Parasmal and Others vs Ganesh Mal Ram Kishore and Others

Pratap Krishna Lohra, J.—Appellants/plaintiffs have laid this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ''CPC'') assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 15th of October 2008, passed by learned District Judge, Pali (for short, ''learned First Appellate Court'') in Civil Appeal Decree No. 13/2007, preferred by them against dismissal of their Civil Original Suit No. 87/2005 vide judgment and decree dated 01.02.2007 passed by Civil Judge (Jr.Div.), Pali (for short, ''learned trial Court'').

Succinctly stated, the facts of the case are that appellants-plaintiffs laid a suit for permanent injunction to restrain the respondents-defendants from interfering with their land of Plot No. 11 situated in Nehru Nagar, Pali, purchased by their father Shri Manak Chand from Pali Municipal Board through registered sale-deed on 10.05.1965. It is averred in the plaint that on the said plot purchased by their father, a house was constructed in the year 1966 after obtaining permission from Municipality, however, later on it revealed that some portion of adjoining plot No. 21 was also included in the permission granted by the Municipality for construction and as such house so constructed was overlapping on the part of adjoining plot. In such a situation, at the request of appellants'' father, Municipality sold that overlapping part of land to their father through a registered sale-deed executed in respect of 20''x40'' land of plot No. 21 utilized by their father ignorantly and regularized the construction so raised thereon and thereafter rest of the land of Plot No. 21 was sold by the Municipal Board to one Kewalchand, who was already having the adjoining Plot No. 20 purchased by him from the Municipal Board through registered sale-deed dated 10.05.1965. It is also averred that Municipal Board sold Plot No. 12 to one Bhanwarlal through registered sale-deed dated 27.01.1967 and possession thereof was handed over to him, who in turn sold that plot to Manak Chand, father of appellants through registered sale-deed on 01.04.1967 and handed over its possession but later on their father sold land of that plot to respondent-defendant M/s. Ganesh Mal Ram Kishore on 20.04.1967 through registered sale-deed and handed over its possession. The appellants, in their plaint, have come up with the case that respondent-defendant No. 1 M/s. Ganesh Mal Ram Kishore on 10.07.2005 tried to interfere with their possession on land of Plot No. 11 which was lying vacant and as such they were constrained to file suit for perpetual injunction against respondents-defendants to restrain them from interfering with the land of Plot No. 11 belonging to them.

The suit was contested by respondent-defendant No. 1 by filing written statement denying the averments contained in the plaint. In the counter, the respondent-defendant No. 1 pleaded that in the southern side of Plot No. 11 no land was lying vacant and no part of Plot No. 11 was ever vacant rather the construction on the whole plot measuring 40''x60'' was raised by the plaintiffs. It was specifically averred that no window projects from Plot No. 11. The respondent-defendant admitted sale of plot No. 12 by Bhanwarlal to Manak Chand, father of appellants and thereafter its sale to it by Shri Manak Chand. Further, it was admitted that no construction was ever raised on Plot No. 12, rather pucca boundary wall existed there with gate. Respondent-defendant No. 1 denied fraudulent intention of encroaching over 20'' x 40'' southern side land of Plot No. 11 and taken the stand that it has no connection at all with the land of Plot No. 11. Respondent-defendant No. 1 firm, while affirming the size of Plot No. 12 to be 40'' x 60'', denied availability of 20'' x 40'' pattasud land of appellants-plaintiffs towards southern side of their Plot No. 11. An objection was raised with regard to non-serving of notice under Section 271 of the Municipal Act and it was pleaded that in case the appellants-plaintiffs had any objection, they could file appeal, which was an alternative remedy available to them, but as they have failed to avail that remedy, discretionary relief of injunction cannot be granted to them. The respondent-defendant No. 1 also stated in its return that in the year 1993 appellants-plaintiffs tried to encroach over the land of Plot No. 12 claiming it to be part of their Plot No. 11 and consequent thereto proceedings were initiated under Section 145 CPC and the District Magistrate concluded that the house of appellants-plaintiffs is constructed on Plot No. 11 and in its southern side Plot No. 12 is of the ownership of respondent-defendant No. 1, as such, only the respondent-defendant No. 1 is entitled to get its possession. The respondent-defendant brought to the notice of the trial Court that revision petition filed against that order has already been rejected and prayed for dismissal of the suit.

