P. Stanley Buck vs D. Govindaraj

K.K. Sasidharan, J.—This first appeal is directed against the Judgment and Decree in O.S. No. 1599/1993 on the file of the I Additional

Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore whereby and whereunder, the suit filed by the respondent praying for a money decree on the basis of the

promissory notes stated to have been executed by the respondent was decreed.

The suit in O.S. No. 1599/1993 was preferred by the respondent against the appellant on the basis of two promissory notes alleged to have

been executed by the appellant on 24.02.1990 and 28.02.1990.

In the plaint in O.S. No. 1599/1993, it was the contention of the respondent that the appellant approached him for a loan and accordingly, a

sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- was advanced on 24.02.1990 and a further sum of Rs. 50,000/- on 28.02.1990. The appellant has also executed two

promissory notes agreeing to pay the amount with interest. However, the appellant failed to pay the amount, which made him to file the suit on the

basis of those two promissory notes.

The suit was contested by the appellant by filing written statement. The appellant categorically denied the execution of the promissory notes as

well as receipt of consideration. It was further contended that the respondent has no financial capacity to advance such a huge amount and as such,

the alleged payment was made up only for the purpose of getting a decree. In short, the appellant denied the execution of promissory note, receipt

of consideration, and also disputed the capacity of the respondent to advance money.

The learned Trial Judge framed the following issues for consideration:

(i)Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover money from the defendant?

(ii)Whether the contention of the defendant that the suit promissory notes were not executed by him is true?

(iii)To what relief he is entitled to?

During the course of trial, PW-1 and PW-2 were examined on the side of the respondent and Exs.A-1 to A-9 were marked. The appellant was

examined as DW-1 and Exs.D-3 to D-3 were marked on his side.

The respondent as PW-1, deposed that an amount of Rs. 2 lakhs was advanced to the appellant on two occasions and it was covered by the

promissory notes marked as Exs.A-1 and A-2. PW-2 - Rajamani was a witness to the transaction and in fact, the said witness was brought by

none other than the appellant at the time of execution of the promissory notes. The respondent has also marked Exs.A-6 and A-7 in support of his

contention that he was engaged in Real Estate business and as such, he has the means to advance money to the appellant. During the time of cross

examination, the respondent, deposed that he was not educated properly and as such, he was not in a position to say about the figures as made

mentioned in Exs.A-1 and A-2. However, PW-1 maintained that the amount was in fact paid by him to the appellant and it was witnessed by PW-

2.

PW-2 Rajamani was examined to speak about the execution of Exs.A-1 and A-2. According to PW-2, he was working as Supervisor in L.N.

Hospital and both the appellant and the respondent were known to him for about 9 to 10 years. It was only the appellant who requested him to

accompany to the residence of the respondent and the promissory notes were signed in his immediate presence. He also signed as a witness in

Ex.A-1 and A-2.

The appellant was examined as DW-1 and even during his evidence, he denied the execution of Exs.A-1 and A-2. According to the appellant,

he knew Dr. Ramachandran of L.N. Hospital since 1977. DW-1 was doing poultry business earlier. During his cross examination, he admitted that

there was necessity for him to take loan for his business. But he was not sure as to the amount of loan taken by him, how much was repaid and

other details about the creditors. There were two other suits pending against him besides the one another suit filed by the respondent.

The learned Trial Judge answered the issues one after another on the basis of pleadings and in the light of the evidence tendered by the parties.

The learned Judge agreed with the case projected by the respondent to the effect that Exs.A-1 and A-2 were executed by none other than the

appellant. In order to arrive at such a conclusion, the learned Judge compared the signature of the appellant as found in Exs.A-1 and A-2 with the

signature as found in the written statement. The learned Judge also found that the respondent was having necessary financial resources to advance

money which was evident from Exs.A-6 and A-7. The learned Judge also relied on the evidence of PW-2 for his conclusion that Exs.A-1 and A-2

were executed only by the appellant. Accordingly, the suit was decreed as prayed for.

It is the said Judgment and Decree dated 23.01.1998 which is impugned in the present appeal.

The point:

Points that arise for consideration in this first appeal are as follows:

Whether the respondent was having the financial capacity to advance the amount as shown in Exs.A-1 and A-2?

Whether Exs.A-1 and A-2 were executed by the appellant?

Relief to which the parties are entitled to?

Submissions:

The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the learned Trial Judge shifted the burden on the appellant to prove that the promissory

notes were actually executed by him. According to the learned Counsel, evidence of PW-1 was not consistent and as such, no reliance could be

placed on the said evidence. The learned Trial Judge was not correct in his approach in comparing Exs.A-1 and A-2 with the signature as found in

the written statement filed long after the execution of those documents. It was his further contention that the documents in Exs.A-6 and A-7 shows

that the appellant has entered into a sale agreement and it would not show that he was having sufficient funds as on the date on which Exs.A-1 and

A-2 were executed. The learned Counsel also relied on the judgment in Mariappa Gounder and Ors. v. Kandasamy 2002 (4) LW 252 in support

of his contention that signature could be compared only with the signature contained in contemporaneous documents.

