Paul Join vs State of A.P. and Others

S.B. Sinha, C.J.—Whether despite unreasonable delay, a person is entitled to get the benefit of the judgment is the question involved in this application.

One of the applicants before the Tribunal who were six in number has filed the present writ petition. They filed an Original Applications inter alia praying the learned Tribunal to direct the respondents therein to appoint them as Special Teachers by declaring the action of the respondents in appointing only 912 candidates through G.O.Ms.No.156 dated 8.7.1996 as illegal and discriminatory.

The case of the petitioner is that he appeared for the test conducted by the District Selection Committee for the post of Special Teacher. The High Court dismissed W.P.Nos.17104 to 17106 of 1993 filed by 912 petitioners directing them to approach the State Administrative Tribunal at the first instance. Consequently, O.A.Nos.7993 of 1998 and batch filed by those petitioners were dismissed by the Tribunal. Some original applications filed by the petitioner herein among others were also dismissed on the ground that they are covered by the decision of the Tribunal in O.A.No.7993 of 1998 and batch. Aggrieved by the orders of the learned Tribunal, the other applicants in O.A.No.7993 of 1998 preferred Writ Petition Nos.10586 of 1999 and batch wherein this Court by an order dated 28.8.2000 observed that such of the qualified candidates who appeared for the selection of Special Teachers were eligible to be appointed subject of course to the availability of vacancies. The petitioner contends after dismissal of his case before the learned Tribunal, he did not prefer any writ petition before this Court as he was waiting for the outcome of the Writ Petition Nos.10586 of 1999 and batch. The learned counsel would therefore submit that the benefit of the decision rendered in W.P.No.10586 of 1999 and batch should also be extended to the petitioner.

The Division Bench in W.P.Nos. 10586 of 1999 and batch inter alia observed:

By this, we are not opening Pandora''s box and we are restraining the grant of relief only to the writ petitioners before us for the reason that even the selection of the candidates panel wise and appointment orders issued thereto are erroneous and even might get upset to some extent, as dichotomy was played by the appointing authorities. While G.O.Ms.No.716 was adopted for construing the qualifying mark, G.O.Ms.No.231 was followed for preparation of panels and fixing the tenure thereof. There is a vital distinction between G.O.Ms.No.716 and G.O.Ms.No.231 regarding the qualifying marks. While in G.O.Ms.No.716, the qualifying mark for oral interview is fixed as obtaining of 30% in written test, there is no qualifying mark fixed in G.O.Ms.No.231 for the purpose of oral interview, but 85 marks have been allotted for written test and 15 marks for oral test; however, retaining the overall minimum qualifying mark of 40 for the purpose of selection and appointment (insofar as open category candidates are concerned). But to review the appointments made on the basis of the above error may lead to chaotic situation unsettling the settled appointments and in fact, that is not the point raised by either side and as such, we refrain from entering into that arena. However, having regard to the fact that there are only 912 vacancies, which left unfilled because of the erroneous interpretation and importing the panel theory and as there are more number of qualified candidates among the petitioners, the petitioners have to be arranged in terms of their merit among them and in order of that merit, the appointments are to be made. We make it clear that such of 911 petitioners who stand qualified to be appointed in order of the above merit, shall continue and others have to pave the way for more meritorious candidates basing upon the merit list. We reiterate that merit list shall be drawn for 912 posts only among the writ petitioners herein and shall not percolate beyond them for the reason of their initiation of legal proceedings right on time and pursuing the same before several forums right from A.P. Administrative Tribunal to that of Supreme Court and others even if they were qualified, had not initiated any legal proceedings and remain contended. This exercise shall be made by the appointing authorities within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. It is pertinent to mention that the above 912 vacancies shall not form part of the selection process for recruitment of teachers pursuant to DSC - 2000.

The contention of the petitioner as noticed hereinbefore is that he should also be given the same benefit.

The writ petitioner filed his application before the Tribunal in the year 1996. It has been noticed that the said batch was dismissed on 12.10.1999. The learned counsel submits that the applicant had been waiting for aforementioned judgment of the High Court. This writ petition has been filed on 23.7.2001 whereas as indicated hereinbefore, the writ petition Nos.10586 of 1999 and batch was disposed of the matter on 28.8.2000.

It is no doubt true that ordinarily, the benefit of judgment should be extended to the other persons who are similarly situated. But gross delay and laches on the part of the petitioners is one of the exceptions to the aforementioned rule. It is now a well settled principle of law that those who sleep over their rights for a long time cannot be granted any relief.

In this connection we may refer to the decisions of the Apex Court in A.HAMSAVENI V. STATE OF T.N.1, STATE OF MAHARASHTRA V. DIGAMBAR2, STATE OF MAHARASHTRA V. ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER3, MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, AHMEDNAGAR V. SHAH HYDER BEIG4. In PRINCIPAL, ENGINEERING COLLEGE V. S.MUKHERJEE5, a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court to which one of us was a party observed:

The petitioner further more, filed the writ application after a long time although the impugned order as contained in annexure D to the writ application passed as aforesaid on 19.12.1988. It is now well known that those who sleeps over their right could not be granted any equitable relief. Reference in this connection may be made to Sudhir Vishnu Panvalkar Vs. Bank of India, .

In the instant case, the petitioner in unequivocal terms stated that they had been waiting on the fence. As noticed hereinbefore despite the fact that the judgment of this Court was delivered as far back on 28.8.2000, he filed this writ application on 23.7.2001, about one year after passing of the judgment. In a situation of this nature, we are of the opinion that no equitable relief could be granted in favour of the petitioner. Further more, this Court had directed drawing up of merit list for 912 posts only amongst the writ petitioners in the said batch of cases and further directed that the same shall not percolate them beyond them for the reason of their initiation of legal proceedings right on time and pursuing the same before several forums right from A.P. Administrative Tribunal to that of Supreme Court.

If the prayer of the petitioner is to be granted, the same would run counter to the aforementioned direction. "Amity and comity" in the decisions is the rule and we intend to follow the same in this case. In any event, the petitioner by filing a separate application inter alia on the ground that he is entitled to the same benefit cannot, so long as the judgment of the High Court in W.P.No.10856 of 1999 subsists, cannot obtain a relief which would run counter to the directions made therein.

For the reasons aforementioned we are of the opinion that this is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. This petition is therefore dismissed.