P.C. Goel vs Union of India (UOI) and Others

Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.—CM is allowed as prayed.

The petitioner was appointed as Financial Controller with the Punjab Wakf Board vide order dated June 16, 1997. He actually joined duty on August 1, 1997. His services were terminated vide order dated August 6, 1998. He was paid one month''s salary in lieu of one month''s notice along with the order of termination. Aggrieved by this order, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure P-16 with the writ petition, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. He prays that the order of termination be set aside.

The respondents contested that writ petition. A detailed written statement has been filed. It has been inter alia pointed out that the petitioner had been appointed on probation for a period of one year. The period of probation could be extended. No order of confirmation had been passed. By an order passed in May 1998, the petitioner''s financial powers were withdrawn. This action was necessitated by the fact that he had deposited Rs.75.00 lakhs "in the Unit Trust of India through his wife....." It has been further pointed out that on an inquiry it was "learnt that the commission to the agent by the, Unit Trust of India is 2% and he, therefore, has got undue financial benefit of Rs. 1.50 lakhs along with his wife....." Subsequently, when the petitioner''s work was assessed as being unsatisfactory his services were terminated as per his terms of appointment.

The petitioner has filed a replication.

Learned counsel for the parties have been heard. The solitary contention raised by Mr. Dinssh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner is that having joined service on August 1, 1997, the petitioner had completed the period of probation on July 31, 1996. Thereafter, his services could not have been terminated except after holding an inquiry. The claim made on behalf of the petitioner has been controverted by learned counsel for the respondents.

A copy of the order of appointment issued to the petitioner has been produced as Annexure P-3 with the writ petition, in this order, it was inter alia provided as under:-

"He will be on probation for a period of one year in the first instance which is liable to be extended for unsatisfactory performance etc. until satisfactory completion of probation period or such extended period as the case may be. He will be on the rolls of the Board on purely temporary basis. During the period of probation his services can be terminated by giving one month''s notice or one month salary in lieu of notice without assigning any reason."

A perusal of the above would show that the petitioner was to be on probation for a period of one year "in the first instance". This period or probation was "liable to be extended........" It is further apparent that till there was satisfactory completion of probation, the petitioner''s appointment was "on purely temporary basis". It was also provided that "during the period of probation his services can be terminated by giving one month''s notice or one month''s salary in lieu of notice without assigning any reason".

What is the position in the present case?

The petitioner had joined on August 1, 1997. No order declaring that he had successfully completed the period of probation was issued. By an order of May 29, 1996 a copy of which has been produced as Annexure P-15 with the writ petition, the petitioner''s financial powers had been withdrawn. This order had been passed after obtaining petitioner''s explanation. It was after the petitioner had submitted his explanation vide letter dated May 4/May 12 that the order regarding withdrawal of financial powers had been passed on May 29, 1998. Still further the Board gave the petitioner one month''s salary in lieu of one month''s notice as also the pay for the period from August 1 to August 6, 1996. After consideration of the matter, we are satisfied that the order of termination was in strict conformity with the terms of appointment.

Mr. Dinesh Kumar submits that the order could not have been passed after August 1, 1996 without holding an inquiry. The contention is misconceived. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the petitioner''s period of probation had not been specifically extended, we think the authority was entitled to a reasonable time to decide as to whether or not the petitioner had satisfactorily performed his duties. In the present case, the impugned action was taken by the authority before the expiry of even a week and the order was issued on August 6, 1998. There was no infirmity in the order. There is no violation of any Rule or law. The action was apparently just and fair. It calls for no interference in the exercise or discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Faced with the above, learned counsel for the petitioner has raised a submission that the post is in existence. In fact, it has been re-advertised. That being so the petitioner''s services could not have been terminated on the round that these were no longer required. The contention is wholly misconceived. It is inherent in the petitioner''s terms of appointment that he was on trial. If during the period of trial the petitioner''s performance was found to be unsatisfactory the authority was entitled to act upon the terms of appointment and to bring the contract of service to an end. This is precisely what has been done. The order of course casts no stigma. It calls for no interference.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has not urged that the impugned order has to be justified only on the ground indicated therein and that the respondents cannot be permitted to agitate that the petitioner''s performance was unsatisfactory as is sought to be made out from the written statement. He relies upon the Rule laid down by their Lordships of Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and Another Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others, . The contention is misconceived. The authority has avoided casting any stigma on the petitioner''s performance. Therefore, no details have been furnished in. the order. However, when the order was challenged, it has disclosed the factual position in the written statement. This disclosure is only calculated to indicate that the order was not arbitrary and unfair. In fact, even the petitioner was aware of this. He had himself produced three documents as Annexures P-13, P-14 and P-15 which indicated that he had been questioned about the deposit of Rs. 75.00 lakhs in the Unit Trust of India through his wife. It thus, cannot be said that the respondents have invented a new justification for the impugned action. The case does not fall within the Rule laid down by their Lordships of Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Singh''s case.

No other point has been raised.

In view of the above, we find no merit in this writ petition. It is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.