P. Tulsi Das and Others vs Govt. of A.P. and Others

Leave granted in SLP (C)Nos. 3699-3710, 7808 and 21533-21580 of 1995.

The above appeals have been filed against the commonorder of the Larger Bench of the Andhra PradeshAdministrative Tribunal at Hyderabad dated 27th April, 1994in O.A. Nos. 50430-50441 of 1991 etc., whereunder by amajority, with the dissenting opinion recorded by theChairman, the challenge to the constitutional validity ofSections 2 and 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Educational ServiceUntrained Teachers (Regulation of Services and Fixation ofPay) Act, 1991 (Act No. 14 of 1991) (hereinafter referred toas 'the Act') came to be rejected.

The facts which lead to the passing of the saidenactment, resulting in the order under challenge may brieflybe stated for a proper appreciation of the contentions of theparties on either side. After the formation of the State ofAndhra Pradesh the State Government framed a composite set ofrules called Andhra Pradesh Educational Rules, 1966 inexercise of the executive powers available for the State.The Schools in the State for the purpose of those Rules wereclassified into three categories: Elementary Schools forclasses 1st to 5th; Upper-Primary Schools for classes 6thand 7th and Secondary Schools for classes 8th, 9th and 10th.In several schools there were combined classes fromelementary stage to secondary stage also, though in someschools classes upto upper-primary alone were conducted. ForSSLC trained teachers(in short SGBT Teacher) the scale ofpay at the time of introduction of 1966 Rules was Rs. 80-150.In the Telangana area earlier the scales were lower andclassification was also said to be different. The scale ofpay for a Graduate B.Ed. known as School Assistant wasRs. 130-250. In addition to the other academic qualification,the teachers' training certificate or B.Ed. degree, was alsoan eligibility criteria for appointment as SGBT teacher orSchool Assistant, as the case may be, respectively.

In G.O.M.S. No. 910, Education dated 27th April, 1970,Statutory Rules were said to have been framed revising thescale of pay with effect from 19-3-1969 and the scale of payof SGBT teacher were said to have been revised to Rs. 96-200.Likewise the scale of pay of a School Assistant was alsorevised to Rs. 150-300. But during the relevant point of timein the year 1967, the scale of pay of SGBT with Matriculationand Teachers Training Certificate was Rs. 80-150 and of theSchool Assistant with Graduation and B.Ed. degree wasRs. 150-250. Due to dearth of trained graduation in Scienceand Mathematics with Mulki qualification for appointment asteachers in Telangana area the Government in G.O. No. 257Education dated 10-2-1967 accepting the proposals of theDirector of Schools, Education, passed orders that untrainedgraduate in those subjects may also be appointed in theminimum pay of Rs. 130/- in the scale of pay of Rs. 130-250with usual allowances admissible for a trained graduateteacher for a period of two years from the date of the saidorder. Keeping in view the fact that previously and at thetime of issuance of the said Government Order such untrainedgraduate, untrained intermediates and matriculates who werebeing appointed only on a pay of Rs. 100/- in the scale of payof Rs. 80-150, the Government issued G.O. 2069 Educationdated 9-10-1967 that untrained teachers in any part of theState may be appointed at the minimum of scale applicableand they will not be eligible to draw any increments in thescale till they acquire the necessary qualificationprescribed for the post. Since the Government Order dated10-2-1967 was with reference to the appointment of untrainedgraduate at the minimum scale of Pay of Rs. 130-250 withusual allowances in respect of Science and Mathematicssubjects only the untrained graduates appointed to teach thesubject of Humanity were not paid at the same scale but werebeing paid at Rs. 100/- which was being paid to such untrainedteachers prior to 10-2-1967. After the Revision of scales ofPay in the year 1970, noticed (supra) some of the untrainedgraduate appointed as School Assistants to teach subjects inHumanities filed W.P. No. 2295 of 1973 before the High Courtof Andhra Pradesh and by a judgment dated 23rd June, 1975 theHigh Court held that the untrained graduate teachers inHumanities were also entitled to get minimum scale of pay ofRs. 130 in the time scale of Rs. 130-250 as in the case ofuntrained graduate appointed to teach Science andMathematics. This decision was not challenged further by theauthorities of the State Government. By the time the HighCourt rendered the judgment the scale of pay then in force atRs. 130-250 was further said to have been revised asRs. 150-300 w.e.f. 19-3-1970 and the High Court, thereforesustained the claim for the revised scale of pay.

