Petchimuthu @ Mani vs Anitha Sruthi

K.K. Sasidharan, J.—These two civil revision petitions are directed against the order dated 17 April, 2009 in E.A. Nos. 748 and

1105/2009 in E.P. No. 3452/2007 in O.S. No. 497/2003 on the file of the learned X Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai whereby and

where under the applications preferred by the revision petitioner to stay all further proceedings in E.P. No. 3452 of 2007 were dismissed.

Background facts:

The suit in O.S. No. 817 of 2009 was instituted by the revision petitioner against the respondent praying for a decree of declaration that he was

a lawful tenant in respect of the suit property and for a consequential injunction restraining the respondent, her agents and men from interfering with

his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property.

In the plaint in O.S. No. 817 of 2007, the petitioner inter alia contended thus:

(a) The respondent and her husband were known to him since long. He was engaged in Tourist Travel business and the respondent was

conducting a beauty parlour at Door No. 4/14, T.T.K. Road, Alwarpet, Chennai-8. While so on 13 May, 2001, the respondent borrowed a sum

of Rs. 15,000/- from him and she was paying interest on time. Subsequently on 1 September, 2001 she borrowed a sum of Rs. 1 lakh. The

respondent was very prompt in the matter of payment of interest and thereby she gained confidence and trust of the petitioner.

(b) While so, during the month of September, 2001, the respondent along with her father approached the petitioner and requested him to lend a

sum of Rs. 21 lakhs for their business at Bangalore. The petitioner accordingly arranged a loan through his friends and paid a sum of Rs.

21,53,000/- on various dates between 15 September, 2001 and 23 February, 2002. Accordingly a total sum of Rs. 25 lakhs was given as loan.

(c) Subsequently in the month of November, 2001, the respondent approached the petitioner and informed him that the premises bearing Door

No. 4/14, T.T.K. Road, Alwarpet, Chennai was intended for sale by its owner M/s. Crescent Agency. The said property was in the possession of

Tmt. Kanaka Durga. Accordingly on 11 November, 2001, the respondent and her employee took the petitioner to the residence of Kanaka

Durga, who informed him that the owner was willing to sell the shop for a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs. The petitioner agreed for the said proposal and

accordingly a sum of Rs. 6,50,000/- was given to the respondent in two instalments towards the sale amount. Though the petitioner repeatedly

requested the respondent to conclude the sale transaction and register the property in his name the respondent was delaying the matter under some

pretext or the other.

(d) The petitioner at last filed a complaint before Teynampet Police Station against the respondent on 12th July, 2002. Since no action was taken

as per the said complaint, the petitioner approached the Commissioner of Police, Chennai and based on the said complaint a case in Crime No.

734 of 2002 was registered against the respondent as well as her employee. The lessee of the building viz., Kanaka Durga was also an accused.

The said case was charge sheeted by the police after investigation and ultimately the respondent was convicted as per judgment dated 4th

September, 2008 in C.C. No. 7455 of 2003.

(e) In the meantime on 2 October, 2002 the petitioner was informed that the respondent was in Chennai City. He immediately informed the City

Crime Branch and accordingly the respondent was taken to the Crime Branch Office for enquiry. She was accompanied by her lawyer. The police

conducted necessary enquiry and at that time the respondent admitted the receipt of a sum of Rs. 9 lakhs from the petitioner for the purpose of

purchasing the shop at T.T.K. Road, Alwarpet. The respondent also agreed to settle the matter. After pro-longed discussion the respondent

agreed to execute a memorandum of agreement with the petitioner. As per the said memorandum, the respondent agreed to re-pay a sum of Rs. 9

lakhs received from the petitioner within a period of three years and until such re-payment the petitioner was permitted to keep possession of the

suit property. It was further agreed that upon receipt of the sum of Rs. 9 lakhs the petitioner would deliver vacant possession to the respondent.

The respondent in turn agreed to execute a lease for eleven months in respect of the said shop which would be extended for a total period of three

years. The petitioner on his part agreed to withdraw the complaint made by him against the respondent with the police.

(f) The memorandum of understanding was ultimately finalised on 3 October, 2002. The memorandum of understanding as well as the lease

agreement were duly signed by the respondent. Accordingly possession of the shop was handed over to him on 3 October, 2002 and the

respondent left for Bangalore.

