Peekay Re-Rolling Mills (P.) Limited vs Secretary to Government, Thiruvananthapuram and Others

P. Bhavadasan, J.—As common issues arise for consideration and since the parties are also the same, these writ appeals are heard together and disposed of by this common judgment. The question raised for consideration in all these writ appeals is whether the refusal to grant exemption from payment of sales tax to the petitioners'' unit for various periods, is justified in law.

W.A. No. 991 of 2003 arises from the judgment in O.P. No. 32947 of 2000, W.A. No. 1316 of 2003 arises from O.P. No. 32807 of 2000 and W.A. No. 1561 of 2003 from O.P. No. 23472 of 2001( Peekay Re-Rolling Mills (P.) Ltd. Vs. Secretary to Government and Others, ). Since the facts of the three original petitions are almost identical, for the purpose of these writ appeals, the facts as narrated in O.P. No. 32947 of 2000 are being referred to in this judgment.

According to the petitioner, his unit is run by a company incorporated under the Companies Act. It produces steel ingots and iron rods. It is a medium scale industrial unit. The unit was registered on September 6, 1991 as per exhibit P1 certificate. According to the petitioner, the motivation and incentive for setting up the unit was a notification issued by the State Government, offering tax exemption as per exhibit P2. The notification has been issued u/s 10 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act and it is a statutory notification. As per exhibit P2, the exemption is made available to various units for a period of seven years. It was acting on exhibit P2 that various units like the petitioner''s unit were set up. The benefit under exhibit P2 notification can be taken aid of only from the date of commencement of production. The only restriction imposed was that the aggregate of the exemption contemplated under clause 4 of exhibit P2 shall not exceed 100 per cent of the capital investment of the unit. The petitioner''s unit commenced production on March 31, 1995. Going by clause 11 of exhibit P2, his unit is entitled to exemption. Subsequent to March 31, 1995, an additional capital investment was made by the petitioner. As on March 31, 1996, the total capital investment of the petitioner''s unit was Rs. 3,96,62,211.62. Since the petitioner''s unit satisfied all the necessary conditions for exemption as envisaged under exhibit P2, his unit got tax exemption for a period of seven years from March 31, 1995 to March 30, 2002.

Initially, the petitioner''s unit started production with a high tension capacity of 1500 KVA. Subsequent to the commencement of production and additional capital investments made, for making the unit more efficient and productive, the petitioner needed more power. After commencement of the production on March 31, 1995, the petitioner made an application for exemption from payment of sales tax before the Director of Industries and Commerce. The said authority has to issue an eligibility certificate and that was issued on June 20, 1997. By proceedings dated December 19, 1997, a certificate of exemption was issued to the petitioner, finding that the petitioner''s unit is eligible for sales tax exemption to the tune of Rs. 2,65,70,965 for a period of seven years from March 31, 1995 to March 30, 2002. A copy of the said proceedings is produced and marked as exhibit P3. Even while the initial application was pending, the petitioner had invested heavily, i.e., nearly to the tune of five crores in the industry, resulting in additional contract load of 4,500 KVA. Claiming exemption for the additional investment, exhibit P4 application was made by the petitioner. It had to be routed through the Director of Industries and Commerce. However, without any justification, exhibit P4 application was rejected by order dated May 27, 1998 on the ground that the petitioner''s unit is a power incentive unit having a load of more than 2,500 KVA and therefore, it is not entitled to tax exemption. The said order was produced as exhibit P5. The petitioner challenged the said order by filing O.P. No. 20154 of 1998. The learned Government Pleader submitted that a mistake had been committed by the authority and on that basis, the original petition was disposed of directing the respondents therein to forward the application for exemption to the State Level Committee for consideration. The petitioner claims to have made a representation dated March 17, 1998 to the State Level Committee. Since no action followed either by the Director of Industries and Commerce or the State Level Committee in pursuance of the directions issued in the judgment in the abovesaid original petition, the petitioner had to move this court again by filing O.P. No. 24212 of 1999, seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the second respondent to act on the application of the petitioner. In the said original petition, the State took the stand that the Director of Industries and Commerce had sought for a clarification from the Government as to the eligibility of the units by the petitioner from sales tax exemption for the additional investment made by him, relying on the Government Orders dated November 26, 1993 and November 24, 1998. According to the petitioner, exhibit P9 GO has only prospective effect and it cannot apply to the unit of the petitioner.