While matters stood thus a group of teachersbelonging to both SGBT and School Assistant categoriesteaching the subject in Humanities working in Zilla PrajaParishad Schools in Nalgonda approached the High Court with agrievance that they were being denied the benefit on theground that they were not graduate in Science andMathematics, by filing W.P. No. 6387 of 1976. With theconstitution of the erstwhile Administrative Tribunal in theState in exercise of the powers under Article 371D of theConstitution of India, the said writ petition stoodtransferred to the Tribunal as Tr. W.P. No. 1361 of 1976.When the matters came up before the Tribunal for hearing itwas disposed of by an order dated 15-9-1977 stating that itwas not disputed that the facts of that case and thoseearlier decided by the High Court were identical and that thelearned Government Pleader appearing also conceded theposition that the case was covered by the earlier decision ofthe High Court. Consequently, the Tribunal directed thateven the untrained graduates in Humanities appointed in theSecondary Grade posts in the scale of pay of Rs. 80-150 shouldbe allowed the minimum of Rs. 130/- in the scale of pay ofRs. 130-250, admissible to trained graduates appointed asB.Ed. School Assistants posts with effect from 10-2-1967 asa result said to have been not intended by the Government.Subsequently, several other judgments came to be renderedfollowing the said decision, as and when claims were madebefore the Tribunal. Consequential benefit including thefixation of seniority on the said position was also granted.The Government without challenging such orders took up thematters for consideration in the light of the decision of theTribunal and by orders dated 12-1-1982 and 20-2-1984 resolvedto implement the judgment of the Tribunal individually and tofacilitate the same also created supernumerary posts of B.Ed.Assistants with retrospective effect to carry out thedirections issued by the Tribunal. Even during January 1976,thousands of posts of B.Ed. Assistants and SGBT teacherswere created. The resultant position was that even SGBTTeachers who were appointed in the scale of pay of Rs. 80-150became entitled to the scale of pay attached to the post ofSchool Assistants on the plea raised that they have alsopossessed the same qualification prescribed for the post ofSchool Assistant. Subsequent to this several other judgmentsalso seems to have been rendered following the order dated15-9-1977 in Tr. W.P. No. 1361 of 1976 and all thosepetitioners also were able to get payments in the scale ofpay attached to the post of School Assistants inspite of thefact that some of them were appointed against the post ofSGBT Teachers only. It appears that all orders were notexpeditiously or effectively implemented and though in thelarge majority of the cases they were implemented, somesuch orders remained unimplemented also.

The decision rendered in Tr. W.P. No. 1361 of 1976has become final in the sense that no challenge was pursuedthereafter to the said judgment as also to the otherjudgments rendered subsequently following this judgment.With the constitution of the State Administrative Tribunalunder the provisions and Administrative Tribunals Act,1985, w.e.f. 1-11-1989 not only some of the cases pending onthe file of the erstwhile Tribunal stood transferred to thenew Tribunal, but several cases were also seem to have beenfiled afresh. It was at this stage that the Governmentsuddenly became alive, though in a belated manner to thepossible heavy financial commitments and serious implicationsflowing from the various judgments considered to bedetrimental to the public interest and promulgated the AndhraPradesh Educational Service Untrained Teachers (Regulation ofServices and Fixation of Pay) Ordinance, 1991 subsequentlyreplaced by the Act under challenge. The Preamble to the Actset out in detail the development of relevant events, fromtime to time and the passing of the various Orders by theGovernment as well as by the Court and the Tribunals, andreasons which necessitated the promulgation of the Ordinanceas well as the enactment of the law in question.

The Ordinance as well as the act referred to abovewas brought into force w.e.f. 10-2-1967. Sections 2 and 3which are relevant for our consideration reads as under:

Notwithstanding anything contained in any ruleor order of the Government or any judgment of anyCourt, Tribunal or other authority, the untrainedgraduate teachers in the subjects of Science andMathematics appointed in pursuance of G.O.Ms.No. 257 Education Department, dated the 10thFebruary, 1967 and the untrained graduate teachersin the subjects of Humanities appointed inpursuance of orders of Tribunal in Transferred writpetition No. 1361/76 dated the 15th September, 1977who actually handled eight, ninth and tenth classesin the Secondary Schools of Government Zilla ParjaParishads or as the case may be, aided managementsin the Telangana area of the State of AndhraPradesh shall be entitled to the minimum ofRs. 130/- in the time scale of Rs. 130-250 admissibleto trained graduate teachers if they are appointedto posts carrying that scale with effect from the10th February, 1967 to 31st December, 1973 andthereafter, their pay shall be regulated as pertheir eligibility as untrained graduate teachers inaccordance with the rules and orders in forces.

