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Judgment
N.V. Anjaria, J.�The appellant is the original plaintiff. His suit for specific performance was partly allowed by the trial Court which held that the plaintiff was entitled to get Rs. 2,62,500/- with 6% interest. The plaintiff''s prayer for specific performance was rejected. Aggrieved by the said part, he filed Regular Civil Appeal No. 252 of 2006 which also came to be dismissed. The appellant-plaintiff has therefore preferred this Second Appeal before this Court under Sec. 100 of me Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
By instituting Special Civil Suit No. 27 of 1991 before the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.), Anand, the plaintiff contended that property being Final Plot No. 677, Town Planning Scheme No. 2, Anand, admeasuring 1789 sq. meters, belonging to deceased Chhaganbhai was agreed to be sold to the plaintiff by said Chhaganbhai and that there was an oral contract for that. Said Chhaganbhai was grandfather of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and was father-in-law of defendant No. 3. The defendants are the heirs. Chhaganbhai died in the year 1985. It was the case of the plaintiff that he was staying at Dubai since long, that he had family relationship with said Chhaganbhai. When he happened to be in India, in the year 1993, Chhaganbhai agreed to sell to him 9 Gunthas of me suit land at the rate of Rs. 50,000/- per Guntha. It was stated that out of total consideration, $ 25,000 were to be paid to defendant No. 1 in U.S.A. upto 15th October, 1985.
2.1. In respect of oral agreement claimed to have been entered into between the plaintiff and deceased Chhaganbhai, as per the case of the plaintiff, a writing was given by Chhaganbhai and the xerox copy was given to the plaintiff. The original thereof was with defendant No. 1, pleaded the plaintiff. The plaintiff further stated that he paid $ 25,000, that is equivalent to Rs. 2,62,500/-. It was pleaded that though the plaintiff was ready and willing to pay balance Rs. 4,50,000/-, defendants were not ready and willing to perform the contract. Defendant No. 1 filed his written statement at Exh. 32, whereas defendant Nos. 2 and 3 filed their written statement at Exh. 40 and contested the suit.
2.2. Trial Court framed issues at Exh. 144. It concluded that an oral agreement was entered into regarding sale of the suit property and further held that plaintiff proved payment of Rs. 2,62,500/-. The trial Court refused to grant prayer 9(A) for specific performance and only directed return of the amount as above. The trial Court found that the writing Mark 3/1 stated to have been given by Chhaganbhai in relation to oral contract was not acceptable in eye of law as secondary evidence. The Court further recorded that as to which portion of the land was agreed to be sold was not clear and the contract was uncertain in terms of identity of the property agreed to be conveyed. On such main ground, relief of specific performance was refused. The first appellate Court concurred with the findings of the trial Court and further held that agreement lacked certainty and the parties were not ad idem.
Learned Advocate Mr. Bhargav Karia for the appellant submitted that oral agreement was held proved and the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. He submitted that the case of the plaintiff in the plaint was specific that 9 Gunthas of land on the Northern side was agreed to be sold, and it was wrong to say that there was no identification of the land. Therefore, according to his submission, Courts below ought to have exercised discretion in favour of the plaintiff by granting decree of specific performance. He placed reliance on decision in A.C. Arulappan Vs. Smt. Ahalya Naik, to submit that discretion which may be exercised by the Court under Sec. 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 has to be sound and judicious consideration.
3.1. Another decision in Damacherla Anjaneyulu and Another Vs. Damcherla Venkata Seshaiah and Another, was relied on to submit that Court should invoke powers under Sec. 20 of the Act for doing complete justice between the parties. Learned Advocate for the appellant pressed into service a decision of this Court in Naranji Makanji Vs. Bhagwanji Makanji Patel and Another, to emphasise the very preposition that the discretion of the Court in refusing relief for specific performance would not be arbitrary. He next relied on decision in Rajeshwari Vs. Puran Indoria, and submitted that grant of decree of specific performance or otherwise substantially affects rights of the parties.
3.2. Learned Advocate for the respondent Mr. H.M. Parikh supported the judgments of the Courts below. He submitted that not only the identification of the property was not established, the terms of the so-called oral agreement never came forth with certainty. He relied on Secs. 65 and 66 of the Evidence Act to contend that document Mark 3/1 was rightly held to be not legally admissible as secondary evidence. He submitted that no contract was borne out at all. He relied on the evidence of plaintiff in support of his contention.