(g) However suppressing the entire background facts, the respondent instituted a suit in O.S. No. 497 of 2003 before the XVIII Assistant Judge,

Chennai invoking Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act against the petitioner.

(f) The said suit was decreed and accordingly the petitioner was directed to put the respondent in vacant possession of the suit property. In such

circumstances, the petitioner was constrained to file the suit on the basis of the memorandum of understanding dated 3 October, 2002 to declare

his right in respect of the suit property.

In the mean time, the respondent filed Execution Petition in E.P. No. 3452 of 2007 before the X Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai to

execute the judgment and decree dated 26 July, 2007 in O.S. No. 497 of 2003.

The petitioner being, the sole respondent in E.P. No. 3452 of 2007 preferred E.A. No. 748 of 2009 invoking Order 21 Rule 26 of the CPC to

stay all further proceedings in the Execution Petition for a period four weeks so as to enable him to prefer a civil revision petition before the High

Court. As per E.A. No. 1105 of 2001 the petitioner again prayed for stay of all further proceedings in E.P. No. 3452 of 2007 till the disposal of

the suit in O.S. No. 817 of 2009

The Executing Court found that the suit in O.S. No. 817 of 2009 was filed by the petitioner on the basis of the judgment and decree in dated 23

September, 2008 in S.A. No. 993 of 2008. In the said appeal this Court found that the remedy was only to file a substantive suit and as such the

second appeal was not maintainable.

Subsequently the petitioner filed an application in E.A. No. 6669 of 2008 before the Executing Court in E.P. No. 3452 of 2007 to stay all

further proceedings in the Execution Petition. The application was dismissed by the Executing Court and the said order was challenged before this

Court in C.R.P (NPD). No. 3600/2008. Before this Court, the petitioner contended that he should be granted sufficient time so as to enable him

to file an appeal before the Supreme Court against the judgment and decree in S.A. No. 993 of 2008.

The learned Judge passed an order to suspend the Execution proceedings till 23 December, 2008 so as to enable the petitioner to file an appeal

before the Supreme Court. In the said order, the learned Judge clearly observed that in case the revision petitioner failed to obtain an order of stay

before the stipulated time, the Executing Court would be at liberty to proceed further in execution of the decree in O.S. No. 497/2007. Therefore

the learned Executing Judge was of the view that the very applications filed to stay the execution petition was not maintainable, especially on

account of the fact that no such appeal was preferred before the Supreme Court. Accordingly both the applications were dismissed. Aggrieved by

those two orders, the unsuccessful petitioner is before this Court.

Submissions:

The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the suit filed by the petitioner in O.S. No. 817/2009 is a comprehensive suit on the basis

of the memorandum of understanding. The suit filed by the respondent against the petitioner was only a summary suit and as such the learned

Executing Judge was not justified in rejecting the applications on the ground that the petitioner has not made out any ground to stay the execution.

According to the learned Counsel, merely because the petitioner has not challenged the judgment and decree dated 23 September, 2008 in

Second Appeal No. 993/2008, it cannot be said that he was not entitled to maintain a regular suit. When there was such a substantive suit filed by

the petitioner, the question of execution of the decree obtained in a summary suit does not arise for consideration at all. The learned Counsel

further contended that there is no pre-condition that the decree holder in a suit u/s 6 of the Specific Relief Act should be directed to hand over

possession before instituting a suit u/s 6(4) of the said Act. Similarly there is no prohibition for granting stay of execution of a decree during the

pendency of the suit filed by the title holder or the Executing Court passing an order of stay of execution of the decree during the pendency of such

suit. According to the learned Counsel similar provision is contained in Order 21 Rule 99 of the CPC for the purpose of redressing the grievances

of a person dispossessed. The learned Counsel also contended that while interpreting the provisions of Order 21 Rule 99 of the CPC the Supreme

Court has time and again indicated that it was not necessary to part with possession for the purpose of invoking Rule 99 of Order 21 of the CPC

and as such the same analogy has to be taken in the present case also.

