P. Sadasivam vs M.M. Rathinasabapathy Chettlar

Ramanujam, J.—This is a revision filed by the tenant against the order of eviction passed against him by the Rent Controller and confirmed

by the appellate and revisional authorities. Eviction was sought on two grounds : one that the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his own

occupation and (2) that the Building has been used by the tenant for a purpose other than the one for which it was let. All the courts below have

held that the tenant has not used the premises for a purpose other than the one for which it was let and as such that ground of eviction will not avail

the landlord to get an order of eviction. On the question of the landlord''s requirement of the premises for his own occupation, the Rent Controller

held that the respondent herein as landlord required the premises bona fide for his own use for starting his business, after rejecting the contention of

the tenant that the premises in question belonged to a trust and not to the respondent and therefore he could not require the same for his own

business. The trial court took note of the fact that the tenant took the building on lease from the respondent and the receipts issued are only in his

personal same and that there was no evidence that the building was a trust property. When the matter was takes in appeal by the tenant the

appellate court called for a finding from the Rent Controller at to whether the premises in question was a trust property and the Rent Controller

gave a finding that the property was the trust property. After the receipt of the finding the appellate Court disposed of the appeal holding that it is

unnecessary to go into the question of title namely whether the property belongs to a trust or whether it belongs to the respondent exclusively, that

it is not open to the tenant to deny the respondent''s title to the property in question, that the definition of '' landlord '' will take in the respondent

and that he can claim the premises in question for his own occupation under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act and in that view affirmed the eviction order

passed by the Rent Controller. The District Court, Madurai, also confirmed the order of eviction holding that the respondent is entitled to file an

application under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. In this revision, the petitioner-tenant contends that once the property is found to be a trust property the

respondent who is only a trustee, cannot apply for eviction on the ground that he requires the premises for his own occupation and that it is only for

the purpose of the trust and not for his own purposes eviction can be sought under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. It Is also contended that though the

term ''landlord'' can take in the respondent as a person who leased out the property to the petitioner and collected rents from him, he cannot be

treated as a landlord for the purpose of seeking eviction on the ground of owner''s occupation, for a petition under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) to be

maintainable, the requirement should be that of the owner and not that of a trustee or agent who becomes a landlord under the definition for certain

specified purposes. It is the contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner that it is only those persons who are owners who can seek an

order of eviction on the ground of requirement for personal occupation under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) and not all persons who will come under the definition

of ''landlord''.

The Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, states that the lease deed executed by the tenant petitioner is only in favor of the respondent

as the owner and not as a trustee and that he has been issuing receipts only in his personal name and not on behalf of the trust. The respondent also

disputes the claim of the tenant that the building is a trust property and states that the property is, in fact, the property of the respondent and set of

the trust, and that in any event the property cannot be said to have been dedicated to the trust but it is made subject to a charge for the

performance of certain charitable purposes.

As pointed out by the courts below the question of title is outside the scope of the rent control proceedings and when it is disputed that the

property is a trust property, that question cannot be conclusively decided in these proceedings. S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act enables the landlord to

get an order of eviction of a non-residential building, if the landlord or his son is not occupying for purpose of a business which he or his son is

carrying on, a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own. The word his denotes the landlord and the landlord is

defined at ''Inclusive of any person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of

another or on behalf of himself of others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or

be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant"". The acceptance of the contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner will

mean that the words he or his in S. 10(3)(a)(iii) will denote the owner and the landlord as defined in the Act. It cannot be disputed and is not in

fact, disputed that the respondent came within the definition of ""landlord"" set out in the Act. When S. 10(3)(a)(iii) specifically refers to ""landlord"",

we cannot cut down the operation of that section by construing the word ""landlord"" used in that section as meaning only the owner and not all the

persons enumerated within the definition of ''landlord''. The Learned Counsel''s contention that the special right or privilege conferred under S.

10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act can be claimed only by the owner cannot by accepted in view of the fact that the section uses the word ""landlord"" and not

the word ""owner"". I cannot accept the argument put forward by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner that the word ""landlord"" used in S. 10(3)(a)

(iii) should have a restricted meaning and not the meaning attributed to it under the definition in S. 2. Further Ex. A. 4 which is the lease executed

by the petitioner proceeds on the footing that the property is the separate property of the respondent and the petitioner got possession only from

the respondent. As lesser the respondent is entitled to re-enter the building at the determination of the lease under the Transfer of Property Act.

