Partap Singh and Others vs Bidhi Singh

Rajiv Sharma, J.—Since all the appeals are directed against common judgment and decree dated 8.4.2005 rendered by the learned District Judge, Hamirpur in Civil Appeals No. 46, 47, 60 and 89 of 2004, hence, same were taken up together and are being disposed of vide this common judgment.

Civil Suit No. 397/1996 titled as Bidhi Chand versus Partap Singh and another was filed by the respondent (Bidhi Chand)(hereinafter referred to as ''respondent'' for convenience sake) and Civil Suit No. 164/1996 titled as Partap Singh and another versus Bidhi Singh was filed by the appellants (Partap Singh and Amar Singh) (hereinafter referred to as ''appellants'' for convenience sake). Civil Suit No. 164/1996 has been filed by Partap Singh and another against Bidhi Singh and Civil Suit No. 397/1996, has been filed by Bidhi Chand against Partap Singh and another. Bidhi Chand and Bidhi Singh refer to one and same person, Respondent (Bidhi Chand) filed civil suit bearing No. 397/1996 for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the appellant (Partap Singh and another) from interfering in any manner whatsoever and from changing nature of suit land themselves or through their family members, agents or servants. Further it is prayed that if during the pendency of the suit, appellants succeed in taking forcible possession of the suit land, decree for possession or any other relief which may be deemed fit was also prayed for. According to the respondent (Bidhi Chand) he was absolute owner-in-possession of the suit land and entries showing names of the appellants in the column of cultivation are illegal, wrongful and fictitious as the land was Kharetar. The land was never possessed by the appellants. Appellants got themselves wrongly reflected in the column of cultivation against Galla Batai in connivance with the revenue officials. Revenue authorities did not follow due procedure laid down in the Act for correction of entries. Land being Kharetar could not be entered in the name of appellants. Appellants were head strong persons and bent upon taking forcible possession of the land. Cause of action arose in the first week of November, 1996.

Suit was contested by the appellants. According to the appellants, they were tenants over the suit land from the time immemorial and after coming into force of the HP Tenancy & Land Reforms Act, they have become owners of the suit land. Respondent was a stranger to the suit land.

Replication was filed by the respondent-Bidhi Chand.

Appellants Partap Singh and Amar Singh filed Civil Suit No. 164/1996 against the respondent Bidhi Singh. According to them, they were absolute owners of the suit land. They have become tenants over the suit land since their ancestors and with the coming into force of the Act, they have become owners by way of adverse possession. Their title was hostile to the knowledge of respondent. Cause of action arose in November, 1996.

Respondent Bidhi Singh filed written statement. According to the averments made in the written statement, appellants have not become tenants over the suit land. He was owner in possession of the suit land. Appellants have got no right, title or interest over the suit land. Replication was filed by the appellants.

Learned Sub-Judge 1st Class consolidated both the suits. Following issues were framed in both the civil suits:

In C.S. 164/96:

Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of declaration and permanent injunction as prayed or? OPP

Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action and locus standi to file the present suit? OPD

Whether the plaintiffs are estopped to file the present suit by their acts and conduct? OPD

Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD

Whether the suit is liable to be stayed U/s. 10 CPC as alleged? OPD

Relief:

In C.S. 397/96:

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction as prayed for? OPP

Whether in the alternative, the plaintiff is entitled to relief of possession as prayed for? OPP

Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD

Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the suit by his own act and conduct? OPD

Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purposes of court fees and jurisdiction? OPD

Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties? OPD

Whether the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit? OPD

Whether the defendants are entitled to special costs u/s. 35A CPC? OPP

Whether the defendants being tenants have become owners of the land in suit by operation of law as alleged? OPD.