The learned Counsel for the respondent contended that in the very memorandum of understanding which is relied on as the document in

support of the right claimed by the petitioner in O.S. No. 817 of 2009, there was no mention about the subject property and as such it cannot be

said that the petitioner was entitled to retain his possession of the property till the disposal of the present suit. The learned Counsel also contended

that interim injunction granted by the learned trial Judge in I.A. No. 1919/2009 in O.S. No. 817/2009 was vacated subsequently and the injunction

petition itself was dismissed as per order dated 22 June, 2009 and as such the petitioner cannot place reliance on the said order in support of his

contention that further proceedings in the Execution Petition has to be stayed.

The statute:

Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act reads thus:

Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property:

(1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming

through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit.

No suit under this section shall be brought -

(a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or

(b) against the Government,

No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be

allowed.

Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof.

Discussion:

The proceeding contemplated u/s 6 of the Specific Relief Act (hereinafter referred to as ""the Act"") is summary in nature. The Court was

concerned only with the factum of dispossession otherwise than in due process of law. The question of title is immaterial in such proceedings. In

case the Court was of the view that the materials produced by the plaintiff clearly shows that he was dispossessed within six months of the

institution of the suit, the Court was obliged to permit him to recover possession. This provision was intended to enforce the rule of law as

otherwise there would be attempt to recover possession without approaching the Court of law and through the means forbidden by law. The

unsuccessful defendant in such a summary suit was not without remedy. It would enable him to establish his title by way of a comprehensive suit

and to recover possession.

The remedy u/s 6 of the Act being one intended to take care of an emergent situation on account of forcible dispossession, the parties so

dispossessed should be given immediate relief. Though Section 6(4) of the Act permits the title holder to institute a suit to establish his title and to

recover possession, execution of a decree u/s 6 of the Act cannot be postponed, as otherwise there would be attempt on the part of the title holder

to retain his possession under the guise of pendency of the suit on title as permitted by Section 6(4) of the Act. It is evident from the very proviso

itself as it gives liberty to the title holder to recover possession. The concern of the law makers to put the persons, who have been dispossessed,

without re-course through the process known to law, is also evident by the fact that no appeal is provided against a decree passed in a suit u/s 6 of

the Act and not even a review is permitted. Therefore the Court deciding the suit u/s 6 of the Act was obliged to execute the decree with all its

seriousness, as otherwise the very purpose in enacting such a provision would be defeated.

The Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar Pandey and Others Vs. Gulbahar Sheikh and Others, considered the nature and scope of a suit u/s 6 of

the Act and observed thus:

A suit u/s 6 of the Act is often called a summary suit inasmuch as the enquiry in the suit u/s 6 is confined to finding out the possession and

dispossession within a period of six months from the date of the institution of the suit ignoring the question of title. Sub-section (3) of Section 6

provides that no appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section. No review of any such order or decree is

permitted. The remedy of a person unsuccessful in a suit u/s 6 of the Act is to file a regular suit establishing his title to the suit property and in the

event of his succeeding he will be entitled to recover possession of the property notwithstanding the adverse decision u/s 6 of the Act. Thus, as

against a decision u/s 6 of the Act, the remedy of unsuccessful party is to file a suit based on title. The remedy of filing a revision is available but

that is only by way of an exception; for the High Court would not interfere with a decree or order u/s 6 of the Act except on a case for interference

being made out within the well-settled parameters of the exercise of revisional jurisdiction u/s 115 of the Code.

Since the decree passed in a suit u/s 6 of the Act is final without there being a remedy of appeal or review, the Court should be vigilant in such

cases. There should be materials before Court to show that there was forcible dispossession within the meaning of Section 6 of the Act.

The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner to the effect that a proceeding at the instance of a title holder within the meaning of

Section 6(4) of the Act is akin to that of a proceeding under Order 21 Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has no basis.

The statutory provision as contained in Order 21 of the CPC deals with execution of decrees and orders. The procedural journey to be

undertaken to enjoy the fruits of a decree obtained after contest is evident from the series of Rules appended to Order 21 of the Code of Civil

Procedure.

The execution procedure is not so simple and it gives ample opportunity to resist the execution of a decree. The Legislature while framing the

provisions regarding execution was very much concerned about the fairness to be adopted in the execution process and at the same time was

equally concerned with the necessity to assist the decree holder to enjoy the fruits of the decree.

Order 21 Rule 99 would read thus:

Dispossession by decree-holder or purchaser

(1) Where any person other than the judgment-debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such

property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the Court

complaining of such dispossession.

