Periasami and Others vs Krishnaiyan and Others

Charles Arnold White, C.J.—The question which has been referred to the Full Bench is as follows: ""When there are two or more joint-

decree-holders, and the execution of the decree is barred by limitation as against one or more of them whether one who is not so barred owing to

minority can execute the decree for the benefit of sill or, if not, for his own benefit alone?"" In other words, whether the minority of one of several

joint judgment-creditors saves execution of the decree from being time-barred during the minority of the minor plus three years.

In the case in which the order of reference was made, the material facts and dates were as follow:-- On June 30th, 1892, a joint decree was

passed in favour of three brothers, who at the date of I he decree, were all minors. On January 8th, 1896, the last application for execution

previous to the present application was made. At this date two of the brothers had attained majority and one was a minor. On February 27th,

1899, the present application was made. The youngest brother had attained majority less that three years before the application.

The first question for determination is--Are joint execution-creditors ""joint-creditors"" within the meaning of Section 8 of the Limitation Act.

In my opinion they are not. This view has been adopted by all the High Courts. See ILR 13 M. 236 ILR 14 C. 50; ILR 22 A. 199; and ILR 20

.B. 383.

As regards Section 7. I think the section only applies when all the joint execution creditors were under disability at the time the period of

limitation began to run. With reference to this point the Madras decisions are in conflict with those of the other High Courts. In Govindram v. Tatia

ILR 20 B. 383 their Lordships say, ""under the provisions of Section 231 of the Civil Procedure Code, the minor was entitled equally with the other

judgment-creditors to apply for execution of the whole decree for the benefit of all the decree-holders; and as ho was a minor when the decree

was passed, and when the last application for execution was made, ho is entitled to the benefit of Section 7 of the Limitation Act, and can apply for

execution within three years of attaining majority;"" and they held that the reasoning in Perry v. Jackson 4 T.R. 579 did not touch the point inasmuch

as Section 7 applies to an application like the present one which any one of the judgment creditors may present by himself under the provisions of

Section 231 of the Civil Procedure Code."" Now, sSection 231 merely empowers the court, where there is a joint decree in favour of more

persons than one, to make an order, on the application for execution of one or more of the joint-decree-holders for the benefit of all, for protecting

the interests of the persons who have not joined in the application if the court sees sufficient cause for allowing the decree to be executed. I do not

see how a rule of procedure such as this can be prayed in aid for the purpose of construing the words ""person entitled to make an application"" in

Section 7 of the .Limitation Act. it seems to me these words mean a person entitled to make an application on his own behalf, and that their

meaning is not affected by the fact that by a rule of procedure the court has a discretion, in a certain case, to make an order which shall enure for

the benefit of parties who have not joined in the application. The word in Section 7 of the Limitation Act is ''entitled.'' That means entitled as of

right. The phraseology of Section 231 of the code shows clearly that the order which by that section the court, in the exercise of its discretion, is

empowered to make, cannot be asked for as of right. In I. L.R. 22 A. 199 the court upon this point concurred with the Bombay decision above

referred to, and the Calcutta decisions Lolit Mohun Misser v. Janoky Nath Roy ILR 20 C. 714 and Norendra Nath Pahari v. Bhupendra Narain

Roy ILR 23 C. 374 are to the same effect.

The question has again been recently considered by the Calcutta High Court in Surja Kumar Dutt v. Arun Chunder Roy ILR 28 C. 465 and the

learned judges re-affirm the view which had been taken by the Calcutta High Court and dissent from the Madras decisions. I have carefully

considered the reasoning on which their decisions are based, and, with all deference to the learned judges of the other High Courts, I am of opinion

that the cases reported, in ILR 13 M. 286 and ILR 16 M. 436, were, as regards the point in question, rightly decided.

There remains the question when does the period of limitation for the execution of a decree begin to run. I am unable to adopt the view taken by

the learned judges in the case reported in ILR 20 C. 714 that if the person entitled to execution is under a disability at the time when any one of the

starting points referred to in the third column of Article 179 commences, the operation of the Limitation Act is .suspended during the continuance

of the disability. It. seems to mo that the effect of paragraphs 2, 8, 4, 5 and ii of the fourth column is to fix one starting point in the events referred

to respectively in these paragraphs, and not to leave it open to the party who seeks the benefit of Section 7 to select his own starting point. It

seems to me clear that where there has been an application according to law to the proper court for execution, the period begins to run from the

date of that application. The first paragraph of column 3 of Article 179 of the Limitation Act provides the time when, in the absence of the

circumstances referred to in the succeeding paragraphs of the 3rd column, the period begins to run--that is the date of the decree. Paragraph 4 of

the t3rd column says expressly that where there has been an application for execution in accordance with the period begins to run from the date of

the application. This is one of the exceptions engrafted on the general rule laid down in the first paragraph.

