High CourtsDivision Bench

P.C. Mallick vs Bhabatosh Das

Calcutta High Court · Decided on 29 July 1954 · Citation: 59 CWN 491

HON’BLE JUDGES
Debabrata Mookerjee, J · Das Gupta, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950 — Section 9(1)(b)
CASE NUMBER
Civil Revision Case No. 1029 of 1953

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

No AI summary yet

Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.

Judgment

10 paragraphs · 1,442 words

Das Gupta, J.—This case raises a question of interpretation of the words "currency of a standard rent" as used in clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of section 9 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950. On an application by the tenant for fixation of rent under the provisions of section 9 of the Rent Control Act, the Rent Controller held that the provisions of Schedule A applied and that for the purpose of this Schedule Rs 175 should be taken to be the basic rent; and adding 20 per cent. thereto under clause (b) of paragraph (1) of Schedule A the basic rent would be Rs. 210. He further held that the provisions of clauses (b) and (c) of section 9(1) also applied to the circumstances of the case and allowed an increase of Rs. 21-10-8 in view of the increase in municipal taxes and a sum of Rs. 8-5-4 per month representing ten per cent per annum of the sum of Rs 1,000 found by him to have been spent in improving the premises. On this basis he fixed the standard rent at Rs. 271-7-8 pies. The order of the learned Rent Controller makes it clear that he fixed the rent at Rs. 249-13 with effect from the month of August, 1950, to March, 1951, and at the rate of Rs. 271-8 with effect from April, 1951. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the provisions of clauses (b) and (c) of section 9(1) of the Act were applicable only after rent had been fixed by the Rent Controller u/s 9 and that these provisions had no application to the present case, where there had been increase in municipal taxes, and additions, alterations or improvements made in the premises, prior to such fixation.

2.

The question before us is whether this interpretation by the learned Subordinate Judge is correct. For a decision of this question it is necessary to turn first to the definition of standard rent in the Act itself. Standard rent is defined in clause (10) of section 2 of the Act in these words : "Standard rent" in relation to any premises means (a) the standard rent determined in accordance with the provisions of Schedule A, (b) where the rent has been fixed u/s 9, the rent so fixed; or at which it would have been fixed if application were made under the said section". Clearly therefore the Legislature contemplated the existence of "standard rent" even where the rent had not been fixed u/s 9. If they understood the standard rent to exist only when the rent had been fixed u/s 9 the definition would not have contained the words, "the standard rent determined in accordance with the provisions of Schedule A" or even less the words, "or at which it would have been fixed if application were made under the section". To say there exists no standard rent of the premises unless it had been fixed u/s 9 is to ignore these words of the definition clause on standard rent in the Act.

3.

Unless therefore there is anything in the context which is repugnant to the definition clause, it would be proper for us to hold that standard rent may be current even without any fixation u/s 9. It is contended however on behalf of the tenant that the context in which the words "standard rent" appear in clauses (b) and (c) is repugnant to the definition of standard rent as (a) "the standard rent determined in accordance with the provisions of Schedule A or (b)................or at which it would have been fixed if application were made under the said section", and that the context is consistent only with the definition of standard rent as the rent fixed u/s 9 of the Act.

4.

In my judgment, this contention should not prevail. It is to be remembered that the purpose of this Act was as stated in the preamble "to make better provision for the control of rents of premises" and in making this better provision the Legislature has attempted to hold the scale evenly between landlords and tenants as also between different landlords owning similar premises. Take the case of a landlord, who let out premises at the rate of Rs. 100 per month on the 1st December. 1941, but has not made any repairs by way of addition, alteration or improvement in the premises, between the date when this Act came into force and the date when an application for fixation of rent is before the Rent Controller-- and the case of another landlord, who let out similar premises on the 1st December, 1941, at the rate of Rs. 100 per month and has spent, say a sum of Rs. 2,000 by way of improvement, between these dates. To both these cases the provisions of section 9(1) (a) will apply. If the correct position be that the provisions of section 9(1) (c) will not apply to the case of the landlord who has made "addition or improvement in the premises" both these landlords will be getting the same rent as the result of the fixation u/s 9. Similarly, if in the case of one of these premises there is an increase of municipal rates between the date when this Act came into force and the date on which the application for standardisation of rent is before the Court, but there is no such increase in the taxation of the other premises the consequence of the view that the provisions of section 9(1) (b) will not apply to the premises, where there has been such increase would be that both the landlords would be getting the same rent as the result of fixation even though one has to pay more in the way of municipal taxes than the other.

5.

In my judgment, there is no reason at all for accepting a view which gives rise to such obviously unfair consequences I see no reason to think that standard rent cannot be "current" unless it has been fixed by a Court. If the intention of the Legislature was that the provisions of clauses (b) and (c) would apply only to cases of such increase in taxation or to cases of expenditure by way of addition, alteration or improvement, after rent had been fixed u/s 9 the Legislature would have said so clearly. The Legislature would not have in that case used the words "during currency of a standard rent" knowing, as they did the definition of the word "standard rent" in clause (10) of section 2. It is important to bear in mind in this connection that in the old Act. that is the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1948, the definition did not contain the words, "or at which it would have been fixed if application were made under the said section". The deliberate addition of these words in the definition would be meaningless if we are to cut down the meaning "standard rent" only to the words, "rent............fixed under section". As I have already indicated, I can see nothing in the provisions of clauses (b) and (c) that can be said to be repugnant to the three definitions of the words "standard rent" that appear in clause (10) of section 2.

6.

On these considerations, I have come to the conclusion that when there has been an increase in municipal taxes, rates and cesses between the date when the Act came into force and the date when an application for fixation of standard rent is before the Court, standard rent must be held to be current and it will be the duty of the Controller in fixing rent u/s 9 (1) to apply the provisions of clause (b) of that section.

7.

Similarly, where the landlord has made addition, alteration or improvement in the premises, not being tenantable repairs necessary or usual for such premises, between the date when the Act came into force and the date when the application for standardisation is before the Court, the increase must be taken to have occurred during the "currency of a standard rent" and it will be the duty of the Controller in fixing the standard rent to give due effect to the provisions of section 9(1.) (c).

8.

I would, therefore, make this Rule absolute, set aside the order passed by the learned Court below and restore the order passed by the learned Rent Controller.

9.

The order relating to adjustment made by the lower Appellate Court will stand. I would make no order as to costs. Debabrata Mookerjee, J.

I agree.