High CourtsDivision Bench

Palepu Narayanamurthi vs Komali Chandrayya

Madras High Court · Decided on 19 January 1927 · Citation: AIR 1927 Mad 790 : (1927) 26 LW 67 : (1927) 53 MLJ 174

HON’BLE JUDGES
Waller, J
Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

No AI summary yet

Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.

Judgment

31 paragraphs · 734 words

Waller, J.—The suit is one for contribution. A suit was filed on a promissory note against the plaintiff and the 1st defendant and a decree

was passed against them jointly. The whole of the decree amount was collected from the plaintiff, who seeks to recover half of it from the 1st

defendant. The latter''s defence is that he and the plaintiff were engaged in an illegal partnerships that the money was borrowed for that partnership

and that, under the circumstances, a suit for contribution does not lie.

2.

It has been repeatedly held in this country, following the old English case of Merryweather v. Nixan (1799) 8 Term Rep. 186 that a suit for

contribution between wrong-doers does not lie. In a case from Scotland Palmer v. Wick and Pulteneytown Steam Shipping Company, Ltd.

(1894) AC 318 the House of Lords refused to follow that decision, holding that it was not founded on any principle of equity. The Lord

Chancellor said in his judgment:

Why, then, should a co-debtor, who has paid the whole sum due. .... when he seeks to recover the share of his co-debtor, be subject more than

other co-obligants to the answer that, the entire debt having been discharged, nothing remains due on the judgment, and that ""it can, therefore, no

longer be proceeded on? The only answer, as it seems to me, must be that the joint debt resulted from a joint wrong and that the law will not

permit or assist any wrongdoer to recover contribution from another. It will be observed, however, that this is to allow the defender to. set up his

own wrong by way of answer, for the pursuer makes out a prima facie case by the production of the judgment. He has no need to rely on the joint

wrong, or to go behind the judgment.

3.

He then went on to remark on Merryweather v. Nixan (1799) 8 Term Rep. 186 that it did not appear to him to be founded on any principle of

justice or equity or even of public policy, which justified its extension to the jurisprudence of other countries. It seems strange that a decision so

characterised should have been imported into the law of India. Lord Watson took the same view remarking that the merits of the rule were not

such as to commend it to universal acceptation. He further observed:

This is not an action brought by one delinquent against whom decree has passed in order to obtain contribution from his co -delinquent who has

not been sued. The respondent company do not require to allege and prove either delict or quasi-delict as the foundation of their claim, which rests

upon a decree constituting a civil debt against the appellant as well as against themselves. There might be some principle in a Court of law refusing

to permit a suitor to aver and prove his own crime or moral delinquency as the medium of recovering from one whom he alleges to have been a

co-delinquent. But the case is very different where the injured party''s claim of damage is liquidated by a joint and several decree against all the

delinquents. In that case--which is the present case--the sum decreed is simply a civil debt.... In this case, it is the appellant who seeks to escape

from the natural import of the decree, by going behind it in order to establish his own delinquency.

4.

Now that is precisely the position here. The plaintiff produces the decree and proves that he has satisfied it. He is under no necessity to rely on

the joint wrong or to go behind the decree. It is the defendant, on the other hand, who seeks to avoid the decree by alleging and proving his own

co-delinquency. If any principle of public policy is involved, it is, it seems to me, that a suitor should not be allowed to succeed by setting up his

own delinquency. That principle has been laid down in a decision of this Court in V. Kamayya and Anr. v. G. Mamayya (1916) 32 MLJ 484 and I

think that it should be applied in this case. The plaintiff can succeed on producing the satisfied decree. There is nothing else that he has to do. The

defendant cannot succeed except by alleging and proving his own delinquency and therefore must fail. The suit is decreed with costs throughout.