High CourtsSingle Bench(1986) 04 MAD CK 0011

P.A.K. Palanisamy High School vs The Joint Director of School Education (Secondary) and Appellate Authority, under Section 23 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulations) and Another

Madras High Court · Decided on 24 April 1986 · Citation: (1987) 1 MLJ 64

HON’BLE JUDGES
T. Sathiadev, J

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Judgment

103 paragraphs · 2,300 words

T. Sathiadev, J.—Petitioner is the Management of P.A.K. Palanisamy High School, at Madras and it seeks for quashing the order of the first

respondent being the Joint Director of School Education, Madras dated 30.6.1979, only in so far as it enforces a condition to pay back wages i.e.,

pay and allowances with all the benefits from the date of removal upto the date of reinstatement of the concerned teachers from the funds of the

Management without any claim from the Government funds and for a direction to issue to the 2nd respondent to sanction the payment of staff grant

to 18 teachers reinstated in service by the petitioner for the period from 21.4.1979 to 17.7.1979.

2.

The petitioner-Management claims as follows: In 1979, there was gross and unprecedented indiscipline among several teachers handling

Standards IX and X in the petitioner''s school, and it went to the extent of themselves enabling students to indulge in mass-copying in the

examinations and several other acts of indiscipline being committed. Therefore, the Management decided to close the Standards IX and X and

accordingly issued notice to 18 teachers informing that the said two standards would be closed for the academic year 1979-80, and therefore,

their services were no longer required on and from the reopening date. The notices were issued on 20.4.1979, and they were offered to be paid

their salary till the date of notice. The first respondent by his order dated 23.4.1979 asked the petitioner to put forth its representations on the

notices issued, and accordingly it gave tits, representations. The Director of School Education by Proceedings dated 3.5.1979 directed the

petitioner to continue to function the Said two standards. Petitioner put (sic) its, representations and the same 4uthority by an order dated

23.5.1979 cancelled its, proceedings dated 3.5.1979, being satisfied with what the petitioner had done. It appears that appeals were filed by

teachers against the closure notices, and the first respondent by proceedings dated 17.5.79, called upon the petitioner to offer its, remarks on the

appeal petitions, and it gave its representations on 30.5.79, whereupon the first respondent by proceedings dated 30.6.79 directed the petitioner

to reinstate the teachers into service with all back wages. and benefits from the date of removal, i.e., 20.4.1979 upto the date of reinstatement,

from the ''funds of the Management without any claim from the Government funds. Petitioner complied with the directions so issued and restored

the teachers into service by the reopening date and also paid them the back wages. Thereafter, the petitioner made a claim for the teachers grant to

be paid to cover the amounts disbursed by it under orders of the educational authority, but the department had not paid the amount, because the

first respondent has ordered ""that there should be no claim from the Government funds"" for the period in question. This order is beyond the powers

of the appellate authority u/s 23 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The

power to withhold the grant either permanently or for any specified period, is exclusively conferred only on the Government u/s 14 of the Act, and

if it is to be withheld, it could be only after extending an opportunity, as provided u/s 14(3) of the Act. The closure notice was issued on the last

working date for the academic year 1978-79 and on the reopening date i.e., 18.7.1979 all the teachers have been reinstated, and there being no

break in service for them, withholding of grant for the said period was not correct, because whatever steps had been taken by the management

having proved to be ineffective, and finally, the service conditions of the teachers having remained unaffected, in that the Management had obeyed

the orders of the educational authority promptly the first respondent had acted beyond his jurisdiction in preventing the petitioner from securing the

teaching grant.

3.

Respondents 1 and 2 would state that, as per Section 2(1) of the Act the academic year of a school generally commences on the 1st June of the

concerned year, and the closure notice issued before one month and 11 days was contrary to Rule 20 of the Rules, which envisages a six months

notice to be issued, and there for suitable orders were issued for the restoration of the concerned 18 teachers. In allowing the appeals filed by the

teachers, the first respondent by his order dated 30.6.79 had stated that, for the disputed period towards teaching grant, ""there should be no claim

from the Government funds"" and such a direction could be issued under Rule 11(4) of the Rules, since he is conferred with the powers to grant or

withhold either permanently or for any specified period. The teachers were not actually in service from 21.4.1979 to 17.7.1979 because they were

removed illegally and the Government cannot be called upon to pay for that period. There is no restriction u/s 43 of the Act preventing the

appellate authority from passing orders relating to claims from Government funds, because the above section enables passing of interlocutory

orders, as deemed fit. Hence, the direction issued is in order, and referred to Rule 9(2)(g). On a representation made by the petitioner, in G.O.Ms.

No. 2328, Education, dated 15.12.1979, the Government had already directed that it is the petitioner who will have to pay back wages of 18

teachers for the period from 21.4.1979 to 17.7.1979. Hence, it cannot be contended that no opportunity was given to the petitioner, before the

impugned order was passed. The period involved is to be treated as break in service irrespective of the fact whether it took place during the

vacation or not.

4.

Mr. T. Chengalvarayan, Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that, in exercising powers u/s 23 of the Act, the first respondent had no

jurisdiction to withhold the grant of teaching grant and it is a power exclusively conferred on the Government. Section 2(5) states that ''grant''

means any sum of money paid as aid out of State fund to any private school. Section 14 deals with payment of grant. Government assumes

responsibility pay to private schools grants at such rates as may be prescribed. Under Sub-section (2) it has a power to withhold either

permanently or for any specified period the whole or any part of any grant, to a school which does not comply with the provisions of the Act or

Rules made thereunder; or in respect of pay and allowances payable to any teacher or any other person employed in a school, which are not paid

to them in accordance with the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder; or which contravenes or fails to comply with any such

condition, as prescribed. Before withholding the grant, under Sub-section (2), the Government has to give an opportunity to the educational agency

to make its representations, under Sub-section (3). Rule 9 deals with conditions, which are to be satisfied before recognition could be granted.

