to the facts in this case. It is also true that in
Yusuobhai Noormchamed Nendoliya''s case, AIR 1991 SCW 2528, this Court had also observed that it would enure the benefit to those
petitioners. In view of the fact that the notification u/s 4(1) is a composite one and equally the declaration u/s 6 is also a composite one, unless the
declaration u/s 6 is quashed in toto, it does not operate as if that the entire declaration requires to be quashed.
Hence the first contention is rejected.
Point No.2:- In view of the findings given for point No.1 that the petitioners'' vendors cannot nave the benefit of the order of this Court in W.P.
1073 of 1987 there is no need to discuss elaborately on question No.2. Since the land acquisition proceedings had become final so far as they are
concerned, they cannot be deemed to be the legal owners of the land.
Point No.3:- In order to consider this issue, it is necessary to recall the relevant dates. The notifications u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act is
published in the Gazette on 16.7.75, the enquiry u/s 5-A of the Act was conducted in December, 1975. The objections were received from the
landowners and were rejected. The remarks of the Housing Board, the requisitioning body, was also communicated to the landowners. After
following all the formalities, the declaration u/s 6 was published in the Government Gazette dated 14.7.78. As per the counter affidavit filed by the
Government, after the award enquiry, the award was passed in Award No. 20/86, dated 23.9.86. The possession of the land was also taken and
handed over to the Tamil Nadu Housing Board on 3.2.87.
Hence the fact remains that as per the statement made by the petitioners herein in their affidavit, admittedly the petitioners had purchased the
properties subsequent to the completion of the entire acquisition proceedings, inclusion of the passing of the award, taking over possession and
handing over of the possession to the Tamil Nadu Housing Board.
Hence the question for consideration is whether on the date of purchase by the petitioners, their vendors have got any right of alienation and
whether the petitioners can be considered to be bona fide purchasers.
In the judgment reported in Yadu Nandan Garg Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, , the Apex Court has held that the purchase of the land
subsequent to the publication of notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was not lawful against the State in the following terms:
We do not find any substance in any of these contentions. It is seen that long after the notification u/s 4(1) was published in the Gazette, the
appellant had purchased the property and constructed the house thereon. Therefore, as against the State his purchase was not lawful and it could
not be used against the State to clothe it with a colour of title as against the State. It is an encumbrance against the State and when the acquisition
was finalised and the possession is taken, the State u/s 16 is entitled to have the possession with absolute title free from all encumbrances. The
appellant cannot get any title much less valid title to the property.
An identical view was expressed by the Apex Court in the Judgment reported in U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman and another
Vs. M/s. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. Lucknow and others, as follows:
It is settled law that after the notification u/s 4(1) "" published in the Gazette any encumbrance by the owner does not bind the Government and the
purchaser does not acquire any title to the property. In this case notification u/s 4(1) was published on March 24. 1973, possession of the land
admittedly was taken on July 5, 1973 and pumping station house was constructed. No doubt, declaration u/s 6 was published later on July 8,
1973. Admittedly power u/s 17(4) was exercised dispensing with the enquiry u/s 5-A and on service of the notice u/s 9 possession was taken,
since urgency was acute, viz., pumping station house was to be constructed to drain out flood water. Consequently, the land stood vested in the
State u/s 17(2) free from all encumbrances. It is further settled law that once possession is taken, by operation of Section 17(2), the land vests in
the State free from all encumbrances unless a notification u/s 48(1) is published in the Gazette withdrawing from the acquisition. Section 11-A as
amended by Act 68 of 1984. therefore does not apply and the acquisition does not lapse. The notification u/s 4(1) and the declaration u/s 6,
therefore, remain valid. There is no other provision under the Act to have the acquired land divested, unless, as stated earlier, notification u/s 48(1)
was published and the possession are surrendered pursuant thereto. That apart, since M/s. Kalra Properties, respondent had purchased the land
after the notification u/s 4(1) was published, its sale is void against the State and it acquired no right, title or interest in the land. Consequently, it is
settled law that it cannot challenge the validity of the notification or the regularity in taking possession of the land before publication of the
declaration u/s 6 was published.
