Pallabi Shil vs State Of Tripura & Ors

Biswajit Palit, J

Heard Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Purusuttam Roy Barman assisted by Learned Counsel Mr. Samarjit Bhattacharjee and Learned Counsel, Mr. Kawsik Nath appearing on behalf of the applicant and also heard, Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Debalay Bhattacharya assisted by Learned Counsel Mr. Samar Das appearing on behalf of the accused-respondents No.2 to 7 and further heard Learned P.P. Mr. Raju Datta appearing on behalf of the State-respondent.

This application for cancellation of bail is filed by the applicant under Section 483(3) of BNSS, 2023 challenging the order dated 25.07.2025 passed by Learned Addl. Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Belonia in connection with ST(T-1) 35 of 2024.

At the beginning of hearing of this matter, Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Debalay Bhattacharya appearing on behalf of the accused-respondents has drawn the attention of the Court challenging the maintainability of the application filed by the applicant-victim. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that there is no provision in the erstwhile Cr.P.C and also under the BNSS, 2023 for the applicant-victim to file such application for cancellation of bail granted to the respondent-accused persons.

To rebut the submission made by Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-accused persons, Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Purusuttam Roy Barman appearing on behalf of the applicant-victim first of all drawn the attention of the Court that the definition of victim as provided under Section 2(y) of BNSS, 2023 was reproduced as under:

“2.       ***      ***      ***

(y) “victim” means a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission of the accused person and includes the guardian or legal heir of such victim;”

Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the definition of victim as per BNSS, 2023 also peri materia with the definition of victim as provided under Section 2(wa) of erstwhile Cr.P.C.

Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant-victim further drawn the attention of the Court referring Section 413 of BNSS which also provides as under:

“413. No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided.- No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided for by this Sanhita or by any other law for the time being in force:

Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court.”

Referring the aforesaid provision, Learned Senior Counsel has drawn the attention of the Court that in view of the aforesaid provision, scope is given to the victim to prefer appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation. Similarly, in the matter at hand although the applicant-victim being the daughter of the deceased has preferred this application for cancellation of bail so the spirit of the aforesaid provision can also be applied in this present matter.

In this regard, reference was also made by Learned Senior Counsel to a citation of Hon’ble the Apex Court reported in (2022) 9 SCC 321 [titled as Jagjeet Singh and others Vs. Ashish Mishra alias Monu and another dated 18.04.2022] wherein in para Nos.15 to 24, 27, 33, 43 and 44, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:

“A. Victim's right to be heard

Until recently, criminal law had been viewed on a dimensional plane wherein the courts were required to adjudicate between the accused and the State. The "victim"-the de facto sufferer of a crime had no participation in the adjudicatory process and was made to sit outside the Court as a mute spectator. However, with the recognition that the ethos of criminal justice dispensation to prevent and punish "crime" had surreptitiously turned its back on the "victim”, the jurisprudence with respect to the rights of victims to be heard and to participate in criminal proceedings began to positively evolve.

Internationally, the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for the Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, 1985, which was adopted vide the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 40/34, was a landmark in boosting the pro-victim movement. The Declaration defined a “victim” as someone who has suffered harm, physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss, impairment of fundamental rights through acts or omissions that are in violation of criminal laws operative within a State, regardless of whether the perpetrator is identified, apprehended, prosecuted or convicted, and regardless of the familial relationship between the perpetrator and the "victim". Other international bodies, such as the European Union, also took great strides in granting and protecting the rights of "victims" through various covenants.

Amongst other nations, the United States of America had also made two enactments on the subject i.e. (i) The Victims of Crime Act, 1984 under which legal assistance is granted to the crime-victims; and (ii) The "victims" Rights and Restitution Act of 1990. This was followed by meaningful amendments. repeal and insertion of new provisions in both the statutes through an Act passed by the House of Representatives as well as the Senate. In Australia, the legislature has enacted South Australia Victims of Crime Act, 2001. While in Canada there is the Canadian Victims Bill of Rights. Most of these legislations have defined the "victim" of a crime liberally and have conferred varied rights on such victims.

On the domestic front, recent amendments to the CrPC have recognised a victim's rights in the Indian criminal justice system. The genesis of such rights lies in the 154th Report of the Law Commission of India, wherein, radical recommendations on the aspect of compensatory justice to a victim under a compensation scheme were made. Thereafter, a Committee on the Reforms of Criminal Justice System in its Report in 2003, suggested ways and means to develop a cohesive system in which all parts are to work in coordination to achieve the common goal of restoring the lost confidence of the people in the criminal justice system. The Committee recommended the rights of the victim or his/her legal representative "to be impleaded as a party in every criminal proceeding where the charges are punishable with seven years' imprisonment or more".