The facts of the present case come within the exception. Think the application made in 1896 was in accordance with Jaw although it may have

been informal, and when the application was made, all the joint, decree-holders were admittedly not under disability. Explanation 1 to the 3rd

column of Article 179 states that if the decree is a joint decree in favour of more persons than one, an application, by one of such persons provides

a fresh starting point in favour of all, but the explanation throws no light on the question whether, if at the time the statute begins to run from the

fresh starting point, some of the persons are under disability and some are not, the persons then not under disability are entitled to the benefit of

Section 7 of the Act.

In the present case the decree was a joint decree and, it seems to me that it is no longer executable as a joint decree, and J see no reason for

holding that, although it is not executable as a joint decree, it is executable quoad the interest of one of the decree holders, that is, as a decree

under which the interests of the joint decree holders have become severed.

Davis, J.

I concur.

Benson, J.

I concur.

Moore, J.

I concur.

Bhashyam Aiyangur, J.

In my judgment in appeal No. 28 of 1900 decided on the 28th August 1901 Ahimsa Bibi v. Abdul Kader Saheb ILR 25 M. 26 I had to

consider the application of Sections 7 and 8 of the Limitation Act to a suit for an account and a share of the profits of a dissolved partnership

brought by the legal representatives of a deceased partner, one of whom was a minor at the time of the death of that partner. In expressing my

concurrence with the decision of this court in Seshan v. Rajagopala ILR 13 M. 236 in so far as it bears upon the construction of Section 7 taken

by itself and independently of Section 8, I stated as follows:--""In cases in which the right of suit vests jointly in a plurality of persons, I am clearly of

opinion that if Section 7 stood by itself and Section 8 had not been enacted, the protection given by Section 7 will extend only to cases in which

each and all of the persons jointly entitled to sue were affected by disability at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned, and

that if any one of them was then free from disability, the suit would be governed by the ordinary law of limitation and Section 7 cannot be availed of

by all or any of them for the simple reason that the cause of action is a joint one."" Adverting then to Section 8, I stated that though it did not

expressly provide, (as the latter part of the corresponding Section 8 of Act IX of 1871 did) ""that in a case in which one or some alone of the

persons entitled to sue worn affected by disability at the time when the cause of action accrued jointly to all the persons entitled, time will not run

against any of them if a complete discharge of the obligation could not be given by one or more of the persons free from disability without the

concurrence of the person or persons labouring under1 disability,"" yet that was necessarily implied in the former part of the section. I then deduced

the following propositions from the combined operation of Sections 7 and 8 in a case in which the right of suit resides jointly in a plurality of

persons:--""(a) Such suit cannot be barred in part in respect of some and not barred in part in respect of the others; (b) if any one of several joint

creditors or claimants is under a disability and a full discharge could be given without his concurrence by all or any of the other joint creditors or

claimants, the suit will be governed by the ordinary law of limitation and time will run against all; (c) but where no such discharge can be given, time

will not run against any of them until all have ceased, to be under dis-1 ability ; (d) if all were affected by disability, time will not run against any of

them until all have ceased to be under disability, unless one of them, who in the meanwhile has ceased to be under disability becomes capable of

giving a complete discharge without the concurrence of the others, in which latter case, time will run against all from the time when one of them has

thus become capable of giving such discharge (Illustration (b) to Section 8, cf. ILR 14 C. 50

As the deceased partner was governed by the Muhammadan Law, I held that none of his legal representatives who were coheirs was, within

the meaning of Section 8, competent to give a discharge which would bind the minor heir and that, therefore, the third of the above propositions,

(viz)., (c), was applicable to the suit and that the same was, therefore, not barred by the law of limitation.

