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Judgment
Ajay Kumar Mittal, J.—This Letters Patent Appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment of learned single Judge dated
13.2.2013, whereby the writ petition riled by it has been dismissed. A few facts relevant for the decision of the controversy involved, as available
on the record, may be noticed. The appellant, a Cooperative Transport Society filed a writ petition in this Court impugning the order dated
27.3.2009 passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab (STAT) whereby the appeal filed by it was dismissed being time-barred.
Order dated 10.4.2001 passed by State Transport Commissioner has also been challenged whereby the application filed by the appellant for the
grant of a regular stage permit on Pathankot to Ludhiana route was rejected. In pursuance to the surveyor report, a notice was published in the
Motor Transport Gazette dated 22.4.2000 inviting applications for grant of six regular stage carriage permits for plying buses on six return trips. In
response thereto, 170 operators including the appellant and private respondents submitted their applications seeking their claim for grant of permit.
Contents of the applications were published in the Motor Transport Gazette dated 8.8.2000. No objection was preferred to oppose the grant of
permits to the route in question. After hearing all the applicants in the meeting held on 22.1.2001, respondent No. 2 passed the order dated
10.4.2001 without notice or intimation to the appellant. The said order was not communicated to the appellant. It was only on 14.2.2008 that the
President of the appellant-society came to know that its application had been rejected. The appellant submitted application for obtaining certified
copy of the order which was prepared and supplied on 1.4.2008 and the appeal u/s 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short, ""the Act"") was
filed before the STAT on 30.4.2008 within a period of 30 days from the date of supply of certified copy of the order within the limitation
prescribed. The said appeal was dismissed on 27.3.2009 being time-barred on the ground that it had been filed after a lapse of about six years.
Counsel for the appellant before the learned single Judge contended that since the appellant did not receive the copy of the order nor it was aware
of the fact that the decision had been taken on its application, there was no occasion for the appellant to file an appeal prior to the date on which
the same had been actually filed. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon Full Bench judgment of this Court in Jagtar Singh Vs. The State
Transport Appellate Tribunal and Others, to contend that even if no formal communication of the order passed by the State or Regional Transport
Authority had been done, the period of limitation for filing the appeal would start running from the date the aggrieved party acquired actual or
constructive knowledge of the making of the said order. The learned single Judge after hearing the parties agreed with the findings recorded by the
STAT and dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant is before this Court through the instant Letters Patent Appeal.
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the STAT as well as learned single Judge had erred in holding that there was constructive
knowledge of order passed by the State Transport Commissioner to the appellant which was reserved on 10.4.2001. Relying upon judgments of
the Apex Court in Bhagwan Das and Others Vs. State of UP and Others, The State of Maharashtra and Others Vs. Ark Builders Pvt. Ltd., and
Single Bench judgments of this Court in CWP No. 15186 of 2010 (Jain Motors Regd., Patiala v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal and
others) decided on 12.12.2011 and Manjit Kaur v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab and another, CWP No. 3423 of 2012, decided on
19.9.2012, it was contended that the view of the learned single Judge being contrary to the aforesaid judgments was unsustainable. Referring to the
meaning of the word ""constructive"", it was urged that as per the Law Lexicon, constructive knowledge means ""if one by exercise of reasonable
care would have known a fact, he is deemed to have had constructive knowledge of such fact; e.g. matters of public record."" On the above
premises, the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Jagtar Singh Vs. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal and Others, sought to be
distinguished.
After hearing learned counsel for the appellant and perusing the record, we do not find any merit in the appeal.
In Jagtar Singh Vs. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal and Others, a Full Bench of this Court after examining the scope of Rule 85 of the
Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (in short, ""the Rules"") and also Second Proviso to Section 80(2) and Section 89 of the Act had observed that
wherever the order passed by the State or the Regional Transport Authority had not been actually communicated to the persons concerned, the
aggrieved party could file an appeal from the date of actual or constructive knowledge of the order and the period of limitation would start running
from the said date. It was held that the date of actual or constructive knowledge would depend upon peculiar facts and circumstances of each
case. It was recorded as under:--
The case at hand as noticed above presents a converse situation. Here the statute makes the period of limitation to start not from the date of the
making of the order but from the date of the receipt of the same by the party affected by it. The question is whether knowledge about the making
of the order against the party concerned should like the cases referred to earlier also give rise to start of limitation even when there is no formal
communication of the order. Our answer to that question is in the affirmative. Knowledge whether actual or constructive of the order passed by the
State or Regional Transport Authority should, in our opinion, result in commencement of the period of limitation. Decisions rendered by the
Division Benches of this Court in Jaspal Singh v. State of Punjab and others, Civil Writ Petition No. 14874 of 2000, disposed of on 29.8.2001;
Capt. Amrit Pal Singh and others v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab and others, Civil Writ Petition No. 3544 of 2002, disposed of on
15.7.2002; Mavi Bus Service Registered, Khanna v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab and another, Civil Writ Petition No. 7451 of
2005, disposed of on 21.5.2007 and in Indian Bus Service (Regd.), Malerkotla v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab and others, Civil
Writ Petition No. 3114 of 2003, disposed of on 4.8.2006 in our view correctly hold that in cases where the State or Regional Transport Authority
has not communicated the order of refusal passed to the persons concerned, the period of limitation for filing an appeal would commence from the
date when the parties concerned acquire knowledge of passing of the said order. We may, however, point out that the said decisions do not
elaborate whether a person, who knows about the order made by the State or Regional Transport Authority, can still wait for a formal
communication of the same before filing an appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. That aspect has been noticed only in Banda
Bahadur''s case (supra) referred to by us in the earlier part of this judgment. The Court had in that case formulated the following question:--
Can a person who knows about the order, can still wait for orders and suddenly come up with the plea that since the order had not been
communicated, he would file the appeal giving any date to his convenience as the date of the knowledge of the order.
