P. Subbiah Mooppanar vs S.S. Venkatarama Ayyangar and Others

Subba Rao, J.—The material facts in this revision petition are not in dispute. Defendants 1 to 3 are usufructuary mortgagees of the plaint-

schedule, property. The fourth defendant is the-mort-gagor. The fourth defendant sold the same to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 18000 under a

registered sale deed dated 10-2-1947. Under the sale deed, a sum of Rs. 3500 was reserved with the plaintiff to be paid to the mortgagees.

Accordingly he paid the amount to the mortgagees on 10-4-1947. The mortgagees though they were in pos-session during faslls 1355 and 1356

did not pay to the zamindar the cist for 1355 and 1356. After the plaintiff took possession of the properties he paid on 4-9-1949 a sum of Rs.

''165-15-9 to the zamindar being, the arrears of cist due In respect of the othi for faslis 1355 and 1356. After paying the amount to the Zamindar,

he filed S. C. 8. No. 789 of. 1951 on the file of the court of the District Mutislf; Ambasamudram, for the recovery of the said amount from

defendants 1 to 3. The learned District Munsif dismissed the suit, on the ground that the plaintiff paid the cist voluntarily"" and therefore, he would

not be entitled to re-cover the same. The plaintiff has filed the above revision.

The learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that Section 69, Contract Act directly applies to the facts of this case. Section 69 reads :

A person who is interested in the payment, of money which another Is bound by law to pay and who therefore pays it is entitled to be re-

imbursed by the other.

It is conceded that defendants 1 to 3 were bound by law to pay the cist to the zamindar. But It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the

respondents that the plaintiff is not a person interested in the payment of the money. The~-short question, therefore, is what is the connotation of

the word ""interested"" in Section 69 of the Act. The cases cited at the Bar are not directly in point. But they may be referred to appreciate the

contention raised.

Bose J., defined the word in - ''Banwarllal v. Rajkishore Guru'', AIR 1946 Nag 21 (A), as follows:

It is necessary that a person must be interest- ed in the payment of money and this interest, as the Privy Council case indicates arid as has been

held in - ''Mojiram v. Sagarmal'', AIR 1920 Nag 119 (B) and - AIR 1937 225 (Nagpur) , must be in order to avert some loss or to protect some

interest which would otherwise be lost to the plaintiffs.

The illustration to Section 69, Contract Act may also usefully be extracted :

B holds land in Bengal, on a lease granted by A the eamlndar. The revenue payable by A to the Government being in arrear, his land is advertised

for sale by the Government. Under the Revenue law, the consequence of such sale will be the annulment of B''s lease. B to pre vent the sale and

the consequent annulment of his own lease, pays to the Government the sum due from A. A is bound to make good to B the amount so paid.

Relying upon the observations of Bose J. and on the aforesaid illustration the learned counsel for the respondents argues that unless there is-some

threat of the non-payment of the amount-leads to some tangible loss to the person, any payment made by him under any other clrcum stance is a

voluntary payment and therefore, he is not a person interested, in the payment. I am, afraid I cannot give such a narrow construction to the word

interested"" in Section 69 of the Act. It is true that when a person pays an amount which another is bound by law to pay to avert some loss or to

protect some interest which would otherwise be lost to him or to avert a ''sate about to take place, it is a clear case, of the said person Having an

interest In the payment of the money. But the said circumstances are not exhaustive Curgenven J. in - Moideen Bibi Ammal by agent Montana

Sahib Vs. Rathnavelu Mudali, , in circumstances, similar to those present in the instant case applied the provisions of Section 69 of the Act. There

as here, the mortgagor paid the land revenue in respect, of the mortgaged properties which the mortgagee was bound by law to pay and in such a

case the learned Judge held that S. 69, Contract Act would apply.

In - ''Subramania Iyer v. Vengappa Reddi,'' 19 Mad L. J. 750 (E), a Division Bench of this court consisting of Benson and Krishnaswami Aiyar

JJ. held that the word ""interested"" was wide enough to include, the apprehension of any kind of loss or inconvenience or at any rate, of any

detriment capable of being assessed in money.

In the present case, the mortgagee did not pay the tax due for, faslis 1355 and 1356. The plaintiff purchased the property in .1947 and took

possession of the same. Taxes were not paid by the mortgagee even thereafter, that is, they were. in arrears for a period of three years. In those

circumstances, when a owner pays the arrears of taxes remaining unpaid, for a period of three years, it cannot.be said that he has no apprehension

that if the arrears were not paid coercive steps might be taken against him and the property. The learned counsel for the respondents says that in

view of the Tenants Protection Act, the lands could not be sold till the statutory notice was given and as no statutory notice was given in this case,

there could be no apprehension in the mind of the plaintiff. Apart from the fact that this point has not been raised in the court below, I cannot hold

that the. fact that statutory notice should be given as a condition precedent for the sale of the property is a ground for holding that a owner would

have no apprehension that steps would be taken against him even though admittedly arrears were not paid for three years.

Further in this case, the plaintiff as P. W. 1 stated that zamin authorities told him that they were going to take steps against him for realising the

arrears of rent due. The learned Judge disbelieved the evidence on the ground that he was an interested witness. In my view, there Is no ground to

reject the statement for it was natural and reasonable to expect the zamindar to threaten to take proceedings when arrears due to him were not

paid for three years. For all the aforesaid reasons I hold that when the petitioner paid the arrears of tax due, he was interested to pay that amount

within the mean ing of Section 69, Contract Act which the defendants were bound by law to pay. If so, it follows that the order of the lower court

is wrong and is liable to be set aside. Accordingly the order of the lower court is set aside. The plaintiff will have a decree as prayed for and he will

have his costs here and in the court below.