Pabbisetti Seethamma vs G. Lakshmana Iyer

Anantanarayanan, J.—The sole point involved in the revision proceeding by the landlord, who was able to obtain an ex parte order of eviction against the tenant, is a question of limitation. Under R. 18(3) of the Rules framed under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, XVIII of 1960:

In any case in which an order is passed ex parte against a tenant or a landlord.......then the party affected may within 30 days from the date of the pronouncement of the order in open Court apply to the Controller by whom the ex parte order or the order of dismissal was passed, for an order to set it aside........

In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the tenant did not apply within 30 days of the date of pronouncement of the order, strictly construed as such. But his case was that there was no service of summons with regard to the proceeding at all, and that he was in total ignorance of the proceeding and the ex parte order of eviction. As soon as he came to know of the existence of such an order, which was about three months after the order had been actually passed, he immediately applied to have the order set aside. The revision is against the order of the learned Second Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Madras holding this contention to be tenable, and directing the Rent Controller to find out whether the respondent (tenant) had knowledge only upon the occasion that he has claimed and not earlier.

Mr. Srisailam for the revision petitioner (landlord) contends that the plain English of the rule must be given effect to; had the Legislature intended that some other construction could possibly apply, such as the date of knowledge by the party affected, the necessary words would have been employed.

But the point is concluded by authority, though as a matter of principle applicable to such rules of limitation with regard to orders of Special Tribunals, and not with regard to this particular rule. In O.A.O.A.M. Muthiah Chettiar Vs. The Comr. of Income Tax, the Bench of Rajamannar, C.J. and Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. had to consider the very same point, with regard to an analogous provision in the income tax Act. The learned Judges stated the principle in the form that

If a person is given a right to resort to the remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed time, limitation should not be computed from a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew of the order or had an opportunity of knowing the order and therefore must be presumed to have knowledge of the order.

The same principle was affirmed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in H.R.C. Raj Singh v. Dy., Land Acquisition Officer (1). Mr. Srisailam, desires to distinguish the present case on the ground that here we have a rule referring to ''the date of pronouncement of the order'', and not merely ''the date of the order'' as in the other instances. I am unable to see that this makes any material difference to the application of the principle. The words ought to be construed, on the above authorities to mean the date on which the party affected had either actual knowledge or constructive knowledge of the order. Hence the order of the learned Second Judge directing an enquiry into the occasion of knowledge of the respondent is perfectly a correct one and must be upheld. The revision proceeding therefore fails and is dismissed. Mr. R. Sundaravaradan appears amicus curiae for the respondent. There will be no order as to costs.