High CourtsSingle Bench(1998) 03 MAD CK 0022

P. Vanavamalai and others vs Govt. of Tamil Nadu and others

Madras High Court · Decided on 25 March 1998 · Citation: AIR 1998 Mad 319

HON’BLE JUDGES
P. Sathasivam, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 3726 of 1989

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

160 paragraphs · 3,617 words

P. Sathasivam, J.—Aggrieved by the land acquisition proceedings, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition on various grounds.

2.

The petitioners own lands in Sooriyur village, Tiruchirapalli Taluk. The respondents have initiated proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act,

1894 to acquire the lands of the petitioners. It is stated that Bharathidhasan University has submitted proposals to the State Government that it

requires 500 acres of land under first stage I. Initially the State Government issued orders to acquire the said 500 acres of land in Sooriyur village.

However, the lands belonging to the petitioners were not included in the said order. In this regard, Section 4(1) Notification was published in the

Government Gazette on 31-12-1986. The substance of the notification was also published in the local dailies circulated in the area. Pursuant to the

notification, 2nd respondent on 30-1-1987 issued notices to the petitioners that the lands belonging to them are required for public purposes for

the formation of Bharathidasan University and if the petitioners have any objection, they can submit the same on 13-4-1987. The petitioners raised

various valid objections. The 2nd respondent forwarded the objection to the third respondent for their comments. The third respondent by reply

dated 25-5-1987 offered their remarks. The second respondent on 30-5-1987 forwarding the above letter of the third respondent to the

petitioners called them to attend further enquiry. Ultimately the second respondent has passed orders on 2-6-1987 and recommended to the

Government for passing 6(6) Declaration. Accordingly, the Government have issued 6 Declaration dated 15-2-1988 and the same was published

in the Government Gazette on 16-2-1988 as per the amended provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, the publication of 6 Declaration on 16-2-

1988 had exceeded one year prohibition imposed under Proviso (ii) of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Hence the entire acquisition

proceedings become void ab initio and the same is liable to be quashed.

3.

Respondents 1 and 2 have filed a counter affidavit disputing the various averments made by them. It is stated that the Government in their orders

Ms. No. 541, Education (Science and Technology) Department, dated 29-3-1982 and Ms. No. 1349, Education (Science and Technology)

Department, dated 26-6-1982 accorded administrative sanction for acquisition of 205.99.5 and 200.98.5 Hectares of lands respectively in two

phases in Sooriyur village, Tiruchirapalli Taluk for the purpose of establishment of Bharathidasan University. The land acquisition proceedings have

been completed in all respects and possession was handed over to the University to the extent of 231.10.0 Hectares. Since the extent of

acquisition applied for was large, the entire extent sought for was split up into 39 Blocks for expediting acquisition proceedings. The petitioners''

lands come under Block No. 39. Notification u/s 4(1) was published in the Government Gazette on 31-12-1986. The said notification was also

published in two dailies, viz. Indian Express and Dinamalar, dated 11-1-1987 and the substance of the notification was published in the locality on

30-1-1987. Thereafter, notices for enquiry u/s 5A of the Land Acquisition Act were duly published and served on the interested persons as per

Rules. They raised objections to the acquisition. Their objections were duly communicated to the requisitioning body. Thereafter Draft Declaration

Notification u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was sent to the Government on 30-7-1987 for approval. The Government approved the said

notification. At that stage the writ petitioners filed a writ petition in W.P. No. 7160/87. But the same was dismissed on 31-8-1987. Against the

said order of dismissal, the petitioners filed Writ Appeal No. 2244 of 1987 and this Court granted stay in C.M.P. No. 19664/87 till 5-1-88. The

writ appeal was also dismissed by this Court on 21-3-1989. It is further stated that in the meantime 6 Declaration was published in the

Government Gazette on 16-2-1988 and also published in two Tamil dailies dated 23-2-1988. The substance of the declaration notification was

also published in the locality on 18-2-1988. The said declaration is being challenged in this present writ petition. The acquisition is for establishment

of Bharathidasan University and it is for public purpose only and not otherwise. The contention that 6 Declaration is beyond one year is factually

incorrect. Since the time taken by the petitioner by way of the writ petition and writ appeal have to be excluded for computation of period referred

to in the first proviso to Section 6; hence declaration u/s 6 of the Act was published in time. Since the respondents have followed all the provisions

after due notice to the petitioners, absolutely there is no merit in the writ petition and prayed for dismissal of the same.