Respondent-defendant No. 2 Municipal Council, Pali also submitted its written statement and admitted the factum of purchasing Plot No. 12 by father of appellants-plaintiffs from Bhanwarlal, and thereafter selling and handing over its possession to respondent-defendant No. 1. In connection with Plot No. 12, it is stated that on the spot situation of the said plot remains as it is. It was contended that the appellants-plaintiffs have no right to file a suit claiming the land of Plot No. 12 to be of their ownership. Municipal Council in its reply clarified that no additional land in between Plot No. 11 and 12 lies as per Master Plan and both the plots are of equal dimensions with size of 40'' x 60'' and that on Plot No. 11 house has already been constructed. According to respondent Municipal Council, at the time of seeking permission to raise construction on Plot No. 11, father of appellants-plaintiffs, mistakenly shown size of plot towards eastern side as 60 ft, whereas as per Master Plan the size of Plot No. 11 towards eastern side ought to have been shown as 40 ft. It was the case of respondent Municipal Council that permission for construction on Plot No. 11 was granted as per Master Plan and accordingly construction was raised, however, it is stated that Manak Chand was allotted 20 ft additional land perhaps treating it to be a strip of land of Plot No. 11 and denied that any part of Plot No. 11 lies in Plot No. 12. The respondent Municipal Council also raised objection about not serving notice under Section 271 and craved for dismissal of the suit.

The learned trial Court, on the basis of the pleadings of the rival parties, framed as many as 4 issues for its determination. In support of their case, appellants-plaintiffs examined PW1 Parasmal, while on behalf of respondent-defendant No. 1 DW1 Rangnath was examined, and on behalf of respondent No. 2 Municipal Council DW2 Kunj Bihari was got examined. Learned trial Court, on evaluation of evidence and other materials available on record, decided three material issues against the appellants except Issue No. 4 and based on finding recorded vis-�-vis issue No. 1 to 3 dismissed the suit filed by the appellants-plaintiffs.

Mr. K.C. Samdariya, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that findings of the learned Courts below on issue No. 1 to 3 are perverse and not in consonance and conformity with the evidence and other materials on record. Learned counsel would contend that both the Courts below have not examined the lis involved in the matter in right perspective and while non-suiting the appellants the material fact about allotment of additional land, which was allegedly part of Plot No. 21, has completely overlooked a vital fact that the said land was allotted to the appellants on payment of additional consideration. Mr. Samdariya submits that even if there is a concurrent finding of fact, this Court is not loathed with the power to examine the perversity of the findings recorded by the Courts below. Mr. Samdariya further submits that the material contradictions in the testimony of witness of the respondent Municipal Council and admission on his part have been completely eschewed by both the learned Courts below rendering the impugned judgments vulnerable. Elaborating his submission in this behalf, Mr. Samdariya submits that it is a case of total misreading of the evidence and documents on record and therefore in the present case the substantial question of law is involved requiring adjudication by this Court. Lastly, Mr. Samdariya submits that as the respondent Municipal Council has not produced the site plan of Nehru Nagar, adverse inference ought to have been drawn by the learned Courts below but by not doing so both the learned Courts below have committed a serious jurisdictional error which constitutes substantial question of law. In support of his contentions, Mr. Samdariya has placed reliance on following legal precedents:

� P. Chandrasekharan and Others Vs. S. Kanakarajan and Others, AIR 2007 SC 2306 : (2007) 104 CLT 585 : (2007) 6 JT 347 : (2007) 6 SCALE 342 : (2007) 5 SCC 669 : (2007) 5 SCR 967 : (2007) AIRSCW 4002 : (2007) 4 Supreme 174