Relief

Sub-Judge 1st Class dismissed the Civil Suit No. 397/1996 titled Bidhi Chand versus Partap Singh. Civil Suit No. 164/1996 titled Partap Singh versus Bidhi Singh for permanent injunction was decreed to the extent that Partap Singh and others were in settled possession of the suit land were entitled to permanent injunction against the respondent Bidhi Chand, who was owner of the suit land till the appellants were evicted in due course of law, by common judgment and decree dated 19.3.2004. Respondent Bidhi Singh being aggrieved by judgment dated 19.3.2004 filed two separate appeals No. 46/2004 and 47/2004 before the learned District Judge, Hamirpur. Similarly, appellants Partap Singh and another also feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 19.3.2004 filed two appeals bearing No. 60/2004 and 89/2004 against the respondent Bidhi Singh. Learned District Judge allowed the appeals preferred by respondent Bidhi Singh bearing No. 46/2004 and 47/2004 and dismissed the appeals filed by appellants bearing No. 60/2004 and 89/2004. Suit filed by Partap Singh and Amar Singh being Civil Suit No. 164/996 was dismissed. Suit filed by Bidhi Singh being Civil Suit No. 397/1996 was decreed prohibiting appellants from causing interference in the possession of the respondent over the suit land.

In these circumstances, four Regular Second Appeals have been filed against judgment dated 8.4.2005. RSA No. 320/2005 was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 8.11.2005:

"1. Whether both the courts below misread and mis appreciated the provisions specifically of Section 2(17) of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act thereby vitiating the impugned judgments and decrees?

Whether entry of Bila Lagan Bebajah Tasabar Malkiat stand misread and mis appreciated by courts below thereby vitiating the impugned judgments and decrees?

Whether impugned judgments and decrees stand vitiated on account of dismissal of application under order 6 rule 17 CPC and further learned District Judge having not adverted to this aspect of the matter?"

Similarly, RSA No. 321/2005 was admitted on 18.11.2005 on the following substantial questions of law:

"1. Whether entry of Bila Lagan Bebajah Tassabar Malkiat stand misread and misappreciated by Courts below thereby vitiating the impugned judgments and decrees?

Whether tenancy land if in part is cultivable and in part is Banjar, the same as a whole in fact is under tenancy and learned District Judge below having gone contrary to the settled law, thus, impugned judgments and decrees as passed stand vitiated and liable to be set aside?"

Similarly, RSA No. 322/2005 on 14.11.2015 and RSA No. 323 on 28.9.2005, were also admitted on above substantial questions of law.

Mr. Ajay Sharma, Advocate, on the basis of substantial questions of law, has vehemently argued that his clients were tenants over the suit land. Learned District Judge has misread and mis-appreciated the entry of Bila Lagan Bebajah Tassabar Malkiat. He also contended that the first appellate Court has also misread and mis-appreciated the provisions contained in Section 2(17) of the HP Tenancy & Land Reforms Act. He lastly contended that the application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC has been rejected erroneously.

Mr. Anand Sharma and Mr. Jagan Nath, Advocates have supported the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court.

Since all the substantial questions of law are interconnected, as such same were taken up together to avoid repetition of evidence. However, in order to maintain clarity, facts recorded in Civil Suit No. 164/1996 titled as Partap Singh versus Bidhi Singh and Civil Suit No. 397/1996 titled Bidhi Chand versus Partap Singh and another, would be discussed separately.

Civil Suit No. 164/1996

PW-1 Partap Singh deposed that his possession over the suit land was continuous since 1928-29. His father died in the year 1982. Respondent never came in possession of the suit land. It is Do Fasli (two crop). In his cross-examination, he deposed that they were tenants of Bidhi Chand. Earlier his father used to pay rent (Lagaan) but he has stopped the same. He further admitted that the land was vacant for the last 5-6 years.

PW-2 Dile Ram deposed that earlier possession was with the father of the appellants and thereafter possession was with him. Land is vacant. Only gross grows on it.

PW-3 deposed that the appellants were in possession of the suit land. Land was never occupied by the respondent. Respondent has not inducted the appellant as tenant in his presence. Rent was not paid in his presence. Land is Avvali Kharetar.

Bidhi Chand appeared as DW-1. He deposed that the appellants have no concern with the suit land. He never inducted the appellants as tenants. He came to know about the entries in the Istemaal (Settlement) in 1978. Land is Banjar. He cuts the grass from the suit land. In his cross-examination, he deposed that there is no Khasra Girdavari of Banjar Kadeem.

DW-2 Bidhi Chand son of Shri Punnu deposed that the land is Banjar. Only gross grows on it. Appellants have no concern with the same.

Civil Suit No. 397/1996

Respondent Bidhi Singh appeared as PW-1. He deposed that he was owner-in-possession of the suit land. It is Kharetar and cultivable. He has never inducted the appellants as tenants. They never came in possession of the suit land.

