Pankajam Ammal and Others vs Thulasidoss and Another

K. Govindarajan, J.—The tenants aggrieved against the order of eviction passed by the authorities below have filed the above Revision.

The landlords filed R. CO.P. No. 16 of 1989 on the file of the learned Rent Controller/District Munsif, Karur to evict the tenants, under

Sections l0(2)(1) and 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960 as amended. In the petition it is stated that

by a settlement deed dated 9.2.1962. one Govindarajulu Naidu who is the original owner of the property settled the property in question along

with the other properties in favour of his sons, including one G. Ramachandran who is the husband of the second petitioner. He died issueless. But,

during his lifetime, on 6.3.1963, the second petitioner in the R.C.O.P. and her husband duly adopted the first petitioner in the R.C.O.P. She had

executed a release deed in respect of her life-interest in the property in favour of the first petitioner in the R.C.O.P., the adopted son. According to

the landlords, the factum of adoption was made known to the tenants. Inspite of the same, they have not paid the rent to the landlords. But, on the

other hand, they denied the title of the first petitioner in the R.C.O.P. On that basis the landlords claimed that on the ground of denial of title, the

tenants are liable to be evicted. It is their further case that the tenants have not paid rent since January, 1988, in spite of demand and so they

committed wilful de-fault in payment of rent. With respect of their requirement for demolition and reconstruction, it is the case of the landlords that

the petition mentioned property is situated in a prominent locality at Karur. For the purpose of augmenting the income and to have better return

from the said property they want to demolish the entire superstructure and put up new construction over the site. According to the first petitioner in

the R.C.O.P., he is having necessary resources for the same. It is stated in the petition that the first petitioner has become the landlord and so he

has filed the petition and to avoid technical objection from the tenants, the second petitioner also had been impleaded as a party. She has also

verified the petition. This petition was objected by the tenants by filing a detailed counter. In the counter it is stated that the first petitioner in the

R.C.O.P. cannot get any right in the property on the basis of the alleged adoption. They have also submitted that the adoption and release deeds

are illegal. With respect to the payment of rent, money orders were sent on 18.1.1988 and 15.2.1988 etc., to the second petitioner in the

R.C.O.P. but she refused to receive the same. As soon as the R.C.O.P. was filed, they have immediately paid all the rent up-to-date. With respect

to the requirement of the building for demolition and reconstruction, it is the case of the tenants that such requirement is not a bona fide one. It is

only with an oblique motive to evict the tenants, and the landlords have no funds for the same.

The Rent Controller in his order dated 6.7.1990 allowed the eviction petition accepting the case of the landlords. Aggrieved against the same,

the tenants filed R.C.A. No. 19 of 1990 on the file of the learned Appellate Authority/Sub Judge, Karur. The Appellate Authority in his order

dated 29.7.1992 found that the denial of title by the tenants cannot be construed as a bona fide one, that the tenants have committed wilful default

in payment of rent and that the requirement of building for demolition and reconstruction by the landlords cannot be said to be bona fide one. On

the basis of the above finding, the Appellate Authority has confirmed the order of eviction. Further aggrieved, the tenants have filed the above

revision.

Pending the revision, the 2nd respondent died. The tenants have filed C.M.P. No. 8104 of 1996 to record the tenants and the 1st respondent

also as Legal Representatives of the deceased 2nd respondent. I will deal with the same separately.

The main question involved in this case for consideration is whether the denial of title of the landlords with respect to the property in question by

the tenants is a bona fide one or not. 6. Before going into that question, it is necessary to see how the first respondent herein claims right in the

property in question. Admittedly, the property in question originally belonged to one Govindarajulu Naidu. He executed a settlement deed on

9.2.1962 in favour of his sons in respect of the property in question and other properties. The relevant portion of the same marked as Ex. A-1 is

as follows:

Admittedly, the said G. Ramachandran is also one of his sons and one of the settle in the abovesaid Ex. A. 1. The second respondent is his wife.

Since they did not have any issues of their own, they adopted the first respondent on 6.3.1963, and the same was reduced into writing by a deed

of adoption under Ex. A. 2. dated 11.1.1988. On the date of adoption, namely, 6.3.1963, the said Ramachandran was alive. Since the second

respondent was having life-interest in the said properties, she released her right under the release deed dated 11.1.1988 marked as Ex. A-3.

Pursuant to the same, the second respondent informed the tenants that the property in question has been given to the 1st respondent and they have

to pay the rent accordingly. In spite of the same, the tenants raised a dispute to the title of the 1st respondent for the property in question, regarding

his capacity to be a landlord.