� State Inspector of Police Vs. Surya Sankaram Karri, (2006) CriLJ 4598 : (2006) 8 JT 177 : (2006) 8 SCALE 451 : (2006) 7 SCC 172 : (2006) 6 SCR 229 Supp

� Balla Ram (Dead) by Lrs. and Others Vs. Phoola (Dead) by Lrs. and Others, AIR 2003 SC 2080 : (2003) 95 CLT 352 : (2002) 9 JT 628 : (2003) 1 SCC 378 : (2003) 1 UJ 344 : (2003) AIRSCW 68 : (2002) 8 Supreme 397

In P. Chandrasekharan and Ors. (supra), Hon''ble Apex Court, while examining true purport of substantial question of law, held:

"19. When thus the courts below misread and misinterpreted a document of title read with other documents and the plan for the identification of the suit lands whereupon the plaintiffs themselves relied upon, a substantial question of law arose for determination of the High Court in between the parties to the suit."

In State, Inspector of Police, Visakhapatnam (supra), Hon''ble Apex Court, while examining a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act, made endeavor to interpret Section 64 and 164 of the Evidence Act and its impact in case of non-production of document in possession of a public functionary. The Court held:

"18. It is now well settled that when a document being in possession of a public functionary, who is under a statutory obligation to produce the same before the court of law, fails and/or neglects to produce the same, an adverse inference may be drawn against him. The learned Special Judge in the aforementioned situation was enjoined with a duty to draw an adverse inference. He did not consider the question from the point of view of statutory requirements, but took into consideration factors, which were not germane."

In Balla Ram (Dead) by Lrs and Ors. (supra), Hon''ble Apex Court has held that second appeal cannot be dismissed in a slip shod manner while examining as to whether substantial question of law is involved in the matter or not. The Court held:

"3. The High Court did not consider whether any substantial question or questions of law arose for consideration between the parties as required under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This Court has taken the consistent view that in order to consider and dispose of a second appeal, substantial question or questions of law should arise for consideration between the parties. The impugned order does not indicate whether any substantial question or questions of law arose for consideration between the parties. It is expected of the appellant to frame substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal. Sub-section (3) of Section 100 C.P.C. states that:

"In an appeal under this Section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal."

On the other hand, Mr. Bhagirath Patel on behalf of Mr. Anjay Kothari, for respondent No. 1 and 3, submits that it is a pure and simple case of concurrent finding of fact by both the Courts below and therefore the impugned judgments require no interference in this second appeal. Mr. Patel would contend that both the learned Courts below have recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the land, which was transferred to the first respondent by father of the appellants, i.e. Plot No. 12 measuring 40'' x 60'' is in possession of the respondents and as such there is no question of encroachment by the respondents beyond the area specified in sale-deed. Learned counsel submits that a finding of fact based on documentary and oral evidence cannot be disturbed in second appeal. Lastly, learned counsel would contend that for entertaining a second appeal, involvement of substantial question of law is sine-qua-non. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of Hon''ble Apex Court in Bhuri Bai and Others Vs. Ramnarayan and Others, (2009) 1 SCALE 3 : (2009) 4 SCC 56 in which the Hon''ble Apex Court held:

"5. Whether the aforesaid plot was allotted in partition in favour of the appellants herein is a pure question of fact. The appellants wanted to rely on certain documents of partition in order to contend that the aforesaid plot was allotted in their favour. The concurrent finding of both the courts is that the said claim is based on interpolation in the deed of partition. This is also concurrently found by both the courts below that the appellants herein were never in possession of the said plot. On the other hand, the finding of both the courts below is that the respondent-defendants were in possession of the said plot. All these questions are pure questions of fact.

The High Court after considering these issues involved in this case rightly held that no substantial question of law is involved and the finding which is sought to be impugned in the second appeal is based on question of fact and appreciation of evidence, and they do not call for any interference under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908."