The question referred to the Full Bench in the present case involves the application of Sections 7 and 8 of the Limitation Act to the execution of

a decree awarding a sum of money to three brothers, members of an undivided Hindu family, who being all minors, were represented by their

mother as next friend. The decree was passed on the 30th June 1892, when all the three joint decree-holders were minors. The present application

for execution was made on the 27th February 1899 by all the three brothers as joint decree-holders, having all attained their majority by that time,

the youngest and he alone within three years prior thereto. The last preceding application for execution was made more than three years prior to

the present application, i.e., on the 8th January 1896, when two of the brothers had attained, majority and the youngest alone was a minor. For the

purposes of this reference, I shall assume that that application was made in accordance with law.

The question referred to is whether the youngest brother can execute the decree for the benefit of all or, if not, whether he can execute it for his

own benefit alone. If joint decree-holders are ''joint-creditors'' within the meaning of Section 8, it will follow, in my opinion, that the application of

the 27th. February 1899 is not obnoxious to the law of limitation, whether the same be regarded as an application for execution of the whole

decree made by the youngest brother alone u/s 231, C.P.C, or by all the three brothers jointly, inasmuch as no discharge of the decree could

validly be given either by the senior of the major brothers or by both without the concurrence of the youngest. Section 257, C.P.C, expressly

provides that all money payable under a decree, should be paid, unless otherwise directed by the decree, either (a) into the Court whose duty it is

to execute the decree, or (b) out of Court to the decree-holder. I need hardly add that the expression ''decree-holder'' in the singular will include

also the plural, and if the decree be in favour of two or more persons as joint decree-holders, the amount should be paid to all of them Tarruck

Chunder Bhattacharjee v. Devendronath Sanyal ILR 9 C. 831 just as if the amount were paid into Court it will have to be drawn from the Court

by all of them under a joint receipt. Even assuming that, as held in Barbar Moran v. Ramanna Goundan ILR 20 M. 461 a release by one of several

joint promisees without the knowledge or concurrence of the others, will, under the Indian Law, bind such others, such a doctrine will not be

applicable to the case of judgment-creditors in regard to whom the processual law as laid down in Section 257, C.P.C., will have to be strictly

observed. A payment made out of Court only to one of several joint decree-holders cannot bind the others unless he was also constituted by them

an agent for the purpose, in which case alone the payment can be recorded as certified u/s 258, C.P.C. The mere fact that one of the joint decree-

holders is the managing member of an undivided Hindu family consisting of the joint decree-holders, will not empower him to give a valid discharge

of the decree debt, without the concurrence of the remaining members any more than it will empower him to execute the whole decree as of right,

without the concurrence of the remaining decree-holders. u/s 231, C.P.C., any one of several joint decree-holders constituting a Hindu family,

whether he be the managing member or not, may, if the Court sees sufficient cause, be allowed to execute the whole decree, and in that case the

Court should pass such order as it deems necessary for protecting the interests of the persons who have not joined in the application. As a general

rule such order will be a direction to the applicant for execution to furnish sufficient securities for the protection of the interests of such persons. If

payment be made out of Court; to a sole decree-holder or several joint decree-holders, is the case may be, such payment will, of course, be a

sufficient discharge of the decree debt (vide Section 259(b)), and it is not the act of the Court in recording such payment as certified that operates

as a discharge, as held in ILR 13 M. 236. u/s 258, C.P.C. the act of the Court simply consists in recording satisfaction if the decree-holder or

decree-holders certify to the Court payment to them out of Court, or if such payment is proved by the judgment debtor adversely to the decree-

holder or decree-holders, within the time prescribed by Article 173-A. of the second schedule to the Limitation Act. A discharge not so recorded

cannot be recognised by the Court executing the decree since, for purposes of executing the decree, such record is by statute made indispensable

evidence far proving the, alleged discharge. But payment to one or some of several joint decree-holders cannot operate as a discharge of the

decree-debt, nor be recorded as certified u/s 258, C.P.C., unless, of course, such person or persons were duly authorized by the others to accept

such payment in entire or partial satisfaction of the decree. In the case of a sole decree-holder or one of several joint decree-holders being a minor,

his next friend or guardian for the suit, whoever he may be, cannot, u/s 461, C.P.C., without obtaining leave of the Court and as a general rule also

furnishing security, receive any money payable under the decree solely to the minor or to him jointly with the-other decree-holders.