PW-2 Amar Singh deposed that respondent (Bidhi Singh) was owner in possession of the suit land. Land was Banjar and Kharetar.

Partap Singh appeared as DW-1. He deposed that he was in possession of the suit land. He was inducted as tenant. His possession was since 1927-28. His father used to pay Galla before 1974. He stopped the same. He treats himself to be owner of the suit land. In his cross-examination, he categorically admitted that respondent Bidhi Chand has never inducted him as tenant. He has never paid any Galla (rent) to the respondent Bidhi Chand. His father died 20 years back. No Galla was paid by his father in his presence. He could not produce any receipt of Galla. He has also admitted specifically that only grass grows on the suit land for the last 7-8 years.

DW-2 Bidhi Chand son of Shri Chiranji Lal deposed that the appellant Partap Singh was in possession of the suit land as his tenant. He also admitted that the respondent never inducted him as tenant. He has never seen Partap Singh paying Galla to him. Half of the land is Kharetar and half is cultivable.

What emerges from the evidence led in both the civil suits is that the appellants have failed to prove that they were inducted as tenants by the respondent Bidhi Chand. It has come in the evidence that the respondent Bidhi Chand has never inducted the appellants as tenants. Partap Singh could not produce any receipt of payment of Galla/rent. Appellant Partap Singh, though, in his statement, has stated that earlier his father used to pay Galla but he stopped the same. However, his own witnesses have stated that Partap Singh was never inducted as tenant in their presence nor have they seen payment of Galla to the respondent by the appellants. Partap Singh could not produce any receipt of payment of rent, rather, as noticed herein above, in his cross-examination in Civil Suit No. 397/1996, that he was never inducted as tenant by Bidhi Chand. Nature of land is Banjar Kadeem/Kharetar, though some portion of it is cultivable. However, fact of the matter is that appellants have not led any evidence to prove their induction over the suit land as tenants. Tenancy is a bilateral act. There is neither any evidence of payment of rent nor induction as tenants. Bidhi Chand has categorically stated that he has never inducted Partap Singh as his tenant. Partap Singh has taken contrary stand by stating that he treats himself as owner of the suit land and on the other hand also claims title on the basis of adverse possession of the suit land. Partap Singh has not led any evidence to prove the adverse possession.

Appellant Partap Singh has also moved an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for amendment of plaint by stating that they were recorded in possession of the suit land as tenants and in the column of land, there is entry of Bila Lagan Bebajah Tassabar Malkiat Khud. Possession over the suit land was open, continuous, hostile, uninterrupted and to the knowledge of the respondent Bidhi Chand. It was prayed by the appellants that they be allowed to plead the fact that they have become owners by way of adverse possession. Application was contested by respondent Bidhi Chand. It was dismissed by the trial Court vide a detailed order dated 31.1.2003. Learned Sub-Judge held that the application could not be allowed at a very belated stage and same was likely to cause serious prejudice to the respondent and it would amount to reopening of the entire trial. He also held that appellants were taking altogether contrary pleas i.e. plea of adverse possession and tenancy, which could not co-exist. Plea of tenancy taken by appellants implies that they were in permissible possession of the suit land as they have been inducted as tenants and other plea could not be of adverse possession of the suit land. It would be apt at this stag to observe that appellants claim themselves to be tenants. They can not be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession. Appellants have also not led any evidence that the land in its entirety was cultivable. To the contrary, there is sufficient material to prove that the land being Banjar and Kharetar, only grass grows on it, even as per the statement of the appellant, for the last 7 years. Even Dile Ram has deposed that suit land was uncultivable and only grass grows on it.

Mr. Ajay Sharma, Advocate has drawn the attention of the Court to Jamabandi for the years 1931-32 (Ext. D1), 1935-36 (Ext. D2), 1939-40 (Ext. D3), 1943-44 (Ext. D4), 1951-52 (Ext. D5), 1955-56 (Ext. D6), 1963-64 (Ext. D7), 1968-69 (Ext. D8) and for the year 1980-81 (Ext. D9) and Jamabandis till the year 1997-98. According to him, in these Jamabandis, possession of the appellants has been shown as tenants. But, fact of the matter is that there is no specific entry of payment of rent to the landlord. He also contended that his client has become owner after coming into force of the HP Tenancy & Land Reforms Act. It is reiterated that his clients could become owners if they had proved tenancy over the suit land. Entry of Bila Lagan Bebajah Tasabar Malkiat Khud can not be termed as payment of rent to landlord. Predecessor of the appellants Shri Sarwan has never paid rent to the owner. Appellants have failed to prove tenancy over the suit land.

