High CourtsSingle Bench

Panchdeo Singh vs Bharat Cocking Coal Limited (B.C.C.L)

Jharkhand High Court · Decided on 24 August 2018 · Citation: (2018) 08 JH CK 0070

HON’BLE JUDGES
PRAMATH PATNAIK, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition (S) No. 3566 of 2007
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Judgment

47 paragraphs · 965 words
1.

In the captioned writ application, the petitioner has inter alia prayed for quashing the identification certificate dated 27.03.2006, wherein the date of

birth of the present petitioner is mentioned as 25.03.1948 and also for quashing order of superannuation dated 20.12.2006 considering the date of birth

of the petitioner as 25.03.1948. Further prayer has been made for payment of his salary from April, 2008 to October, 2010 after taking into

consideration the date of birth of the petitioner as 19.10.1950 and further prayer has been made for direction upon the respondents to compute the

pension and other retiral benefits in terms of the last pay that was supposed to be drawn by the petitioner.

2.

The facts, as delineated in the writ application, in brief is that the petitioner was appointed on 25.03.1973 as an employee of BCCL, where after his

service book was opened mentioning his date of birth as 19.10.1950. Basing on such entry, in other service excerpts, the date of birth of the petitioner

was mentioned as 19.10.1950. But surprisingly, the date of birth of the petitioner was mentioned in Identification Certificate dated 27.08.2006 as

“25.03.1948†and thereafter the respondents-authorities erroneously passed order of superannuation dated 20.12.2006 considering his wrong date

of birth i.e. 25.03.1948.

3.

Heard Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta, learned counsel being assisted by Mr. Atul Rai,

learned counsel for the respondents-BCCL.

4.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondents-authorities have tempered the documents so far the date of birth of the petitioner is

concerned and have illegally changed the date of birth from 19.10.1950 to 25.03.1948 with a sole purpose to superannuate the petitioner at an earlier

date. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that it is service book/record of the employee, which is conclusive to decide the date of birth

of the petitioner, besides in many other service excerpts the date of birth of the petitioner has been mentioned as 19. 10.1950; hence the petitioner be

extended the benefit of continuity in service treating his date of birth as 19.10.1950.

5.

As against this, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that initially the petitioner was appointed on 25.03.1973 at West Mudidih Colliery

under Katras Area of M/s BCCL. At that time, in the Form B register in age column, his age was recorded as 25 years, accordingly his date of birth

comes to 25.03.1948. While continuing as such, once the petitioner was dismissed from services, however, after reinstatement in service while issuing

LPC his date of birth was wrongly mentioned as 19.10.1950 in From B of P.B. Colliery.

But when it came to knowledge of the authorities, the same was corrected as 25.03.1948. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that

when the petitioner was again transferred from P.B. Area to Angarpathara Colliery under Katras Area on 03.04.2006, again Form B Register was

opened where his date of birth was recorded as 25.03.1948, wherein the petitioner put his signature in token of acceptance of date of birth as

mentioned in Form B register. Hence, at the fag end of service and on the strength of some wrong entry, which was even later on corrected, the

petitioner cannot claim modification/rectification of date of birth.

6.

After bestowing my anxious consideration to the rival contentions raised by learned the parties and on perusal of the documents available on record,

I am of the considered view that the petitioner has failed to make out a case for interference for the following facts, reason and judicial

pronouncements:

(i).From the pleadings available on record, it appears that the petitioner was appointed on 25.03.1973 and at that time, in the Statutory Form B register,

his age was mentioned as 25 years and his date of birth was treated as 25.03.1948. Furthermore, from perusal of Form B, the Statutory Form,

annexed as Annexure C to supplementary counter affidavit dated 26.02.2018, as well as Original Form B register, it appears that the date of birth of

the petitioner has been mentioned as 25 years as on 25.03.1973 and in token of acceptance the petitioner has put his signature.

(ii).So far some wrong entry made after reinstatement of petitioner is concerned, which was though later on corrected, would not give any indefeasible

right to claim his date of birth i.e. 19.10.1950. Moreover, it is no more res integra that the disputed question of facts regarding veracity or genuineness

of the certificate pertaining to date of birth cannot be effectually adjudicated by the Writ Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of G.M.

Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. Shib Kumar Dushad & Ors as reported in AIR 2001 SC 72, has unequivocally held that the High Court in writ petition

cannot make an enquiry into such disputed questions of fact.

(iii).Furthermore, in the case at hand, the petitioner has raised the disputed question of facts relating to his date of birth at the fag end of service, which

cannot be adjudicated in view of the decision rendered in the case of Burn Standard Co. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Dinabandhu Majumdar & Anr as reported in

AIR 1995 SC 1499, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court in unequivocal terms has enunciated that writ petition for correction of date of birth at the fag

end of service with object of continuing in service ordinarily should not be entertained. Therefore, the reliefs sought for in the writ application is

thoroughly misconceived and unsustainable.

(iv).Apart from the factual assertions made by the respondents, documentary evidences lean in favour of the respondents so as to nullify the claim of

the petitioner.

7.

As a logical sequitur to the facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, no relief can be granted to the petitioner. Hence, the writ petition being

devoid of any merit is dismissed.