It has been held by all the High Courts ILR 13 M. 236 that Section 8 of the ''Limitation Act is not applicable to execution creditors, and I fully

concur in that view, though, if I understand aright the reasoning on which it is based, I must with all deference say that the reasoning does not

warrant the conclusion arrived at, but would lead to the opposite conclusion. My reasons for holding that execution creditors'' are altogether

outside the scope of Section 8 are that the were so under the corresponding Section 8 of Act IX of 1871, and that though the said section was

altered by Act XV of 1877 in respect of its latter hall,--which was necessarily implied in the first half by substituting in place of the latter half a

provision that limitation is to commence from the time when one of several joint creditors or claimants who were all labouring, under disability

becomes capable of giving a discharge, thus modifying Section 7--yet its scope was not extended, as in the case of Section 7. The corresponding

Section 7 in Act IX of 1871 was confined to suits only and Section 8 in that Act could therefore relate only to suits. When Act XV of 1877 was

passed, the scope of Section 7 was enlarged by including therein ''applications'' also, the result of which was that so for as Section 7 was

concerned, as in the case of suits so in the case of applications, if the person or persons entitled to make the application were at the time from

which the period of limitation was to be reckoned all under disability, that application could be made within the period prescribed after all of them

had ceased to be under disability. If the legislature intended to give a similar extension to the scope of Section 8, the expression when one of

several joint-creditors or claimants is under any such disability'' may naturally be expected to have been altered into ''when ''one of several joint-

creditors or claimants or one of several persons jointly entitled to make an application is under any such, disability.'' The absence of such or similar

alteration clearly shows that execution creditors and. persons entitled to make applications during the course of a suit were not brought within the

purview of Section 8. The reason seems to mo to be obvious. Whether or not one of several joint creditors or claimants can, according to the

general law or the personal law governing them, give a discharge binding upon the others--which is the criterion on which Section 8 proceeds--can

well apply to claims or obligations for the enforcement of which suits have to be brought ; but in the case of applications which are governed by

processual law, such a criterion is inapplicable inasmuch as one of several persons entitled, jointly to make an application, can without the

concurrence of the others, give no valid discharge binding upon all in respect of the matter of the application.

The word ''creditor'' in its general sense denotes a person ""who has a right bylaw to demand and recover of another a sum of money on any

account whatever"" (Anderson''s ''Dictionary of Law at p. 291), and standing by itself I doubt if it includes a ''judgment creditor'' or an ''execution

creditor the former denoting "" one whose claim has been merged, into a judgment against his debtor and under which generally execution may be

had and. the latter, a creditor who has obtained a levy upon property belonging to his debtor.

Section 8 being for the above reasons inapplicable to an application for execution presented by decree-holders, the only question which has

now to be considered is, whether with reference to Section 7 of the Limitation Act, the application is or is not barred under Article 179.

The first question which presents itself upon the facts of this application is the determination of the date referred to respectively in the various

clauses in column 3 opposite article 179 of the 2nd schedule from which date the period of limitation is to be reckoned. The dates referred, to in

Clauses 2, 3, 5 and 6 are upon the facts already stated inapplicable to the present case, if it were optional with the decree-holders to elect the date

referred to in clause, i.e., the date of the decree (80th June 1892) when they were all minors, in preference to the date referred to in Clause 4, i.e.)

the date, of the last preceding application (8th January 1896) when only one of them was a minor, the matter is simple enough and, according to

the derisions of all the High Courts, the present application which was made within 3 years after the youngest brother attained the age of majority,

will not be barred by the law of limitation. The different dates, subsequent to the date of the decree referred to in the various clauses of Article

179, as the starting point from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned being evidently intended for the benefit of the execution-creditors, I

was at first inclined to the opinion that they might forego the privilege and elect the date of the decree itself, if by reason of Section 7 it were in the

particular case more beneficial to them to reckon the period of limitation from the date of the decree sought to be executed instead of from a later

date i.e., the date of the last preceding application. Such view certainly would remove the anomaly of placing a decree-holder in a worse position

by reason of an application for execution having once been made on his behalf or by a joint decree-holder than if no such application has ever been

made. But such view will, I find produce even greater anomalies in other cases. If the decree-holder or decree-holders were to have the option of

choosing any of the dates referred to in the various clauses, he or they might choose the date of the original decree, when he or they were all under

disability, in preference to the date of the final decree of the appellate Court (confirming the original decree when he or one of some of them may