Mr. Tej Singh Champawat, learned counsel for respondent Municipal Council, while placing heavy reliance on the statement of witness Kunj Bihari and Ex. A/1 site-plan/map, submits that the document pertains to Nehru Nagar and the same has been rightly relied upon by both the Courts below and the said finding of both the Courts below, being concurrent finding, cannot be faulted. Mr. Champawat, while taking a dig at the statement of PW1, the witness of appellants, submits that he has not been able to prove all the three issues and therefore it is not a case wherein jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC is to be exercised for upsetting the finding of fact. Learned counsel, Mr. Champawat, would contend that while presenting proposed plan for seeking permission to raise construction, the appellants have not produced the site plan as per the allotted plot, and after granting of permission to raise construction accompanying part of the land of plot No. 21, which was subsequently regularized, is sufficient to conclude that appellants are estopped from challenging the action of the Municipal Council for regularization. Mr. Champawat has also submitted that in a dispute for possession of immovable property between appellants and the first respondent concerning the land in question, the proceedings have terminated in favour of first respondent by restoring possession to them, now it is not open for the appellants to challenge that finding of the Court of competent jurisdiction. He further submits that to the extent of possession of the immovable property, the finding recorded by a competent Court under Section 145 Cr.P.C. is binding. Learned counsel placed reliance on a decision of Hon''ble Apex Court in Bhinka and Others Vs. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960 : (1959) CriLJ 1223 : (1959) 2 SCR 798 Supp , wherein the Court held:

"16. This leads us to the consideration of the legal effect of the order made by the Magistrate under S. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under S. 145(6) of the Code, a Magistrate is authorized to issue an order declaring a party to be entitled to possession of a land until evicted therefrom in due course of law. The Magistrate does not purport to decide a party''s title or right to possession of the land but expressly reserves that question to be decided in due course of law. The foundation of his jurisdiction is on apprehension of the breach of the peace, and, with that object, he makes a temporary order irrespective of the rights of the parties, which will have to be agitated and disposed of in the manner provided by law. The life of the said order is coterminous with the passing of a decree by a Civil Court and the moment a Civil Court makes an order of eviction, it displaces the order of the Criminal Court. The Privy Council in Dinomoni Chowdhrani vs. Brojo Mohini Chowdhrani(1901) L.R. 29 I.A. 24 (Privy Council) , tersely states the effect of orders under Sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure thus:

"These orders are merely police orders made to prevent breaches of the peace. They decide no question of title..."

We, therefore, hold that a provisional order of a Magistrate in regard to possession irrespective of the rights of the parties cannot enable a person to resist the suit under S. 180 of the Act."

Lastly, learned counsel Mr. Champawat submits that a suit simplicitor for injunction without prayer for possession is not tenable inasmuch as the first respondent has handed over possession on favourable termination of proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court as well as the learned trial Court, and have also gone through the records of learned Courts below.

In the instant case, Plot No. 11, Nehru Nagar, was allotted by the Municipal Council to father of the appellants and a sale-deed was registered on 10th of May 1965. As per sale-deed, the land was measuring 40'' x 60''. Similarly, Plot No. 12 of same dimensions was allotted to Bhanwarlal Chandmal from whom appellants'' father purchased the said plot on 01.04.1967 and thereafter transferred the same by registered instrument to the first respondent on 20th April 1967. It appears that while submitting proposed plan for seeking permission to raise construction on Plot No. 11 by appellants'' father, due to some mistake in showing dimensions of the plot, the proposed site-plan was submitted contrary to the dimensions, i.e. its length and breadth. As a matter of fact, the measurement of the plot towards northern and southern side was 40'' whereas towards eastern and western side it was 60'' but in the proposed plan, the situation was topsy turvy inasmuch as the northern and southern sides were shown as 60'' and eastern and western sides were shown as 40''. The proposed plan submitted by father of the appellants was not properly scrutinized by the Municipal Council and construction permission was accorded in terms of the proposed plan. Adhering to the permission granted, construction was raised which was completed in the year 1966 itself. Subsequently, it was revealed that due to erroneous mentioning of the dimensions of Plot No. 11 the construction raised exceeded the land which was allotted to appellants'' father. On enquiry, it was revealed that appellants'' father, while raising the construction has also occupied part of Plot No. 21, which was adjacent to Plot No. 11 and thereupon the additional land was allotted to appellants'' father by the Municipal Council after receiving additional consideration amount. There remains no quarrel that till construction was completed by the appellants'' father and regularization of the additional land on payment of consideration amount completed, the owner of Plot No. 12, i.e. respondent No. 1 was not in picture but admittedly the sale-deed executed by appellants'' father in favour of first respondent is anterior to the date of regularization of the additional plot.

