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Pathal Singh and Others vs Sheobachan Singh and Others

Patna High Court · Decided on 21 November 1933 · Citation: AIR 1934 Patna 283

HON’BLE JUDGES
Courtney-Terrell, C.J · Kulwant Sahay, J
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Judgment

8 paragraphs · 595 words

Courtney-Terrell, C.J.—This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from the decision of the District Judge of Muzaffarpur who in agreement with the Subordinate Judge dismissed their suit for a declaration that a certain compromise which had been entered into in a previous suit was not binding upon them. The plaint set forth the case that the defendants second party has purchased certain properties from one Earn Padarath Singh who was the grandson of one Mt. Bhagwan on the 5th March 1909, that in 1926, the defendants first party had sued to set aside this purchase on the allegation that they were the reversioners of the husband of Mt. Bhagwan and that Ram Bahadur Singh had got the gift from Mt. Bhagwan. The suit was compromised and the compromise was to the effect that the piece of property, which in fact had been purchased for the sum of Rs. 1,225, was given up to the defendants first party on receipt of a sum of Rs. 1,200.

2.

The plaintiffs allege that they are members of the family of defendants second party but were minors at the time and were not made parties and claim a declaration that the compromise decree obtained in the suit was not binding upon them.

It has been found as a fact by both the Courts below that the plaintiffs were represented in the suit which was compromised, by reason of the fact that the fathers of each and every one of them was a party to the suit and a party to the compromise.

3.

Only one of the plaintiffs has since attained majority and this suit is obviously an attempt not by the minor at all, but by the persons who bad entered into the compromise with the object of getting the compromise set aside because they have changed their minds. The law, as I understand it, is clear. It is first of all part of the ordinary business of the karta of a family, and a father''s position with regard to his son is certainly no less, to compromise suits and on the face of the facts described in the plaint itself they are such that the compromise was prima facie a good compromise. If a member of a family wishes to set aside a contract made by the karta or by his father it is at least necessary to shew that the compromise or contract effected was of an imprudent character and not such as to benefit the family.

4.

In this case the plaintiffs have offered no evidence of any sort or kind. The learned Judge has based his decision that the plaintiffs were represented, not only on the statements in the plaint as to the relationship between the parties in the first suit and the plaintiffs in the present suit but also on the fact that in Register D the fathers of the plaintiffs were entered and were in a proper position therefore to deal with the matters in dispute and were in possession. In these circumstances there can be no doubt that the plaintiffs are bound by the terms of the compromise. The compromise itself has not been assailed on its merits. The mere fact that the plaintiffs were at the time of the compromise minors is not a ground for setting aside the compromise on a mere proof of that fact.

5.

In my opinion the judgment of the learned District Judge and that of the Subordinate Judge was right and this appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Kulwant Sahay, J.

6.

I agree.