The learned Single Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Kanwar A. Ahmed Khan v. The Union of India reported in 1954 PLR 468, has held as under:

The relationship of landlord and tenant comes into existence as the result of an agreement, express or implied. It may be implied from the acts and conduct of the parties which indicate that the landlord intended to divest himself of the possession of the premises and that the tenant intended to assume possession thereof. One of the most important circumstances from which this inference may be drawn is the payment of rent, for although rent is not an essential, it is a normal incident of tenancy, and the fact that a person in possession of the premises paid rent to the owner thereof indicates to an extent at least that the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties. On the other hand the fact that no rent was paid would lead one to a contrary conclusion and negative the existence of such relationship.

In the record also, entry is also of appellants with regard to possession as owner and not as tenant. In the revenue record, initially entries have come that half of the land is cultivable and half is Banjar Kadeem but it is evident from the oral evidence as discussed herein above that for the last so many years, only grass grows on the suit land.

Mr. Ajay Sharma, Advocate has also argued that the first appellate Court has not correctly considered Section 2(17) of the HP Tenancy & Land Reforms Act. This question would not be relevant for the simple reason that the appellants have failed to prove their tenancy over the suit land. Question, whether Banjar land could be included in the tenancy of land for the purposes of tenancy would be relevant if the appellants have proved their tenancy over the suit land.

Their lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Natha Singh and Others Vs. The Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab and Others, , have held that in the absence of payment of rent or other material to show that there was a contract between ''A'' and ''B'' absolving latter of the liability to pay rent, the claim of "B'' that he was tenant of ''A'' can not be upheld. Their lordships have held as under:

[6] So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants based on the revenue record is concerned, it may be remarked that it has been concurrently found by the Collector and the Commissioner who examined the original Khasra girdawaries that they had been tampered with by the revenue staff in collusion with the appellants. In the circumstances, it would not be safe to place any reliance on them. The reliance ought to be placed on ''Roznamcha Waqaiti'' is also an afterthought. No authenticated copy of the ''Raznamcha Waqaiti'' with reference to which we are invited to verify the entries in the khasra girdawaries has been included in the record. It is also significant that no reliance either before the Collector or before the Commissioner or even before the Financial Commissioner seems to have been placed upon the ''Roznamcha Waqaiti''. It is also to be noted that even in the application for leave to adduce additional evidence, no mention has been made of any entry in Roznamcha Waqaiti''. Even if the entries in khasra girdawaries are treated as genuine, they can be of little assistance to the appellants as they do not at all, as observed by the Collector, appear to show that any rent was being paid by the appellants Nos. 2 and 3 to appellant No. 1. In the absence of payment of or in the absence of material to show that there was a contract between appellant No. 1 and appellants Nos. 2 and 3 absolving the latter of the liability to pay rent, it is difficult to uphold the claim of appellants Nos. 2 and 3 that they were tenants of appellant No. 1.

Their lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Guru Amarjit Singh Vs. Rattan Chand and others, have held that the entries in Jamabandi are not a proof of title or payment of rent. Their lordships have held as under:

The trial court found that the original lease deed was not produced. A copy of more than 30 years old was produced and was admissible in evidence which would show that Shardha Ram and Nar Singh Dass had executed a lease deed on October 20, 1905 in favour of Guru Naunihal Singh. But there is no proof of payment of any rent of Rs. 2/- per year. Jamabandi entries did not show any payment of rent, but only existence of terms of lease to pay rent at Rs. 2/- per annum. Non-production of the receipts of the payment of rent clearly indicates that there was no relationship of landlord and tenants.

