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Judgment
A.Y. Kogje, J
This petition under Articles 226 /227 of the Constitution of India is filed challenging award dated 13.04.2018 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamnagar in Reference (LCR) No.60 of 2013. By the aforesaid award, the claim of the petitioner came to be dismissed for reinstatement and back wages to the original post of the petitioner.
Learned Advocate for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the Labour Court has not taken into consideration the merits of the case at all with regard to his longevity of service and his master-servant relation, but only on the basis of delay and acquiescence, the award has been passed. It is submitted that the Labour Court could not have rejected the reference on the ground of delay, more particularly when the petitioner was very much before this Court agitating his grievance throughout. It is submitted that the Labour Court has thoroughly disregarded the fact of the petitioner being before the High Court in various petitions. Learned Advocate drew attention of this Court to the order passed by this Court in three petitions, filed from time to time. It is also submitted that as the petitioner had agitated the issue of regularization, the respondent had resorted to an illegal act of terminating the services of the petitioner.
2.1 Lastly, learned Advocate for the petitioner made a valiant attempt praying for compensation as the petitioner has not attained age of superannuation and has, therefore, relied upon decisions of the Apex Court in case of Ranbir Singh Vs. Executive Eng. P.W.D., in Civil Appeal No.4483 of 2010 dated 02.09.2021 and in case of State of Uttarakhand & Anr. Vs. Raj Kumar in Civil Appeal No.124-125 of 2019 dated 07.01.2019.
As against this, learned Advocate Mr.Rajesh Chauhan for learned Advocate Mr.H.S.Munshaw for the respondent submitted that the petitioner was before this Court for the same relief and this Court did not entertain his petitions on more than one occasion and therefore, the Labour Court was justified in dismissed the reference. It is further submitted that the petitioner has not been able to explain the delay of approximately 10 years despite liberty reserved by this Court in favour of the petitioner to avail alternative remedy.
3.1 It is lastly submitted that the claim of the petitioner is a dead claim when the petitioner approached the Labour Court in the year 2013. It is also submitted that in the year 2004 itself, the petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed with specific observation to avail alternative remedy. Despite this, instead of filing reference, in the year 2013, yet another petition for the same relief was filed, which also came to be dismissed by this Court and hence, delay was not explained and the reference was rightly dismissed.
3.2 Learned Advocate for the respondent relied upon decision of the Apex Court in case of Prabhakar vs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department & Anr., reported in (2015) 15 SCC, 1, to substantiate his argument about claim of the petitioner being a dead claim.
Having heard learned Advocates for the parties and having perused documents on record, it appears that the first petition filed by the petitioner was Special Civil Application No.3158 of 2002, which was filed claiming to decide representation of the petitioner for absorption which was made on 25.01.2001. This petition came to be disposed of by order dated 08.03.2002 for considering the representation. It appears that thereafter, as claimed by the petitioner, the petitioner came to be orally terminated on 31.03.2001 and therefore, Special Civil Application No.2363 of 2004 came to be filed, which also came to be rejected by order dated 19.07.2004, wherein this Court observed as under:-
“This petition is essentially by two group of daily wage labourers. One is seeking reinstatement in service and also regularisation in service. The other group of petitioners who are still in service seek regularisation in service. The service details of none of the petitioners is placed on the record of the matter, except the statement at Annexure-'A' to the petition. It is not stated that since when the service of those petitioners has been terminated or for the period for which they rendered service as daily wage labourers. A common petition by two group of labourers seeking distinct reliefs is not maintainable. The averments made in the petition are vague. Specific averments are not made in the petition. The petition shall also involve disputed questions of fact. The petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the present nature shall not be maintainable. Petition is, therefore, summarily rejected.”
Despite the aforesaid order, it appears that, the petitioner, tough allegedly out of service, made no movement to move the Labour Court, but instead again filed a petition being Special Civil Application No.637 of 2013, which came to be disposed of by order dated 17.06.2013, where the petitioner was permitted to withdraw the petition to avail remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act. It is thereafter that the petitioner, in the year 2013, raised industrial dispute.
In the opinion of the Court, the Labour Court has taken into consideration the fact that no explanation was offered by the petitioner for a period between 19.07.2004 to 2013 when reference was filed. In the opinion of the Court also, though order dated 17.06.2013 was order of withdrawing of the petition to raise industrial dispute, still, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to explain delay between 2004 to 2013, which the petitioner has failed to discharge.
The Apex Court in case of Prabhakar (supra) has held with regard to non-existent dispute. It is held in para-44 as under:-
“44. To summarise, although there is no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act, yet it is for the 'appropriate Government' to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words 'at any time' used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on the employers' financial arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry.”
With regard to argument made for the purpose of giving compensation, the only evidence coming on record is pertaining to oral termination on 31.03.2001. However, there is nothing to indicate the date on which the petitioner had entered into the services. Not only that, before the Labour Court also, there is nothing to indicate the number of days that the petitioner had worked and no claim for compensation was made either before the Labour Court or before this Court. However, insofar as reliance placed by the petitioner on the decision of the Apex Court in case of Ranbir Singh (supra) is concerned, it would be appropriate to observe that finding of fact was given by the Labour Court with regard to workman having worked for more than 240 days and breach of Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, wherein reinstatement was awarded with 25% back wages and considering that to be the basic fact, the Apex Court had proceeded to grant payment of compensation. Similarly, in case of Raj Kumar (supra), award of the Labour Court itself provided for monetary compensation of Rs.30,000/- in full and final satisfaction against claim of reinstatement and consequential benefits. On facts, these two judgments would not come to the rescue of the petitioner.
In view of the aforesaid reasonings, no case is made out for interference by this Court. The Court finds no jurisdictional error or perversity in the award of the Labour Court. The petition therefore deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. Notice is discharged. No order as to costs.