According to the Director of Industries and Commerce, the petitioner''s unit came to be included in the negative list on account of clause 7 of exhibit P8 which excluded the units whose total power requirement exceeded 2,500 KVA. The petitioner points out that it, was without adverting to GO (MS) No. 102/94/ID dated April 19, 1994 that the application for exemption filed by him was kept pending. That Government Order stated that the exemption continued to be available to all such industries, which were provisionally registered before December 31, 1993. The petitioner''s unit having been registered on September 6, 1991, was entitled to the benefit. O.P. No. 24212 of 1999 was disposed of with a direction to the Government to furnish the clarification sought for within a prescribed time limit and directing the authorities concerned to take appropriate decision on the basis of the clarification issued by the State. The petitioner had preferred a writ appeal against exhibit P11 judgment. Pursuant to the directions in exhibit P11 judgment, the Director of Industries and Commerce passed an order declining sales tax exemption in respect of the capital investment for the period from April 1, 1996 to March 31, 1997. Copy of the said order is exhibit P12. Exhibit P12 was challenged on various grounds.

In O.P. No. 32807 of 2000, the very same unit challenged the rejection of exemption for additional investment as per exhibit P3 order for the period from July 1, 1995 to March 31, 1996.

In O.P. No. 23742 of 2001, the very same unit sought tax exemption for the period from November 19, 1996 to December 23, 2000 as per exhibit P6 application. That was rejected by exhibit P8 order. The same is challenged on the same grounds as in the other original petitions.

The common grounds taken in all these original petitions were that the petitioner was entitled to exemption as per S.R.O. No. 1729 of 1993 issued u/s 10 of the KGST Act. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the reasons given for rejecting their application for exemption was untenable and the interpretation given to clause 7 of the G.O.''s concerned namely, November 26, 1993 and November 24, 1998 cannot be accepted. The petitioner in these original petitions also contended that since the unit has been registered provisionally prior to the cut-off date mentioned in the G.O. dated April 19, 1994, the unit is entitled to the benefit of the exemption, which the authorities have not considered.

In all the original petitions, the State took the stand that going by the Government Orders dated November 26, 1993 and November 24, 1998, units like the petitioner''s unit became ineligible for exemption as they had a consumption of power exceeding 2,500 KVA. Thus, the State sought to sustain the rejection of exemption. The original petitions were heard jointly and the learned single judge accepted the contentions of the State and dismissed all the writ petitions. The petitioner carried the matter in respective writ appeals as already mentioned. The writ appeals were allowed and the State was directed to grant tax exemption to the petitioner.

The State took up the matter in appeal before the apex court as Civil Appeal Nos. 8031, 8032 and 8033 of 2004 ( Secretary to Government and Others Vs. Peekay Re-Rolling Mills (P) Ltd., ). The contention taken by the appellants before the apex court was that clause 7 of the Government Order dated November 27, 1993 was a comprehensive one, covering various industries made mention of therein. The State contended that the exemption granted as per the notification dated November 4, 1993, i.e., annexure 2, stood withdrawn by the issuance of the GO dated November 27, 1993. The apex court approved the GO dated November 27, 1993. The apex court also held that the GO dated November 24, 1998 had retrospective effect. When the GO dated April 19, 1994 came up for consideration before the apex court, it was noticed that the said GO has not been considered by this court while dealing with the matter.

According to the apex court, clause 3 of the said GO has considerable impact on the issues involved in the proceedings. The apex court also observed that the order dated October 21, 2000 issued by the Director of Industries had also not been considered by this court. It was also observed by the apex court that this court had omitted to consider clause 3 of the GO dated November 1, 1995. The specific contention taken by the State before the apex court was that this court ought to have read the word "and" contained in clause 7 of the said GO as "or". The apex court said that since this specific issue has not been considered by this court, the matter requires reconsideration by this court and accordingly, remanded the matter to this court. This is how, the writ appeals have come up before this court again.

W.P. (C) No. 19516 of 2009

The petitioner in this case was also running a manufacturing unit of iron rods and ingots. The unit is said to have been set up in 1992 and it was claimed that it was eligible for exemption. According to the petitioner, during the year 1999-2000, massive investments were made availing of financial assistance so as to increase the efficiency of the units. When exemption was sought for, it was declined on the ground that the petitioner''s unit fall within the negative list. The petitioner says that he had taken up the matter before this court and this court declined to interfere. The matter was pending in a writ appeal. While so, the petitioner was served with exhibit P2 order purportedly issued u/s 23(3) of the KGST Act. In the meanwhile, the petitioner would say that the writ appeals filed by him were allowed and it was declared that his unit was entitled to exemption. The State took up the matter before the apex court. The apex court set aside the judgments in the writ appeals passed by this court and remanded the matter for fresh consideration with certain directions. Without prejudice to the right of the petitioner, he paid the amount under the Amnesty Scheme. This would be evident from exhibit P3. The petitioner claims that his unit is liable to get the exemption and he points out that by way of abundant caution, he had filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal as evident from exhibit P5. The petitioner claims similar benefits as the writ appellants in the writ appeal.