It was further recommended that the victim be armed with a right to be represented by an advocate of his/her choice, and if he/she is not in a position to afford the same, to provide an advocate at the State's expense. The victim's right to participate in criminal trial and his/her right to know the status of investigation, and take necessary steps, or to be heard at every crucial stage of the criminal proceedings, including at the time of grant or cancellation of bail, were also duly recognized by the Committee. Repeated time as briefly noticed above, prompted Parliament to bring into force the Code of Criminal Procedure(Amendment) Act,2008, which not only inserted the definition of a “victim” under Section 2(wa) but also statutorily recognized various rights of such victims at different stages of trial.

It is pertinent to mention that the legislature has thoughtfully given a wide and expansive meaning to the expression “victim” which “means a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged and the expression "victim” includes his or her guardian or legal heir”.

This Court in Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka:(2019) 2 SCC 752, while dealing with questions regarding a victim's right to file an appeal under Section 372 CrPC, observed that there was need to give adequate representation to victims in criminal proceedings. The Court therein affirmed the victim's right to file an appeal against an order of acquittal. In Mallikarjun Kodagali(supra), though the Court was primarily concerned with a different legal issue, it will be fruitful in the present context to take note of some of the observations made therein: (SCC pp. 760-61, paras 3 and 8)

"3. What follows in a trial is often secondary victimisation through repeated appearances in court in a hostile or a semi-hostile environment in the courtroom. Till sometime back, secondary victimisation was in the form of aggressive and intimidating cross-examination, but a more humane interpretation of the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872 has made the trial a little less uncomfortable for the victim of an offence, particularly the victim of a sexual crime. In this regard, the judiciary has been proactive in ensuring that the rights of victims are addressed, but a lot more needs to be done. Today, the rights of an accused far outweigh the rights of the victim of an offence in many respects. There needs to be some balancing of the concerns and equalising their rights so that the criminal proceedings are fair to both.:(2017) 14 SCC 809 …

*                                  *                                 *

The rights of victims, and indeed victimology, is an evolving jurisprudence and it is more than appropriate to move forward in a positive direction, rather than stand still or worse, take a step backward. A voice has been given to victims of crime by Parliament and the judiciary and that voice needs to be heard, and if not already heard, it needs to be raised to a higher decibel so that it is clearly heard."

(emphasis supplied)

It cannot be gainsaid that the rights of a victim under the amended CrPC are substantive, enforceable, and are another facet of human rights. The victim's right, therefore, cannot be termed or construed restrictively like a brutum fulmen. We reiterate that these rights are totally independent, incomparable, and are not accessory or auxiliary to those of the State under the CrPC. The presence of "State" in the proceedings, therefore, does not tantamount to according a hearing to a "victim" of the crime.

A "victim" within the meaning of CrPC cannot be asked to await the commencement of trial for asserting his/her right to participate in the proceedings. He/She has a legally vested right to be heard at every step post the occurrence of an offence. Such a "victim" has unbridled participatory rights from the stage of investigation till the culmination of the proceedings in an appeal or revision. We may hasten to clarify that "victim" and "complainant/informant" are two distinct connotations in criminal jurisprudence. It is not always necessary that the complainant/informant is also a "victim", for even a stranger to the act of crime can be an "informant", and similarly, a "victim" need not be the complainant or informant of a felony.

The abovestated enunciations are not to be conflated with certain statutory provisions, such as those present in the Special Acts like the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, where there is a legal obligation to hear the victim at the time of granting bail. Instead, what must be taken note of is that:

24.1. First, the Indian jurisprudence is constantly evolving, whereby, the right of victims to be heard, especially in cases involving heinous crimes, is increasingly being acknowledged.

24.2. Second, where the victims themselves have come forward to participate in a criminal proceeding, they must be accorded with an opportunity of a fair and effective hearing. If the right to file an appeal against acquittal, is not accompanied with the right to be heard at the time of deciding a bail application, the same may result in grave miscarriage of justice. Victims certainly cannot be expected to be sitting on the fence and watching the proceedings from afar, especially when they may have legitimate grievances. It is the solemn duty of a court to deliver justice before the memory of an injustice eclipses.

