Payal Sharma And Ors vs State & Another

Through the medium of instant petition filed under Section 561-A Cr.P.C., petitioners seek quashing of the challan arising out of FIR No.10/2017 dated 09.02.2017 registered at Police Station, Janipur, Jammu under Sections 494/495/406/417/415/420/120-B/201 RPC against the petitioners, pending before Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu, on the ground of compromise arrived at between the parties.

It is pertinent to mention here that this Court on 26.10.2018, at the statement of learned counsel for the petitioners to the effect that a compromise has been arrived at between the parties, directed the parties alongwith their counsel to appear before the Registrar Judicial of this Court for recording their statements with regard to authenticity of compromise.

Pursuant to the aforesaid direction, Registrar Judicial has recorded the statements of the petitioners and respondent No.2. The same are placed on record, which read as under:-

Statement of Payal Sharma (petitioner no.1); Age : 24 years ; D/o Chiranjee Lal ; R/o Thathar, Paloura, Tehsil and District Jammu on oath today i.e. 29.01.2019

Stated that I have entered into a compromise deed dated 15.03.2018 with a Respondent no.2 namely Rajeev Raina and have amicably settled all our disputes and I, therefore, pray the Hon'ble Court to allow the petition and quash the proceedings in FIR No.10/2017 pending before the Addl. District Judge, Jammu.

Statement of Chiranjee Lal Sharma (petitioner no.2); Age : 42 years ; S/o Des Raj Sharma ; R/o Thathar, Paloura, Tehsil and District Jammu on oath today i.e. 29.01.2019

Stated that I am the father of petitioner no.1 and have entered into a compromise deed dated 15.03.2018 with a Respondent no.2 namely Rajeev Raina and have amicably settled all our disputes and I, therefore, pray the Hon'ble

Court to allow the petition and quash the proceedings in FIR No.10/2017 pending before the Addl. District Judge, Jammu.

Statement of Asha Sharma (petitioner no.3); Age : 40 years ; W/o Chiranjee Lal Sharma; R/o Thathar, Paloura, Tehsil and District Jammu on oath today i.e. 29.01.2019

Stated that I am the mother of petitioner no.1 and have entered into a compromise deed dated 15.03.2018 with a Respondent no.2 namely Rajeev Raina and have amicably settled all our disputes and I, therefore, pray the Hon'ble

Court to allow the petition and quash the proceedings in FIR No.10/2017 pending before the Addl. District Judge, Jammu.

Statement of Prahbad Mahajan (petitioner no.4); Age : 28 years ; S/o Ashok Gupta; R/o Pandoka Colony, Paloura, Tehsil and District Jammu on oath today i.e. 29.01.2019

Stated that I am the brother in law of petitioner no.1 and have entered into a compromise deed dated 15.03.2018 with a Respondent no.2 namely Rajeev Raina and have amicably settled all our disputes and I, therefore, pray the Hon'ble Court to allow the petition and quash the proceedings in FIR No.10/2017 pending before the Addl. District Judge, Jammu.

Statement of Anju Devi (petitioner no.5); Age : 37 years ; W/o Ajay Sharma; R/o Near BSF Gate, Paloura, Tehsil and District Jammu on oath today i.e. 29.01.2019

Stated that I have entered into a compromise deed dated 15.03.2018 with a Respondent no.2 namely Rajeev Raina and have amicably settled all our disputes and I, therefore, pray the Hon'ble Court to allow the petition and quash the proceedings in FIR No.10/2017 pending before the Addl. District Judge, Jammu.

Statement of Rajeev Raina (respondent no.2); Age : years ; S/o Som Nath Raina; R/o Vinayak Nagar, Khajuria Mohalla, Paloura, Tehsil and District Jammu on oath today i.e. 29.01.2019

Stated that I have entered into a compromise deed dated 15.03.2018 with all the petitioners and we have amicably settled all our disputes and I have no objection in case the Hon'ble Court allows the petition and quash the proceedings in FIR No.10/2017 pending before the Addl. District Judge, Jammu.

Statement of Sh. Rajat Sharma, Advocate for petitioners on oath today i.e. 29.01.2019

Stated that the petitioners has tendered their statements in my presence and I do hereby identify the petitioners who have deposed the said statements before Registrar Judicial.

