Parbhati alias Paro vs Khiali Ram and another

S.S. Dewan, J.—The short question which requires consideration in the present revision petition is to find out as to whether the term "mother" as used in S. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, the Code) includes a "step mother" in its import.

The facts are very brief. The Petitioner, who is the stepmother of the opposite party instituted proceedings for maintenance u/s 125 of the Code before the Judicial Magistrate 1st Glass, Sirsa, making the necessary averments entitling her to maintenance. The main ground on which the Petitioner claimed maintenance was that she being the widow of Hazari and the Respondents being the sons of Hazan from his first wife, the was entitled to maintenance from them because the entire property of her husband had been transferred in their names. The Respondents contested the claim of the Petitioner on the ground that she being their step-mother, does not fall within the expression "mother" and, therefore, irrespective of the merits of the case, the petition it liable to be dismissed. The trial Magistrate awarded Rs. 150/- P.M. as maintenance to the Petitioner. Feeling aggrieved, the Respondents went up in revision and the same was accepted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Sirsa, on August 17, 1983 while observing that when the Petitioner''s sons and daughcers are alive, she has no right to claim maintenance from her step-sons Being aggrieved, the Petitioner has now invoked the re-visional jurisdiction of this Court.

For properly appreciating the controversy involved in this case, it will be useful to refer to the relevant provision of the Code which reads as follows:

125 (1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuse to maintain........ (d) of his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his... father or mother, at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole as such Magistrate thinks fit and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct.

It is necessary to state here that the provisions for making an order for the maintenance of father or mother was for the first time introduced in the Code of 1973. In S. 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was replaced by the Code of 1973, there was no provision for passing an order against the son to pay a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his father or mother. Obviously, there is no previous authority on the precise point that arises for consideration in this case.

While interpreting the provisions of S. 125 of the Code, we must in the first place bear in mind that the main object of this provision is to prevent vagrancy Secondly, this provision has a social purposes to fulfil irrespective of the personal law of the parties. Keeping these consideration in mind it is obvious that no interpretation should be adopted which will aim at defeating the main object of the Legislature. It is not unusual that in our country a man having begotten children marries again after the death of his first wife Children grow up and become major. Still the father, the sons, the daughters and step mother all alive in the same family under the same roof as a unit This state of affairs even continues after the father''s death so that the stepmother and her children continue to remain under the same roof The affinity brought about by the father''s marriage between the step mother and the step children is not sapped by the father''s death. If in given case, therefore, difference is developed between the step-mother and the step-sons with the result that the step-mother is uncared for, would a strict interpretation of a beneficial provision of law be justified ? In my opinion, such a strict interpretation would rather encourage vagrancy and thus defeat the main purpose of the provision. In fact the prevision makes an erring husband and erring children fulil its social purpose where, such husbands and children neglect or refuse to maintain the wife or parents, respectively. Any interpretation of the language of S. 125 of the Code, which would defeat, even to an extent, the main object of the provision, should be avoided by a court of law.

It is contended by Mr. D.N. Ganeriwala, Learned Counsel for the Respondent, that the word mother'' occurring in S 125 does not include ''step-mother'' and since the expression ''mother'' has not been defined either in the Code or in the General Clauses Act. 1897, this expression will have to be given its dictionary meaning Reliance is placed en a Single Bench decision in Rambai w/o G.M. Balraj v. Dinesh s/o G.M. Balraj 1976 Mah. L.J. 565. I regret my inability to accept this contention. It is true that in the General Clauses Act the expressions ''father'' and ''son'' have respectively been defined in Sections 3(20) & 3(57). It includes natural as well as adoptive father and son The expression mother has not been defined in the General Clauses Act, but that does not mean that necessarily, the expression should be taken in its respective sense. Indeed there are many expressions which have not been defined in the General Clauses Act. The General Clauses Act does not claim to be an encyclopedia or dictionary which defines all expressions. One has, therefore, to look, while interpreting such expressions which have not been defined, to the context in which the expression has been used It would have been a different matter, had the expression ''mother'' been defined by the General Clauses Act only to mean the ''woman'' who has given birth to the child, that is to say the natural mother only. Indeed the definition of the expression ''father'' and ''son'' in the General Clauses Act would furnish a clue to the interpretation of the term ''mother which has been left undefined in that Act. If the expression ''father'' and ''son'' is to be given wider interpretation, I do not see any valid reason why the expression ''mother'' also should not be given similar wider interpretation so as to include a ''step-mother'' as well.

S. 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, while providing inter alia for the obligation of a Hindu to maintain his aged parents, states in its Explanation that the word ''parent'' occurring in the section includes a childless step-mother. This status is also recognised under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In the Schedule attached thereto u/s 8, dealing with general rules of successsion in the case of males, class II, Entry No VI, includes father''s widow, which in the context would mean step-mother. In Chamoers Twentieth Century Dictionary, 1976 Editior, we find in the definition of ''mother''that the expresssion is extended to a ''step-mother'' also. The Oxford English Dictionary in its 1970 Edition, in Vol. VI, defines ''mother'' as a ''female parent''; as well as a woman who has given birth to a child The same dictionary in its definition of ''step mother'' defines her as ''a woman who has married one''s father after one''s mother''s death'' This dictionary meaning would also show that so far as filial relationship is concerned, each of the two parents can be one of the two categories, viz , in the case of mother, a natural mother and a step-mother, and in the case of father, a natural father and a step father. Of course, in respect of a given function to be discharged by such mother in accordance with law, she may not be considered competent, at for instance a Hindu stepmother cannot give her step-son in adoption vide Dhanraj Vs. Smt. Suraj Bai, . But that factor cannot revolt against the interpretation to be given to the word ''mother''. So as to include a step-mother. There is in fact nothing in the section to indicate that the expression ''mother is confined to the natural mother only and the legislative intent is to exclude the step mother from that expression. In the case of Rambai w/o G.M. Balraj (supra) it was held that the expression ''mother'' occurring in S 125 of the Code does not include a ''step mother'' but the facts of that cast were peculiar. The ''step mother'' claimed maintenance from her ''step son'' although she herself had a natural born son in the same family. S. 125 of the Code confers a discretion on the court which has to be exercised having regard to the facts and circumstances before it In view of the reasons given above, the conclusion is that the word ''mother'' occurring in Clause (d) of S. 125 (1) includes a woman who has the status of a step mother by reason of her lawful marriage with the father of the person sought to be made liable for maintenance under S 125 of the Code.

The order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge does not appear to be correct. He has been labouring under a misapprehension that because the Petitioner had her own sons alive from her previous husband, therefore, she was not entitled to maintenance from her step children This does not appear to be correct on a fair appreciation of the evidence of the parties. She may be having sons from her previous husband but she had no son from the loins of Hazari deceased father of the Respondents. On this ground therefore, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has erred in law in rejecting her application under S 125 of the Code There is no denial of the fact that the entire property of Hazari deceased had been transferred in the names of the Respondents. The Respondents being the step sons of the Petitioner are, therefore, legally bound to maintain their stepmother. The Respondents are having 39 Killas of land inherited by them from their father Hazari. Thus, in view of justice and equity the learned trial Magistrate was justified in awarding Rs. 150/- p.m. as maintenance allowance payable to the Petitioner.

In the result, the revision petition is allowed ; the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sirsa dated August 17, 1983 is set aside and that of the trial Court''s order dated March 23, 1982 is hereby restored.