However, in the above case, the Supreme Court has held that the respondent therein though cannot acquire any title to the land, at best he would
be entitled to step into the shoes of the owner and claim payment of compensation, but according to the provisions of the Act. It is settled law that
the price prevailing as on the date of the publication of the notification u/s 4(1) is the price to which the owner or the person who has an interest in
the land is entitled to. Therefore the purchaser i.e., the persons interested in the compensation, since he steps into the shoes of the erstwhile owner,
is entitled to claim compensation. In the case on hand also at the best the petitioners will be entitled only for the said benefit of compensation alone
and they have no right to challenge the acquisition proceedings.
Yet another judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Ajay Krishan Shinghal, etc. etc. Vs. Union of India and Others, is also of the similar
view wherein it has been held as follows:
Another contention raised by Shri Ravinder Sethi is that the claimant in the first appeal had purchased the property after the declaration u/s 6 was
published and that therefore he does not get any right to challenge the validity of the notification published u/s 4(1). Since his title to the property is
a void title, at best he has only right to claim compensation in respect of the acquired land claiming interest in the land which his predecessor-in-title
had. In support thereof, he placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in State of U.P. Vs. Smt. Pista Devi and Others, ; Gian Chand Vs.
Gopala and Others, ; Mahavir and Another Vs. Rural Institute, Amravati and Another, and Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute,
1995 (3) 583: AIR 1993 SCW 2114. We need not deal at length with this issue as is the settled legal position,
In the judgment reported in Mahavir and Another Vs. Rural Institute, Amravati and Another, the Supreme Court had expressed the view as
follows:
We do not find any justification warranting interference in this matter. Admittedly, notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (for short, ''the
Act'') was published on January 29, 1957 and thereafter the owner sold the properties to the petitioners on June 11, 1957 and August 22, 1958.
Declaration u/s 6 was published on August 14, 1958. Thus, it could be seen that the sales made after the publication of the notification u/s 4(1) are
void sales and the state is not bound by such a sale effected by the owner. Admittedly the notice u/s 9 and 10 was served on September 23, 1958
and award was made on October 9, 1959 and possession was taken on November 18, 1959. Thus the acquisition was complete. The possession
of the Government is complete as against the original owner and title of the original owner stood extinguished and by operation of Section 16 the
State acquires the right, title and interest in the property free from all encumbrances. So any encumbrance made by the owner after notification u/s
4(1) was published does not bind the State.
From the above laid principles, it is clear that if any transaction is entered into by the owner of the land subsequent to the publication of the
notification u/s 4(1) as well as the declaration u/s 6 of the Act, it will amount to an encumbrance over the property and such encumbrance will not
bind the state. The principle being that when once such notifications are published, the landowner has no right to deal with the property.
Immediately after the completion of the land acquisition proceedings i.e., the passing of the award and taking over the possession of the land as per
the provisions of the land acquisition proceedings, the acquired land vests with the Government without any encumbrance whatsoever.
When that be the position, the petitioners herein, having admittedly purchased the property long after the passing of the award and taking over
possession, cannot have any right to challenge the acquisition proceedings. Further the alienation in favour of the petitioners being totally void as the
vendors of the petitioners, the original landowners have no title to be conveyed on the date of sale, the petitioners cannot be said to be bona fide
purchasers. Hence the question of bona fide also will not arise in this case. Hence these contentions are also rejected as unsustainable.
Point No.4: So far as the fourth contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the laches on the part of the Housing Board would
confer a right on the petitioners is concerned, as stated already, the apex Court had repeatedly held that once the notification u/s 4(1) is issued, the
landowner has no right to deal with the property and any encumbrance created by the landowner in respect of such land which is the subject-
matter of the notification u/s 4(1) will not bind the State. When once after completion of the acquisition proceedings the possession has been take
by the State and handed over to the requisitioning body, the Housing Board in this case, naturally the requisitioning body may taken some time to
implement the scheme. Till the commencement of the scheme, the land would lie vacant. Merely because the lands are lying vacant after the
completion of the land acquisition and vesting of the land with either the State or the requisitioning body, the erstwhile owner of the land has no title
or right to alienate the property. Similarly the same will not embolden the persons like the petitioners to purchase the property in order to put forth
an unlawful claim.
