AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.—The question raised by this writ petition is as regards the proper construction of certain provisions of The Madras
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act XXV of 1949 and the validity of certain action taken by the Accommodation Controller in regard to the
premises of the petitioner. The petitioner is the owner of two houses, Nos. 60 and 61 Gangadhareswarar Koil St. Purasawalkam, Madras. House
No. 60 has been occupied by an official of the Central Government and its only relevancy for the present proceedings is that it is not available for
occupation by the petitioner. House No. 61 had been let out to tenants for the past several years. The last tenant, who occupied that property died
in 1955, and his heirs, who continued to remain in the premises for some time after the death of the tenant vacated the premises on 14th April,
9155. On 20th April, 1955, the petitioner intimated the Accommodation Controller of the vacancy, but in this notice, which is purported to be one
under S. 3(1) (a) of the Act, the petitioner did not furnish the particulars, which he was required to furnish under S. 3 (1) (b) of the Act, a matter to
which I shall refer in little more detail later. The Accommodation Controller when he received this notice stated that it was not in proper form and
directed the petitioner to submit a notice, Which would conform to the rules. The petitioner did so and sent another notice on 27th April, 1955,
which admittedly conformed to the requirements of the rules. In this he gave all the particulars, which a landlord, when giving notice under S. 3(1) ,
had to furnish. In his communication dated 20th April, 1955 the petitioner had stated that House No. 61 was required for his own occupation and
that the Accommodation Controller might be pleased not to requisition the building. But notwithstanding the request contained in this
communication, the Accommodation Controller who is the respondent here by his order dated 3rd May, 1995 requisitioned the house bearing
door No. 61 for the accommodation of an officer of the income tax Department. The petitioner applied to the Secretary, Home Department for
redress; but not having obtained it he has approached this Court with this writ petition. Learned Counsel for the petitioner raised three contentions.
I he first was that his client''s notice dated 20th April, 1955 was substantially in compliance with the enactment and that as the Accommodation
Controller had received this notice on 21st April, 1955 the ten days time within which a requisition could take place under S. 3 (3) of the Act
expired by the end of the month and that the order dated 3rd May, 1955 was out of time. As part of this argument he urged that the notice or the
intimation dated 27th April, 1955 in which the petitioner furnished the full particulars, which were demanded of him was dispatched beyond the 7
days time mentioned in S. 3 (1) and was not therefore a notice on which a requisition under S. 3 (3) could be founded. The second contention was
that the Accommodation Controller had not considered the bona fide requirement of the petitioner of the premises No. 1 before directing the
requisition and that, as this material matter has not been considered by the Accommodation Controller or by the Government, the order should be
set aside. Lastly, he contended that as the petitioner still continued to remain in possession of the property any attempt on the part of the
Government to enforce the requisition would offend the guarantee contained in Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution.
I shall consider these contentions in the order in which I have set them above. S. 3 (1) (a) enacts :
''Every landlord shall, within even days after the building becomes vacant by his easing to occupy it, or by the termination of a tenancy, or by
release from requisition give notice of the vacancy in writing to the officer authorised in that behalf by the State Government (hereinafter in this
section referred to as the ''authorised officer'') :
Provided that this sub-section shall not apply to a building in respect of which the landlord has obtained an order for possession on any of the
grounds specified in S. 7, Sub-S. (3).
Sub-Cl. (b) of this Sub-Section provides that every notice given under Cl. (a) shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed. S. 15 requires
every landlord to furnish to the Controller or any person authorised by him in that behalf, such particulars in respect of the building as may be
prescribed by rules made under the Act; and under S. 17 (2) the State Government is empowered by rules to provide for all matters expressly
required or allowed by the Act to be prescribed. In accordance with these provisions, rules have been made and under the rules published in G.
O. No. 3850, Development, dated 10th October 1946, the particulars to be furnished under S. 15 to the Controller or any person authorised by
him in that behalf are set out, and R. 4 prescribes that a notice under S. 3(1) should contain the particulars prescribed in R. 3; the effect of which is
that all the requirements of R. 3 have to be complied with before a notice could be said to conform to the requirements of S. 3 (1) (a) and (b).