B. Whether the High Court overlooked relevant considerations

We may, at the outset, clarify that power to grant bail under Section 439 CrPC, is one of wide amplitude. A High Court or a Sessions Court, as the case may be, are bestowed with considerable discretion while deciding an application for bail. But, as has been held by this Court on multiple occasions, this discretion is not unfettered. On the contrary, the High Court or the Session Court must grant bail after the application of a judicial mind, following well-established principles, and not in a cryptic or mechanical manner.

Before dealing with the case at hand, we may, at the cost of repetition, emphasise that a court while deciding an application for bail, should refrain from evaluating or undertaking a detailed assessment of evidence, as the same is not a relevant consideration at the threshold stage. While a court may examine prima facie issues, including any reasonable grounds whether the accused committed an offence or the severity of the offence itself, an extensive consideration of merits which has the potential to prejudice either the case of the prosecution or the defence, is undesirable. It is thus deemed appropriate to outrightly clarify that neither have we considered the merits of the case nor are we inclined to comment on the evidence collected by the SIT in the present case.

This Court is tasked with ensuring that neither the right of an accused to seek bail pending trial is expropriated, nor the "victim" or the State are denuded of their right to oppose such a prayer. In a situation like this, and with a view to balance the competing rights, this Court has been invariably remanding the matter(s) back to the High Court for a fresh consideration.:(1999) 9 SCC 104 We are also of the considered view that ends of justice would be adequately met by remitting this case to the High Court for a fresh adjudication of the bail application of the respondent-accused, in a fair, impartial and dispassionate manner, and keeping in view the settled parameters which have been elaborated in paras 29 to 32 of this order.

Needless to say that the bail application shall be decided on merits and after giving adequate opportunity of hearing to the victims as well. If the victims are unable to engage the services of a private counsel, it shall be obligatory upon the High Court to provide them a legal aid counsel with adequate experience in criminal law, at the State's expense.”

Relying upon the aforesaid citation, Learned Senior Counsel for the applicant-victim has submitted that in view of the principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforenoted case, the victim has got the right to approach for cancellation of bail before this Court and the victim also has a legally vested right to be heard at every step post the occurrence of offence from the stage of investigation till the culmination of the proceeding in an appeal or revision. So, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that since the Hon’ble Apex Court has given the liberty to approach for cancellation of bail granted to an accused, so, this present application for cancellation of bail filed by the applicant-victim is very much maintainable.

I have heard both the sides to this point and perused the citation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. It appears to this Court that in view of principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this present application is maintainable as because Hon’ble the Apex Court very categorically observed that the victim has the legal right to be participated in every stage of the proceeding.

Now, regarding the grounds for cancellation of bail, Learned Senior Counsel for the applicant-victim has drawn the attention of the Court that earlier excepting one of the accused person namely Manoranjan Tripura, the other accused persons preferred one bail application before this Court under Section 483 of BNSS which was numbered as B.A. No.10 of 2025 and this Court after elaborate hearing of Learned Counsel of both the parties by order dated 07.03.2025 rejected the bail application of the said accused persons with a direction to the Learned Trial Court to proceed with the case considering the fact that the accused person were lodging in jail. It was also submitted that when the bail matter bearing No.B.A. No.10 of 2025 was heard, that time, already 15(fifteen) numbers of witnesses were examined by the prosecution but the Learned Trial Court by order dated 25.07.2025 in connection with ST(T-1)/35/2024 ignoring the order of this Court simply on the ground that they were in custody for a considerable period of time and by this time 22 numbers of witnesses have been examined granted bail to all the said accused persons including one Manoranjan Tripura which amounts to judicial indiscipline and violation of the order of the superior Court.

Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that in course of hearing before the Learned Trial Court the issue of ground of arrest was agitated but surprisingly the said issue during investigation was never raised before the Learned Trial Court and furthermore, the issue was raised during continuation of trial before the Learned Trial Court. Although no such finding was given by the Learned Trial Court regarding ground of arrest.

It was also submitted that the order dated 07.03.2025 passed by this Court was communicated to the Learned Trial Court but at the time of consideration of the bail application, nothing was mentioned by the Learned Trial Court about the order of the High Court, which shows utter disregard to the order of the superior Court.

Learned Senior Counsel again submitted that after release on bail, the accused persons threatened the victim and another witness to withdraw the case otherwise they would commit the said offence what they did for the deceased father of the applicant and in this regard, on 28.08.2025 and 14.08.2025, the informant and one independent witness submitted prayer to S/P, South Tripura, Belonia and O/C, PR Bari P.S.