4.

In the light of the above pleadings, I have heard Mr. N.S. Sivam, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. V.M. Rajavelu, Special

Government Pleader for respondents.

5.

Even though the petitioners have raised many objections regarding the proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, the learned counsel

for the petitioner confined his argument, namely, 6 Declaration published by the respondents on 23-2-1988 is beyond one year period provided

u/s 6(1), Proviso 2 of the said Act. On the other hand, the learned Special Government Pleader, after taking me through the facts and figures in the

light of the counter-affidavit, submitted that 6 Declaration published is well within time and prayed for dismissal of the same.

6.

I have carefully considered the rival submissions.

7.

As stated earlier, in view of the limited argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners, I need not traverse the other factual aspects except

the legality of the 6 Declaration made by the respondents.

8.

It is seen that 4(1) Notification is dated 15-12-1986. The same has been published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 31-12-1986.

Publication in news papers were effected on 11-1-1987 and the substance of the 4(1) Notification was published in the locality on 30-1-1987.

9.

Section 6 Declaration is dated 15-2-1988. The said declaration was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 16-2-1988,

published in the news papers on 23-2-1988 and in the locality on 18-2-1988. According to the petitioners, the stay granted by this Court in

C.M.P. No. 19664/87 in Writ Appeal No. 2244/87 was in operation during the period from 14-12-1987 to 5-1-1988, In other words, there was

an order of stay for a period of 22 days. By relying on Section 6(2) of the Act, it is contended that the last date of such publication and the giving

up of the publication of the notice, hereinafter referred to as the date of publication of the declaration, the last date of such publication is in

newspaper on 23-2-1988. Accordingly, it is the case of the learned counsel for the petitioner that as per Section 6(1), Proviso (ii) declaration shall

be made within one year of Section 4(1) Notification. He points out that as per Section 4(1), the last date of publication being the date of

publication of the notification, the locality publication effected on 30-1-1987 has to be considered. Likewise, as per Section 6(2), the last of the

date of publication, namely, newspaper publication which took place on 23-2-1988 is the relevant date for ascertaining the period of limitation.

Here, according to the learned counsel, the period of 22 days have to be excluded. In other words, from 30-1-1987, the one year period expires

on 30-1-1988, out of which 22 days of stay have to be excluded. Accordingly, the one year period provided u/s 6(1), Proviso (ii) is extended up

to 22-2-1988. In other words, the declaration has to be published on or before 21-2-1988 in order to save limitation as per Section 6(1), Proviso

(ii). In this case, since the last date of publication, namely, newspaper publication was effected only on 28-2-1988 i.e., after one year period, the

same cannot be sustained and the 6 Declaration has to be quashed. In order to support the above contention, the learned counsel for the

petitioners very much relied on Section 6(2) of the Act which runs as follows:-

Section 6(2): Every declaration shall be published in the Official Gazette, and in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is

situate of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such declaration to be

given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred

to as the date of the publication of the declaration), and such declaration shall state the district or other territorial division in which the land is

situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area, and, where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan

may be inspected.

He contended that since the statute itself extends the date of publication of declaration, the same has to be considered. In other words, by relying

on the details furnished within the bracket in sub-section (2) of Section 6, the learned counsel submitted that the date of publication of declaration

is the last date of such publication. Here within 3 modes of publication of 6 Declaration the last date of publication being newspaper publication on

23-2-1988 after deducting the said period (22 days) the publication of the Declaration on 23-2-1988 is barred by Section 6(1) Proviso (ii) of the

Act. He also relied on the similar details furnished in the Statute, namely, in Section 4 with regard to the last date of such publication, is deemed to

be the date of publication of the Notification. Repelling the above contentions, learned Special Government Pleader has submitted that such

construction cannot be accepted. According to him, the last date of such publication as the date of publication of the declaration is only for the

purpose of passing an award as per Section 11A of the Act. As per Section 11A, the Collector has to make an award u/s 11 within a period of

two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of

the land shall lapse. No doubt, in computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to

be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. After considering Sections 4(1), 6(2) as well as