Among the matters to be set out in the notice or communication by the landlord on a vacancy occurring are (1) details of the accommodation
available together with particulars as regards the ground area, garden and out-houses if any. appurtenant to the building; (2) If the building is not
occupied by the landlord, whether it is occupied by a single tenant or by more than one tenant; (3) Amenities available in regard to lighting, water,
sanitation and the like; (4) monthly rent paid by the tenant. There cannot be any controversy that these matters are essential to be known before
the Accommodation Controller could make up his mind as to whether the residential house in question is or is not fit for being occupied by a
Government servant, and it is also admitted that in the communication dated 20th April 1955, which the petitioner addressed to the
Accommodation Controller, these details were not set out. I cannot, therefore, regard this notice dated 20th April 1955 as a notice conforming to
the requirements of S. 3 (1) (a) or (b). If this notice were any other way we have the fact that the petitioner did furnish those particulars on 27th
April 1955 in response to the requisition of the Accommodation Controller. Learned Counsel did, as I have indicated, contend that as this notice
was beyond the seven days time prescribed by S. 3 (1), it was not a notice upon which the Accommodation Controller could act. I do not see any
force in this argument at all. 1 he period of seven days is prescribed within which without committing an offence, the landlord could furnish the
information. If he does not do so, it might be open to the authorities to prosecute the landlord. But merely because the period prescribed by S. 3
(1) has expired, it does not mean that a notice purporting to be under S. 3 (1) (a) ceases to be a valid notice under that section. In my opinion the
Accommodation Controller was justified in treating the notice dated 27th April 1955 as a valid notice and proceeding on that basis.
The next question for consideration is whether the order of the Accommodation Controller requisitioning the premises is liable to be quashed,
for the reason that he did not in his order give indications, that he has considered the request of the petitioner that the premises should be
requisitioned, as they were needed bona fide for his own accommodation. So far as the language of S. 3 (3) is concerned, it gives a right to the
Accommodation Controller to requisition premises for the use of a Government servant as one entitled to priority. Even if the request of the
petitioner had been considered, still, if the officer was of the opinion that the building was required for the occupation of an officer of the Central
Government, he was bound to order the requisition, and he was not entitled to conform to the wishes of the petitioner. It no doubt true that under
the proviso to S. 3(1) (a), when the landlord has obtained an order from a Rent Controller that the building is required bona fide for his own
occupation, the Accommodation Controller has no jurisdiction to direct a requisition. But from this it does not follow that in cases not covered by
the proviso the Accommodation Controller is bound to consider the needs of the owner and postpone public requirements on that ground.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to a decision of Rajagopalan J. reported in Premavathi Ammal v. State of Madras (1955) 1
M.L.J. 454:68 L.W. 224.. No doubt, there are some observations in it, which appear to favour the contention put forward by the learned Counsel
for the petitioner; but I do not read that decision as meaning that, unless the conflicting or competing considerations of the requirement of the owner
and the need of the officer of the State or the Central Government to occupy the premises are set Out in the order, the order is liable to be
quashed. As I have said before S. 3 (3) lays down the need for accommodation of public officials as the paramount consideration in the matter of
requisition. If, therefore, these have to be given that priority, it follows that the bona fide requirement of the landlord to occupy his own house has
to be rejected. In this view I do not see any necessity to interfere with the order of the Rent Controller.
The last point urged was that the order of the Rent Controller, which is sought to be quashed, was in contravention of the freedom guaranteed
under Art. 19 (1) (f) . Frankly speaking I am unable to appreciate the point at all. It is not suggested that the deprivation of the landlord of the right
to hold the property, by the law granting to a tenant paying a reasonable rent a right to be in possession of the premises against the will of the
landlord is an infraction of Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution or an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of that right. If this were so, the fact that
it is a Government servant that comes to occupy the house does not in my opinion attract Art. 19 (1) (f) at all. The writ petition falis and is
dismissed. No order as to costs.