Parvez Khan vs State of M.P. and Others

Ajit Singh, J.—This writ petition is directed against the order dated 3-3-2010 passed by the learned Single Judge of this High Court whereby he has dismissed the appellant''s Writ Petition No. 15052/2008. The facts in short are these. The appellant''s father Sultan Khan died on 21-6-2005 while serving in the Police Department of the State Government. Immediately thereafter the appellant applied for his compassionate appointment. The respondents processed his application and found him eligible for appointment. They, therefore, referred the matter to the Competent Authority. The Competent Authority also found the appellant eligible for appointment and sent his record for police verification. It is stated that according to the police verification report the appellant was found involved in two criminal cases. In the first case he was prosecuted for offences under Sections 323, 324, 325, 294 and 506-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code and in the second case he was prosecuted for offences under Sections 452, 394 and 365 of the Indian Penal Code. The Superintendent of Police (respondent No. 4) by order dated 26-9-2007 held that on character verification of the appellant he is not found suitable for Government service and closed his case. Aggrieved, the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 15052/2008 and submitted that in the first case he was acquitted of all the charges vide judgment dated 31-1-2007 passed in Criminal Case No. 3014/2007 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Damoh, and in the second case also he was acquitted because the offences were compounded before the Competent Court. But the learned Single Judge dismissed the petition on the ground that as in the second case the matter was compromised, the acquittal of appellant was not clear. The learned Judge also held that because of the involvement of appellant in criminal offences, the decision of respondents in closing his case for compassionate appointment cannot be said as arbitrary.

It is argued on behalf of the appellant that the order dated 26-9-2007 dismissing the claim of petitioner for compassionate appointment does not contain any reasons and, therefore, it deserves to be quashed on this ground alone. It has also been argued that the learned Judge committed an illegality in holding that as the appellant was discharged of the offences on the basis of compromise, his acquittal was not clear. The learned Deputy Advocate General, on the other hand, justified the action of respondents as well as the order passed in the writ petition.

The Supreme Court in Ram Kumar Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , has held that the object of the verification of the character and antecedents of Government servants before their first appointment is to ensure that the character of a Government servant for a direct recruitment is such as to render him suitable in all respects for employment in the service or post to which he is to be appointed and it would be a duty of the Appointing Authority to satisfy itself on this point.

In the case at hand, the appellant was admitted acquitted in both the aforesaid criminal cases much prior to the passing of the order dated 26-9-2007 by the Superintendent of Police, Sagar. On perusal of the order dated 26-9-2007, we find that the Superintendent of Police, without giving any reference to the judgments of acquittal of the appellant in criminal cases, has disqualified him not only for the appointment in the Police Department but also for any Government service. The Superintendent of Police has not given any finding as to why merely on the report of character verification of the appellant he has disqualified him for appointment in the Government service even for future. Apparently, we are of the view that the Superintendent of Police has not only acted arbitrarily but exceeded his brief.

It is now well settled that the conferment of quasi-judicial power implies that the person concerned must follow the rules of natural justice and must give reasons for making the order which he is empowered to make. Purely administrative bodies are also bound to act justly and fairly which may bring in the requirement of natural justice as also the duty to give reasons. Even a non-statutory private body, which is not a state under Article 12 of the Constitution, but which exercises public functions is bound to follow the principles of ''fairness'' and "good faith'' and to act reasonably and its orders are amendable to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. Section 4(1) (d) of the recently enacted statute, the Right to Information Act, 2005, also requires every Public Authority of India to ''provide reasons for its administrative or quasi-judicial decisions to affected persons'' (See: Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, XIIIth Edition, 2012, pp. 453, 456 and 457).

Further under English Law a quasi-judicial authority need not give reasons unless required to do so by statute but now there is also a definite shift in favour of the view that reasons should be given. In Flannery Vs. Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd., (2000) 1 All ER 373, at Pages 377 and 378 (CA) comments have been made that the duty to give reasons "is function of due-process and, therefore, of justice. Its rationale has two principle aspects. The first is that fairness surely requires that the parties especially the losing party should be left in no doubt why they have won or lost. The second is that a requirement to give reasons concentrates the mind and if it is fulfilled the resulting decision is much more likely to be soundly based". Also in Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, the Supreme Court has held that necessity of giving reasons is a healthy check against abuse or misuse of power for if the reasons recorded are extraneous or irrelevant the order would be struck down.

In view of the aforesaid principle of law the order dated 29-6-2007 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Sagar, cannot be sustained and we accordingly quash the same.

We are also unable to agree with the learned Single Judge that since in the second case the offences were compromised, the acquittal of appellant is not clear. It is not in dispute that the offences were lawfully compounded u/s 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and sub-section (8) of this Section clearly provides that the composition of an offence shall have the effect of an acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been compounded. The section does not mention anywhere that the composition of an offence will not have the effect of clear acquittal. We accordingly, quash the order dated 3-3-2010 of the learned Single Judge. For these reasons, we allow the appeal and direct the respondents to consider the case of appellant for compassionate appointment afresh in the light of above discussion. The respondents are also directed to do so within three months from the date of receiving the copy of this order and communicate the decision to the appellant.