Learned Senior Counsel again drawn the attention of the Court that the respondent-accused persons may take the plea that no supervening circumstances could be projected by the applicant in the application but where the order passed by the Learned Trial Court itself is perverse, in such a situation, in absence of supervening circumstances also, there is scope to file application for cancellation of bail. Finally, Learned Senior Counsel urged for cancellation of the order dated 25.07.2025 passed by Learned Additional Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Belonia in connection with case No.ST(T-1)/35/2024 with a further direction to conclude the trial keeping the accused persons in judicial custody for the sake of justice.

On the other hand, Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Debalay Bhattacharjee appearing on behalf of respondent-accused persons also drawn the attention of the Court referring the earlier order dated 07.03.2025 passed by this Court in B.A. No.10 of 2025 wherein this Court gave certain observation but by that observation, the right of accused to pray for further bail was not curtailed. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that considering the materials on record, the Learned Trial Court rightly granted bail to the respondent-accused persons and there is no scope to interfere with the same.

In support of his contention, Learned Senior Counsel referred few citations. Reference was made to a order of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Criminal Appeal No.2381 of 2025 (arising from SLP(Crl.) Nos.1632 of 2025) [titled as Sanjay Kumar Jangid Vs. Mukhesh Kumar Agarwal and another] wherein in para Nos.16 and 17, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:

“16. The jurisprudence surrounding cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) of the CrPC is very clear as to that bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner unless any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to enjoy the concession of bail during the trial:(1995) 1 SCC 349. The grounds for cancellation of bail as illustrated in Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar :(1986) 4 SCC 481 and reiterated in Aslam Babalal Desai v. State of Maharashtra:(1992) 4 SCC 272 broadly lay down the grounds on which a bail can be cancelled where (1) the accused misuses his liberty by indulging in similar criminal activity, (ii) interferes with the course of investigation (iii) attempts to tamper with evidence or witnesses, (iv) threatens witnesses or indulges in similar activities which would hamper smooth investigation, (v) there is likelihood of his fleeing to another country, (vii) attempts to make himself scarce by going underground or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency, (vii) attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety, etc. These grounds are illustrative and not exhaustive. It has also been echoed in various judgments that rejection of bail stands on a different platform as compared to cancellation of bail which is considered to be a harsh order as it interferes with the liberty of an individual, and hence, it must not be lightly resorted to.

A perusal of the record makes it apparent that even though multiple FIRs have been lodged against the co-accused persons after the appellants' release on bail, i.e. on 22.03.2022, the names of the instant appellants have not been mentioned in most of these FIRs, nor any allegation has been levied against the appellants. It is only in FIR No.11/2023 dated 23.01.2023 under Sections 143, 332 and 353 of the IPC that the appellants have been named. However, even in the said offence, after due investigation, chargesheet was filed on 10.07.2024, wherein the appellants were not charge-sheeted. Therefore, merely because subsequent FIRs have been registered against the other co-accused persons, it does not become a valid or fair ground to seize the liberty of bail that has been extended to the appellants herein. The exercise of cancellation of bail is a strict one, and needs to be executed in a restrictive manner, only when the circumstances demand for it. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we feel that the instant case is not a fit one to employ the provisions of cancellation of bail and curb the appellants liberty.”

Learned Senior Counsel again referred another order of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Criminal Appeal No.726 of 2025 (arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.17918/2024) [titled as Vipin Kumar Vs. State of U.P.] wherein in para No.4, 5 and 6, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:

“4. There is no prohibition in filing a fresh bail application after the earlier was rejected or cancelled, if granted. This Court in canceling the bail application has not taken away the right of the appellant to apply for bail afresh, if the circumstances permit.

Filing of a fresh bail application, once an earlier bail application has been rejected or if granted and thereafter cancelled is a matter of right and solely on the ground that the Apex Court had not permitted filing of the fresh bail application, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the bail application.

In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the order impugned dated 31.05.2024 passed by the High Court rejecting the bail application of the appellant is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded to the High Court for decision afresh on merits.”

Again, Learned Senior Counsel referred another citation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Criminal Appeal No.861/2025 (arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.713/2025) [titled as Kailash Kumar Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and another] wherein in para No.10, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:

“10. The decision of this Court in Ajwar v. Waseem and Anr.:(2024) 10 SCC 768, relied on by the High Court, has been perused. In terms of such decision, while seized of an application for cancellation/ revocation of bail, the considerations (illustrative, not exhaustive) which ought to weigh with the courts are whether: (i) the accused has misused the concession of liberty; (ii) he has been delaying the trial; (iii) he has been influencing/threatening the witnesses; (iv) he has been tampering evidence in any manner; and (v) there has been any supervening circumstance after grant of bail warranting a relook. The decision also lays down that orders granting bail could be interfered with if the same are found to be perverse or illegal in the sense that the Court‟s conscience is shocked or extraneous material has been considered.”

