P. Thyagrajan vs Union of India (UOI) and Others

M. Ramakrishna, C.J.—Mr. P. Thyagrajan, who was working as ASI of Central Reserve Police Force, CRPF in short, having been appointed as such by the competent authority under the CRPF Rules, 1955, while he was so working in Guwahati, it is stated that he had been transferred to go to Jammu by an order made on 31st May, 1991. It is further stated that on the same day, he was relieved from the office so as to enable him to proceed to Jammu. It is stated that instead of proceeding to Jammu, pursuant to the above order, and assuming charge there at Jammu, he failed to report for duty at Jammu. On the other hand, he remained absent for a period of three months from duty on the pretext that he was unwell and that he was advised to take rest. However, the fact remains that having come to know about this plea disobeying the order of the competent authority, action was taken to hold an enquiry under Chapter VI of the CRPF Rules, 1955, hereinafter referred to as the Rules, as to the discipline of the Police Force as contemplated under the Statute. It is stated that charges were framed and an officer had been appointed as enquiring authority to enquire into the charges pursuant to the framing of charges by the competent authority. It is stated that the enquiring authority after completion of the enquiry, submitted his report to the disciplinary authority and the disciplinary authority, by an order made on 7.6.95, set aside the finding of the enquiring authority and directed the latter to hold the enquiry de novo. Aggrieved by this order of the disciplinary authority, the Petitioner, P. Thyagrajan, approached this Court in Civil Rule No. 2508/95, challenging the correctness and the legality of the order passed by the disciplinary authority/Commandant. The learned Single Judge, by an order made on 23.6.95, admitted the writ petition ; but while considering the prayer for interim relief sought for by the Petitioner, the learned Single Judge rejected the same holding:

I am not satisfied that this order requires any stay inasmuch as that power has been exercised by the authority under Rule 15 only using the word "De-Novo" will not change the tenor of the order. In view of that matter, the prayer for stay stands rejected.

It is this order which is called in question in this writ appeal.

We have heard the learned Counsel on both the sides.

Mr. R.P. Kakati, the learned CGSC appearing for the Union of India, while opposing the appeal submitted that by virtue of Rule 27(b) of the Rules, the disciplinary authority has got the power to set aside the report submitted by the enquiring authority and ask the latter to enquire into the facts of the case de-novo.

We have perused Sub-rule (b) of Rule 27 of the Rules dealing with Discipline and the Procedure for the award of punishment. It reads:

When non-gazetted officers or men of the various ranks to be punished for any offence, a departmental enquiry, if necessary under Clause (a) shall be held by the Commandant or other Superior Officer under the orders of the Commandant, provided that when the charge is against an officer of the rank of Subedar (Inspector) or Sub-Inspector the enquiry shall be held by an authority to be designated for the purpose by the Deputy Inspector General. Where the officer conducting the enquiry in the case of Subedar (Inspector) or a Sub-Inspector considers that a punishment under items (1) to (5) and (7) of the Table is called for, he shall complete the departmental proceedings and forward the departmental proceedings and forward the same to the Deputy Inspector General for orders.

Referring to the ambit of this provision of law, Mr. R.P. Kakati, submits that the disciplinary authority has by this machinery been empowered to set aside the report submitted by the enquiring authority and to ask him (the enquiring authority) to hold de novo enquiry.

Let us now examine the intendment of the legislation and as to whether sufficient power has been conferred upon the disciplinary authority within the scope of Sub-rule (b) of Rule 27 of the Rules to set aside the report of the enquiring officer and to direct to hold de novo enquiry. We are afraid, by a careful consideration of the Statute extracted above, it is not possible to arrive at a conclusion that the Parliament conferred such power upon the disciplinary authority to do so. In other words, regard being had to the provisions of an appeal arising out of an order of punishment made by the disciplinary authority accepting or rejecting the conclusion reached by the enquiring authority, the appellate authority certainly has got the power in the event of he (appellate authority) not being satisfied with the impugned order of the disciplinary authority, to set aside the order impugned under appeal and ask the enquiring authority to reconsider afresh or to do de novo enquiry. Such power which can be enjoyed by the appellate authority, cannot be said to be conferred upon the disciplinary authority under the provisions of Sub-rule (b) of Rule 27 of the Rules extracted above. As a matter of fact, it is seen that Rule 28 deals with appeals.

By a careful consideration of the provisions of Rule 28, it is seen that Rule 28 provides the machinery for appeals and the scope of such appeals including the powers of the appellate authority to deal with such appeals. It is further seen that regard being had to the powers conferred upon the appellate authority, such appellate authority can, while dealing with an appeal, set aside the order under appeal in the event of the appellate authority not being satisfied with the order impugned therein and thereby the appellate authority may direct the competent authority to reconsider the matter afresh and to hold de novo enquiry.

Therefore, in the light of the consideration of the statutory requirements as referred to above, coming within the purview of Sub-rule (b) of Rule 27 of the Rules, it is not possible to accept the submission of Mr. R.P. Kakati that such a power which can be exercised only by the appellate authority, does vest with the disciplinary authority under Sub-rule (b) of Rule 27 of the Rules. In other words, in absence of such power having been conferred upon the disciplinary authority under Sub-rule (b) of Rule 27 of the Rules, it is not possible to arrive at a conclusion that the order of the disciplinary authority impugned in the writ petition can be sustained. In other words, such order can be said to be one without jurisdiction, therefore, such an order cannot be sustained. On that ground alone, the writ Court could have disposed of the writ petition.

On the other hand, the writ petition having been admitted, refusing to grant interim relief, that matter came up before this appellate Court, it is unfortunate that such a simple matter is pending for three years.

In view of the foregoing, we set aside the impugned order made by the Deputy Inspector General, CRPF, on 7th June, 1995, impugned in the writ petition.

By this order, it is made clear that it is open to the disciplinary authority to consider the report submitted by the enquiring authority and to pass appropriate orders. Thus the writ petition referred to above, stands disposed of in terms of this order.

In the result, the appeal stands disposed of accordingly.

Parties to bear their own costs.