(2) Where any such application is made, the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein

contained.

It was only with a laudable object, provisions were made that all questions (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property)

arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 or their representatives and relevant to the adjudication of

the application, shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit. In case such issues were permitted to be

tried separately, it would cause further delay in the process of execution.

As per Order 21 Rule 101 of the CPC an order in an adjudication under Rule 98 or 100 shall have the same force and be subject to the same

conditions as if it was a decree.

It is evident from Rule 99 of Order 21 of the CPC that the remedy of a person, who was dispossessed from immovable property by the

decree holder or his assignee was to apply before the Executing Court complaining of dispossession and the Court was required to adjudicate the

said issue. The determination of such question is a prerogative of the Executing Court and the decision taken after such determination is deemed to

be a decree.

In Brahmdeo Chaudhary, Adv. Vs. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and another, , the first respondent before the Supreme Court obtained a decree

against the second respondent for eviction. When the decree was sought to be executed the appellant offered resistance and subsequently filed an

application to stay the warrant issued to the Amin to deliver the property to the decree holder with the aid of police and to decide his objection to

the execution. The said application was opposed by the decree holder on the ground that the application was not maintainable before handing over

actual possession of the property to the decree holder. The said objection was sustained by the Executing Court and it was also confirmed by the

High Court. The Supreme Court found that the appellant was not a judgment debtor or a person claiming through the judgment debtor. He was a

total stranger to the decree claiming independent interest in the suit property, possession of which was decreed in favour of the decree holder. The

Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and observed that the application from the objector was maintainable without handing

over possession. While deciding the said issue, the Supreme Court also considered the principles of Order 21 Rule 99 of the CPC in extenso and

indicated thus:

In short the aforesaid statutory provisions of Order 21 lay down a complete code for resolving all disputes pertaining to execution of the decree

for possession obtained by a decree-holder and whose attempts at executing the said decree meet with rough weather. Once resistance is offered

by a purported stranger to the decree and which comes to be noted by the executing court as well as by the decree-holder the remedy available to

the decree-holder against such an obstructionist is only under Order 21, Rule 97, Sub-rule (1) and he cannot bypass such obstruction and insist on

reissuance of warrant for possession under Order 21, Rule 35 with the help of police force, as that course would amount to bypassing and

circumventing the procedure laid down under Order 21, Rule 97 in connection with removal of obstruction of purported strangers to the decree.

Once such an obstruction is on the record of the executing court it is difficult to appreciate how the executing court can tell such obstructionist that

he must first lose possession and then only his remedy is to move an application under Order 21, Rule 99 CPC and pray for restoration of

possession. The High Court by the impugned order and judgment has taken the view that the only remedy available to a stranger to the decree

who claims any independent right, title or interest in the decretal property is to go by Order 21, Rule 99. This view of the High Court on the

aforesaid statutory scheme is clearly unsustainable. It is easy to visualise that a stranger to the decree who claims an independent right, title and

interest in the decretal property can offer his resistance before getting actually dispossessed. He can equally agitate his grievance and claim for

adjudication of his independent right, title and interest in the decretal property even after losing possession as per Order 21, Rule 99. Order 21,

Rule 97 deals with a stage which is prior to the actual execution of the decree for possession wherein the grievance of the obstructionist can be

adjudicated upon before actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder. While Order 21, Rule 99 on the other hand deals with the subsequent

stage in the execution proceedings where a stranger claiming any right, title and interest in the decretal property might have got actually

dispossessed and claims restoration of possession on adjudication of his independent right, title and interest dehors the interest of the judgment-

debtor. Both these types of enquiries in connection with the right, title and interest of a stranger to the decree are clearly contemplated by the

aforesaid scheme of Order 21 and it is not as if that such a stranger to the decree can come in the picture only at the final stage after losing

possession and not before it if he is vigilant enough to raise his objection and obstruction before the warrant for possession gets actually executed

against him. With respect the High Court has totally ignored the scheme of Order 21, Rule 97 in this connection by taking the view that only

remedy of such stranger to the decree lies under Order 21, Rule 99 and he has no locus standi to get adjudication of his claim prior to the actual

delivery of possession to the decree-holder in the execution proceedings. The view taken by the High Court in this connection also results in patent