Reference was made to another judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2020) 18 SCC 693 [titled as Bharatbhai Bhimabhai Bharwad Vs. State of Gujarat and others dated 30.07.2019] wherein in para Nos.3 and 8, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:

“3. Respondents 2 and 3 and other accused were arrested on 16-1-2019 and were remanded to judicial custody on 17-1-2019. Respondents 2 and 3-Accused 1 and 2 filed bail application which was allowed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Viramgam vide order dated 6-2-2019. After considering the arguments and also the materials placed before the court, the learned Additional Sessions Judge observed that prima facie case is made out against the accused and gravity of offence has to be taken into consideration. However, the learned Additional Sessions Judge granted bail on the ground that the injured Ajitbhai was discharged from the hospital on 24-1-2019 and other injured witness Shaileshbhai was also discharged from the hospital and that weapons allegedly used in the commission of offence have been recovered and also the statements of important witnesses are recorded. The trial court also observed that the accused are young, having no criminal antecedents and that they are permanent inhabitants of Sokli Village and their presence can easily be secured and on those findings, granted bail to Respondents 2 and 3 inter alia by imposing various conditions.

Though the application has been filed before the High Court under Section 439(2) CrPC i.e. an application for cancellation of bail, by perusal of the grounds raised in the application, it is seen that the appellant has raised grounds challenging the exercise of discretion in granting bail to Respondents 2 and 3 under Section 439 CrPC and that the order granting bail is unsustainable in law. In effect, the application filed was only challenging the order of grant of bail on the ground that it was an arbitrary exercise of discretion. The Court while granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner by taking into consideration the relevant facts as held in State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi:(2005) 8 SCC 21.”

Again, Learned Senior Counsel referred another citation of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in (2008) 16 SCC 471 [titled as Sami Ullaha Vs. Superintendent, Narcotic Central Bureau dated 07.11.2008] wherein in para No.18, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:

“18. Furthermore, for the purpose of cancellation of bail, the statutory requirements must be satisfied. The appellant has failed to do so. We may notice that in State (Delhi Admn.) v. Sanjay Gandhi:(1978) 2 SCC 411, this Court held: (SCC pp. 418-19, para 13)

"13. Rejection of bail when bail is applied for is one thing; cancellation of bail already granted is quite another. It is easier to reject a bail application in a non-bailable case than to cancel a bail granted in such a case. Cancellation of bail necessarily involves the review of a decision already made and can by and large be permitted only if, by reason of supervening circumstances, it would be no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom during the trial. The fact that prosecution witnesses have turned hostile cannot by itself justify the inference that the accused has won them over. A brother, a sister or a parent who has seen the commission of crime, may resile in the court from a statement recorded during the course of investigation. That happens instinctively, out of natural love and affection, not out of persuasion by the accused. The witness has a stake in the innocence of the accused and tries therefore to save him from the guilt. Likewise, an employee may, out of a sense of gratitude, oblige the employer by uttering an untruth without pressure or persuasion. In other words, the objective fact that witnesses have turned hostile must be shown to bear a causal connection with the subjective involvement therein of the respondent. Without such proof, a bail once granted cannot be cancelled on the off chance or on the supposition that witnesses have been won over by the accused. Inconsistent testimony can no more be ascribed by itself to the influence of the accused than consistent testimony, by itself, can be ascribed to the pressure of the prosecution. Therefore, Mr Mulla is right that one has to countenance a reasonable possibility that the employees of Maruti like the approver Yadav might have, of their own volition, attempted to protect the respondent from involvement in criminal charges. Their willingness now to oblige the respondent would depend upon how much the respondent has obliged them in the past. It is therefore necessary for the prosecution to show some act or conduct on the part of the respondent from which a reasonable inference may arise that the witnesses have gone back on their statements as a result of an intervention by or on behalf of the respondent."”

Finally, Learned Senior Counsel referred one judgment of the High Court of Kerala reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Ker 1252 [titled as Renjith Vs. State of Kerala dated 03.03.2023] wherein in para Nos.9 and 10, the High Court of Kerala observed as under:

“9. Bail once granted ought not to be cancelled for the mere asking. There must be cogent and overwhelming circumstances existing to cancel the bail which should not be resorted to in a mechanical manner also. In a recent decision in P v. Madhya Pradesh (2022 SCC OnLine SC 552) the Supreme Court considered the circumstances when bail could be cancelled. One of the conditions for cancelling the bail has been succinctly stated to be that if he misuses his liberty by indulging in similar or other criminal activity.