Such a right of the respondent to re-possess the building after the determination of the lease is not affected by the provisions of the Rent Control

Act which merely provides that the right of re-entry can be exercised only on stated grounds set out in the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent

Control) Act 1960. The petitioner having taken the building from the respondent, he cannot now turn round and say that he is not the person

entitled to repossess the building. I am inclined to agree with the Learned Counsel for the respondent that it is not open to the petitioner to put

forward the plea that the property is a trust property and that it is only the trust that can ask for the building for its own purposes.

The Learned Counsel for the respondent invites my attention to a decision is Guru-swami v. Ranganathan I.L.R., 1954 Mad. 341 wherein it was

held that in a suit for recovery of possession of a property together with arrears of rent, based on tenancy, the question of title could not be gone

into and that the doctrine of estoppel between landlord and tenant under S. 116 of the Evidence Act had to apply, subject to the exception of

eviction by title paramount as recognized by law. The Learned Counsel points out that if in a suit for recovery of possession of the demised

property in a court of law the tenant is bound by the doctrine of estoppel and cannot question the title of the lesser, it should be a fortiori that the

question of title cannot be gone into in Rent Control proceedings as the scope of eviction proceedings is narrow and as it is not possible to

determine therein the rival contentions of parties as a title to the property. The following observations of the Bench in that case are pertinent (page

350):

If the suit is based upon tenancy alone, the question of title cannot be gone into in such an action and the estoppel operates. The tenant cannot

defeat the title of the landlord by showing that, since the beginning of the tenancy, he had voluntarily acquired title to the property. In the suit based

upon tenancy, which is narrow in its scope, the question of title cannot he gone into, and it is not possible to determine the validity of the title put

forward by the tenant. But the position is totally different, where the suit is based upon title.

Reliance was also placed on a decision in Sreeramulu v. Venkateswar Rao (2). In that case the appellant had taken on lease the suit land

measuring about 12 acres from the first respondent, for one year on 1st June, 1950, and the lease arrangement was evidenced by a lease deed Ex.

A. 1. which contained the stipulation to the effect that the first respondent may take back possession of the land without a need for a registered

notice to the lessee at the end of the lease period that is, 31st May, 1951. When the first respondent demanded back from the appellant

possession of the land after the end of the lease period and also the rents due from him, the appellant denied the title of the first respondent to the

extent of half of the suit land. The first respondent thereafter was constrained to file a suit in ejectment and for recovery of arrears of rent. The

appellant put forward a defence that the lease by the first respondent was not only in his own right but also on behalf of his paternal uncle who

owned a moiety of the suit land and that the rents due in respect of that portion had been paid to the uncle. On these facts, the High Court held

that, even assuming that a third party has title to any extent in the suit property, where the contract is one entered into between the appellant and

the first respondent and actual possession was given by the first respondent to the appellant in his own right, the first respondent alone was to be

regarded as the landlord for the purpose of S. 116 of the Evidence Act and that the appellant''s plea that the first respondent must be regarded as

a benamidar for the third party and the payment to that third party should operate as a discharge of his liability cannot succeed. In this case even if

the trust is shown to have title to the property in question, the lease being one between the petitioner and the respondent and the petitioner having

obtained actual possession from the respondent, the respondent should, in law be regarded as the landlord for the purpose of the Madras Buildings

(Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, as also for the purpose of S. 116 of the Evidence Act. As held in Bokka Sreeramulu Vs. Kalipatnapu

Venkateswar Rao and Another, the question of lessor''s title is foreign to a suit for rent or in ejectment against the lessee and this is equally true in a

case where the ostensible lesser is merely a trustee and liable to account to the cestui que trust. The principle of S. 116 of the Indian Evidence Act

applies in such cases. A tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlord''s title, however, defective it may be, so long as he has

not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord. This has been pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Bilas Kunwar v. Dearaj Ranjit

Sing I.L.R., 1954 Mad. 341.

The above decisions clearly lay down that in a suit in ejectment the question of title cannot be gone into and that so long as the tenant continuous

to be in possession on the basis of the lease between the lesser and himself he is stopped from questioning the lessor''s title and his right to

possession, under S. 116 of the Evidence Act.

The Learned Counsel for the petitioner brought to my notice a decision of Anantanarayanan C.J. in Bokka Sreeramulu Vs. Kalipatnapu

Venkateswar Rao and Another, : But that decision has no relevance to the question arising for consideration in this case. In that case the building

was required by the landlord-trust for erecting a Kalyanamantapam and that was held to be not ''for its own purposes''. That decision does not

throw any light on the question whether the respondent in this case can get the building for his own occupation. On a due consideration of the

matter, I am of the view that the courts below are correct in ordering eviction of the petitioner from the suit premises. I therefore dismiss the above

civil revision petition but, without costs, The petitioner is granted three months'' time to vacate the premises.