Parbati Kumari vs Doman Manjhi

Courtney-Terrell, C.J.—These appeals are from a Single Judge of this Court (Noor, J.) affirming the appellate decision of the Subordinate Judge of Hazaribagh by which he reversed the decree of the Munsif and dismissed the suits on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. The plaintiff as mukarraridar sued in each case to eject the defendants from certain gairmazura khas land after declaration of the plaintiff''s title. The defendants alleged that they were protected under the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act as they had brought the land under cultivation as "korkar" and further contended that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in the matter.

The suits related to four plots of land Nos. 46, 20, 41 and 43. As to plot Nos. 64 and 43, it has been found as a fact by the Munsif that the conversion into korkar was complete as to portions thereof and the defendants having acquired an occupancy right therein u/s 67 of the Act the suits must be dismissed as to these portions, but he gave a decree as to the rest.

The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suits entirely holding as a fact that the conversion into korkar of the remaining land though not completed had been begun, and that in all the suits the defendants were either raiyats or residents of the village. Section 64(3) upon which his decision was based runs as follows:

Where the consent of the landlord is required by this section for the conversion of land into korkar, such consent shall be deemed to have been given if, within two years from the date on which the cultivator commenced such conversion, the landlord has not made an application to the Deputy Commissioner for the ejectment of the cultivator (and no cultivator who is a tenant or a resident of a village, shall be ejected from land of that village which he has commenced to convert into korkar otherwise than upon such an application).

In my opinion the effect of this section is that within two years of the commencement of the conversion the landlord may apply to the Deputy Commissioner to eject the cultivator and may in such application prove that the work was begun without his consent.

If he fails to take this step then his, consent will be deemed to have been given and the concluding sentence added by amendment has the effect of giving to the Deputy Commissioner exclusive jurisdiction in the matter of ejecting a tenant or a resident of the village from land which he has begun to convert into korkar. Circumstances may occur in which a tenant or resident begins conversion and then abandons the attempt but the question of whether any such attempt has or has not been abandoned is a matter of fact. In the present cases no such abandonment has been found, a commencement of conversion has taken place and in such case the application for ejectment can only be made in the Court of the Deputy Commissioner.

The plaintiff argues that the defendants have denied the landlord''s title. This is not true as I shall presently show. The Act specially gives to the Deputy Commissioner exclusive jurisdiction and the only way in which that jurisdiction can be ousted in favour of the civil Court is by showing that the defendant is neither a tenant nor a resident of the village. Two cases were relied on by the appellants to support their contention that a denial of the plaintiff''s title by the defendants will attract the jurisdiction of the civil Court. They are: Gobinda Bauri v. Kristo Sardar, 1926 Pat 64 and Aghor Manjhi v. Kshiroda Sundari, 1928 Pat 198. In both of these the defendant relied on Section 139(4) of the Act, and it was held that that section referred only to suits between a landlord and his tenant and ceased to apply when the relationship of landlord and tenant was in issue and that in the latter case the civil Court had jurisdiction.

In these cases the Court had no concern with Section 64 or of any question of korkar rights and they are not relevant. The case of Gursaran Das v. Parmeshwari Charan 1927 Pat 203 is also not relevant. The decision turned on Section 139-A and had no reference to korkar rights or to Section 64. Here also the plaintiff''s title was expressly denied. In these cases the defendants did not deny that they were tenants or residents of the village: had they done so the case might have been otherwise decided. They merely contended that as a mukarraridar under the superior landlord of the village the plaintiff had no right to sue. It could hardly be contended that the mukarraridar was not in as good a position as the superior landlord and so this plea failed.

In my opinion Khaja Mohammad Noor. J., was right in holding that Section 64(3) is conclusive and I would dismiss these appeals with costs.

Agarwala, J.

I agree.