Notwithstanding any Government order,judgment, decree or order of any court. Tribunal orother authority, the supernumerary posts created inthe B.Ed., scale of Rs. 130-250 in accordance withthe orders issued by the Government in Memos.No. 1630/H-1/81-3, dated the 12th January, 1982 andalso on the 20th February, 1984 in place of theSecondary Grade posts of teachers in the time scaleof Rs. 80-150 shall and shall be deemed always tohave been secondary grade posts in the time scaleof Rs. 80-150 with subsequent increases due torevision of pay scales from time to time andaccordingly;

(a) at excess amount already sanctioned and paid tothe incumbents by creating supernumerary posts asaforesaid shall be recovered in such manner and insuch number of instalments as the Director ofSchool Education may, by order, direct;

(b) the teachers working in such supernumeraryposts shall not be entitled for counting theirservice in the B.Ed., scale for the automaticadvancement scheme formulated in G.O.Ms. No. 164,Finance dated, the 1st June, 1982;

(c) any benefit given to the teachers referred toin Clause (b) in accordance with the saidGovernment order shall stand cancelled from thedate of extending such benefit and any amount drawnin pursuance of such benefit shall be recoverablein the manner specified in Clause (a);

(d) no suit or other proceedings shall bemaintained or continued in any Court, Tribunal orother authority against the Government or anyperson or the authority whatsoever for creation ofsupernumerary posts for the teachers referred to inClause (b) and also such pending proceedings shallabate forthwith and

(e) no court shall enforce any decree or otherdirecting the pay fixation on par with the posts ofteachers created for the subjects of Mathematicsand science in accordance with G.O.Ms. No. 257Education Department, dated the 10th February,1967."

Since the provisions of the Act not only purported todisturb the state of affairs prevailing as on the date of theAct but proceeded to deprive the benefits already accrued andacquired by the class of petitioners by giving retrospectiveeffect to the Act w.e.f. 10-2-1967 and further by providingalso for the recovery of the amount already paid otherwisethan in terms of the Act and in the manner specified therein.Hence, the petitioners approached the Tribunal seeking forstriking down the provisions contained in Sections 2 and 3 ofthe Act. As noticed earlier the Chairman of the Tribunal whowas in the minority sustained the challenge made by theappellants to provisions contained in Section 2, Section 3(a)and (e). Though Section 3(b) was held to be valid, in viewof Sections 2 and 3 held to be bad, Sub-section (b) to (d)was considered not capable of surviving in isolation.Section 3(b) related to the grant of benefit of automaticadvancement scheme, in special grade Posts. So far as theremaining two Members who constituted the Bench areconcerned, they rendered separate opinions upholding thevalidity of the Act. One Member while dissenting from theview expressed by the Chairman was of the view thatdiscriminatory and offending part of the enactment can be setright if the words "the Telangana Area of" occurring inSection 2 of the Act is alone struck down to make itapplicable uniformly to the entire State. The other Memberwho also expressed his dissent with the opinion of theChairman but purported to agree with the Member who upheldthe validity subject to the modification in Section 2 noticedabove, assigned further reasons high-lighting certainanomalies, lapses and mistakes which according to him creptinto the matter resulting in the passing of indiscriminatoryorders not really justified on the facts of the cases whichwere brought before the Tribunal from time to time. Hencethese appeals.

Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao, learned senior counsel forthe appellants urged that the enactments in question broughtinto force with retrospective effect from 10-2-1967 takesaway the vested rights of the appellants and consequentlysuffers the vice of hostile discrimination, arbitrariness andexpropriation of vested rights and, therefore, are liable tobe struck down as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of theConstitution of India. It was also urged by the learnedsenior counsel that insofar as the Act purports to destroythe rights acquired under the orders of the High Court asalso the judicial orders passed by the statutory Tribunals,it tends to encroach into the judicial sphere andconsequently is liable to be struck down. A new point, notraised before the Tribunal based on alleged violation ofArticles 202 and 203 of the Constitution, though was soughtto be urged, was not permitted to be raised at this stage.Per contra Mrs. K. Amareshwari, learned senior counselappearing for the respondent-State with equal vehemence triedto justify the decision of the majority view of the Tribunalbelow and urged that the indisputable factual detailsindicated in the Preamble to the Act and noticed by theTribunals also warranted the interference of the Legislatureto set right the anomalies said to have resulted in thematter. According to the learned counsel seriousmistakes, lapses and errors have been committed having graveconsequences both in the matter of enforcement of law as alsothe effective administration and control of the schoolsresulting in serious financial problems and, therefore, noexception could be taken to the provisions of the Act whichwere meant to set right the whole matter. In substance thesubmission was that there was no deprivation of any of thelegally acquired or vested rights, but the Act purported toreally deny and discontinue ill-gotten rights and benefitsundesirably obtained.

