Perumal Pillai vs Venkiteswara Iyer and Others

M.S. Menon, C. J

This petition challenges the validity of the judgment of the District Judge of Kozhikode dismissing civil revision petition No. 103 of 1962. That petition was filed by the petitioner before us u/s 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959. The dismissal of the petition was essentially based on a narrow construction of section 20. All that the District Judge did was to follow 1957 K. L. T. 335, a decision under the analogous provision-Section 12-B-of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949.

Another decision taking a narrow view of the revisional jurisdiction is the decision in O. P. 2440 of 1963. That decision dealt with section 20 itself.

Between the two decisions mentioned above, there were three other decisions on the subject, 1960 K. L. T. 895, 1960 K. L. T. 1383 and the decision in O. P. No. 411 of 1963. Of these the first and last dealt with section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959; and the second, with section 12-B of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949. All these three decisions took a wider view of the jurisdiction conferred by the section concerned.

The extent of a jurisdiction naturally depends on the wording of the section that confers that jurisdiction. The relevant portion of section 20 reads as follows:

In cases where the appellate authority empowered u/s 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in oilier cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.

The crucial words are "legality", "regularity" and "propriety" occurring in the section. The ambit of the jurisdiction depends on the meaning of these words.

"Legality" and "regularity" are familiar terms in the conferment of the powers of intervention. An order is illegal, if it is opposed to an enactment; an order is irregular, if it is opposed to a rule of procedure. The word "propriety" is of wider import. The Oxford English Dictionary-Volume VIII-says that it means "fitness; appropriateness; aptitude, suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or conditions; conformity with requirement, rule or principle; Tightness, correctness, justness, accuracy".

The Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1948, introduced the following provision, as section 64 A, into the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939:

The State Government may, of its own motion or on an application made to it, call for the records of any order passed or proceeding taken under this chapter by any authority or officer subordinate to it, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceeding and after examining such records, may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.

This section came up for consideration in A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 463. The Court said:

In clothing the State Government with such power the legislature clearly intended the State Government to decide the issue as to whether any order in question was illegal, irregular or improper.

quoted the definition of the word "propriety" in the Oxford English Dictionary, and observed:

If the State Government was of the opinion that respondent 2 had better facilities for operation than the appellant and their services to the public would be more beneficial, it could not be said that the State Government was in error in thinking that the order of the Board confirming the order of the Regional Transport Authority was improper.

Section 13 (3) (a) (iii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, provided that a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession in the case of any building if he requires it for the reconstruction of that building or for its replacement by another building or for the erection of other buildings; and section 15 (5) of that Act:

The High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party or on its own motion, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit.

These provisions came up for consideration in A. 1. R. 1960 S. C. 655.

In that case both the Rent Controller and the appellate authority had come to the conclusion that the claim made by the landlord that he required the shop for the purpose of reconstruction was not bona fide. The High Court reversed the concurrent finding and the reversal was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court said:-

Mr. Bindra has argued that the High Court was in error in coming to its own conclusion as to whether the requirement of Section 13(3)(a)(iii) has been satisfied. As we have already pointed out the finding of the Rent Controller and the appellate authority was that the claim made by respondent 1 that he required the shop for the purpose of reconstruction was not bona fide. The High Court has reversed this conclusion and Mr. Bindra challenges the correctness or the propriety of the said conclusion. The revisional power conferred upon the High Court u/s 15(5)is wider than that conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. u/s 15(5) the High Court has jurisdiction to examine the legality or propriety of the order under revision and that would clearly justify the examination of the propriety or the legality of the finding made by the authorities in the present case about the requirement of the landlord u/s (13) (3) (a) (iii).

To the same effect is A. 1. R. 1963 S. C. 499. In that case also there was a reversal by the High Court of a concurrent finding. No reason, however, was given for the reversal. The Supreme Court said:

It is hardly necessary to go into the question of the extent of the powers of the High Court u/s 15 (5) of the Rent Restriction Act. They have been adverted to in the ruling of this Court, Moti Ram Vs. Suraj Bhan and Others, . They do not, however, include the power to reverse concurrent findings, without showing how those findings are erroneous. In the present case, the learned judge has given his conclusion without adverting to a single piece of evidence, from which his conclusion was drawn. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that he had examined the propriety of the order sought to be revised.

Whenever a revisional power is mentioned one is apt to think in terms of the powers of revision conferred by section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The provisions of that section, with no material change, have endured from 1879 and judicial approaches over the years have certainly been conditioned and canalised by the restrictions and trammels of that section.

It is not easy to forget the section; and it is helpful to have a reminder, as the one given in A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 698, that the restrictions and trammels are peculiar to section 115 and are not of universal application. In that case the Supreme Court said:

Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court''s powers are limited to see whether in a case decided, there has been an assumption of jurisdiction where none existed, or a refusal of jurisdiction where it did, or there has been material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of that jurisdiction. The right there is confined to jurisdiction and jurisdiction alone. In other Acts, the power is not so limited.

Section 12-B of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, which was considered in 1957 K. L. T. 335 was also considered in (1956) An W. R. 1079. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh said:

The powers of revision given u/s 12-B of the Act are certainly wider than those conferred on the High Court u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The words ''legality, regularity, or propriety of the order'' are wide enough to cover both questions of law and fact and go far beyond the revisional jurisdiction strictly so called,

To the same effect is A. I. R. 1964 Andhra Pradesh 314. In the light of what is stated above we cannot but allow the original petition, quash the judgment in civil revision petition No. 103 of 1962, and direct the District Court of Kozhikode to deal with the matter afresh on the basis that the jurisdiction is not as narrow as the one sketched in 1957 K. L. T. 335; but is as wide as the one indicated in A. 1. R. 1960 S. C. 655. Judgment accordingly. No costs.