11, 11A of the Act, I am in agreement with the argument of the learned Special Government Pleader. As rightly pointed out, in view of the

reference of the word ''hereinafter'' in Section 6(2), that the last date of such publication as the date of publication of the declaration is meant only

for passing an award u/s 11 of the Act. A perusal of the scheme of the Act shows only to such conclusion. Learned Special Government Pleader

has also brought to my notice the latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in Eugenio Misquita and Others Vs. State of Goa and Others,

Before Their Lordships an identical question was raised. In other words, the same argument was advanced before the Supreme Court in that

decision. In the light of the similar contention raised in that case, Their Lordships have referred to Sections 4A, 6(1)(2) and 11A of the Land

Acquisition Act. After referring the same a question has been formulated in the following manner in that decision:-

7.

It is now well settled that the last of the dates in the series of the publications made u/s 4(1) of the Act is the relevant date to reckon the starting

point of limitation for the purpose of proviso to Section 6(1)(ii). Now, the question is which is the relevant date to reckon the last date for the

purpose of clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1). In other words, whether the modes of publication prescribed u/s 6(2) obviously for the

purpose of reckoning limitation u/s 11A of the Act have any part to play in the matter of computing the period prescribed under clause (ii) of the

first proviso to Section 6(1).

A similar argument was raised in that case stating that the limitation prescribed under Clause (ii) of Section 6(1) has to be construed with reference

to the date of the publication prescribed u/s 6(2) of the Act. In support of the said submission the learned counsel referred some of the decisions

rendered earlier by the Apex Court on Section 6(1) of the Act holding that the last of the dates of such publication in the series is the relevant date

for computing the period of limitation under clause (ii) to Proviso (1) to Section 6(1). Their Lordships have concluded thus:-

9.

Let us examine whether the learned counsel is right in his submission. As seen from the above extracts of relevant provisions, while Section 4(1)

commands publication of notification under that section. Section 6 speaks of the declaration being made to the effect that any particular land is

needed for public purpose or for a company. There are judicial decisions that have interpreted the word ""made"" to mean ""published"" for the

reasons stated in those decisions. Therefore, strictly speaking, but for those judicial decisions the date of making of the declaration u/s 6(1) will be

the relevant date for reckoning the period of limitation. However, in the interest of the general public, the courts have taken the view that the

declaration made will stand accomplished only when it is published. This publication has, therefore, nothing to do with the publication referred to in

Section 6(2) of the Act which is for a different purpose, inter alia, for reckoning the limitation prescribed u/s 11A of the Act. This construction is

supported by the language employed in Section 6(2) of the Act. In particular, the word ""hereinafter"" used in Section 6(2) will amply prove that the

last of the series of the publication referred to u/s 6(2) is relevant for the purposes coming thereafter, namely, for making award u/s 11A. The

language employed in second proviso to Section 6(1) also supports this construction. Therefore, the contention of learned counsel cannot be

accepted.

It is also seen that the very same view was taken by the Apex Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and Another Vs. Makrand Singh and Others,

. The following conclusion arrived at in that case, namely, Eugenio Misquita and Others Vs. State of Goa and Others, Since the conclusion of Their

Lordships in those decisions are answered to our present question, the relevant conclusions have been hereby extracted (Para 12 of AIR):-

...........The learned Judges after referring to the relevant provisions observed thus: (SCC pp. 499-500, paras 4 and 5).

The question, therefore, is that which date of the publications in three steps i.e., publication in the Gazette, two news papers and local publication

to be the last date for the purpose of computing three years limitation prescribed in clause (i) of the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act. Prima facie,

it gives an impression that the last of any of the three steps puts in motion, the running of limitation of three years.

So it is necessary to understand the scheme and policy of the Act to get the crux of the question.

* * *

It would be seen that the purpose of notification u/s 4(1) is an intimation to the owner or person having an interest in the land that Government

exercised the power of eminent domain in relation to his land and for public purpose his land is needed or likely to be needed, puts an embargo on

his freedom to deal with the land as an unencumbered land and also pegs the price of the land prevailing as on that date. It also is a caveat to the

Collector to make the award u/s 11 as well as to determine the market value prevailing as on the last of the dates to be the date and the award

should be made within a period prescribed by Section 11 A, lest the entire acquisition shall stand lapsed. The word ''hereinafter'' is for such

purposes as well as for the purpose of determination of the compensation under Chapter III of the Act as well. Therefore, the word ''hereinafter''

referred to as the last date of the publication of the notification is the date from which the prevailing prices of the land is to be computed etc.