The learned senior counsel for the appellant Sri. S. Ganesh raised the following three points for consideration :

(i) According to the learned counsel, in clause 7 of annexure 8, Government Order, the latter portion should be read conjunctively and not distinctively. In other words, the word "and" should be read as "and" only and not as "or".

(ii) Even assuming that it cannot be so done, the petitioner''s unit having been registered before December 31, 1993, goes out of the negative list as stated in the notification as per clause 2 of the same notification.

(iii) The authorities have understood the notification in a particular manner and have given effect to it. Almost all other units, except the petitioner''s unit, have been given exemption and the petitioner''s unit alone has been isolated and discriminated. That could not be done. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decisions in Organo Chemical Industries and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , Berger Paints India Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta, , R and B Falcon (A) Pty Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, , State of Karnataka and Others Vs. Balaji Computers and Others, , Union of India and Others Vs. Kaumudini Narayan Dalal and Another, and Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Collector of Central Tax [2007] 13 SCC 803, in support of his contentions.

The learned Government Pleader, on the other hand, contends that the word "and" occurring in the Government order produced as annexure 8 should be read as "or" and if that be so, the decision taken by the Revenue, declining exemption to the petitioner, is perfectly justified. In support of his contention, the learned Government Pleader relied on the decision report in Attorney General v. Beauchamp [1920] 1 KB 650 and R. v. Oakes [1959] 2 All. E.R. 92. As regards clause 2 relied on by the appellant, it was contended that it should be read along with clause 3 and clause 2 cannot be read in isolation. As regards the third contention, it was pointed out that merely because a wrong has been committed in favour of the person, it does not mean that the petitioner is also entitled to the same benefit.

Point No. 1 :--In order to appreciate the controversy involved in these appeals, it will be necessary to refer to annexure 2, SRO No. 1729 of 1993 dated November 3, 1993, published on November 4, 1993 issued u/s 10 of the KGST Act. That is the basic Government Order. As far as the cases on hand are concerned, the unit of the petitioner falls within the "medium and large scale units" contemplated under annexure 2. Clause 4 of the Government Order mentions that new industrial units under "medium and large scale industries" can enjoy tax exemption for a period of seven years from the date of commencement of the commercial production. As far as the existing units are concerned, which undertake diversification, expansion or modernisation on or after April 1, 1993, the same benefit is given from the date of such diversification, expansion or modernisation is completed.

There is no dispute that the petitioner''s unit falls within the ambit of the aforesaid Government Order. As already noticed, he is, therefore, entitled to tax exemption for a period of seven years from the date of commencement of production. Clause 10 may also have some relevance. Sub-clause (iii) of clause 10 reads as follows :

In the case of new industrial units other than public sector undertakings under medium and large scale industries, the aggregate exemption in respect of sales tax, purchase tax, surcharge and Central sales tax together shall not exceed 100 per cent of the fixed capital investment of the unit.

The next relevant GO is annexure 8 dated November 26, 1993. It refers to the earlier Government orders. Annexure 8 GO happened to be issued due to power shortage and it was decided to withdraw all types of concessions to industrial units included in the negative list. This GO is of considerable importance in the present case. The contention is regarding the interpretation to be given to sub-clause (7) and clauses 2 and 3 of the said GO. They read as follows :

(7) Power intensive units based on electro thermal/electro chemical processors or units where total power requirement exceeds 2500 KVA of contract load and where cost of power is more than 25 per cent of cost of production of the items manufactured except where the units generate their power requirements in excess of 2500 KVA of contract load by own captive power.

(2) All units in the above list provisionally registered on or after December 31, 1993 will not be eligible for the State Investment Subsidy. Provisional registration for the purpose of large and medium units will be taken to mean, the date of S.I.A. registration/filling I.E.M. with Government of India Letter of Intent/submission of application for financial assistance, as the case may be.