Despite the above, is the bail granted to the petitioner liable to be cancelled because later, an FIR is registered against him? In the decision in Imran v. Muhammed Bhava [2022 SCC OnLine SC 496] it has been held that certain supervening circumstances impeding a fair trial must develop after granting bail to an accused for its cancellation. After referring to the above decisions, the Supreme Court in the decision in P. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) observed that cancellation of bail already granted would indeed require significant scrutiny.”

Referring all the aforesaid citations, Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-accused persons, Mr. Bhattacharya drawn the attention of the Court that bail once granted cannot be cancelled in a mechanical manner in absence of any supervening circumstances and urged for dismissal of the application filed by the applicant-victim under Section 483 of BNSS.

Learned P.P. on the other hand appearing on behalf of the State-respondent submitted that since elaborate arguments have been made by the Learned Senior Counsel of both the sides, so, on behalf the State, he will not make any further submission. However, Learned P.P. urged before the Court to pass appropriate order in accordance with law and produced the Case Diary.

I have heard elaborate arguments of the contesting parties and perused the application for cancellation of bail filed by the applicant-victim and the objection filed on behalf of the respondent-accused persons and also gone through the Case Diary.

It is the admitted position that in this case Learned Trial Court framed charges against all the accused persons under Section 118(2)/109(1) of BNS and added Section 103(1) read with Section 3(5) of BNS. The trial is commenced and upto this stage prosecution has adduced in total 22 numbers of witnesses before the Learned Trial Court whose evidence have already been recorded.

It is also the admitted position that after filing of charge-sheet the respondent-accused persons excepting accused Manoranjan Tripura filed one bail application before this Court and this Court by order dated 07.03.2025 in connection with B.A. No.10 of 2025 rejected the bail application of the said accused persons on the ground that till that period prosecution examined as many as 15 numbers of witnesses and there were sufficient incriminating materials against all the accused persons and a direction was given to the Learned Trial Court to dispose of the case giving top priority on the ground that the accused persons were languishing in jail. A copy of the said order passed by this Court was duly communicated to the Learned Trial Court from the Registry but thereafter the Learned Trial Court by order dated 25.07.2025 on the basis of a put up petition granted bail to all the accused persons on the ground that 22 numbers of witnesses have been examined and the accused persons were in custody for a quite long period but surprisingly, at the time of passing order, Learned Trial Court nowhere reflected anything about the order dated 07.03.2025 passed by this Court which was duly communicated to the Learned Trial Court. Even Learned Senior Counsel, who was appearing on behalf of all the accused persons before this Court at the time of hearing of bail application bearing No.B.A. No.10 of 2025 on 07.03.2025, did not think it necessary to apprise the Learned Trial Court about the fate of the said order, which he was legally bound to do as an officer of the Court. This conduct on the part of Learned Senior Counsel is not appreciated. Even Learned P.P. also perhaps failed to apprise the Learned Trial Court in this regard.

The plea of ground of arrest as agitated before the Learned Trial Court was taken at a belated stage during continuation of trial after filing of charge-sheet. Although on the plea of the ground of arrest, the bail was not considered. Hon’ble the Apex Court in this regard, in a case reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1702 [titled as State of Karnataka Vs. Sri Darshan etc. dated 14.08.2025] wherein in para No.20.1.7, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:

“20.1.7. In the present case, the arrest memos and remand records clearly reflect that the respondents were aware of the reasons for their arrest. They were legally represented from the outset and applied for bail shortly after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed understanding of the accusations. No material has been placed on record to establish that any prejudice was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse. In the absence of demonstrable prejudice, such as irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot, by itself, warrant release on bail. As reiterated above, the High Court treated it as a determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the charge under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. Its reliance on Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha is misplaced, as those decisions turned on materially different facts and statutory contexts. The approach adopted here is inconsistent with the settled principle that procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest, absent prejudice, do not ipso facto render custody illegal or entitle the accused to bail.”

From the aforesaid principle of law, it appears that on the plea of “ground of arrest” in absence of irregularity, there is no scope to consider bail. In the case at hand, from the record, it appears that the respondent-accused persons were all along represented by their engaged Learned defense Counsel. During investigation and even after filing of charge sheet, they did not take any plea that “grounds of arrests” were not informed to them, as such, on the basis of “ground of arrest”, there is no scope to consider bail as alleged.