"There is hardly any evidence if the plaintiff accepted them to be his tenants. In these circumstances it can hardly be stated that defendants 1 to 5 are the tenants of the plaintiff". He concluded that from 1955 the respondents were holding the land as trespassers, and they had no relationship of tenancy with the appellant and that the suit was barred by limitation and the defendants have become owners by adverse possession. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Addl. District Judge assumed several things in favour of the appellant and concluded that there is a proof of payment of rent of Rs. 2/- per year till 1966-67 as per Jamabandi, though Jamabandi only mentioned the lease and rent of Rs. 2/- per year. It is settled law that entries in the Jamabandi are not proof of title. They are only statements for revenue purpose. It is for the parties to establish the relationship or title to the property unless there is unequivocal admission. Yet the appellate court contrarily deduced inference and findings in favour of the appellant and thereby it held that the respondents are continuing as tenants at sufferance on permissive possession and there was no hostile assertion of title to the knowledge of the appellant, so the question of adverse possession does not arise. Therefore, he allowed the appeal and decreed the suit.

From the copy of the alleged lease, it is clear that predecessors of Shardha Ram and Nar Singh Dass had already constructed the buildings and they were in enjoyment of the land and buildings and they continued to enjoy the property. The statutory operation of law conferring title was pleaded. The respondents were not parties to the lease deed and they had no knowledge of it. There is no proof, that they had knowledge of 1905 lease or that they acknowledged or acted on it. There is no clear proof or finding that they received any notice under S. 111(g) said to have been issued by the appellant. For the entries in the Jamabandi to which the respondents had no knowledge. It is common knowledge that the tiller of the land primarily pre-occupies with cultivation and seldom notices the entries made by the Patwari in revenue records unless he is of litigious mind. Maintenance and custody of revenue records is the exclusive domain of the Patwari and it is not uncommon that revenue records are often tinkered by him to suit the exigencies. Therefore, the entries often are not to the knowledge of the respondents and may not be genuine or accurate. There is no proof that the respondents had such knowledge or brought to their notice and that they accepted or acquiesced. If the entries are made in the regular course of duty, the entries may furnish presumptive rebuttable evidence of being correct. Jamabandi entries at best would show of the lease covenanting to pay Rs. 2/- per annum as ground rent. They do not, therefore, establish any proof of payment of rent. Admittedly no iota of evidence to prove payment of rent or passing of receipts were thus produced by the appellant. Under those circumstances and in the light of the statutory operation of the aforesaid two Acts pleadings of the respondents that they became owners is not a clear unequivocal disclaimer of title. The plea cannot be said that it is unequivocal disclaimer. In this background the plea of adverse possession and particularly in the face of the nonpayment of rent and their payment of revenue to the State also cannot be said to be unequivocal. As seen earlier lease is only unproved document of 30 years old to which knowledge was disclaimed by the respondents. Therefore, it does not amount to unequivocal and clear disclaimer of title but at best denial of relationship of lessor and lessee and does not entail with forfeiture. The High Court rightly, in the nature of pleadings and scope of the suit, did not go into the plea of adverse possession on merits.

Their lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Jattu Ram Vs. Hakam Singh and others, , have held that Jamabandi does not create any title. These are only for fiscal purposes. Their lordships have held as under:

[3] Section 119 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short ''The Act'') envisages that if any party to an exchange is ........... by reason of any defect in title of the other party deprived of the thing or any part of the thing received by him in exchange, then, unless a contrary intention appears from the terms of the exchange, such other party is liable to him ...... for the return of the thing transferred ........ The admitted case is that the appellant had exchanged his lands with the first respondent. Due to defect in title, the first respondent had suffered a decree of 2/3rd share of the minors who had admittedly taken possession of an extent of 52 kanals 10 marlas from the appellant. The appellant was deprived of that property and the first respondent is liable to return to the appellant to the extent of 52 kanals 10 marlas. Obviously, in furtherance of the oral understanding the appellant came in possession of 47 kanals 1 marla in exchange. The entry in column 9 thus fortifies the stand of the appellant. The sole entry on which the appellate Court placed implicit reliance is by the Patwari in Jamabandi. It is settled law that the Jamabandi entries are only for fiscal purpose and they create no title. It is not the case that the appellant had any knowledge and acquiesced to it. Therefore, it is a classic instance of fabrication of false entries made by the Patwari, contrary to the contract made by the parties, though oral. The first respondent admitted that he received no rent from the appellant. Thus it is clear that the plea of the first respondent that the appellant was his lessee-at-will is a false one. It is not his case that for the loss suffered by the appellant, the respondent had compensate him by paying the price of that land. It is, therefore, too credulous to believe that he let the appellant in possession of the plaint scheduled property as a tenant-at-will and is a deliberate, desperate and false plea set up by him, which unfortunately found favour with the appellate Court and the High Court paid no attention to go into the crucial question and dismissed the appeal as usual, in limine. The contention of Sri Ujagar Singh, the learned Senior counsel that the appellant''s sons purchased 8 kanals of land from his client was a step in aid to woodwink the innocent appellant and a self serving. Thus we are constrained to hold that the decree of the appellate Court is perverse, apart from manifestly illegal. It and the High Court decree are accordingly set aside and that of the trial Court is restored and the appeal is allowed with costs throughout.

The learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Chand Premi Vs. Nawab Kaur, , has reiterated that certain essential features would have to be proved before it could be assumed that there is relationship of landlord and tenant. It further requires that possession of the immovable property should be proved by the tenant in his capacity as such on payment of rent. The learned Single Judge has held as under:

After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the considered view, that this appeal lacks merit and the same is liable to be dismissed. It is well settled that certain essential features would have to be proved before it could be assumed that there is relationship of landlord and tenant. It necessarily involves the existence of a contract in the form of lease deed or any circumstantial evidence showing that such a contract was in existence. It further requires that possession of the immovable property should be proved by the tenant in his capacity as such on payment of rent. A reference in this regard can be made to Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. However, in the present case, no material has been placed on record to substantiate the claim that the appellant was a tenant and the respondent was his landlady. There is no lease deed or rent note placed on the record which could have been a direct piece of evidence establishing the fact of relationship between the appellant and respondent. No rent receipt has been proved on the record. Alt that has been brought on record is the statements of witnesses produced by the plaintiff-appellant which have been controverted by the witnesses of the defendant-respondent. The veracity of the oral statements made by the witnesses of the plaintiff-appellant has been controverted by the statement made by the witnesses of the defendant-respondent. In such a situation, no finding could be recorded to conclude the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. In somewhat similar circumstances, this Court in the case of Jagdish Singh (supra) has held that such evidence is wholly insufficient, and in fact no evidence of the fact that there is relationship of landlord and tenant.

Payment of rent by tenant to landlord can be made in kind or cash in following manner: (1) cash rent which could be irrespective of nature of land and kind of crop grown upon it. (2) Batai rent means division of produce between cultivator and landlord. (3) Zabati rent means fixed money payable per bigha or canal for certain crops. (4) Chakota rent means fixed amount of produce in particular season and fixed amount of cash in another season.

The term "Bila Lagan Bawaja Tasuwwar Malkiat", has been defined in ''Dictionary of Revenue Terms'' as under:

"Not paying rent because he claims himself to be owner of land. This entry is made in the column of rent regarding person in adverse possession. The presumption would be that the person in whose favour such entry is made is the owner ( Sukhbir Kaur Vs. Mahabir Singh and Others, )"

Thus, in the instant case appellants consider themselves to be owners as per this entry of "Bila Lagan Bebajah Tassabar Malkiat". They were not paying any rent claiming themselves to be owners of the land. Thus, there is no evidence led by the appellants that they were cultivating or possessing the suit land as tenants. They could become owners as per the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, if they had proved their induction as tenants by the respondent.

It has also come in the statement of appellant Partap Singh that earlier his father was paying rent but he has stopped the same. Even his own witnesses have deposed that they have not seen his father paying rent. This expression ''Bila'' been considered by the Hon''ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in Sukhbir Kaur Vs. Mahabir Singh and Others, as under:

[10] The possession of Sukhbir Kaur plaintiff on the land, in dispute, is proved from Jamabandi Exhibit P-2 for 1960-61. However, in the entry, vide which she claims to be in possession as owner, the exact written words are:-

"Ba-taswar Malkiat Khud".

The Jamabandi relates to a period of 4 years prior thereto. She is again shown in possession of the land, in dispute, in Jamabandi Exhibit P-1 for the year 1967-68. Presumption of continuity of possession would be raised untill presumption is rebutted. No evidence to rebut the presumption has been produced. Hence, it is held that she continued to be in possession till the filing of the suit.

The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly.

Accordingly, there is no merit in these appeals and the same are accordingly dismissed. Pending applications, if any, are also dismissed.