High Courts

Paramjit Singh vs State of Punjab

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 8 August 1983 · Citation: (1983) 08 P&H CK 0028

HON’BLE JUDGES
B.S.Yadav, J
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Miscellaneous No. 3342-M of 1983 and Criminal Miscellaneous No. 3343 of 1983
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Judgment

10 paragraphs · 742 words

B.S. Yadav, J.

1.

Paramjit Singh, petitioner, who is a partner of M/s. Sat Kartar Shellers, Solvent and Allied Mills, Khanna, has filed this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing First Information Report No. 7 dated 11th June, 1983, registered under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code in Police Station City, Khanna, District Ludhiana.

2.

According to the allegations in the petition, 1275 quintals of paddy relating to the crop of 198283 was stored in the premises of the Sheller by Markfed and was to remain in trust. Paddy was to be shelled by the Miller and the rice was to be delivered to the Food Corporation of India in Markfed account. In lieu of the above, the Sheller was to deliver 8136 quintals of rice of P.R. 106 quality at the rate of 67% and 243.77 quintals of rice of I.R. 8 quality at the rate of 69% respectively. However, the Sheller delivered only 4510 quintals of rice of P.R. 106 quality and the balance quantity of rice of the two qualities was not delivered to the Food Corporation of India, in the Markfed account. It was also alleged in the First Information Report that the Miller had disposed of the paddy stock and had thus misutilised the proceeds of the same and the Miller had committed breach of trust.

3.

The contention of the petitioner is that according to oral agreement between the parties, the Sheller was to make good the loss that might be incurred in paddy and rice during the transit or storage and in case of shortfall in the rice, the Sheller was to pay to the Markfed the cost of paddy equivalent to the shortfall at the rate of 11/2 times the economic cost of the paddy. On 4th January, 1983 fire broke out in the premises of the Sheller of the Firm and about 350 bags of paddy were burnt to ashes and the same number of bags became wet and damaged. On 17th May, 1983, the Firm wrote to the District Food and Supplies Officer, Ludhiana, requesting him to allow the Firm to deposit the value of short supply of rice.

4.

On the basis of the above, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the dispute between the parties is of civil nature and, therefore, the First Information Report should be quashed. I am afraid, the above contention cannot be accepted. Investigations are still going on and during the investigations the petitioner can prove the agreement which might have entered into between the parties.

5.

At this stage I am only to see the prima facie allegations in the First Information Report. According to those allegations the paddy was entrusted to the Miller for shelling it and to deliver the rice to the Food Corporation of India. Thus the paddy was to remain in trust with the Sheller. If any broke out in the premises of the Sheller and some paddy was destroyed it will be a piece of evidence but this is no ground for quashing the First Information Report.

6.

I may here quote Vinod Kumar Sethi and others v. The State of Punjab and another, I.L.R. 1982(2) Punjab and Haryana:

"It necessarily follows from the above that if the first information report disclose no cognizable offence whatsoever, it would give the court jurisdiction for entering into an enquiry for quashing the proceedings. However, this is no warrant for holding that either because a defective first information report has been recorded or at time of commencing the investigation, the information was cryptic, yet the subsequent investigation must be quashed irrespective of all other considerations. Indeed, the true test appears to be that when challenged the investigation agency, even on the basis of all the material collected by it, is unable to show that there is reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence, it would be then and then alone that the inherent jurisdiction can warrant the quashing of the investigation itself, being a patent harassment to the accused. It deserves highlighting that the core of the jurisdiction herein is the satisfaction of the court that it amounts to a clear abuse of power by the police."

7.

The case is still at the stage of investigation. I do not find sufficient ground to quash the First Information Report lodged against the petitioner.

For the foregoing reasons I dismiss the present petition.