have ceased to be under disability. The contingency that the reckoning of the period of limitation from an earlier date may, in some cases, be more

favorable to execution creditors than from a later date, was most probably not in the contemplation of the legislature when Article 179 was enacted

and after a full consideration of this question, which was not fully argued, and having regard to the relative anomalies which inevitably present

themselves in either view, I have come to the conclusion that for the purposes of Section 7, the time from which, the period of limitation is to be

reckoned, should be the latest (applicable to the case) of the various dates referred to in the clauses of Article 179. The execution creditor or

creditors can claim the benefit of Section 7 only if he or they, as the case may be, were all under disability at that date. In the present case,

therefore, the starting point for reckoning the period of limitation should be taken to be the date of the last, preceding application, i.e., 8th January

1896, assuming, of course, that that application had been, made in accordance with law.

As already stated, only one of the three joint decree-holders was then under disability. Viewing the question from this standpoint, there is a

direct conflict between the decisions of this Court and those of the High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Allahabad. In the latest case on the point

Surjikanwar Dutt v. Arunchandra Roy ILR 28 C. 465 the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court and Banerji, J., in dissenting from the decisions

of this Court in I.L.R.13 M. 236 and Narayanan Nambudri v. Damodaran Nambudri ILR 17 M. 189--in all of which it was held, following the

construction placed by Lord Kenyon in Perry v. Jackson 4 T.R. 519 on the proviso to the statute of James I, and Section 4 of 3 and 4 William IV.

Clause 42, that Section 7 of the Indian Limitation Act applies only to cases in which either there is one decree-holder and he is a minor, or in which

all the joint decree-holders are minors or labour under some other disability--distinguish the said English statutes from section 7 of the Indian

Limitation Act, by pointing out that in the former the expression is of any person or persons &c.,'' whereas in the latter, the expression is ''If a

person entitled to institute a suit or make any application be, &c.'' With all respect to the learned judges who took part in the above decision, I

must say, the phrase '' if a person'' in the Indian Act is, by virtue of the General Clauses Act, the same as the expression ''if any person or persons,''

occurring in the English statute.

This decision of the Calcutta High Court as well as a former decision of the same Court in ILR 14 C. 50 and the decisions of the Bombay and.

Allahabad High Courts in ILR 20 B 383 and ILR 22 A. 199 all relate to joint decree-holders, one of some of whom alone were labouring under

the disability of minority at the time from which the period of limitation had to be reckoned. It was held in all these cases, that Section 8 was

inapplicable to the case, but that u/s 7 the application made by a minor decree-holder, within three years, after he attained majority, for execution

of the whole decree u/s 231, C.P.C., was not barred by the law of limitation, though move than three years had elapsed since the date of the last

preceding application, inasmuch as the applicant was labouring under a disability at the date of (the last preceding application. The ratio decidendi

of these decisions seems to be that by virtue of Section 231, C.P.C, each One of several pint decree-holders is competent to make an application

for the execution of the whole decree, that therefore even if one of them alone was a minor at the date of the decree or of the last preceding

application as the case may be, he is a person entitled to make an application for the execution of the whole decree, and having been, at the time

from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned, a minor, he could have the benefit of Section 7, if he applies for execution of the whole

decree, within three years after he attains the age of majority, though the other decree-holders would, at that time, be barred by limitation from

applying for execution of the decree. With all deference I find it impossible to adopt this conclusion or the reasoning on which it is based. Section

231, C.P.C. is only a rule of procedure which enables one of several joint decree-holders to make an application for the execution of the decree

on behalf of and for the benefit of all the joint decree-holders, and if the Court sees sufficient cause for allowing the decree to he executed on an

application, so made, it should pass the necessary orders for protecting the interests of the other persons who have not joined in the application. In

my opinion ''a person entitled to institute a suit or make mi application'' within the meaning of Section 7, is one, who in his own right, is thus entitled,

and not a person who under a statutory provision is authorised with the permission of the Court to institute a suit on behalf of himself and others

having an interest in the suit (Section 30, C.P.C.) or make an application for execution for the benefit of himself and others interested jointly with

him in the decree to be executed, subject to the permission of the Court to allow him thus to execute the decree (Section 231, C.P.C). The logical

result, of the reasoning on which the above decisions seem to be based would, practically be that if two or more persons are jointly entitled to

institute a suit and one of them alone was under disability when the right to sue accrued, he could, institute the suit within three years after he

attained majority by joining the others as co-defendants, though they would be barred by limitation if they had then instituted the suit. In the sense in

which one only of several joint decree-holders is entitled to apply for execution of a decree on behalf of all, one only of several joint promisees or

creditors is entitled to institute a suit joining the others as co-defendants along with the debtor. But, for purposes of limitation, neither the

application nor the suit would be within time unless the application if jointly made or the suit if jointly instituted by all, would be within time.