In fact in more than one case, this Court criticised the conduct of the officials in allowing the indiscriminate encroachments over the
Government properties. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the inaction on the part of the officials of the Housing Board to
take care over the land vested with the Housing Board is nothing but a total dereliction of duty on their part. It is not known as to whether such
dereliction of duty on the part of the officials of the Housing Board is with the connivance of the erstwhile landowners or the petitioners herein.
Equally it is not clear as such dereliction of duties had been croped up among the officials either with some personal interest or at the intervention of
the politicians.
When it is the settled law that the landowner has no right to deal with the property i.e., his title is being lost on the issue of the notification u/s
4(1) of the Act, he has no title to pass on the land which vests with the Government free from all encumbrances; which means any encumbrance
that had been created by the landowner during the pendency of the acquisition proceedings is null and void. Hence the purchaser from such
landowners cannot derive any title. When that be the case, the petitioners herein cannot have any better title than that of their vendors. When the
land vested with the State free of all encumbrances, it is a known fact that the vendors of the petitioners has no title over the property. The
petitioners are necessarily be the trespassers as they do not derive any valid title under the sale deeds as the sales in their favour is totally void.
Hence there is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners.
point No.5: So far as the ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the inaction on the part of the officials of the Housing
Board to prevent the petitioners from putting up the construction would confer a right of equity on the petitioners to challenge the acquisition
proceedings or to claim title is concerned, there is no dispute that the land acquisition proceedings were over as early as 1987 when the possession
was taken by the Housing Board. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the vendors of his clients represented that they are the
owners of the land under dispute and executed the sale deed and handed over possession to the petitioners. The petitioners also believed such
representation and purchased the property, raised loans and constructed the building. Whatever the manner in which the learned counsel put forth
the plea, ultimately it leads to the only question as whether the vendors of the petitioners have got any semblance of title to pass on to the
petitioners herein on the date of sale and whether the petitioners being the purchasers subsequent to the completion of the acquisition proceedings
can challenge the validity of such acquisition proceeding.
As held already, when the vendors of the petitioners have no title at all to be conveyed, the petitioners cannot be considered to be owners of
the land. Whatever the investment they made in the land is only at their risk. Hence such investment by the petitioners will not confer any right of
equity on them. As the Apex Court has pointed out in more than one judgment referred to above, ultimately the petitioners can step into the shoes
of their vendors to claim compensation of the land alone. When the petitioners have purchased the land subsequent to the completion of the
acquisition proceedings, they are only trespassers. It is not the case of the counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners made any verification
regarding the title of their vendor before ever they purchased the land. There is no averment in the affidavit also to that effect. Hence their plea of
mere acceptance of the representation made by the vendors would clearly exhibit the lacking of bona fides on the part of the petitioners. In such
circumstance, the principle of equity has no application at all to the facts of the present case. Hence this contention is also untenable both on law as
well as on facts.
Point No.6:- So far as the contention regarding laches of the petitioners is concerned, there is no dispute that the acquisition proceedings had
been initiated in 1975 when 4(1) notification published on 16.7.75 and the declaration u/s 6 was published on 13.7.78 which are being challenged
in these writ petitions in the year 1994 after the lapse of 16 long years. Very ingenuously the learned counsel for the petitioner pleaded that when
once the writ petitions are admitted or taken on file, the question of laches cannot be gone into.
I am unable to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners. The Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay
Vs. The Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt Ltd., and others, has observed as follows:
It is well settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have
become final, the Court'' should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution to quash the notification u/s 4(1) and declaration u/s 6. But it should he exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic
consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is
a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in
the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the
learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches.