breach of principles of natural justice as the obstructionist, who alleges to have any independent right, title and interest in the decretal property and

who is admittedly not a party to the decree even though making a grievance right in time before the warrant for execution is actually executed,

would be told off the gates and his grievance would not be considered or heard on merits and he would be thrown off lock, stock and barrel by

use of police force by the decree-holder. That would obviously result in irreparable injury to such obstructionist whose grievance would go

overboard without being considered on merits and such obstructionist would be condemned totally unheard. Such an order of the executing court,

therefore, would fail also on the ground of non-compliance with basic principles of natural justice. On the contrary the statutory scheme envisaged

by Order 21, Rule 97 CPC as discussed earlier clearly guards against such a pitfall and provides a statutory remedy both to the decree-holder as

well as to the obstructionist to have their respective say in the matter and to get proper adjudication before the executing court and it is that

adjudication which subject to the hierarchy of appeals would remain binding between the parties to such proceedings and separate suit would be

barred with a view to seeing that multiplicity of proceedings and parallel proceedings are avoided and the gamut laid down by Order 21, Rules 97

to 103 would remain a complete code and the sole remedy for the parties concerned to have their grievances once and for all finally resolved in

execution proceedings themselves.

The principles governing Order 21 Rule 99 of the CPC cannot be applied to a proceeding u/s 6 of the Specific Relief Act. Rule 99 enables a

party to resist execution and to file a petition even before he was actually dispossessed. This position was clarified by the Supreme Court in

Brahmdeo Chaudhary''s case cited supra {(1997) 3 SCC 694}.

The question of filing a suit u/s 6 of the Act arises only when a party was dispossessed unceremoniously and without taking recourse of law.

Therefore Section 6 of the Act as well as Order 21 Rule 99 of the CPC operates in two separate spheres. The cause of action for filing a suit u/s 6

of the Act is an act of dispossession otherwise than in due process of law. However all cases of dispossession cannot be challenged by taking

recourse to this provision. It was only those acts of recent dispossession made within six months, can be challenged by way of a suit u/s 6 of the

Act. However such a condition was not found mentioned in Rule 99 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 6 of the Act

contemplates forcible dispossession. However Rule 99 of Order 21 of the CPC does not prescribe any such condition. It would enable a party,

who was dispossessed by the holder of a decree or possession or his assignee to represent before the Court complaining of such dispossession.

Dispossession contemplated by Order 21 Rule 99 of the CPC was related to a decree for possession obtained by the decree-holder. It also arises

in a situation where he was dispossessed by the subsequent purchaser, who purchased the property in execution of decree. Therefore Order 21

Rule 99 of the CPC has nothing to do with forcible dispossession or dispossession otherwise than in due process of law.

Law respects possession and leans against forcible dispossession.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the Supreme Court in Brahmdeo Chaudhary, Adv. Vs. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and

another, , permitted a person in possession to make an application under Order 21 Rule 99 of the CPC without delivery of possession or before

his dispossession from property and the said interpretation with respect to Rule 99 is applicable to the case of a person against whom a decree

was passed u/s 6 of the Act, to challenge the decree by filing a suit on title without surrendering actual possession. According to the learned

Counsel the provisions of Order 21 Rule 99 of the CPC is similar to Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and as such Section 6 of the Act also

should receive similar interpretation.

The contention of the learned Counsel has no force, as it was without taking note of the legislative intention behind the provision. A party who

was dispossessed must be in a position to recover possession at the earliest point of time. Therefore a summary proceeding was contemplated in

such cases, without there being a right of review or appeal, as otherwise, the very object of enacting Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act would be

defeated.

Purposive Interpretation:

While interpreting the statutory provisions, the Court has to consider the intention behind such provisions. In short, purposive interpretation

should be resorted to. Legislature is presumed to know the need of its people and the ground realities. Section 6 of the Act was enacted with a

laudable object behind it. Forcible dispossession is a threat to the society and it was only to put an end to such menace this provision was

introduced. Therefore Courts have to recognise the rationale behind such provision and the attempt should be to avoid such interpretation which

would give frustration to the recipients of justice.