Rule 11 deals with payment of grant, which would be subject to Government orders and instruction issued from time to time. The District

Educational Officer is the competent authority to sanction the grant. The purposes for which the grant may be paid are specified in Annexure I. The

Joint Director of Elementary Education and Secondary Education respectively have jurisdiction over different types of schools as mentioned in

Rule 11(4) and authorised to withhold permanently or for any specified period the payment of grant, if any of the conditions specified in Rule 9, is

contravened or not complied with. Annexure I deals with the staff grant and it shall be paid in full by the State, to cover the entire approved

expenditure of pay and other allowances of teaching and non-teaching staff, including employees paid from contingencies. As for maintenance grant

it shall be paid at 6 per cent of the assessed teaching grant for a calendar year.

5.

By referring to these provisions, Mr. T. Chengalvarayan, Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that, in disposing of the appeals, u/s 23 of

the Act, the 1st respondent had gone beyond its jurisdiction conferred upon it in passing orders pertaining to teaching grant, because a decision

thereon could be taken only by Government u/s 14 of the Act. The learned Additional Government Pleader by relying upon Rule 11 would submit

that, when the petitioner had contravened the provisions of the Act and terminated the services of certain teachers, the first respondent had the

jurisdiction to pass orders either permanently or for any specified period to withhold the payment of grant.

6.

Regarding withholding permanently on for any specified period, the whole or part of the grant payable to a private school, u/s 14(2) of the Act,

the power is conferred only on the Government. It is claimed by respondents that the termination of 18 teachers was in contravention of Section

22(2) read with Rule 20. It being a non-compliance u/s 14(2)(i), any order relating to withholding of grant for any specified period could be passed

only by Government and not by any lesser subordinate authority. Section 14(3) provides that any order to that effect could be passed only after an

opportunity is extended to the educational agency. This had not been done. Therefore, the direction given by the 1st respondent that the back

wages of all the teachers for the disputed period has to be paid ""from the funds of the Management without any claim from Government funds"",

was a contravention of Section 14.

7.

On the contention put forth by respondents that u/s 43(3) the appellate authority has the jurisdiction to pass such orders as it deems fit, the

direction issued by him was not pending disposal of an appeal before it. When the direction issued is part of the final order, it would not come

within the ambit of Section 43(3).

8.

As far as reliance placed on Rule 11(4) is concerned the facts and the circumstances of this case would not bring the contravention committed

by the petitioner, within the scope of Rule 9, which deals with several conditions prescribed relating to recognition. Rule 9(2)(g) states that the

educational agency has to carry out the instructions issued by the Director or other officers subordinate to him, with a view to maintain academic

standards and to safeguard the interests of teachers and pupils, including linguistic minorities. In the context of what is provided u/s 14, Rules 9(2)

(g) and Rule 11(4) cannot be read as to destroy the power conferred on the Government. The rule making power u/s 56(2)(g) would not result in

the power of the Government being abdicated in favour of its subordinates, when the Act does not contemplate such surrender of powers on its

part. Hence, there is considerable force in the contention of Mr. T. Chengalvarayan that it is only the Government which could withhold any

portion of the teaching grant or maintenance grant, and that could be done only after issue of notice u/s 14(3), and not otherwise.

9.

The next contention of the respondent is that, in G.O.Ms. No. 2328, the Government had arrived at the same conclusion. But, the said G.O., is

not produced before this Court to know as to whether an opportunity as contemplated u/s 14(3) had been complied with or not. This Court has

pointed out more than once, whenever any material is relied, upon in a counter-affidavit it is incumbent upon the respondent to furnish copies of

such materials by annexing them as part of the counter-affidavit so that it would enable not only the petitioner to realise as to whether his claims are

not correct or not but also enable the Court to know the correct position. Hence, the reliance placed on the said G.O., would not make the

impugned proceedings valid.

10.

The impugned order being set aside, would not preclude the Government to exercise its power'' u/s 14, and pass suitable orders thereon. In

matters of this nature, while disbursing the staff grant to teachers for the involved period their agony would not be there. For any contraventions or

omissions committed by the Management in relation to the service conditions of the teachers, there is ample power conferred under the Act, to

withdrawing recognition. Having held that the petitioner - Management had contravened Section 22 (I) read with Rule 20, nothing precluded the

concerned authority to take action for withdrawing of recognition. In such those instances, Government must disburse the staff grant to teachers

directly and if it be held that the Management was responsible for consequences that occasioned and was bound to reimburse the Government,

then it could be deducted out of the endowment created under Rule 9(2)(c). Unless within the time fixed, the deficit out of the endowment on hand

is made good then the recognition could be withdrawn. Like invoking Bank guarantees, from and out of the endowment, adjustments could be

made then and there, and thereby prevent teachers to resort to protracted proceedings in more than one forum. Larger amount of endowment can

be insisted from schools which repeat commissions and irregularities etc Certain arguments have been heard on this aspect, but this being not an

appropriate matter, they will be considered as and when all the materials are placed before Court, as, to how far the difficulties experienced by

teachers could be set right, when teachers are told to look to managements for their emoluments, inspite of State having assumed full responsibility

to pay them on due dates.

11.

Hence, this writ petition is allowed only on the ground that the impugned order, as passed, is contrary to the provisions of the Act, but leaving

it open to the concerned authorities under the Act to take appropriate action, for whatever had been done by the petitioner-Management. No

costs.