AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Ayling, J.—The suit from which this appeal arises was instituted u/s 14, Religious Endowments Act XX of 1863, by four persons, who had
obtained leave of the Court u/s 18 of the same. Subsequent to its institution, one of these persons died; and the District Judge has dismissed the
suit on the single ground that it is not competent to the three survivors to maintain it, it being "" essential that all the donees of the power (to institute
a suit) conferred by the Court should jointly exercise that power right up to the finish of the suit."" The surviving plaintiffs appeal.
The chief authority relied on by the District Judge is that of Venkatesha Malla v. Ramayya Hegade ILR (1914) M. 1192 : 27 M.L.J. 241 in
which it was held that where sanction was given u/s 18 of the Religious Endowments Act to two men, it was not open to one of them alone to
institute the suit under that sanction. It may be pointed out at once that this ruling does not necessarily cover the present case, in which the suit was
validly instituted by all the persons who obtained leave to sue, but one of them subsequently died. It does not necessarily follow that a validly
instituted suit abates for this reason. Another judgment of this Court quoted in support of the Lower Court''s decree, Maddala Bagavannarayana v.
Vadapalli Perumalacharyulu (1915) 29 M.L.J. 231 also deals with a case in which the institution was itself defective (in the above sense) and the
only authority brought to our notice in support of the abatement, is Chhabile Bam v. Durga Prasad ILR (1915) A. 296 which was expressly
dissented from in a recent case of this Court, Parameswaran Mumpee v. Narayanan Nambodri I.L.R (1916) M. 110 : 31 M.L.J. 279. All the last
three cases were of suits instituted u/s 92, Civil Procedure Code; but as I shall endeavour to show presently, the difference between the two
sections is in the present appellants'' favour.
Section 18 of the Eeligious Endowments Act is very similar to Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In each, the Courts are
expressly forbidden to entertain a complaint or suit, unless express sanction or leave for its institution has been previously obtained. The grant of
the sanction or leave in each case removes the bar to the Court taking cognizance of the matter; and once that bar is removed, it is not easy to see
how either of the two sections can have further effect. In the case of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the complaint may be filed by
a different person altogether from the person who applied for the sanction (Vide In re Thathayya ILR (1888) M. 47 and though it is not necessary
for us to go so far as the present case, I do not see why the same should not hold good in the case of leave granted u/s 18 of the Eeligious
Endowments Act. With"" all respect to the learned Judges who decided Venkatesha Malia v. Ramayya Hegadi ILR (1914) M. 1198 : 27 M.L.J.
241 the wording of Section 18 of the Eeligious Endowments Act seems to afford no warrant for the consideration by, the Court of the personality
of the applicant. The duty of the Court is specifically defined as the determinations of whether there are sufficient prima facie grounds for the
institution of the suit. In dealing with applications u/s 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Courts do, not uncommonly, bear in mind the
personality of the applicant and his probable motives, although Section 195 is, in this respect, quite general in its terms, and does not attempt to
define the matters for the Court''s determination. Nevertheless, as already stated, a sanction granted to one person may be utilised by another.
Section 92 of the CPC is different. It expressly authorises the institution of a suit by "" two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having
obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate-General."" This wording certainly supports the view that the persons who institute the suit must be
identical with those who obtained the sanction.
u/s 14 of the Religious Endowments Act, on the contrary, any person or persons interested may sue; and Section 18 merely interposes an
independent condition that the suit shall not be entertained unless leave has been previously granted on application--but without indicating in any
way by whom the application should be made.
There seems to me, therefore, no need to adopt the District Judge''s very narrow view of the section and where the District Court has, on due
consideration, decided that there are sufficient prima facie grounds for the institution of a suit against trustees of religious endowments it is
undesirable in the public interest that unnecessary obstacles should be thrown in the way of its prosecution.
I would set aside the decree of the District Court and remand the suit for disposal on its merits. Costs in this Court should be costs in the cause.
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.
I should like to reserve my opinion on the question whether when ''leave is granted to A u/s 18 of Act XX of 1863 to institute a suit, B could
institute that suit u/s 14.
But I entirely agree with my learned brother that there is nothing in Section 18 which can be construed as putting an end to the suit after it is
once legally instituted, simply because one of several persons who obtained the leave u/s 18 died during the pendency of the suit. I think that the
general provisions of the CPC become applicable as much to a suit brought in the Special Court mentioned in Section 14 of the Religious
Endowments Act after the first step, namely, the institution of the suit, has taken place, as to a suit brought u/s 92, Civil Procedure Code, except
that a certain special or rather supplemental provision regarding reference to arbitration (See Section 16 of the Religious Endowments Act) is also
applicable to the former case and the Court is given express powers to award certain named reliefs in its decree to a suit u/s 92, Civil Procedure
Code. (See also Parameswaran Mumpee v. Narayanan Nambudri ILR (1916) M. 110 : 31 M.L.J. 279 and Varadayya Chetti v. Munusami Chetti
(1911) 10 M.L.T. 614
A suit u/s 14 of Act XX of 1863 is, in my opinion, as much a representative suit as one brought u/s 92 of the CPC or some of the suits under
Order 1, Rule 8 of that Code, as it is equally brought in and as it affects the rights of all those interested in the religious endowment. All such
interested persons become, in the eye of the law, parties to such a suit and the death of one or more of them cannot cause the suit to abate nor
would it prevent the suit from being heard till "" its finish "" after it has been once properly and legally instituted, unless perhaps in the almost
impossible contingency of all the persons interested ceasing to exist in this world by death or by wholesale apostacy. I agree in the order proposed
by my learned brother.