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Judgment
Mishra, J.—Petitioner herein has been detailed u/s 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (Act 14 of 1982).
The Grounds of detention contained two instances of the petitioner previously having indulged in the sale of illicit liquor and punished with fine and as grounds of detention that on 15.4.1993 at 9:00 a.m., one Patchiappan informed that he had purchased from the petitioner a glass of arrack and consumed the same, which caused intoxication, followed by burning of eyes and giddiness and vomiting several times, which was controlled only after some native treatment given to him by his wife. On information from Patchiappan that the petitioner was the seller, it is said, the Police party headed for the spot, where the petitioner was found selling the arrack to one unknown person, who on seeing the police-party, dropped the glass of arrack and ran away, ''and could not be secured, a statement, which we invariably find recorded in almost every detention order u/s 3 of Act 14 of 1982. The police party, however, found the petitioner, who was having in his possession four litres of arrack, and the samples of the arrack were chemically analysed and ''the samples contained ethyl alcohol, acids, easters, higher alcohol and aldehyde and it was illicitly distilled arrack and also detected and toxic principles of datura equivalent to 5.21% (w/v.) of atropine .Regarding the satisfaction the detaining authority has said.
I am satisfied that Thiru Palanisami, son of Kandasami is a Boot Legger selling illicitly distilled arrack, mixed with poisonous substance in contravention of the provisions of Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act 1937 and Rules made thereunder which is likely to cause widespread danger to life and public health. He is thereby acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
We are conscious that a Bench of this Court in Dharman v. State of Tamil Nadu (W.P. No. 6737 of 1988, Order dated 15.2.1989) and Pepisu Alias Kanni v. State of Tamil Nadu (W.P. No. 9179 of 1990, Order dated 9.11.1990) has taken the view that for the purpose of detention of a person, who is a bootlegger, it will be necessary to, see amongst other things, that the poisonous ingredients of the liquor sold by him or her was in such a quantity that it posed a grave or widespread danger to public life. In the said two cases the Court has held that presence of 10 milligrams percentage in hundred litres of liquor will not be dangerous to life or public health. In Pambukaran Alias Kamalesan v. State of Tamil Nadu (W.P. Nos. 11773 and 11774 of 1990, Order dated 10.2.1990), a Bench of this Court has expressed that in a proper case, this Court will be required to reconsider the correctness of the above view, but for the reason of the stereo type of grounds, the narration of the incidents leading to the apprehension of the detenue by the police, the escape of the purchaser sighted at the time of arrest, etc., are such that the Court may avoid going to the issue as to whether the view expressed in the afore-mentioned Judgments requires a reconsideration and follow the same. In the instant case also, we propose to adopt the same approach.
It will indeed be necessary in all the cases of preventive detention to bear in mind that a detention order is not a performance of ritual, but act of exception guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, as envisaged under Article 22 thereof. Ordinarily, no exception to the general rule should be made unless it is found that any action against such a person under the ordinary law of the land will not be enough to prevent him from activities prejudicial to the maintenance of Public Order. Explanation at the foot of the definition-S. 2 of Act 14 of 1982 says that if any of the activities of any of the person is directly or indirectly causing or calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life or public health or ecological system, he shall be deemed to be one affecting adversely or likely to affect adversely the public order. The expression, ''to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life or public health or ecological system'' appear to give several alternative grounds and in a given case there may be one or more than one such grounds, available to the detaining authority to act under S. 3 of Act 14 of 1982. The Detaining Authority, however, cannot afford to be casual and say if not any harm, it may be danger, if not danger it may be alarm, if not alarm it may be a feeling of insecurity and similarly cannot afford to be casual to say, if it is not any of them among the general public or any section thereof, it is a grave or widespread danger to life or public health or ecological system or that if it is not a graved anger to life, it is widespread danger to life and if it is not a grave danger to public health, it is a widespread danger to public health and similarly if it is not grave danger to ecological system. It is a widespread danger to ecological system. The Detaining Authority is required in all cases to realise that he will have the power to detain only when he is satisfied that the grounds made available lead to a reasonable deduction that the person sought to be detained has indulged in one or the other such activity or more than one such activity, which cannot be prevented, except by an order of detention. A casual approach, without there being any definite deduction, noticed in the detention order in many cases may be a ground in itself, to interfere with the detention order, as one can legitimately suggest that no legitimate deduction has been drawn by the Detaining Authority from the grounds and his satisfaction is not reflected in what is stated by him in the order. A dividing line between conjecture and inference, as noticed by a Bench of this Court in the case of The Managing Director, M/s. Dunlop India Limited v. S.G. K. Rishnakumar and 2 Others (1991 I L.W. 624), is often a very difficult one to draw. A conjecture may be plausible, but it is of no legal value, for its essence is that it is a mere guess. An inference, in the legal sense, on the other other hand, is a deduction from the evidence, and if it is a reasonable deduction it may have the validity of legal proof. The cogency of a legal inference of causation may vary in degree between practical certainty and reasonable probability. It is often be said.
Where the coincidence of cause and effect is not a matter of actual observation there is necessarily a hiatus in the direct evidence, but this may be legitimately bridged by an inference from the facts actually observed and proved.
It is the exactitude of this nature that will give legitimacy to the acts of the detaining authorities and if they are failing in this, they may be given opportunity to the detenues to say that they have been made a victim of an executive fiat. In the instant case, however, since we have chosen to follow the authority in Dharman v. State of Tamil Nadu (W.P. No. 6737 of 1988, order dated, 15.2.1989), and Pepisu Alias Kanni v. State of Tamil Nadu (W.P. No. 9179 of 1990, order dated 9.11.1990), We have no hesitation in interfering with the order of detention of the petitioner. The proceedings in C.M.P. No. 60/BLA/93 (C2), dated 27.4.1993 are accordingly quashed. The respondents are directed to release the petitioner detenue forthwith, unless he is liable to be detained in custody for some other cause.