We have carefully considered the submissions onbehalf of both parties.

The State of Gujarat and Another Vs. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni and Others, a Constitution Benchof this Court had an occasion to deal with the situationarising out of a retrospective legislation by the GujaratState enacting Gujarat Panchayats (Third Amendment) Act, 1978depriving the Secretaries, officers and servants of oldvillage Panchayats the status as members of the Stateservice. It was observed therein, while sustaining thechallenge to the constitutionality of the Act on the groundof unjust deprivation of vested or acquired rights asfollows:

"48. From the summary of the provisions of theAmending Act that has been set out above itrequires no perception to recognise the principaltarget of the amending legislation as the categoryof 'ex-municipal employees', who are, so to say,pushed out of the panchayat service and are to bedenied the status of government servants and theconsequential benefits. The ex-municipal employeesare virtually the "poor relations", the castle, thepanchayat service, is not for them nor theattendant advantages, privileges and perquisites,which are all for the "pedigree descendants" only.For them, only the outhouses. As a result of theamendments they cease to be government servantswith retrospective effect. Their earlierallocation to the panchayat service is cancelledwith retrospective effect. They become servants ofGram and Nagar Panchayats with retrospectiveeffect. They are treated differently from thoseworking in Taluqa and District Panchayats as wellas from the Talat is and Kotwals working in Gram andNagar Panchayats Their conditions of service areto be prescribed by Panchayats, by resolution,whereas the conditions of service of others are tobe prescribed by the Government. Their promotionalprospects are completely wiped out and alladvantages which they would derive as a result ofthe judgments of the courts are taken away.

Now, in 1978 before the Amending Act waspassed, thanks to the provisions of the principalAct of 1961, the ex-municipal employees who hadbeen allocated to the Panchayats service asSecretaries, Officers and servants of Gram andNagar Panchayats, had achieved the status ofgovernment servants. Their status as governmentservants could not be extinguished, so long as theposts were not abolished and their services werenot terminated in accordance with the provisions ofArticle 311 of the Constitution. Nor was itpermissible to single them out for differentialtreatment. That would offend Article 14 of theConstitution. An attempt was made to justify thepurported differentiation on the basis of historyand ancestry, as it were. It was said that Talat isand Kotwals who became Secretaries, Officers andservants of Gram and Nagar Panchayats weregovernment servants, even to start with, whilemunicipal employees who became such Secretaries,Officers and servants of Gram and Nagar Panchayatswere not. Each carried the mark or the 'brand' ofhis origin and a classification on the basis of thesource from which they came into the service, itwas claimed, was permissible. We are clear that itis not. Once they had joined the common stream ofservice to perform the same duties, it is clearlynot permissible to make any classification on thebasis of their origin. Such a classification wouldbe unreasonable and entirely irrelevant to theobject sought to be achieved. It is to navigatearound these two obstacles of Articles 311 andArticle 14 that the Amending Act is sought to bemade retrospective, to bring about an artificialsituation as if the erstwhile municipal employeesnever became members of a service under the State.Can a law be made to destroy today's accruedconstitutional rights by artificially reverting to asituation which existed 17 years ago? No.

The legislation is pure and simple,self-deceptive, if we may use such an expressionwith reference to a legislature-made law. Thelegislature is undoubtedly competent to legislatewith retrospective effect to take away or impairany vested right acquired under existing laws butsince the laws are made under a writtenConstitution, and have to conform to the dos anddon'ts of the Constitution, neither prospectivenor retrospective laws can be made so as tocontravene fundamental rights. The law mustsatisfy the requirements of the Constitution todaytaking into account the accrued or acquired rightsof the parties today. The law cannot say, 20 yearsago the parties had no rights, therefore, therequirements of the Constitution will be satisfiedif the law is dated back by 20 years. We areconcerned with today's rights and not yesterday's.A legislature cannot legislate today with referenceto a situation that obtained 20 years ago andignore the march of events and the constitutionalrights accrued in the course of the 20 years. Thatwould be most arbitrary, unreasonable and anegation of history. It was pointed out by aConstitution Bench of this court in B.S. Yadav v.State of Haryana. Chandrachud, CJ, speaking forthe Court held:

