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55 paragraphs · 1,162 wordsBalakrishna Aiyar, J.—These are two petitions to revise a consolidated order made by the Additional First Class Magistrate, Virudhunagar,
in M. C. Nos. 36 and 38 of 1951 on his file, finding the respondents to be in possession of the property in dispute and u/s 145(6) placing them in
possession thereof.
Mr. Narayanaswami Aiyar, the learned advocate for the petitioners, took the preliminary objection that the entire proceedings before the
Magistrate are void for the reason that no preliminary order as required by Section 145(1), Cr. P. C., was issued.
Mr. Vaidyanatha Iyer, on the other side, replied that as a matter of actual fact orders u/s 145(1), Cr. P. C., must have been issued because in a
letter dated 22-9-1951, addressed by the Joint Magistrate, Bivakasi, to the District Magistrate, Ramanathapuram, suggesting that the case be
transferred to the Additional First Class Magistrate, Virudhunagar, it is stated, ""as it is anticipated a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace
and the parties were served an order u/s 145(1), Cr. P. C. (sic)"". Now no copy of such an order exists in the file.
On a refrence made to the Additional First Class Magistrate, Virudhunagar, he reported
No separate orders u/s 145(1) , Cr. P. C, are available in the records received from the Executive Magistrate, at the time of the transfer of the
case to this Court. The Executive Magistrate Sivakasi, who was subsequently addressed by me reports that no such orders u/s 145(1), Cr. P. C.,
are available in the records of his office also.
It is clear to me that no order u/s 145(1), Cr. P. C., was actually issued because if it had been, the office copy of it ought to have been in the file.
Besides, the copies served on the parties must have also been placed in the file and every one of these could not have been lost.
The likelihood is that what the Joint Magistrate refers to as an order under S. 145(1), Cr. P. C., is merely the notice dated 1-8-1951 intimating the
parties that the petition u/s 145, Cr. P. C., stood posted to 2-8-1951 at Sivakasi for hearing. That is really not an order u/s 145(1), Cr. P. C,
Mr. Narayanaswami Aiyar, for the petitioners, contended that the omission to issue an order u/s 145(1), Cr. P. C., vitiates the entire
proceedings of the Magistrate. In support of this argument he referred to the decision of Ayling J. in -- Subbarama Aiyar and Another Vs. Mariya
Pillai, , where the learned Judge observed oh p. 81:
On the other hand it seems to me ""that the Magistrate''s proceedings are void ''ab initio'' by reason of his failure to comply with the requirements
of Clause (1) of Section 145, Cr. P. C. This provides that where a Magistrate is satisfied that a dispute exists regarding any land or water or the
boundaries thereof within the local limits of his jurisdiction, he shall record a formal order in writing setting forth the grounds of his being so satisfied
and requiring the disputing parties to attend his court and file written statements. It is only in this way that proceedings u/s 145 can be initiated. The
provision of law is imperative and failure to comply with it destroys the Magistrate''s Jurisdiction.
To the same effect is the decision of Burn J. in -- '' Mariasusai Udyan and Others Vs. Hajee Mahamud Azezudeen Sahib Bahadur, . The learned
Judge observed:
.... The decisions of this court so far tend to show that unless there is a preliminary order u/s 145(1), Cr. P. C., the magistrate has no jurisdiction
to pass any order u/s 145(6), Cr. P. C. These decisions I would say, with all respect, are correct for the reason which I have already indicated.
That reason runs in these terms:
There was nothing to prevent the learned Sub- Divisional Magistrate from drawing up a preliminary order u/s 145(1), Cr. P. C., on the date on
which he decided that the case was one properly falling u/s 145, Cr. P. C. The importance of this is that the question of possession with reference
to the date of the preliminary order (See Section 145(4), Cr. P.C.) and if there is no preliminary order the one question which the Magistrate has
to decide cannot be decided.
Mr. Vaidyanatha Aiyar on the other side referred to a number of decisions which I shall now examine.
The decision in -- B. Madan Mohan Lal Vs. Mt. Sheoraj Kunwar , is the one most in point and in that Boys J. made a fairly detailed examination
of the subject and expressed the view that the omission to draw up an order u/s 145 (1), Cr. P. C., has nothing whatever to do with the question
of jurisdiction. He observed:
.......it appears to me that it would be quite unjustifiable and unreasonable to set aside lengthy proceedings u/s 145, when the facts indicate that the
parties could, not conceivably have been prejudiced by the absence of a formal order, where it is manifest that they knew well all the facts and
contested the matter with the advantage of the knowledge of the whole of the facts.
The decision in -- ''Mg. Po Lon v. Mg. Ba On'', AIR 1925 Rang 111 (D), is no doubt to the same effect; but there is no discussion of the matter
and no reasons are assigned.
So too in the decision in -- ''Nur Bakhsh v. Emperor'', AIR 1917 Lah 35 (E). Another case reported on the same page -- ''Sajad Hussaln v.
Nanak Chand'', AIR 1917 Lah 35 (F), is distinguishable because the report makes it clear that on a subsequent date an order, which essentially
complied with the requirements of Sub-clause (1) of Section 145 was placed on record and no prejudice whatever was caused to either party by
the omission to draw up the order earlier.
The case in -- Kapoor Chand and Another Vs. Suraj Prasad , does not really help Mr. Vaidyanatha Aiyar, because in that case there was an
order, though somewhat defective in form u/s 145 (1), Cr. P. C. The decisions of the other courts to which reference was made during the
arguments are at variance with at least two decisions of this court, and if I may say so with respect, I prefer the reasoning of Burn J., because, as
already explained u/s 145, Cr. P. C., the Magistrate has to determine who was in possession on a particular date and that date is the date of the
order u/s 145 (1) and if there is no order u/s 145 (1), Cr. P. C., there will be no date with reference to which the question of possession can be
determined.
In this view, the objection raised by Mr. Narayanaswami Iyer must be upheld. The result is that these criminal revision cases are allowed and the
orders complained of set aside.