The learned Counsel for the respondent contended that the notice sent by the respondent to the appellant calling upon him to pay the amount

as per the promissory notes was not replied to by the appellant. According to the learned Counsel, the approach made by the learned Trial Judge

was perfectly correct as he has compared the documents in Exs.A-1 and A-2 with the admitted signature of the appellant as contained in his

written statement. The learned Counsel relied on Exs.A-6 and A-7 only to show that the respondent was in the real estate business which would

fetch necessary funds for him to do business in money lending. The learned Counsel by placing reliance on the evidence of PW-2 contended that

the said witness has clearly deposed about the factum of execution of Exs.A-1 and A-2 by the appellant.

Discussion:

The suit in O.S. No. 1599/1993 was filed by the respondent against the appellant. The suit was based on two promissory notes dated

24.02.1990 and 28.02.1990 stated to have been executed by the appellant and marked as Exs.A-1 and A-2. In the written statement filed by the

appellant, he has categorically denied the execution of Exs.A-1 and A-2. The appellant also disputed the financial capacity of the respondent to

advance such a huge amount and that too within a gap of about four days. In order to prove that the documents were in fact executed by the

appellant only, respondent examined PW-2 - Rajamani, who according to him was brought only by the appellant at the time of execution of

Exs.A-1 and A-2. PW-2 has deposed that it was none other than the appellant who took him to the residence of the respondent for the purpose

of execution of promissory notes.

Financial capacity to lent:

The learned Trial Judge on the basis of Exs.A-6 and A-7 arrived at a categorical conclusion that the respondent was having necessary financial

resources to advance money.

The respondent specifically disputed the claim made by the appellant that he was not having the capacity to advance such a huge amount. In his

evidence as PW-1, respondent has marked Exs.A-6 and A-7 to substantiate his contention that he was in the real estate business. His evidence

that he used to purchase property, prepare lay outs, and assign the plots, remain un-challenged. His case regarding availability of finance with him

was consistent and trustworthy. There was nothing on record to show otherwise. Therefore, in the light of the pleadings and evidence on the side

of the respondent, especially in the light of documents in Exs.A-6 and A-7, it was clear that the respondent has discharged the burden regarding his

capacity to advance money. The finding to that effect, as arrived at by the learned Trial Judge, is perfectly correct and it does not call for

interference. The first point is therefore decided against the appellant.

Challenge to Exs.A-1 and A-2:

Claim of the respondent was based on two promissory notes marked as Exs.A-1 and A-2. The appellant in his written statement denied the

execution of the promissory notes. His denial was also specific. Even during his cross examination as DW-1, the appellant has maintained that he

has not signed either Exs.A-1 or A-2. In spite of such express denial, the respondent has not taken any steps to examine the document by an

expert.

The learned Trial Judge compared the signature in Exs.A-1 and A-2 with the signature as found in the written statement filed by the appellant

and concluded that the signature in Exs.A-1 and A-2 were that of the appellant only.

The relevant law of comparison of signature:

Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act empowers Court to compare the disputed signature with reference to the admitted signature of the party

in case there was a dispute with respect to such signature. The provision also enables the Court to direct any person present in Court to write any

words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words or figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been

written by such person. This provision enables the Court to compare the signature as well as writing. Discretion to examine the disputed signature

has to be exercised by the Court in accordance with legal principles. Court is not an expert in the matter of comparison of signature or writing. This

is only an enabling provision to be taken recourse to in exceptional circumstances. However, it cannot be said as a universal rule that the Court is

not entitled to compare the signature or handwriting and in all cases, it has to be sent to the experts. If such an interpretation is given, it would make

Section 73 nugatory.

However, in cases wherein the very issue to be decided by the Court relates to the signature and writing made by a particular party, and a

decision on the said question would decide the very suit itself, it would be prudent to send the document for expert opinion.

While considering an application filed by a party to send the document for expert opinion, Court has to consider the entire factual matrix

involved in the matter. The nature of contentions, stage of the suit and the bona fides of the party in taking up such contentions are all relevant

factors. The denial of signature in the documents should be specific. In any case, if the Court was of the view that the comparison of the signature

or the disputed signature or writing by the expert would enable it to decide the lis more effectively, Court is at liberty to send such documents for

expert opinion.

In Ajit Savant Majagavi Vs. State of Karnataka, , Supreme Court indicated that the Court has the power to compare the disputed signature

with the admitted signature. But in case of slightest doubt, the matter should be left to the wisdom of an expert. The relevant paragraph would read

thus:

As a matter of extreme caution and judicial sobriety, the Court should not normally take upon itself the responsibility of comparing the disputed

signature with that of the admitted signature or handwriting and in the event of the slightest doubt, leave the matter to the wisdom of experts. But

this does not mean that the Court has not the power to compare the disputed signature with the admitted signature as this power is clearly available

u/s 73 of the Act.