3.3. In support of his submissions, learned Advocate relied on decisions in (i) Jupudi Kesava Rao Vs. Pulavarthi Venkata Subbarao and Others, ; (ii) Mayawanti Vs. Kaushalya Devi, ; (iii) Ahammed Vs. Mammad Kunhi and Others, and (iv) H. Siddiqui (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. A. Ramalingam, .
An agreement for sale, oral or otherwise, has to include the identity of the land sought to be transferred amongst the conditions agreed upon. The case of the plaintiff about oral contract for sale mainly rested on the writing Mark 3/1 and letter dated 15th February, 1991 addressed by defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff (Exh. 188) which acknowledged receipt of $ 25,000 by defendant No. 1 in U.S.A. Exh. 188 by itself could not be construed to have spell out any agreement between the parties. Now, Mark 3/1 was xerox copy of an undated typed writing. It inter alia mentioned that Chhaganbhai (the name mentioned in hand-writing) agreed to sell to the plaintiff 9 gunthas of land divided in two parts in Town Planning Scheme No. 2. The sale price was not mentioned and kept blank. There were certain other corrections in the hand-writing.
4.1. Before the first appellate Court the plaintiff filed an application under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking to produce as additional evidence the said document Mark 3/1. The first appellate Court held that the said document was produced by the plaintiff on the first day of institution of the suit, however until the trial Court finally decided the suit, no attempt was made by the plaintiff to get it exhibited. The plaintiff had knowledge and it was his case that original of document Mark 3/1 was lying with defendant. Yet he never called upon the defendant to produce. In the circumstances, the first appellate Court reasoned that provisions of Order XLI, Rule 27, C.P.C., could not be invoked for filling up lacuna. The first appellate Court''s refusal to allow Exh. 71 application of the plaintiff for production of Mark 3/1 as additional evidence was on germane and valid reasons and the decision of the first appellate Court on that count booked no error.
4.2. Section 65 of the Evidence Act deals with the cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given. Section 66 mentions about rules as to notice to produce. Section 65 inter alia reads clause (a) provides that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition, or contents of a document when the original is shown or is in possession or power of a person against whom the document is sought to be proved and when after the notice mentioned in Sec. 66, such person does not produce it. As per Sec. 66, secondary evidence of the contents of the document referred to in clause (a) of Sec. 65 shall not be given unless the party proposing to give such secondary evidence as previously given to the party in whose possession document is, a necessary notice to produce it.
4.3. Since the case of the plaintiff was that document (Mark 3/1) was in the custody of defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff produced only xerox copy, if he wanted to rely on the said secondary evidence, he was enjoined to give notice to produce as required under Sec. 65(a) read with Sec. 66 above. The plaintiff did not gave any such notice. The view taken by the Courts below, therefore, that Mark 3/1 was not liable to be accepted as secondary evidence was proper.
4.4. Even otherwise, Mark 3/1 did not specify the identification of the property allegedly agreed to be sold thereunder. It only stated that half of the land admeasuring 9 Gunthas was to be sold. Learned Advocate for the appellant contended in vain that he had pleaded that Northern part of the land was agreed to be sold. Both the Courts below arrived at a concurrent view and the finding that no evidence was produced by the plaintiff on the identification of the land. What was pleaded to make out a case was not proved to establish it.
4.5. It is essential and indispensable that in order to avail the relief of specific performance, property must be identifiable. In Nahar Singh Vs. Harnak Singh and Others, it was a case before the Supreme Court where the trial Court without applying mind to the identifiability of the property, decreed the suit. Upholding the reversal of the decree by the appellate Court, the Supreme Court stated :
".......It is seen that the trial Judge while decreeing the suit for specific performance never applied his mind to the identifiability of the property in question and on the basis of a finding that the parties had entered into an agreement and the respondents failed to perform their part, granted the relief sought for in the suit. The Lower Appellate Court, however, examined the materials on record and came to the positive conclusion that the agreement Exh. D-1 neither contains the exact area of the land to be sold to Nahar Singh (supra), nor the boundaries thereof. He further found that no length or breadth of the land has been given and it does not pinpoint the place from where it was to be measured and though Nahar Singh (supra), had claimed right from Khasra Nos. 435 and 436 but the said Khasra Nos. had not been given in the agreement Exh. D-1....."