Relying upon Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh Vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Another, ), the Court answered the question in
negative and held that since the application made by the petitioner had been rejected and a permit granted to the opposite party in November,
1988 and since the successful party had started plying on the route concerned, it was not possible to believe that the petitioner did not know or
could not have had the knowledge of the making of the order for more than two years. When the route was being operated, observed the Court,
the petitioner must be presumed to know that permit had been granted to the other party and not to it, thereby giving to the aggrieved party the
constructive knowledge about the rejection of his request for a permit. We respectfully approve the reasoning given in the decision rendered by this
Court in Banda Bahadur''s case (supra) and hold that even in cases where there is no formal communication of the order passed by the State or
Regional Transport Authority, the period of limitation prescribed for filing the appeal would start running from the date the aggrieved party acquires
actual or constructive knowledge of the making of the said order. Whether or not the aggrieved party had any such knowledge will, however, be a
matter to be seen by the Tribunal in each case depending upon its peculiar facts and circumstances. It will not, therefore, be necessary or proper
for us to enumerate, exhaustively situations in which such knowledge can be imputed to the party aggrieved, while examining whether or not the
appeal is within limitation.
Examining whether the appellant had actual or constructive knowledge of order dated 10.4.2001 passed by State Transport Commissioner,
respondent No. 1 while dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant had noticed as under:--
In Jagtar Singh Vs. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal and Others, , it has been specifically held that even in cases where there is no formal
communication of the order passed by the State or Regional Transport Authority, the period of limitation prescribed for filing the same, shall start
running from the date the aggrieved party acquired actual or constructive knowledge of making of the said order. Whether or not the aggrieved
party had any such knowledge will, however, be a matter depending upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. In this case, the
applications made by the appellants were rejected about six years before filing of these appeals. The successful parties had been found plying on
the route in question. In these circumstances, it is not possible to believe that the appellants did not know or could not have had the knowledge of
passing the order of all these years. When the route was being operated, the appellants must be presumed to know that the permits had been
granted to the other parties and not to them, meaning thereby that they had the constructive knowledge about the rejection of their request for
permit.
In these circumstances, the appeals filed by them after lapse of about six years, are badly time-barred and on this score also, the same are also
liable to be rejected.
Agreeing with the findings of respondent No. 1, learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant vide order dated
13.2.2013.
The word ""constructive"" means inferred rather than directly expressed. In the present case, it has been concurrently recorded by respondent
No. 1 as well as by learned single Judge that there was constructive knowledge of the order inasmuch as the successful parties had been found
plying on the route in question for the last six years. In such circumstances, it could not be concluded that the appellant had no constructive
knowledge of the order dated 10.4.2001 passed by respondent No. 2. Applying the judgment in Jagtar Singh Vs. The State Transport Appellate
Tribunal and Others, no infirmity could be found in the order passed by the learned single Judge.
Adverting to the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, it may be noticed that Bhagwan Das and Others Vs. State of
UP and Others, was relating to the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short, ""1894 Act""). The question was whether the period of six
months under clause (b) of proviso to Section 18 of the 1894 Act should be reckoned from the date of knowledge of the award of the Collector
or from the date of award itself. It was held that if award is made in the presence of person interested, he has to make application within six weeks
from the date of Collector''s award itself and in his absence, he has to make application seeking reference within six weeks of receipt of notice
from the Collector u/s 12(2) of the 1894 Act. It was further recorded that if the person interested was not present when the award was made and
no notice u/s 12(2) of the 1894 Act was received from the Collector, an application is to be made within six months from the date of actual or
constructive knowledge of the contents of the award. In The State of Maharashtra and Others Vs. Ark Builders Pvt. Ltd., it was held that if the
law prescribes that a copy of the order/award is to be communicated to the parties concerned in a particular way and in case the law also sets a
period of limitation for challenging the order/award in question by the aggrieved party, then the period of limitation can only commence from the
date on which the order was received by the party concerned in the manner prescribed by the law. In Jain Motors Regd., Patiala''s case (supra), it
was held by a learned single Judge of this Court that the prescribed period of limitation would only commence from the date on which the order
was received by the party concerned unless and until there is a strong and positive evidence of acquisition of knowledge of the order. Similar was
the position in Manjit Kaur''s case (supra). These cases being on individual fact-situation, no advantage can be derived by learned counsel for the
appellant. Accordingly, finding no merit in the appeal, the same is dismissed.