The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the adoption deed is not in accordance with law, and, more than that, the

second respondent was having only enjoyment right in the said property, and so the first respondent cannot get any right under the alleged adoption

and release deeds marked as Exs. A-2 and A-3. I am deciding the rights of the parties only for the restricted purpose to see whether the denial of

title by the tenants is a bona fide or not, and I am not deciding the dispute between the parties as to the title of the property in question. According

to the 2nd respondent, the adoption was as early as in 1963, and that has been reduced into writing under Ex. A-2. Since the second respondent

was having life interest in the said properties, the same has been released in favour of the 1st respondent, under Ex. A-3. The learned Counsel

appearing for the petitioners has tried to assail the case of the first petitioner by submitting that he is not denying the title of the second respondent

to the said properties, and his denial is only with respect to the right of the first respondent in the property in question, on the basis that he will not

get any right in the property in view of the recitals in Ex. A-1. On a mere reading of Ex. A-1 prima facie I feel that the intention of the testator was

that each branch should retain the property described therein within their branch. Merely because it is stated therein that it cannot be said that the

same is only with respect to the children born to the parents. Further, adopted son also can be taken as a son. So, in view of the adoption of the

first respondent as stated in Ex. A-2 the branch of the said Ramachandran is entitled to retain the said property.

As stated earlier the second respondent has also released her right in the properties in favour of the first respondent. So, on the date of filing of

the R.C.O.P., the 1st petitioner claims that he is the landlord of the premises in question.

So, the denial of title with respect to the first petitioner in the said property dates back to the date of filing of the R.C.O.P. So to reject the

R.C.O.P. as not maintainable at the instance of the first petitioner, it has to be decided whether such a denial is a bona fide one at the relevant point

of time when the same was raised. If any authority is needed, the same is found in Thanvagel, A. v. A. Mariappan 100 L.W. 381, wherein Abdul

Hadi, J., has held as follows:

Even though originally the petition for eviction was made u/s 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act on the ground that the landlady did not have any

accommodation in her own possession and that she was living in the rented premises, the order of eviction cannot be interfered with merely on the

ground that subsequently the landlady has come in possession of some accommodation even though that accommodation does not fully meet the

need of the landlady. There is no doubt that the petition as framed when it was made was clearly maintainable because at that time the landlady

was not in occupation of any premises of her own. The petition does not automatically become nonmaintainable because of subsequent events. All

that has to be seen is whether the accommodation which has now secured subsequent to the order of eviction is sufficient to meet the need of the

family and forcing the landlady to have recourse to another proceeding will only mean multiplicity of proceedings.

The abovesaid decision has also been followed by Abdul Hadi, J. as he then was in Abdur Rashed Sahib, M.K. v. A.R. Rahimunnissa Begum

(1990) 1 L.W. 582.

After the execution of the adoption and release deeds the second respondent has written a letter to the tenants under Ex. 38 to pay the rent to

the first respondent. The second respondent is also a signatory to the eviction petition recognising the rights of the first respondent to be a landlord

and to collect the rent from the tenants. She has also deposed to that effect. In spite of the same, the tenants have denied the title of the 1st

respondent to the property in question, which cannot be construed other than mala fide denial of title and so order of eviction on that ground is

sustainable. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that now the second respondent is dead and so the first respondent

cannot have any right. As stated earlier, the nature of denial of title to the document has to be gone into on the basis of the facts available on the

date of filing of the petition, and the date on which the tenant raised objection regarding the rights of the landlord. So, such a submission cannot be

sustained in law.

With respect to the eviction on the ground of wilful default, the case of the petitioners is that the authorities below are not correct in holding that

the tenants have committed wilful default. In the counter, the tenants have stated that as soon as the petitioners filed the R.C.O.P., the respondents

immediately paid the arrears up-to-date. It is also stated that the rent was sent to the 2nd respondent which was refused. So, the order of the

authorities below in this regard cannot be sustained in law.

With respect to the requirement of the premises of the landlords for demolition and reconstruction, it is their specific case that the premises is

situate in a prominent locality at Karur, and for the purpose of augmenting their income and to have better return from the property in question,

they want to demolish the entire superstructure and put up new one over the site. Regarding funds, it is stated that they are having sufficient funds.

The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners/tenants has submitted that the respondents have not proved their bona fide with respect to the

such requirement. Though the Rent Controller accepted the case of the respondents herein, the Appellate Authority rejected the same, only on the

ground that the premises is not in dilapidated condition. The appellate authority has not applied his mind that for seeking eviction u/s 14(1)(b) of the

Act, it is not necessary that the premises should be in dilapidated condition.

While considering similar issue I have held in S. Saraswathi Ammal (deceased) and Others Vs. R.S. Mallikarjun Raja and Others, , that the

bona fides have to be assessed with respect to the facts and circumstances of each case and the building need not be in dilapidated condition or in

dangerous state of affairs for ordering eviction u/s 14(1)(b) of the Act. The Rent Controller on the basis of the evidence has found that the 1st

respondent can gather sufficient funds to reconstruct the premises. That factual finding has not been assailed by the Appellate Authority. The case

of the 1st respondent has also been established adducing evidence. So, the requirement of the 1st respondent of the premises in question for

demolition and reconstruction is nothing but bona fide, as he has proved his readiness to put up new construction.

In view of the above, the order of the Appellate Authority in this regard cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly the order of eviction passed

by the authority below is sustainable. I do not find any merit in this Revision and the same is dismissed. No costs.