Pemji Nathu vs State of Gujarat and 1 Another

K.S. Jhaveri, J.

All these appeals involve common questions on law and facts and therefore, they are disposed of by this common judgment.

These appeals have been filed against the judgment and award passed by the learned Civil Judge (SD) Junagadh in Land Acquisition Reference Case Nos. 1/2000 to 15/2000 dated 30.12.2000, whereby, the said references were dismissed. The facts in brief are that the competent authority in the defendant-State proposed to acquired lands situated in the sim of Village Babartirath for the purpose of Mendarda Amrapur Road Scheme. The Notification u/s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 came to be published on 04.03.1982 and Notification u/s. 6 of the said Act came to be published on 07.10.1982. After following due procedure, the competent authority passed award dated 31.05.1983. Being aggrieved by the said award, the claimants raised dispute, which, ultimately, culminated into references before the Court below. After hearing both the sides, the reference Court dismissed the references by passing the impugned award. Against the said judgment and award, the appellants-original claimants has preferred the present appeals.

Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the documents on record. The Court below has dismissed the references filed by the appellants, original claimants on the ground that they were barred by limitation. In the case on hand, the Collector declared the award in respect of the lands in question on 31.05.1983. It is required to be noted that in the present case, the claimants were not intimated about the date of award and the award was passed in their absence. However, the appellants-original claimants filed references cases on 08.04.1985. Considering the facts of the case, it would be relevant to refer to the provisions of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, which reads as under:

Section 18 of the, Act which enables land owner to seek reference of the question of quantum of compensation and/or dispute about apportionment or entitlement of the same requires making of application for reference to the Collector within prescribed period of limitation.

Section 18 reads as under:

(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the court, whether his objection be to the measure of the land, the amount of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.

(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken;

Provided that every such application shall; be made-

(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector''s award;

(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector u/s 12 subsection (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector''s award, whichever period shall first expire.

A bare reading of the above provision clearly goes to show that the application for reference has to be filed within six months from the date of Collector''s award if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award and in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice of the Collector u/s. 12(2) off the Act or within six months from the date of Collector''s award, whichever period shall first expire. In the present case the application for references came to be filed only on 08.04.1985 whereas the award of the Collector came to be passed on 31.03.1983. Therefore, evidently, the application for references was filed beyond the period of limitation.

Looking to the facts of the case, it would be relevant to refer to the decision of the Full Bench rendered in the case of Spl. Laq Officer Vs. Nathaji Kacharaji, Died, thro'' Heir Dhulaji Nathaji, , wherein in para 11 the Court has observed as under:-

The above observations and decision of the Supreme court in the case of Raja Harish Chandra (supra) were followed and reiterated in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum and Another, . In the subsequent decision, it was further clarified that ''actual or constructive knowledge'' of the award would not mean mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. ''The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award''. The essential contents of the award should mean, as explained in the subsequent decision of the Supreme court, contents of the award as referred to in section 11(1) i.e. area of the land, quantum of compensation and apportionment. In the case of Qaisar Jehan Begum (supra), evidence of the land owner was recorded and he stated that amount of compensation was not made known to him nor was he aware of the fact of award of compensation. He came to know about it from another person who was his power of attorney holder. What is to be noted from the decisions of the Supreme court in the cases of Raja Harish Chandra (supra) and Qaisar Jehan Begum (supra) is that those were the cases which covered the last contemplated contingency in latter part of proviso (b) of section 18(2) i.e. where the land owner is neither present nor represented nor a notice was served on the land owner. In such cases, the limitation would commence from the date when the party-either actually or constructively-receives notice of essential contents of the award, meaning-area of the land, quantum of compensation and apportionment. It is nowhere laid down by the Supreme court that even for the purpose of contingencies covered by proviso (a) where the owner is present or represented or first part of proviso (b) where he has been served with notice u/s 12(1) of the Act, the period of limitation would begin only from ''actual or constructive notice of all contents of the award including reasonings and basis of the determination of the award''. The line of cases of the Division Benches of this court which take a contrary view, with respect, have committed mistake in wrongly applying the ratio of two decisions of the Supreme court in the cases of Raja Harish Chandra (supra) and Qaisar Jehan Begum (supra) to the cases falling under proviso (a) and first part of proviso (b) of section 18(2). Therefore, they do not lay down correct law and are required to be over-ruled.

Thus, in view of the above and considering the principle laid down in the above decision, I of the opinion that the Court below was completely justified in rejecting the references on the ground of limitation. I am in complete agreement with the reasonings given by the reference Court in the impugned award and hence, find no reasons to interfere with the same. For the foregoing reasons, the appeals stand dismissed. No order as to costs.