(3) Expansion/modernisation/diversification of existing units in the areas included in the list above shall also not be eligible for any financial assistance/loan/tax exemption from Government unless application has been made by the unit for the purpose and received on or before the cut-off date, viz., December 31, 1993.

The next GO that may have relevance is annexure 10 GO dated April 19, 1994. So far as the cases on hand are concerned, the relevant portion is clause 3, which reads as follows :

Government wish to clarify that the financial assistance/loan/ tax exemption from Government, including electricity tariff concession and duty exemption will continue to be/will be available to all industries which were provisionally registered before December 31, 1993. Those industries listed out in para 1 of the GO read above and provisionally registered on or after December 31, 1993 alone be ineligible for financial assistance/loan/tax exemption from Government, including electricity, tariff concession and duty exemption. Provisional registration for the purpose of large and medium units will be taken to mean as in para 2 of the G.O. read above, viz., the date of S.I.A. registration/filing of I.E.M. with Government of India/ letter of intent/submission of application for financial assistance, as the case may be.

Then comes annexure 9 order dated November 24, 1998. Here also, we get a repetition of clause 7 contained in annexure 8 order. It is seen that all types of steel re-rolling mills and units manufacturing iron ingots are brought within the negative list. However, it is stated that the said order will be effective from the date of order and will be applicable to all units taking provisional registration of ISI/SIA as the case may be, from the date of the order.

Annexure 20 order issued by the Industries Department reiterates clause 7 already made mention of and also asserts that the units that fall under the negative list will not be entitled to any exemption. However, it is significant to notice clause 3 which says that the units provisionally registered on or after June 1, 1993 will not be eligible for State Investment Subsidy, which indicates that those units which are registered before the said date will be entitled to that benefit.

In these cases, the interpretation to be given to clause 7 of annexure 8 order comes up for consideration. As already noticed, clause 7 takes care of two situations. They are (1) In order to be excluded from the category of units, which are entitled to the subsidy and other benefits, the unit must be one based on electro-thermal/electro-chemical processors and (2) units where the total power requirement exceeds 2,500 KVA of contract load and where cost of power is more than 25 per cent of cost of production of the items manufactured. However, units which generate the power requirement in excess of 2500 KVA of contract load by own captive power, are entitled to the benefit.

On a plain reading of the provision, it is clear that in the latter portion, in order to go outside the ambit of the benefits of tax exemption, the unit has to satisfy both the requirements/ i.e., it has to have the power requirement which exceeds 2500 KVA of contract load and the cost of power is more than 25 per cent of the cost of production of the items manufactured.

The State, on the other hand, wants "and" to be read as "or". For the said purpose, the learned Government Pleader relies on the decisions already made mention of. It is true that under certain circumstances, "and" could be read as "or" or vice versa in order to avoid resulting absurdity.

In the Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh at page 250, this aspect is dealt with. It is stated that the word "or" is normally distinctive and "and" is normally conjunctive, but at times, they are read as vice versa to give effect to the manifest intention of the Legislature as disclosed from the context. Usually, according to the author, a distinction can be made between positive and negative conditions prescribed by a statute for acquiring a right or benefit. Positive conditions separated by "or" are read in the alternative but negative conditions connected by "or" are construed as cumulative and "or" is read as "nor" or "and".

In Sutherland Statutory Construction Third Edition at Note 4923, it is observed as follows :

Where two or more requirements are provided in a section and it is the legislative intent that all of the requirements must be fulfilled in order to comply with the statute, the conjunctive "and" should be used. Where a failure to comply with any requirement imposes liability, the disjunctive ''or'' should be used. There has been, however, so great laxity in the use of these terms that courts have generally said that the words are interchangeable and that one may be substituted for the other, if to do so is consistent with the legislative intent.

In Earl. T. Crawford''s Construction of Statutes, Note 188 deals with disjunctive and conjunctive words. The relevant portion reads as follows :

In ordinary use, the word ''or'' is a disjunctive that marks an alternative which generally corresponds to the word ''either''. In fact of the meaning, however, the word ''or'' and the word ''and'' are often used interchangeably. As a result of this common and careless use of the two words in legislation, there are occasions when the court, through construction, may change one to the other. This cannot be done if the statute''s meaning is clear, or if the alteration operates to change the meaning of the law. It is proper only in order to more accurately express, or to carry out the obvious intent of the Legislature, when the statute itself furnishes cogent proof of the error of the Legislature and especially where it will avoid absurd or impossible consequences, or operate to harmonize the statute and give effect to all of its provisions.

