Parmanand Thakur vs Commissioner, Coal Mines Welfare Organisation

Lalit Mohan Sharma, J.—The main question which arises in this case is whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the ''Tribunal'') constituted u/s 110, Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claim of compensation in respect of an accident involving the death or bodily injury to a person arising out of the use of a motor vehicle not covered by a policy of insurance. On the application of the appellant-claimant, the Tribunal awarded compensation amounting to Rs. 13,620/-. The opposite party filed an appeal in this Court u/s 110D of the Act which was registered as Miscellaneous Appeal No. 15 of 1978(R). A learned single Judge of this Court, who heard the appeal, held that the remedy of the claimant was by way of a suit in the Civil Court and the application before the Tribunal was not maintainable. He also held that the claim petition was fit to be rejected on the additional ground that it was filed by the father of the injured minor boy and not by the boy himself. The award was accordingly set aside (vide 1984 BLT (Rep) 285). The present appeal under Clause 10 Letters Patent, is directed against this judgment.

The accident took place in June, 1971 when Bachanand Thakur, a young boy, was run over by a truck belonging to the opposite party-respondent, a Welfare Organisation, which is exempted by Sub-section (3) of Section 94 of the Act from the requirement of getting its vehicles insured. The boy sustained serious injuries, and his father moved the Tribunal claiming compensation of over Rs. 53000/-. The opposite party contested the claim on the ground that the claim petition was not maintainable. As stated earlier, the Tribunal rejected the defence and allowed the claim partially.

In support (of) his view that the claim petition was not maintainable on the ground that the truck involved in the accident was not covered by an insurance policy, the learned single Judge strongly relied on the heading "Insurance of Motor Vehicles Against 3rd party Risk "of Chapter VIII in which the provisions relating to the constitution of Tribunals and their jurisdiction are included, and on Section 96 directing the insurer to pay the awarded sum. Mr. Debi Prasad, the learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the provisions of Chap. VIII support this view. Referring to the Proviso in Section 94(3) which is quoted below, the learned counsel argued that the requirements of establishing and maintaining a fund for meeting liabilities arising out of road accidents involving uninsured vehicles has been inserted for the reason that the claim arising out of such accidents are beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal:

"94.................................. (3) The appropriate Government may, by order, exempt from the operation of Sub-section (1) any vehicle owned by any of the following authorities, namely : --

(a) the Central Government or a State Government, if the vehicle is used for Government purposes connected with any commercial enterprise;

(b) any local authority;

(c) any State transport undertaking within the meaning of Section 68A;

Provided that no such order shall be made in relation to any such authority unless a fund has been established and is maintained by that authority in accordance with the rules made in that behalf under the Act for meeting any liability arising out of the use of any vehicle of that authority which that authority or any person in its employment may incur to third parties .............................."

Reference was also made to the mandatory nature of the provisions of Section 95(1) by the use of the word "must" and the item 17 in the Form of application for compensation prescribed under the Bihar Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940 relating to the name and address of the insurer.

The establishments of Claims Tribunals are dealt with in Section 110 which says that the Tribunals may be constituted "for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles". The section does not use any word which may be interpreted to narrow down its scope. The clause "arising out of the use of motor vehicles" in the section does not suggest that any category of vehicles is excluded. The expression "motor vehicle" defined in Section 2(18) of the Act to mean any mechanically propelled vehicle adopted for use upon roads is wide in its scope and admits only those vehicles which run upon fixed rails or those of a special type adopted for u se only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises, as exceptions. The distinction between an insured vehicleandan uninsured one is not made. While assigning special meaning to several expressions in Section 93 for the purpose of Chap. VIII, "motor vehicle" has not been given a different definition. The intention is clear that "motor vehicle" has to be understood in the same sense in this Chapter as in the other parts of the Act; and it can certainly not be suggested that uninsured vehicles are entirely beyond the scope of the Act. The learned counsel for the parties took us through all the sections of Chap. VIII in search of provisions helpful to their respective interpretations and I could not discover any such provision which may support the view expressed in the impugned judgment excepting the Heading. The proviso in Section 94(3) directing creation of a fund, relied on by Mr. Debi Prasad does not help him at all. On the contrary, it suggests that compensation may be awarded in connection with accidents arising out of the use of uninsured vehicles, for, in such cases there being no insurer to discharge the liability, creation of a fund for that purpose was considered necessary. The opening sentence in Section 95 referred to by Mr. Prasad is of a neutral character in regard to the question under consideration. The word "must" is applicable only to such cases where a policy of insurance is required. To assume that the section is directing insurance in every case will amount to negativing Sub-section (3) of Section 94 dealing with the power of exemption. Besides even the suggested meaning of Section 95 does not advance the defendant''s case at all. Similar is the position with respect to Section 96 as also Section 110B, which is quoted below : --

"110B. On receipt of an application for compensation made u/s 110A, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim and may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid; and in making the award the claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be."