Statement of Sh. Ravinder Parihar, Advocate for respondent no.2, on oath today i.e. 29.01.2019

Stated that the respondent no.2 has tendered his statement in my presence and I do hereby identify the said respondent who has deposed the said statement before Registrar Judicial.

From bare perusal of the statements placed on record, it is evident that parties have entered into a compromise whereby they have settled their differences.

Relevant extract of the compromise deed is reproduced as under:-

"That the party of the 2nd party (Payal Sharma) shall not claim for any property of the party of the 1st part after executing the said compromise deed.

That both the parties shall not interfere into the personal life as well as into the professional life of each other after executing the said compromise deed.

That both the parties are executing this deed of compromise out of their own free will and without any undue influence, pressure, coercion or fraud and while in his sound state of mind and health.

That the 2nd party shall have no right whatsoever, claims right or title in the property, moveable and immovable, of the 1st paty.

That after executing the said compromise deed both parties have no concern with each other.

That the case pending in the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu titled State Vs. Payal Sharma and ors. Under section 494/495/406/415/417/420/201 and 120-B RPC in FIR No.10/2017 will be quashed by the Hon‟ble Court on the basis of this compromise deed."

In Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Anr., (2012) 10 SCC 303, it is held as under:-

The question is with regard to the inherent power of the High Court in quashing the criminal proceedings against an offender who has settled his dispute with the victim of the crime but the crime in which he is allegedly involved is not compoundable under Section 320 of the Code.

Section 482 of the Code, as its very language suggests, saves the inherent power of the High Court which it has by virtue of it being a superior court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It begins with the words, „nothing in this Code‟ which means that the provision is an overriding provision. These words leave no manner of doubt that none of the provisions of the Code limits or restricts the inherent power. The guideline for exercise of such power is provided in Section 482 itself i.e., to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As has been repeatedly stated that Section 482 confers no new powers on High Court; it merely safeguards existing inherent powers possessed by High Court necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. It is equally well settled that the power is not to be resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of an aggrieved party. It should be exercised very sparingly and it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.

In different situations, the inherent power may be exercised in different ways to achieve its ultimate objective. Formation of opinion by the High Court before it exercises inherent power under Section 482 on either of the twin objectives, (i) to prevent abuse of the process of any court or (ii) to secure the ends of justice, is a sine qua non.

In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice or to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is founded on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine qua res ipsa esse non potest. The full import of which is whenever anything is authorized, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required to be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing unless something else not authorised in express terms be also done, may also be done, then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed by the High Court underSection 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and circumspection.

It needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power by the High Court would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is neither permissible nor proper for the court to provide a straitjacket formula regulating the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482. No precise and inflexible guidelines can also be provided.

Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.

Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has been settled although offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers and threatens well-being of society and it is not safe to leave the crime- doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without permission of the Court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc; or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between offender and victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or F.I.R if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard and fast category can be prescribed.

55 B.S. Joshi1, (2003) 4 SCC 675 Nikhil Merchant (2008) 9 SCC 677 Manoj Sharma (2008) 16 SCC 1 and Shiji alias Pappu (2011) 10 SCC 705 do illustrate the principle that High Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi1, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji alias Pappu, this Court has compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so. There does exist the distinction between compounding of an offence under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal case by the High Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different although ultimate consequence may be same viz., acquittal of the accused or dismissal of indictment.

Having carefully considered the facts and circumstances of the present case, and also the law relating to the continuance of criminal cases where the complainant and the accused had settled their differences and had arrived at an amicable arrangement, I am of considered opinion that future trial is mere wastage of time of courts. As the parties have compromised, there would be no chance of conviction of any accused in the case. Offences for which criminal prosecution has been launched are not heinous one.

Consequently, this petition is allowed and Challan arising out of FIR No.10/2017 dated 09.02.2017 registered at Police Station, Janipur, Jammu under Sections 494/495/406/417/415/420/120-B/201 RPC against the petitioners, pending before Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu, is quashed in view of compromise arrived at between the parties.

Copy of this order be sent to Court below for compliance.