P. Ponniah vs Estate Officer, Southern Railways, Madurai and others

Nainar Sundaram, J.—The petitioner in W. P. No. 2377 of 1986 is the appellant in this writ appeal. The respondents in the writ petition arc

the respondents in the writ appeal. We are referring to the parties as per their nomenclature in the writ petition. The petitioner was put in

possession of a vacant site belonging to the railways. The petitioner would call the arrnagements a lease. The railways would call it a licence. But,

nothing crucial turns upon this aspect when we consider the nature of the controversy which we are called upon to resolve, because the terms of

the grant must speak with reference to the rights and obligations of the parties. After issuing the notice of termination, the railways called upon the

petitioner to vacate the land after removing the superstructures put up by him. Finding no compliance with the same, the process under the Tamil

Nadu Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as the Act, has been resorted to and that

culminated in an order of eviction being passed by the first respondent. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the fourth respondent and that was

dismissed and challenging the orders of the first respondent and the fourth respondent, the petitioner came to this Court by way of the above writ

petition.

Before the learned single Judge, who dealt with the writ petition, the main concentration was on a contention put forth on behalf of the petitioner

that the petitioner is a tenant within the meaning of Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1922, hereinafter referred to as the Protection Act,

and hence the petitioner could not be dispossessed by resorting to the process under the Act. The learned single Judge repelled this line of thinking

put forth on behalf of the petitioner by his learned counsel, holding that in respect of Government Grants, the rights under the Protection Act cannot

be claimed. The learned single Judge also held that even if the Protection Act is to be invoked, the process under the Act is not excluded and

untenable. There were also contentions raised with reference to, the lease being a perpetual one on the ground that permanent superstructures have

been put up, the notice of termination being not valid in law; the obligation to resort to arbitration; the purpose for which the land was sought to be

resumed having been served, the propriety of the eviction proceedings being pursued; and the action of the railways abrogating the right to

livelihood of the petitioner. All these contentions were also repelled by the learned single Judge. As a result, the writ petition was dismissed. This

has obliged the petitioner to prefer this writ appeal.

Before us, Mr. E. Padmanabhan, learned counsel for the petitioner, appellant herein, would project in main the point built on the Protection Act

and would say that the Protection Act being applicable to the case on hand, the process under the Act ought not to have been resorted to and that

would abrogate the rights secured to the petitioner under the Protection Act. We carefully examined the provisions of the Act and the Protection

Act. We are proceeding on the hypothesis that the petitioner could claim the benefits of the Protection Act, even though it is a case of Government

grant. The provisions of the Protection Act do not impose any embargo with reference to eviction of a city tenant. The rights secured to a city

tenant under the Protection Act are to claim on eviction compensation for the superstructures put up by him and in such a contingency also put

forth a right to purchase the land on which such superstructures arc put up. The provisions of the Act for eviction as such could certainly be

resorted to, despite the Protection Act. It must be noted here that the petitioner did not, of his own, move any independent process for securing

the rights, if any, available to him under the Protection Act. We do not get any explanation, much less a convincing one therefor. That question

apart, as stated earlier, in the absence of any specific provision in the Protection Act, casting an embargo with reference to the eviction of a city

tenant. We are not able to spell out any inhibition for the working of the provisions of the Act for eviction of a city tenant. Even in the Act, there is

no exclusion of the process thereunder, in respect of a city tenant. The reliance placed by Mr. E. Padmanabhan on the pronouncement of the

learned single Judge of the High Court of Delhi in Delhi Simla Catholic Archdiocese Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, , could not be of any

avail to his client because we could not express or support a proposition that rights higher than or different from those conferred by the grant, with

reference to the eviction process with which alone we are now concerned, have come to be conferred on the petitioner under the Protection Act.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. and Others Vs.

Union of India (UOI) and Others, to say that when superstructures have been put up with the sanction of the grantor there is no question of

applying the provisions of the Act for eviction of the petitioner. On facts, we could not find any parity between that case and the present case. In

that case, there were permanent constructions put up by the grantee with the sanction of the grantor, the Union of India, and in that context and on

the facts of that case, it was opined that by no process of reasoning, the conerned premises could be regarded as public premises within the

meaning of the Act. In the present case, clause 4 of the grant has specifically inhibited the grantee from erecting or causing to be erected on the

land or any part thereof any structure of a permanent or a quasi permanent nature. Clause 14(1) lays down that on determination of the grant, the

licensee shall remove the structures at his own cost. These clauses govern the rights and obligations of the parties, de hors the question as to

whether the petitioner has, in fact, put up superstructure of permanent nature or not. In spite of these clauses, if the petitioner has put up

superstructures of permanent nature, he has taken the risk and he cannot, on that ground, stultify the action for eviction under the Act.

The learned single Judge, as already noted, has expressed the opinion that the petitioner cannot claim the benefits of the Protection Act because

the grant is a Government grant. We can only construe that opinion as having been expressed for the purpose of repelling the contention raised that

in view of the application of the provisions of the Protection Act, eviction process under the Act is not tenable. In our view, an opinion, one way or

the other on this question, may not be absolutely necessary for resolving the contention raised in this case, with reference to setting in motion or

resorting to the process for eviction under the Act. As we have already said, in the absence of any embargo expressed in the Protection Act for

eviction as such of a city tenant, the process for eviction resorted to under the Act cannot be frowned upon. The Act also does not by its terms

exclude a city tenant from its purview. Even otherwise, we find that the learned single Judge has followed the principles set down in the

pronouncement of a Bench of this Court and the pronouncement of the Supreme Court on this question. They certainly govern and answer this

question against the petitioner.

With reference to the other contentions put forth on behalf of the appellant, we do not find any substance in them and we are in entire agreement

with the views of the learned single Judge over them. Accordingly, this writ appeal is dismissed. No costs. At this juncture, Mr. E. Padmanabhan,

learned counsel for the petitioner, says that we must show his client, the indulgence of granting time for him to vacate and deliver vacant possession

of the land in question finding sincerity and bona fides in his pleas, we grant the petitioner six weeks time from today to vacate and deliver vacant

possession of the land in question.

Appeal dismissed.