The judgment in O.S. No. 497 of 2003 was challenged by way of an appeal in A.S. No. 557 of 2007 and the said appeal was dismissed as

per judgment and decree dated 4 June, 2008. The said decree was challenged before this Court in Second Appeal No. 993 of 2008. This Court

clearly observed that the second appeal was not maintainable and the remedy of the aggrieved was only to file a comprehensive suit as indicted by

Section 6(4) of the Specific Relief Act. However for the reasons best known to the petitioner, no such suit was instituted originally. Subsequently

the respondent initiated proceedings in E.P.N.o.3452 of 2007 to execute the decree in O.S. No. 497 of 2003. It was only at that point of time the

petitioner filed an application before the Court to stay the Execution petition in view of the order passed by the Executing Court to break open the

lock and to give delivery by 1 March, 2009.

The petitioner in the meantime filed the present suit in O.S. No. 817 of 2009 and obtained an order of ex parte injunction as per order dated

30 January, 2009 in I.A. No. 1919 of 2009. The said order was taken advantage of by the petitioner to file an application before the Executing

Court to stay the execution proceedings. In fact the prayer was to stay the Execution Petition in view of the order passed in I.A. No. 1919 of

2009 in O.S. No. 817 of 2009.

There was an earlier revision filed by the very same petitioner before this Court in CRP (NPD). No. 3600 of 2008 challenging the order

passed in E.A. No. 6669 of 2008. In the said Execution Application the prayer was to stay the execution till the institution of SLP before the

Supreme Court against the judgment and decree in S.A. No. 993 of 2008. While disposing the Civil Revision Petition this Court as per order

dated 20 November, 2008 granted time till 23 December, 2008 to the petitioner to obtain an order of stay from the Supreme Court. However no

such appeal was preferred before the Supreme Court.

It was only after the disposal of the Civil Revision Petition as per order dated 20 November, 2008, the petitioner has filed a civil suit in O.S.

No. 817 of 2009 and obtained an interim order on 30 January, 2009 in I.A. No. 1919 of 2009. The learned First Assistant Judge as per order

dated 30 January, 2009, granted interim injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the

property by the petitioner otherwise than in due process of law. Such order was produced before the Executing Court. The Executing Court found

that the interim order was only against eviction, except in due process of law. However the Execution Petition filed by the respondent was on the

basis of the judgment and decree dated 26 July, 2007 in O.S. No. 497/2003, which was confirmed in S.A. No. 993/2008 and as such, it was in

due process of law. The learned Executing Judge was of the view that the interim order was not a bar for the purpose of proceeding with the

execution and accordingly the stay petitions were dismissed.

The substantial contention before the Executing Court was on the basis of the interim order dated 30 January, 2009 in I.A. No. 1919 of 2009

in O.S. No. 817 of 2009. However the said order was subsequently vacated. The very injunction petition in I.A. No. 1919 of 2009 was dismissed

by the learned First Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai as per order dated 22 June, 2009. Therefore there is no subsisting order restraining

the Executing Court from executing the judgment and decree dated 26 July, 2007 in O.S. No. 497 of 2003,

The merits or otherwise of the contention raised in the suit in O.S. No. 817 of 2009 is a matter to be considered by the learned trial Judge.

The judgment and decree dated 26 July, 2007 in O.S. No. 497 of 2003 has become final. The respondent, who was the plaintiff in the said suit is

entitled to execute the said decree. The said suit being a summary suit u/s 6 of the Specific Relief Act, the decree holder should be put in

possession of the property. The decree holder cannot be made to wait till the disposal of the suit filed by the revision petitioner on the basis of the

memorandum of understanding. In fact there was nothing in the memorandum of understanding about the suit property. There was only a reference

about the shop in the said agreement. The schedule property now found mentioned in the plaint has absolutely no place in the memorandum of

understanding. In any case, the contention of the petitioner with respect to the execution of the memorandum of understanding and the consequent

delivery of possession of property to him are all matters to be considered by the learned trial Judge in O.S. No. 817 of 2009. In any case , the

respondent has to be permitted to enjoy the fruits of the decree obtained by her in O.S. No. 497 of 2003. Therefore the learned Executing Court

was perfectly correct in dismissing the applications filed by the petitioner to stay further proceedings in the Execution Petition till the disposal of the

suit in O.S. No. 817 of 2009.

To conclude:

I do not find any error or illegality or perversity in the order warranting interference in a revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

In the result, the Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed. Consequently the connected Mps are closed. No costs.