From the above principle, it is very clear that considering the question of laches is the discretionary power of the court. It is well laid principle
that such discretionary power can be exercised in a judicious manner. While doing so, the court is bound to take all relevant factors such as the
conduct of the petitioners, their vendors etc., into pragmatic consideration.
In a recent judgment in the case of The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Another Vs. Shah Hyder Beig and Others, the learned Judges of
the Supreme Court have categorically held that after passing of the award no writ petition can be entertained, in the following words :-
In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This
has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of recent cases C. Padma and Others Vs. Dy. Secretary to the Govt. of T.N. and
Others, . This court observed as below: -
The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the Act'') in GOR
No.1392 Industries, dated 17.10.1962. total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram village. Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District in
Tamil Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Rasiua by Tvl. Reichold Chemicals India Ltd., Madras.
The acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30.4.1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the
company, it was handed over to Tvl.Simpson and General Finance Co., which is a subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals India Ltd., it would appear
that at a request made by the said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect of which the appellants originally had ownership,
was transferred in G.O. MS.No.816 Industries, dated 24.3.1971 in favour of another subsidiary company, shri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., the 5th
respondent which is also another subsidiary of the company had requested for two acres 75 cents of land; the same came to be assigned on
leasehold basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the agreement in G.O.Ms.No.439 Industries, dated 10.5.1985. In
G.O.Ms.No.546 Industries, dated 30.3.1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original G.O.Ms.No.1392
Industries dated 17.10.1962 contending that since the original purpose for which the land was acquired had ceased to be in operation, the
appellants are entitled to restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the
acquired land having already vested in the State, after receipt of compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to
challenge the notification. Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed.
Even though in view of the earlier principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the petitioners herein have no locus standi to challenge the
acquisition proceedings and the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on that ground, the question of laches is also being discussed since it has
been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
Before parting with the case, it may be worthwhile to point out the averments made in the affidavit which mislead the court for admitting the
writ petitions and granting interim order. In paragraph 2 of the affidavit it is stated as follows:
The subject matter of this writ petition has been already decided by this Hon''ble Court in favour of the persons similarly placed like the petitioner
in W.P.No.1073 of 1987 dated 25.10.91 by following the Supreme Court decision reported in State of Tamil Nadu and another Vs. A.
Mohammed Yousef and others, .
Already it has been discussed that the Writ Petition No.1073 of 1987 has not been filed by the persons similarly placed like the petitioners. The
Writ Petition No.1073 of 1987 was filed by the landowners. The petitioners herein are the purchasers subsequent to the conclusion of the land
acquisition proceedings. Hence the petitioners herein cannot be said to be the persons similarly placed like the petitioners in W.P.No.1073 of
1987.
Apart from that, the judgment referred to by the petitioners in the affidavit State of Tamil Nadu and another Vs. A. Mohammed Yousef and
others, had been held Per Incuriam by the Apex Court in a later judgment in State of Tamil Nadu and others etc. Vs. L. Krishnan and others etc.,
Following the Judgment reported in State of Tamil Nadu and others etc. Vs. L. Krishnan and others etc., this court had allowed number of writ
appeals filed by the state Government and it may be worthwhile to mention the following writ appeals:- State of Tamil Nadu v. A.V.M. Murugan,
(W.A.715/94) State of Tamil Nadu v. Ravichandran, (W.A.No.393 of 1993) and as such it is not open to the petitioners herein to rely upon the
judgment reported in State of Tamil Nadu and another Vs. A. Mohammed Yousef and others, . Hence on this ground also the writ petitions are
liable to be dismissed.
The Writ Appeal Nos. 169 and 170 of 1997 filed by the State and the Housing Board against the order in W.P.No.1073 of 1987 were
allowed by this court and as such the petitioners.
For the reasons stated above, this Court is of the view that the petitioners have no locus standi to maintain the writ petitions, after the
acquisition proceedings having become final as well as on the ground of laches.
Accordingly the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.