P. Ramesh Rao vs K.V. Srinivasa Rao

T. Ramaprasada Rao, C.J.—The judgment of the appellate authority under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960,

is absolutely unsustainable. The Petitioner-land-lord filed the application for possession of his own premises, since he was only residing with his

father in a building which is not his own, on three grounds. Firstly, he wanted the down-stairs portion for non-residential purposes, as he intended

to start a business of his own and as he was already acquainted with business when he has associated with his father, secondly he required the up-

stairs portion of the premises for his own residential purposes and thirdly, since the tenant has sub-let the premises to a betelnut shop keeper and

admittedly was collecting rent from him and thus parted, without authority, with the possession of the property. The landlord claimed that the tenant

was, therefore, liable to be evicted under the provisions of the Act.

The Rent Controller agreed with the landlord. The appellate authority, on a curious reasoning, reversed the same. I shall take up the three

grounds one after another.

The first one is whether the Petitioner was entitled to ask for possession of the premises at all, since he was residing with his father. It is the

admitted case of both parties that the Petitioner, who was 20 years old, was naturally residing with his father, but in a building which is not his own.

The premises in question, however, is indisputably his own. He wanted to occupy his own premises and sought for eviction. The curious reasoning

of the appellate Judge was that as he was an young man of 20 years and was a bachelor and was residing with his father, there is no necessity for

him to shift. This is a curious reasoning in a State like ours. It is expected that young persons should develop as far as possible by themselves

without any prop being given by their parents and if such an enterprising young man is prepared to come out of the family to stand on his own, and

seeks for a premises admittedly belonging to him, it should not be negatived on the only ground that he is young and that he is a bachelor and that

he is with his father. The appellate authority has not given any acceptable reasoning for negativing the request of the Petitioner for his own

occupation. The second contention was that even though the Petitioner was young, he was not carrying any independent or appreciable business

for him to seek for a non-residential premises for purposes of carrying on the business of his own. In the counter-affidavit filed by the tenant he

himself admits that the Petitioner is carrying on a jewellery business along with his father at No. 301, Triplicane High Road But his case is that the

Triplicane High Road is better than the place in which the property in question is situate and, therefore, there is no bona, fide in his request. The

Petitioner''s case, on the other hand, was that he was not only an associate with his father, but he was doing other business of his own and he was

very anxious to set up an independent business of his own, in his own house and that was the reason, why he sought for eviction of the

Respondent. The appellate authority would say that it can be presumed that there is no business at all, which is being carried on by the Petitioner,

even though he found, as a fact, that he was indeed associated with his father in a business, even according to the tenant, and that the Petitioner''s

case was that he was engaged in other such businesses as well. It is not for the tenant to find out as to what is the nature of the business which the

landlord wants to do. What the law requires is to find out whether there is a bona fide intention on the part of the landlord to set up a business of

his own which he is carrying an in a premises of his own occupied by a tenant who is indulging a nonresidential activity. The necessary criteria

required under the Act are satisfied in the instant case. The reasoning of the learned appellate Judge, who would not agree with the Rent

Controller, appears to be without any foundation or without any reasoning whatsoever.

The third ground on which the Petitioner, sought for eviction was that the Respondent sub-let the premises. Subletting is practically admitted,

because the Respondent''s case is that he has let it out to the betelnut shop keeper and that he was collecting the rent from him. The suggestion of

the appellate authority appears to be that ""the covenant against sub-letting will, rest rain the assignment, but a mere covenant against sub-letting

does not prohibit under-letting a part of the premises."" I am unable to follow either the legal exposition which the appellate authority thought he was

doing in his judgment; nor am I in agreement with him. So long as the Act says that if a tenant sub-lets the building which is only a part without

written authority from the landlord, then, that would be a ground for eviction. Under-letting referred to by the appellate authority is nothing, but a

synonym of sub-letting and why he makes a difference between the two, I am unable to understand. Even the learned Counsel for the Respondent

also is unable to sustain as to the mind behind the appellate authority when he wrote this judgment. He is not able to make out clearly what the

writing means. I am also in the same difficulty. Sub-letting, which is equivalent to under-letting being admitted in this case, the question whether

there has been a parting of possession of the property becomes un-necessary for consideration. As the third ground on which the petition was

opposed, namely, that the tenant sub-let without authority is practically admitted, the tenant is liable to be evicted on this ground also. The Rent

Controller was, therefore, right in directing eviction on all three grounds. The bona fide requirement of the landlord is established beyond doubt.

The appellate authority''s order is without jurisdiction and brizles with material irregularities. The judgment and the order of the appellate authority

are set aside and the civil revision petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. The tenant is granted six months, time to vacate.