Since the Governor exercises the legislativepower under the proviso to Article 309 of theConstitution, it is open to him to giveretrospective operation to the rules made underthat provisions. But the date from which the rulesare made to operate must be shown to bear eitherfrom the face of the rules or by extrinsicevidence, reasonable nexus with the provisionscontained in the rules, especially when theretrospective effect extends over a long period asin this case.

Today's equals cannot be made unequal bysaying that they were unequal 20 years ago and wewill restore that position by making a law todayand making it retrospective. Constitutionalrights, constitutional obligations andconstitutional consequences cannot be tampered withthat way. A law which if made today would beplainly invalid as offending constitutionalprovisions in the context of the existing situationcannot become valid by being made retrospective.Past virtue (constitutional) cannot be made to wipeout present vice (constitutional) by makingretrospective laws. We are, therefore, firmly ofthe view that the Gujarat Panchayats (ThirdAmendment) Act, 1978 is unconstitutional, as itoffends Articles 311 and 14 and is arbitrary andunreasonable. We have considered the questionwhether any provision of the Gujarat Panchayats(Third Amendment) Act, 1978 might be salvaged. Weare afraid that the provisions are so intertwinedwith one another that it is well nigh impossibleto consider any life-saving surgery. The whole ofthe Third Amendment Act must go. ....."

In Ex-Capt. K.C. Arora and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others, the principles laiddown by the above Constitution Bench were followed, whilestriking down an amendment to the Punjab Government NationalEmergency (Concession) Rules taking away acquired or accruedfundamental rights with retrospective effect, as offendingArticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Theretrospective amendment of the Rules in the said case had theeffect of depriving the benefit of military services beyond aparticular date with retrospective effect thereby taking awaythe vested rights which accrued to the petitioner and thiswas declared to be ultra vires the Constitution and struckdown.

In Chairman, Railway Board and others Vs. C.R. Rangadhamaiah and others, yet anotherConstitution Bench of this Court had an occasion to deal withthe validity of a retrospective amendment to the servicerules adversely affecting the pension of the employees whoalready stood retired on the date of the notification issuedby way of an amendment, on the view that the pensionadmissible was under the Rules in force a the time ofretirement, and the reduction of the pension as admissiblewith retrospective effect was held to be arbitrary andunreasonable, after an exhaustive review of case law of thesubject.

On a careful consideration of the principles laiddown in the above decisions in the light of the factsituation in these appeals we are of the view that theysquarely apply on all fours to the cases on hand in favour ofthe appellants. The submissions on behalf of therespondent-State that the rights derived and claimed by theappellants must be under any statutory enactment or rulesmade under Article 309 of the Constitution of India and thatin other respects there could not be any acquisition ofrights validly, so as to disentitle the State to enact thelaw of the nature under challenge to set right seriousanomalies which crept in and deserved to undone, does notmerit our acceptance. It is by now well settled that in theabsence of Rules under Article 309 of the Constitution inrespect of a particular area, aspect or subject, it waspermissible for the State to make provisions in exercise ofits executive powers under Article 162 which is co-extensivewith its Legislative powers laying conditions of service andrights accrued to or acquired by a citizen would be as muchrights acquired under law and protected to that extent. Theorders passed by the Government, from tie to time beginningfrom February 1967 to 1985 and at any rate upto the passingof the Act, to meet the administrative exigencies and caterto the needs of public interest really and effectivelyprovided sufficient legal basis for the acquisition of rightsduring the period when they were in full force and effect.The orders of the High Court as well as the Tribunal alsorecognised and upheld such rights and those orders attainedfinality without being further challenged by the Government,in the minor known to law. Such rights, benefits andperquisites acquired by the Teachers concerned cannot be saidto be rights acquired otherwise than in accordance with lawor brushed aside and trampled at the sweet will and pleasureof the Government, with impunity. Consequently we are unableto agree that the Legislature could have validly denied thoserights acquired by the appellants retrospectively not onlydepriving them of such rights but also enact a provision torepay and restore the amounts paid to them to the State. Theprovisions of the Act, though can be valid in its operation'in future' can not be held valid in so far as it purports torestore status quo ante for the past period taking away thebenefits already available, accrued and acquired by them. For allthe reasons stated above the reasons assigned by the majorityopinion of the Tribunal could not be approved in our hands.The provisions of Sections 2 and 3(a) insofar as they purportto take away the rights from 10-2-1967 and obligates thosewho had them to repay or restore it back to the State ishereby struck down as arbitrary, unreasonable andexpropriatory and as such is violative of Articles 14 and 16of the Constitution of India. No exception could be taken,in our view, to the prospective exercise of powers thereunderwithout infringing the rights already acquired by theappellants and the category of the persons similarly situatedwhether approached courts or not seeking relief individually.The provisions contained in Section 2 have to be read down soas to make it only prospective, to save the same from theunconstitutionality arising out of its retrospectiveapplication.