The provisions relating to apportionment of the liability does not suggest an insurer in every case, because then on the same logic it will be necessary to have a driver of the vehicle apart from the owner. I do not think it can be suggested that an owner driven car is also exempted from the jurisdiction of the claims Tribunals.

Mr. Debi Prasad also placed before us the form of application prescribed by the Bihar Rules in which column 17 is meant for giving the name and address of the insurer. This column obviously is meant only for such cases where insured vehicles are involved but there is no warrant for assuming that all cases in which any of the columns is redundant are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Tribunals. It cannot be suggested that every column in this form is necessarily applicable to all categories of claim cases. By way of example I would refer to columns 20 and 21 for stating respectively "relationship with the deceased" and "title to the properties of the deceased". This very form is to be used even incases where no death occurs as is apparent from columns 2, 3, 4 and 6 etc. A close examination of the language of Section 110 read with Sections 2( 18) and 93 and that of the proviso to Section 94(3) lead to the irresistible conclusion that uninsured vehicles are also within the scope of Section 110.

Mr. Debi Prasad is, of course, right in referring to the Heading of the Chapter in support of his argument. The question is whether the language of the Heading can limit the scope of the Chapter which is otherwise clearly wider. It has been uniformly held that Headings cannot control the plain words of the statute. The court is entitled to look at the Heading for resolving any doubt that it may have as to the ambiguous words but, if the meaning of the section is clear, it cannot be used for giving a different effect (see Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes). In R. v. Surrey Assessment Committee (1948) 1 K. B. 29Lord Goddard, G. J. observed that "while the court is entitled to look at the headings in an Act of Parliament to resolve any doubt they may have as to ambiguous word, the law is quite clear that you cannot use such heading to give different effect to clear words of the section where there cannot be any doubt as to their ordinary meaning. Since the sections of Chapter VIII clearly lead to the conclusion that all the Vehicles covered by the definition of Section 2(18) whether insured or not are within its scope, the heading cannot be relied upon for negativing it.

There is another reason in support of my view. The object of establishment of claims Tribunals by the amendment in the Act was, inter alia, to ensure speedy relief to victims of road accidents by a less expensive process and there is no reason to place the victims of accidents involving uninsured vehicles at a disadvantage. If the interpretation as suggested by the respondent is accepted it will lead to illegal discrimination, which has to be avoided. I, therefore, hold that the claim petition of the appellant filed before the Tribunal cannot be held to be not maintainable.

The learned Single Judge has also observed that the claim petition having been filed by the father of the injured boy and not by the boy himself was not maintainable. I am aforesaid this view also can not be sustained. Section 110A(1)(c) permits the petition to be filed by a duly authorised agent of an injured person. The proviso to the clause further indicates that the compensation can be claimed in certain cases in a representative capacity. So far the present case is concerned, the injured was a young boy reading in class IV and could not have sued by himself. Even on his behalf his father who is the natural guardian had to take all necessary steps. The father could have authorised any other person under Clause (c) of Section 110A (1) for making the application; instead he has himself acted in this regard. It has not been suggested on behalf of the opposite party at any stage that he was not empowered to act on behalf of his son. The judgment of the Tribunal does not indicate that the point which found favour with the High Court was even urged in the court below. I fully agree with the observation of the Punjab High Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd., New Delhi v. Punjab Roadways, Ambala City AIR 1964 P&H 235 , that the expression "duly authorised agent" referred to in Clause (c) should not be construed narrowly so as to mean a person expressly authorised or having the authority in writing. It must be given a wide and liberal meaning as including a person having implied authority to claim compensation. In that case the husband of the injured person was held to be competent to maintain the action. So far the present case is concerned, the father-applicant besides suffering severe mental strain on account of the injury to his son, had to spend considerable amount of money over the treatment of the boy for which he was compensated by the Tribunal. I, therefore, do not find any merit in the hyper-technical objection taken on behalf of the respondent before us.

For the reasons mentioned above, the appeal is allowed, the judgment in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 15 of 1978 (R) is set aside and the decision of the Tribunal is restored. The appellant shall be entitled to the costs of the Misc. Appeal and of the Letters Patent Appeal which together are assessed at Rs. 1000/-.

R.N. Lal, J.

I agree.