The finding of fact, as emerged out on evaluation of evidence and other materials on record by both the Courts below, clearly and unequivocally reveals that the dispute was between the appellants and the Municipal Council, Pali, and at no point of time first respondent had made any attempt to encroach or grab the land beyond the sale-deed, which was executed in its favour by appellants'' father. True it is that, at the threshold, it was fault on the part of the appellants'' father, while submitting application for seeking permission to raise construction as the true dimensions of the plot were not shown, however, the Municipal Council, which was the allotting authority and which has approved the entire colony of Nehru Nagar, by showing different plots of same dimensions has also not shown any interest to unearth the true dimensions of the plot. Despite availability of technical staff with the Municipal Council, permission to raise construction was granted and while acting on the said permission, entire construction was raised on Plot No. 11. Therefore, the fault on the part of the appellants and the respondent Municipal Council is writ large and both the Courts below have taken note of this fact. As regards, additional land allotted to the appellants'' father, the appellants'' contention is that they have paid consideration amount, and therefore, it cannot be said that this land has been allotted to them in exchange of the land which appellants sacrificed. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the plot, which was sold by appellants'' father to the first respondent after receiving consideration amount, i.e. Plot No. 12, Nehru Nagar, is still available with the same dimensions and there is no semblance of proof that its dimensions are beyond 40'' x 60''. The fact that its possession is also handed over to the first respondent on favourable termination of proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. and the Commissioner''s report Annex.A/6, is sufficient to conclude that the grievances of the appellants against the first respondent are not at all tenable. The concurrent finding of fact recorded by both the Courts below to that extent is in consonance and conformity with the evidence and other materials available on record. Censuring the conduct of the respondent Municipal Council by the learned lower appellate Court to expose it for appropriate action at the behest of appellants is a just decision in these circumstances for redressal of appellants'' afflictions.

On a close scrutiny of the impugned judgment, in my opinion, no substantial question of law is involved in this second appeal requiring adjudication in view of the settled law that it is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds, on which the findings were arrived at by the last Court of fact, i.e. the First Appellate Court. if in the given set of circumstances two interferences of fact are possible, one subscribed by the First Appellate Court is not to be interfered by the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any approach in such a situation is not permissible. The High Court, however, can interfere where it is found that the conclusions drawn by the First Appellate Court were erroneous on account of being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law or trite legal position settled by authoritative pronouncements of Hon''ble Apex Court, or based on inadmissible evidence, or arrived at by ignoring material evidence. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means-of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something purely technical, of no substance, or consequence, or merely academic. When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it, or where the Court thinks it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then obviously the question may be construed as a substantial question of law. On the other hand, if the question is covered by the decision of the Apex Court, or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled, and the only question is to apply principles to the particular facts of a case, it may not be a substantial question of law. The general rule is that High Court shall not interfere with the concurrent findings of Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well recognized exceptions are where: (i) the Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the Courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the Courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When Court refers to ''decision based on no evidence'', it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.

The ratio decidendi of the legal precedents, on which learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance, cannot be applied in abstract sense. In the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case, the proposition laid down in these judgments cannot offer any assistance to the appellants for espousal of their cause in this appeal.

Thus, in totality, jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Section 100 CPC is to be exercised sparingly and second appeal is to be entertained only when there is a substantial question of law involved, and a finding of fact cannot be re-appreciated unless and until it is proved that it is perverse or based on misreading of evidence and materials available on record. I am unable to find any such infirmity in the impugned judgment and therefore not inclined to entertain this appeal.

Consequently, the appeal fails and the same is hereby dismissed. No costs.