So far as the claim of benefits under the automaticadvancement scheme formulated in GOMS No. 164, Finance andPlanning Department, dated 1st June, 1982 is concerned we areunable to agree with the stand take for the appellants thatany service rendered could entitle the appellants or theclass of persons similarly placed, to claim the benefit ofthe automatic advancement scheme. It is well settled that aperson holding a lesser grade of post can be made to beincharge of a higher post and be paid also the scales of paypermissible for the higher grade or category of post but thatwill not make the said person entitled to claim to be aregular member or incumbent of the post to claimconsequential benefits for any advanced career or promotionas if he is a regular incumbent to the said post. Even anyone of the appellant or the class of persons similarlysituated when assert a claim for the benefits of the saidscheme they will have to strictly comply with the requirementof the conditions stipulated therefore in the scheme andcannot be virtue of the services rendered in a post pursuanttot he concession show to appoint them in the highercategory of posts with a limited purpose and object as theaim automatically become entitled to count such service forclaiming the benefits under the special scheme.

The provisions contained in Section 3 mandates thatthe supernumerary posts created in the B.Ed.Grade ofRs. 130-250 pursuant to the orders noticed therein shall bedeemed always to have been Secondary Grade Posts of teachersin the time scale of Rs. 80-150 with subsequent increases dueto revision of pay scales from time to time, accordingly.The reasons assigned, supra would apply with equal force toinvalidate this retrospective reclassification by a fictionto nullify the lawful rights acquired during the past periodand justify only prospective application and accordingly readdown, as in the case of Section 2 of the Act. In view of theconclusions arrived at on the eligibility or otherwise toclaim the benefit of the automatic advancement scheme thereis no need or warrant to interfere with the stipulationscontained in Section 3(c) and (d). In the light of and tothe extent of relief granted to the appellants in thisJudgment, Section 3(e) also cannot have any such force andeffect to deprive the rights accrued to and acquired by theappellants and persons similarly placed.

The appeals are partly allowed, accordingly.

In the light of the above orders passed grantingrelief to all persons similarly placed as the appellants nofurther orders are necessary on the application forimpleadment.

C.A. No. 5208 of 2000

The above appeal has been filed against the judgmentof a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dated9th September, 1997 in Writ Appeal No. 931 of 1997 whereunderthe Court while allowing the appeal of the respondentdirected the appellants to give the benefits of due scale ofpay of Rs. 320-580 as revised from time to time with effectfrom due date. By a separate judgment in C.A. Nos. 2652-2654of 1995 etc., we have dealt with the constitutional validityof the Andhra Pradesh Education Service Untrained Teachers(Regulation of Services and Fixation of Pay) Act, 1991 (A.P.Act No. 14 of 1991) and upheld the rights of teachers who wereappointed as SGBT Teachers to be entitled to the pay scalesof School Assistants for the period prior to the said Act.The Teacher/concerned in this appeal also would be entitledto the benefits, to the extent such benefits have beenallowed in favour of the appellants in the other appeals, andnothing more. If the order of the High Court purports togive anything more than what was held permissible in respectof others, the order in W.A. No. 931 of 1997 shall standmodified to bring it in conformity with our decision in theconnected appeals.

Consequently the appellants shall work out themonetary benefits as are due to the respondent in this appealin the light of the Judgment rendered by us in the connectedappeals i.e. CA Nos. 2652-54 of 1995 etc., it is also madeclear that the claim of the respondents is sustained only tothe extent of availing the monetary benefits and not for anysubstantive appointment to the post of School Assistants, assuch. With this clarification of the correct position of lawand modification in the light of the other judgment renderedby us, this appeal shall stand finally disposed of.