The written statement was filed five years after the execution of Exs.A-1 and A-2. It is true that the appellant has not furnished any document

containing his contemporaneous signature for comparison with the signature as found in the promissory notes. However, the fact remains that there

was no application filed by the respondent for the purpose of comparing the signature.

The suit is based on two promissory notes alleged to have been executed by the appellant. When there was an express denial of execution of

the promissory notes by the appellant, the burden of proof lies on the respondent to prove that the documents were executed only by the appellant.

However, the respondent has not taken any steps for comparison of the signature. The issue was left to be decided by the learned Trial Judge. The

learned Judge took up the burden of comparing the documents and observed that the signature as contained in Exs.A-1 and A-2 was put by none

other than the appellant.

In Thiruvengada Pillai Vs. Navaneethammal and Another, , the issue before the Supreme Court was regarding the observation made by the

First Appellate Court about the failure on the part of the Defendants to prove that the signature was forged. By concurring with the views of the

High Court in setting aside the findings of the trial Court, by observing that it was for the plaintiff to prove the execution of document, the Supreme

Court held thus:

The trial Court had analyzed the evidence properly and had dismissed the suit by giving cogent reasons. The first Appellate Court reversed it

by wrongly placing onus on the Defendants. Its observation that when the execution of an unregistered document put forth by the plaintiff was

denied by the Defendants, it was for the Defendants to establish that the document was forged or concocted, is not sound proposition. The first

Appellate Court proceeded on the basis that it is for the party who asserts something to prove that thing; and as the Defendants alleged that the

agreement was forged, it was for them to prove it. But the first appellate court lost sight of the fact that the party who propounds the document will

have to prove it. In this case the plaintiff came to court alleging that the first defendant had executed an agreement of sale in his favour. The first

defendant having denied it, the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that the first Defendant had executed the agreement and not on the first

defendant to prove the negative. The issues also placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove the document to be true. No doubt, the plaintiff

attempted to discharge his burden by examining himself as also scribe and one of the attesting witnesses.

In P. Sood & Co., (Manufacturing) represented by its P. Sood and Co. Vs. Peerchand Misrimalji Bhansali, Prop. Meena Metals, , Division

Bench of this Court opined that when the defendant denied the signature in a particular document which is very much relied on by the plaintiff, it is

for the plaintiff to take steps to ascertain the genuineness of the disputed signature by sending the document to the hand writing expert.

The respondent has also marked Exs.A-8 and A-9 on his side which contains the signature of the appellant. However, the appellant denied the

said signatures also. Even though he has admitted that the letter head belongs to him, the contents of the letter as well as his signature were denied.

Therefore, the Trial Court was having only the written statement which admittedly contains the signature of the appellant. However, the written

statement was filed long after the execution of Exs.A-1 and A-2 and as such, it was not a contemporaneous document. It was only on a

comparison of the signature found on the suit pro notes that the Trial Court has recorded a factual finding that Exs.A-1 and A-2 were executed

only by the appellant. The said finding was seriously challenged by the appellant.

Since the Trial Court had taken the task of comparison, the respondent was not serious about the issue and as such, no action was taken by

him to compare the signature as found in Exs.A-1 and A-2 with reference to the admitted signature of the appellant. In view of the serious

challenge now made by the appellant with respect to the genuineness of Exs.A-1 and A-2, I am of the view that the respondent should be given an

opportunity to prove the genuineness of the signature as found in Exs.A-1 and A-2.

In The State (Delhi Administration) Vs. Pali Ram, , the Supreme Court opined that it would be permissible for the Trial Court to send the

disputed document for expert opinion even without an application. The relevant paragraph would read thus:

Even where no such expert witness is cited or examined by either party, the court may, if it thinks necessary for the ends of justice, on its own

motion, call an expert witness, allow him to compare the sample writing with the alleged writing and thus give his expert assistance to enable the

court to compare the two writings and arrive at a proper conclusion.

Therefore, I am of the view that the signature as found in Exs.A-1 and A-2 had to be examined by an expert at the cost of the respondent.

Disposition:

The finding with regard to the capacity of the respondent to advance amount was on the basis of relevant materials and accordingly, the said

finding is confirmed.

The finding given by the learned Trial Judge with respect to the genuineness of Exs.A-1 and A-2 is set aside and the matter is remitted for fresh

consideration.

In the result, the matter is remanded to the Trial Court for fresh consideration in respect of Issue No. 2. The Trial Court is directed to call upon

the appellant to submit contemporaneous documents containing his admitted signature and to call an expert to compare the signature as contained

in Exs.A-1 and A-2 with reference to such admitted signature and to answer Issue No. 2 afresh.

The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs. Consequently, C.M.P. No. 593/2009 is closed.