The above aspect was considered in a recent decision reported in Competition Commission of India Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Another, , wherein it was held as follows :

It is a settled principle of law that the words ''or'' and ''and'' may be read as vice versa but not normally.

... You do sometimes read "or" as "and" in a statute... But you do not do it unless you are obliged, because "or" does not generally mean "and" and "and" does not generally mean "or".

(Green v. Premier Glynrhonwy Slate Co. [1928] 1 KB 561 (CA) KB at page 568).

As pointed out by Lord Halsbury, the reading of ''or'' as ''and'' is not to be resorted to, ''unless some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it requires that to be done.'' (Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Henderson Bros [1888] 13 AC 595 (HL), AC at page 603). The court adopted with approval Lord Halsbury''s principle and in fact went further by cautioning against substitution of conjunctions in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Tek Chand Bhatia, , where the court held as under (SCC page 163, para 11).

11.... As Lord Halsbury L.C. observed in Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Henderson Bros. [1888] 13 AC 595 (HL) (AC at page 603) the reading of "or" as "and" is not to be resorted to "unless some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it requires that to be done". The substitution of conjunctions, however, has been sometimes made without sufficient reasons, and it has been doubted whether some of the cases of turning "or" into "and" and vice versa have not gone to the extreme limit of interpretation.

To us, the language of the section is clear and the statute does not demand that we should substitute ''or'' or read this word interchangeably for achieving the object of the Act. On the contrary, the objective of the Act is more than clear that the Legislature intended to provide a very limited right to appeal. The orders which can be appealed against have been specifically stipulated by unambiguously excluding the provisions which the Legislature did not intend to make appealable under the provisions of the Act. It is always expected of the court to apply plain rule of construction rather than trying to read the words into the statute which have been specifically omitted by the Legislature.

With the above principles in view, one may now have a look at the relevant provisions. If the interpretation suggested by the learned Government Pleader is accepted, then the exemption mentioned in the latter portion of the provision becomes redundant and it would result in an absurd situation. The suggestion made by the learned Government Pleader that the exemption may be ignored as draftsman''s folly, cannot be easily accepted. One cannot omit to note that in the former portion, the word "or" is used and in the latter portion, "and" is used. It is very clear that the delegatee was very cautious about the words used in the notification and if that be so, the word "and" can be read only conjunctively. The learned counsel for the appellant is well founded in his submission that the word "and" cannot be read as "or". It is also evident that the respondents became conscious of the anomaly and thereafter, by annexure 27 dated July 11, 2000, they brought out a notification differently worded. It reads as follows :

Units having total connected load more than 2500 KVA and also units having total connected load less than 2500 KVA but cost of power is more than 25 per cent. of cost of production. The units having total connected load of less than 2500 KVA and cost of power/ less than 25 per cent of the cost of production will not come under the negative list. However, this is not applicable to those units generating their power requirements in excess of 2500 KVA of contract load by own captive power.

But, this cannot govern the earlier notifications and Government Orders which have already been referred to.

Point No. 2 :-- This point looks equally formidable as the first one. It is clear from the various notifications and orders referred to that in order to be excluded from the category of units which are entitled to exemption, the units will be such that were registered on or after December 31, 1993. Obviously, it means that units provisionally registered before the said date can continue to enjoy the benefits. Admittedly, the unit belonging to the appellant obtained registration from the Industrial Department as a medium scale unit for the manufacture of steel rods and bars on September 6, 1991. The suggestion made by the learned Government Pleader that clauses 2 and 3 should be read together, cannot be countenanced. Clauses 2 and 3 deal with two different situations and there is nothing in common. One is not controlled by the other. Since the petitioner''s unit is registered earlier to the date mentioned in the notifications, obviously, he is entitled to the benefit. The petitioner succeeds on this ground also.

Point No. 3 : It is well-settled that merely because a wrong has been committed, that does not confer any right on others to claim the very same benefit. However, one needs to notice that the definite allegation of the petitioner in the writ petition is that except the unit belonging to the petitioner the other similarly situated units have been granted exemptions and his unit alone has been singled out. True, merely because a mistake might have been committed in one case, does not confer any right on the petitioner to get the very same exemption by repeating the said mistake. But, the fact that all other similarly situated units have been granted exemption, is an indication as to how the statutory authorities have understood the notifications.