Now, in respect of cancellation of bail granted to the respondent-accused persons, Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Bhattacharya at the time of hearing has referred certain observation of the Hon’ble Apex court as noted above. I have also gone through the said citations.

It is the settled position of law that bail once granted cannot be cancelled in a mechanical manner. But in this regard, in State of Karnataka Vs. Sri Darshan (supra) in para Nos.18.1, 18.3, 18.13, 20.5.1, 20.5.2, 22.2.1, 22.4, 22.4.1, 22.4.3, 22.4.5, 23.1, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:

“(A) Annulment of bail orders

18.1. This refers to the appellate or revisional power to set aside a bail order that is perverse, unjustified, or passed in violation of settled legal principles. It is concerned with defects existing at the time the bail was granted, without reference to subsequent conduct.

18.3. In Puran v. Rambilas :(2001) 6 SCC 338, it was held that a bail order can be set aside even in the absence of post-bail misconduct if it is found to be unjustified, illegal, or perverse.

18.13. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar (supra), Justice D.Y. Chandrachud explained:

“An appellate court is empowered to set aside a bail order if it is found to be based on a misapplication of legal principles or where relevant considerations have been ignored. On the other hand, cancellation of bail typically arises from post-bail conduct or supervening circumstances.”

20.5.1. The fact that the accused were in custody for more than 140 days, or exhibited good conduct post-release, does not ipso facto render the order of bail sustainable, if it suffers from non-consideration of material factors at the stage of grant.

20.5.2. In State through CBI v. Amaramani Tripathi:2005 (8) SCC 21, this Court reaffirmed that “…the mere fact that the accused has undergone certain period of incarceration… by itself would not entitle the accused to being enlarged on bail… when the gravity of the offence alleged is severe…”

22.2.1. In Puran v. Rambilas:(2001) 6 SCC 338, this Court categorically held that “Cancellation of bail is permissible where the order granting bail was perverse, or if the accused tampers with evidence or attempts to influence witnesses.”

(d) Non-consideration of material facts by the High Court

22.4. An order that overlooks material evidence or proceeds on an erroneous premise is perverse, and such perversity forms a valid ground for cancellation or setting aside of bail.

22.4.1. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar (supra), this Court laid down that “where the order granting bail is founded on irrelevant considerations, or non-consideration of material facts, the same is rendered perverse and is liable to be set aside.” Similarly, in State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi (supra) the Court held that “bail orders must be founded on a careful and judicious application of mind to the facts of the case and the seriousness of the offence. Non-consideration of relevant material renders the order vulnerable to challenge.”

22.4.3. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. (supra), this Court reversed the grant of bail observing that “Where the High Court ignores vital circumstances and material facts, the order becomes indefensible”.

22.4.5. In offences punishable with life imprisonment or death, the bail court must be especially cautious. In Ash Mohammed v. Shiv Raj Singh (supra), this Court emphasized that in serious offences, “the gravity of the offence and its impact on society must weigh heavily with the court, and such cases must be considered with greater care and circumspection”. However, in the present case, the High Court's order fails to reflect any such higher scrutiny or cautious approach, despite the seriousness of the charge and the wider societal impact of the case.

23.1. In State of Maharashtra v. Dhanendra Shriram Bhurle:(2009) 11 SCC 541, it was observed that “grant of bail in serious offences involving public confidence must be handled with great caution, especially where the accused enjoys influence”.

From the aforesaid observation, it appears that if the order of bail suffers from perversity, there is scope to interfere with the order.

Similarly, in another case, in Shabeen Ahmed Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another reported in 2025 4 SCC 172, wherein in para No.18, Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed as under:

“18. *** *** ***

It is equally well settled that bail once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to interference by the superior court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on the society resulting in such an order. In P. v. State of M.P. [P. v. State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211] decided by a three-Judge Bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the considerations that must weigh with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1)CrPC in the following words : (SCC p. 224, para 24)

‘24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 237] . To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.’

Considerations for setting aside bail orders

The considerations that weigh with the appellate court for setting aside the bail order on an application being moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may add that this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause prejudice to the accused, ought to be avoided. Suffice it is to state that the bail order should reveal the factors that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to the accused.”

Further, in Jage Ram & Ors. vs. State of Haryana reported in (2015) 11 SCC 366, wherein in para No.12, Hon’ble the Supreme Court of India observed as under:

“12. For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, the prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder; and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the prosecution that the accused had attempted to commit the murder of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended to commit murder of another person would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the nature of injury and severity of the blows given, etc.”