4.6. What is held by the Supreme Court in Nahar Singh Vs. Harnak Singh and Others, squarely applies in the facts of the present case. The principle stated was that it is well settled that unless the property in question for which the relief has been sought for is identifiable, no decree can be granted in respect of the same. The Supreme Court observed :
".......The learned Counsel in the course of his arguments, however, having not been able to dislodge the findings arrived at by the Lower Appellate Court merely urged that the agreement having been found to have been entered into between the parties, the Court should issue the direction for enforcement of the same. We are unable to agree with this argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant."
The first appellate Court appreciated the evidence of plaintiff (Exh. 187) and held that even on other counts, element of certainty in the so-called contract was missing. Furthermore, on going through the evidence of the plaintiff (Exh. 187) it was seen that in that he admitted that he had not seen the suit land nor had seen abstract 7 and 12 form. He pleaded ignorance about the actual date of oral agreement. He stated in his chief examination that he asked about price of the land and he came to know that price of the land is Rs. 50,000/- per Guntha. He stated that he would think over and reply. His evidence was conspicuously silent on the identification of the land which he had agreed to purchase, and thereafter, it was even suggested that Northern side of the suit land was agreed to be sold. The contention of learned Advocate for the respondent that even plaintiff''s own evidence was suggestive that no final terms were arrived at much less translated into an oral agreement and it was vague could not be thus brushed aside.
5.1. In Mayawanti Vs. Kaushalya Devi, observed that specific performance of contract is the actual execution of contract according to its stipulation and terms, and the Courts direct the party in default to do the very thing which he contracted to do. It was observed that the stipulation and terms of the contract have, therefore, to be certain and the parties must have been consensus on the stipulations. The Supreme Court held as under :
"The jurisdiction to order specific performance of a contract is based on the existence of a valid and enforceable contract. Where a valid and enforceable contract has not been made, the Court will not make a contract for them. Specific performance will not be ordered if me contract itself suffers from some defect which makes the contract invalid or unenforceable. The discretion of the Court will be there even though the contract is otherwise valid and enforceable and it can pass a decree of specific performance even before there has been any breach of the contract. It is, therefore, necessary first to see whether there has been a valid and enforceable contract and then to see the nature and obligation arising out of it. The contract being me foundation of the obligation the order of specific performance is to enforce that obligation."
5.2. As discussed above, in the facts of the present case, Mark 3/1 read with Exh. 88 did not spell out existence of a valid enforceable contract to sell. The element of parties being ad idem on the precise stipulation of the contract was absent. The burden of showing that stipulations and the terms of the contract were precisely agreed upon and the minds were ad idem, was on the plaintiff, in which he failed.
In view of above aspects emerging from the evidence on record in which neither the identification of the land agreed to be sold could be shown nor the terms of alleged oral agreement could come out with certainty, the Courts below did not commit error in not passing the decree of specific performance, even though they held that oral agreement was proved. It is trite that decree granting specific performance is a discretionary equitable relief and merely because it is lawful to grant the specific performance, it cannot be claimed as of right.
Thus, the concurrent findings arrived at by both the Courts below on the basis of which they exercised their discretion for not granting equitable relief of specific performance in favour of me plaintiff were eminently proper and legal. They were based on proper appreciation of facts and evidence and rested on correct application of provisions of law. By no stretch of reasoning, those findings arrived at and the conclusions reached for not granting decree of specific performance could be characterized as perverse so as to warrant interference in exercise of jurisdiction of this Court under Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
For the foregoing reasons, me present Second Appeal does not raise any question of law much less a substantial question of law. The Appeal is required to be dismissed and it stands dismissed. Notice is discharged. Learned Advocate Mr. Bhargav Karia for the appellant requested that the interim relief granted earlier may be continued for some time. Learned Advocate Mr. H.M. Parikh for the respondents objected to the request. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is directed that the order of status quo granted on 7th March, 2013 shall continue to operate till 5th September, 2014.