In the decision reported in Desh Bandhu Gupta and Co. and Others Vs. Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd., , it was held as follows :

It may be stated that it was not disputed before us that these two documents which came into existence almost simultaneously with the issuance of the notification could be looked at for finding out the true intention of the Government in issuing the notification in question, particularly in regard to the manner in which outstanding transactions were to be closed or liquidated. The principle of con-temporanea expositio (interpreting a statute or any other document by reference to the exposition it has received from contemporary authority) can be invoked though the same will not always be decisive of the question of construction (Maxwell 12th Edition page 268). In Crawford on Statutory Construction (1940 Edition) in para 219 (at pages 393-395) it has been stated that administrative construction, (i.e., contemporaneous construction placed by administrative or executive officers charged with executing a statute) generally should be clearly wrong before it is overturned; such a construction, commonly referred to as practical construction, although not controlling, is nevertheless entitled to considerable weight; it is highly persuasive. In Baleshwar Bagarti v. Bhagirathi Dass [1908] ILR 35 Cal 701 at 713 the principle, which was reiterated in Mathura Mohan Saha and Others Vs. Ramkumar Saha and Chittagong District Board, : Mathura Mohan Saha and Others Vs. Ramkumar Saha and Chittagong District Board, has been stated by Mookerjee, J, thus :

It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that courts in construing a statute will give much weight to the interpretation put upon it, at the time of its enactment and since, by those whose duty it has been to construe, execute and apply it... I do not suggest for a moment that such interpretation has by any means a controlling effect upon the courts; such interpretation may, if occasion arises, have to be disregarded for cogent and persuasive reasons, and in a clear case of error, a court would without hesitation refuse to follow such construction.

Of course, even without the aid of these two documents which contain a contemporaneous exposition of the Government''s intention, we have come to the conclusion that on a plain construction of the notification, the proviso permitted the closing out or liquidation of all outstanding transactions by entering into a forward contract in accordance with the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the respondent.

In the decision reported in Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Collector of Central Excise [2007] 13 SCC 803, it was held as follows :

Since the point involved in the present case is identical to the point involved in 2000 (68) ECC 346 and the Department having accepted the principle laid down in 2000 (68) ECC 346 , the Department cannot be permitted to take a different stand in the present appeals.

In Union of India and Others Vs. Kaumudini Narayan Dalal and Another, , it was held thus (page 220 in 249 ITR) :

If the Revenue did not accept the correctness of the judgment in the case of Pradip Ramanlal Sheth Vs. Union of India and Others, it should have preferred an appeal thereagainst and instructed counsel as to what the fate of that appeal was or why no appeal was filed. It is not open to the Revenue to accept that judgment in the case of the assessee in that case and challenge its correctness in the case of other assessees without just cause. For this reason, we decline to consider the correctness of the decision of the High Court in this matter and dismiss the civil appeal.

In Berger Paints India Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta, , it was held thus (page 104 in 266 ITR) :

In view of the judgments of this court in Union of India and Others Vs. Kaumudini Narayan Dalal and Another, , Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Narendra Doshi, and Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Shivsagar Estate, the principle established is that if the Revenue has not challenged the correctness of the law laid down by the High Court and has accepted it in the case of one assessee, then it is not open to the Revenue to challenge its correctness in the case of other assessees, without just cause.

Applying the above principles, to the cases on hand, it follows that since the executive authorities have understood the various orders in a particular manner in the case of all other units, there is no reason why the same should not be applied in the case of the petitioner also.

Accordingly, the appellant is entitled to succeed on all the three grounds in these writ appeals.

In the result,

(1) W.A. No. 991 of 2003 is allowed and the judgment in O.P. No. 32947 of 2000 is set aside.

(2) Exhibit P10 in O.P. No. 32947 of 2000 is quashed and the respondents are directed to reconsider the claim for exemption for the period sought for by the appellant in the petition in the light of the observations contained in this judgment.

(3) W.A. No. 1316 of 2003 is allowed setting aside the judgment in O.P. No. 32807 of 2000. Exhibit P9 is quashed and the respondents are directed to reconsider the claim for exemption for the period July 1, 1995 to March 31, 1996 in accordance with the observations contained in this judgment.

(4) W.A. No. 1561 of 2003 is allowed setting aside the judgment in O.P. No. 23472 of 2001, exhibit P8 is quashed and the respondents are directed to consider exhibit P6 application in the light of what is stated in the judgment in the writ appeal and in accordance with law.

(5) W.P. (C) No. 19516 of 2009 is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the respondents are directed to reconsider the claim made by the petitioner in the light of this judgment.