Reference is also made in another citation of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in (2024) 10 SCC 768 [titled as Ajwar vs. Waseem & Anr. along with other connected matters] wherein in para Nos.26 and 27, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:

“Relevant parameters for granting bail

While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer : Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974] ; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977] ; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368] ; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765] ; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] ; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425] ; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .]

It is equally well settled that bail once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to interference by the superior court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on the society resulting in such an order. In P v. State of M.P. [P v. State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211] decided by a three-Judge Bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the considerations that must weigh with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1)CrPC in the following words : (SCC p. 224, para 24)

“24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 237] . To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.”

From the aforesaid citations, it appears that if the order of bail is perverse, without any proper reasoning, then there is no bar for the Appellate Court to interfere with the order.

Here in the case at hand, after going through the order passed by the Learned Trial Court, it appears that at the time of passing of order, first of all Learned Trial Court did not consider the earlier order dated 07.03.2025 passed by this Court. Secondly, Learned Trial Court without considering the evidence on record of the prosecution, simply on the basis of period of detention of the accused persons in custody and also the fact that 22 numbers of witnesses have been examined, have granted bail to the accused persons, which shows non-application of mind and gross judicial indiscipline and utter disregard of the order of the superior Court. Because when this Court refused the bail application by order dated 07.03.2025 in B.A. No.10 of 2025, that time, 15 numbers of witnesses were examined and considering the evidence on record the bail application was rejected with a direction to the Learned Trial Court to take appropriate step for expeditious trial of the case on the ground that the accused persons were languishing in jail.

In this case, from the record it appears that the IO in the charge-sheet has cited 45 numbers of witnesses and out of 45 numbers of witnesses, only 22 numbers of witnesses have been examined. From the order passed by Learned Trial Court further it appears that in course of hearing of bail Learned P.P. on behalf of the prosecution strongly objected the submission of Learned defense Counsel which was also not considered by the Learned Trial Court.

In course of hearing, learned Senior Counsel for the applicant-victim has drawn the attention of the Court that after release on bail the accused persons threatened the victim-cum-informant and another witness and in this regard, they have informed the respective police authority but it is not known to this Court as to whether police has taken any action on that or not. However, Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-accused failed to counter the same allegation.

Admittedly, at the time of hearing, Learned Senior Counsel for the applicant-victim could not project any supervening circumstances save and except to cancel the bail and it was also not the case of the applicant to pray for cancellation of bail on the ground of supervening circumstances rather they have challenged the validity of the order passed by the Learned Trial Court on the ground of perversity and judicial indiscipline. From the aforesaid citations referred by this Court it appears that if the order is found to be perverse, not well reasoned then in a case of this nature, there is scope on the part of this Court to interfere with the order passed by the Learned Trial Court.

So, after detailed hearing of both the rival parties, it appears to this Court that the order dated 25.07.2025 passed by Learned Trial Court suffers from infirmity and perversity which attracts judicial indiscipline and violation of the order of the superior Court, as such, the order dated 25.07.2025 passed by Learned Trial Court stands cancelled and the bail bond of the accused persons also accordingly stands cancelled. The accused persons are to surrender before the Learned Trial Court on or before 07.10.2025.

Learned Trial Court after receipt of the case record fix new calendar for examination of the rest witnesses giving top priority and pass judgment in accordance with law.

As asked for by this Court, Learned Trial Court submitted one report earlier. Perused the same. However, necessary order in administrative side would be passed accordingly.

It is made clear that on 07.10.2025 there will be Long Puja Vacation and in such a situation, the accused person also may surrender before the Court of Learned CJM, South Tripura, Belonia, who in the event of surrender of the accused persons, shall pass order of remand for their production before the Court of Learned Additional Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Belonia accordingly.

Further, it is ordered that all the criminal courts across the State at the time of consideration of any bail application shall ensure by obtaining one declaration in the form of affidavit from the concerned parties through their engaged Learned Counsel/Counsels mentioning the following facts:

pendency of any other bail application of the same accused to any other upper forum.

the order of the superior Court in this regard so as to avoid any legal conflicts in near future.

Registrar(Judl.) be asked to circulate the order to all the Courts across the State.

With this observation, this present bail application stands disposed of.

Send down the record of Learned Trial Court along with a copy of this order.

Return back the Case Diary to IO through Learned P.P. along with a copy of this order.

Also, send a copy of this order to Learned CJM, South Tripura, Belonia for information and necessary action, if so requires.