No doubt as observed, in ILR 14 C. 50 the bar of ""limitation to the execution of a decree bars only the remedy; the right is not extinguished.

But if, as therein assumed, the remedy of certain decree-holders be barred, it is difficult to see on what principle they can recover their portion of

the decree amount from the decree-holder who executes the whole decree and whose remedy so to execute the decree is assumed not to be

barred by the law of limitation. u/s 231, C.P.C., it is obligatory on the Court, if it sees sufficient cause to permit the execution of the whole decree

on application made by one of the joint decree holders, to pass such, orders as may seem necessary to protect the interests of the remaining joint

decree holders. If their remedy to realise their interests under the decree has already been barred, no orders could be passed for protecting the

same. Suppose the joint. decree-holder who, it is assumed, could make an application for the execution of the whole decree, though it is assumed

that the remaining decree-holders are barred from making such application, does not choose to apply for the execution of the decree, or chooses

to apply only for a partial execution of the decree, or receive payment out of Court, hare the remaining joint decree holders any remedy against him

Section 231, C.P.C., proceeds on the footing that the joint decree which is sought to be executed, by any one or some of the joint decree-holders

and not by all. is not barred by limitation either in whole or in part, and that therefore the Court may, if it sees sufficient cities, allow the whole

decree to be executed for the benefit of all on application made by only one or some of them, due provision being made to protecting the interests

of the others.

Explanation 1 to Article 179 makes it clear that where a decree has been passed jointly in favour of more persons than one and not severally,

distinguishing portions of the subject-matter payable or deliverable to each, the decree cannot be barred in part, as against some, but must be

barred in whole, against all, or not at all against any. Both Sections 7 and 8 of the Limitation Act proceed on the same principle. For purpose of

giving a fresh starting point for reckoning the period of limitation under article 179, an application for execution made by any one of several joint

decree-holders will, under explanation 1, enure to the benefit of them all.

A joint decree may, no doubt, sometimes become divisible and executable in part to the extent of such severance, when by operation of law,

or by act of parties, the judgment-debtor has acquired the interest of one or some of the joint decree-holders in the decree and thus a partial

satisfaction or extinguishment of the decree fakes place Banarsi Dass v. Maharani Kuar ILR 5 A. 27 Kudhai v. Shea Dayal ILR 10 A. 570. But as

no such contingency is alleged to have happened in the present case, I do not consider the decisions which were cited by the learned pleader for

the respondent Kally Soondery Davia v. Hurrish Chunder Chowdhri ILR 6 C. 594 Hurrish Chunder Chowdhri v. Kally Soonderi Davia ILR 9 C.

482 Tarruck Chunder Bhattachdrjee v. Devandronath Sanyal ILR 9 C. 831 Sultan Moideen v. Savalay Ammal ILR 15 M. 343 Muthusami Aiyar

v. Natesa Aiyar ILR 18 M. 464 in support of liis alternative contention that the decree can be executed, if a all only to the extent of the youngest

brother''s interest in the decree-debt, i.e., an one-third share to which he would be entitled in a partition between himself and his elder brothers.

Assuming that the facts bearing upon the question referred to the Full Bench are as set forth at the beginning of this judgment and. that the last

preceding application for execution was made in accordance with, law, my answer is that the present application for the execution of the decree,

whether that be regarded as one made by all the three brothers as joint decree-holders or u/s 231, C.P.C. by the youngest brother alone for the

benefit of all or as one made by him for the recovery of his alleged one-third share therein, is barred by the law of limitation, but that if the last

preceding application was not made in accordance with law and the starting point for reckoning the period of limitation is therefore the date of the

decree, the present application, whether it be one made by all the three brothers or u/s 231, C.P.C., by the youngest of them alone, is not barred

by limitation either in whole or in part.