* * *

The last dale u/s 6(2) shall be the date for the purposes ''hereinafter referred to'' would be not for computing the period of three years prescribed in

clause (1) of the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act as it was already done, but purposes to be followed hereinafter. Otherwise language would

have been ''hereinbefore done''. Sub-section (2) as such did not prescribe any limitation within which the declaration u/s 6(1) or other steps

hereinafter to be taken, in other words, the steps to be taken thereafter in making the award u/s 11 or in computation of the period prescribed in

Section 11A. The publication of the declaration in two daily newspapers having circulation in the locality one of which is in the regional language

and the publication of the substance of the declaration in the locality are ministerial acts and is a procedural part. It appears that these publications

are required to be done to make the declaration published in the manner, to be conclusive evidence of the public purpose u/s 11 by the Collector.

In other words, the limitation prescribed u/s 11A is of the purpose of making the award and if the Collector fails to do so, the entire proceeds

under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) shall stand lapsed. If this consistent policy of the Act is understood giving teeth to the operational efficacy to the

scheme of the Act and public purpose the Act seeks to serve. We are of the considered view that publication in the Official Gazette already made

under clause (i) of proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 is complete, as soon as the declaration u/s 6(1) was published in the Official Gazette.

That will be the date for the purpose of computation of three years period from the last of the dates of the publication of the notification u/s 6(1).

The procedural ministerial acts prescribed under sub-section (2) are only for the purpose of the procedure to be followed ''hereinafter'', in other

words, the steps to be taken subsequent to the publication of the declaration u/s 6(1) of the Act. We cannot agree with Shri Rana, the learned

Senior counsel, that the date of making the declaration by the Secretary to the Government or the authorised officer is the date for computing

period of three years. Equally, we cannot agree with the learned counsel for the respondents. Shri Upadhyay, (sic) that publication of the substance

being the last date from which the period of three years needs to be compared. Acceptance of either contention would easily defeat the public

policy under the Act by skillful manner of management with the lower level officials.

10.

After referring various other High Courts decisions, Their Lordships have also concluded thus Eugenio Misquita and Others Vs. State of Goa

and Others,

The above view of this Court lends support to the view that for the purpose of calculating the limitation prescribed under Clause (ii) of the first

proviso to Section 6(1), it is not the last of the publication in the series that should be taken into account, but the publication that was made in the

first instance u/s 6.

11.

In the light of the direct decisions of the Supreme Court as referred to above, the contra argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner

cannot be accepted and the contention of the learned Special Government Pleader is well founded. Even though the learned counsel for the

petitioner has referred to various earlier decisions of this Court as well as the decisions of the Apex Court, in view of the two recent decisions of

the Supreme Court in Eugenio Misquita and Others Vs. State of Goa and Others, and Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and Another Vs. Makrand

Singh and Others, which are directly applicable to the present question, I am not referring the decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the

petitioner. By applying the said decisions of the Supreme Court, the relevant date during which date of declaration published in the Tamil Nadu

Government Gazette on 16-2-1988. In other words, as stated earlier, the substance of the S. 4(1) Notification was published in the locality on 30-

1-1987. The declaration made u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was published in the Government Gazette on 16-2-1988. The period from 14-

12-1987 to 5-1-1988 during which period the interim stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the Notification issued u/s 4(1) of the Act in G.O.

Ms. No. 2008 Education, dated 15-12-1986 has been in force, has to be excluded for computation of any period referred in the first proviso to

Section 6 of the Act. After such deduction I am satisfied that the declaration u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was published well within time. I

have already slated that except the above said objection, no other points were pressed into service.

12.

In the light of what is stated above, I hold that the publication u/s 6 Declaration in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 16-2-1988 is well

within time; accordingly there is no infirmity in the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the respondents. Net result, the writ petition fails and the

same is dismissed. No costs.