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11 paragraphs · 1,544 wordsSarjoo Prosad, C.J.—The Petitioner Phani Bhushan Dam has moved this application under Article 226 of the Constitution for cancellation of an order of the State Transport Authority, dated 27-5-52, and another order dated 23-10-52 and for restoration of an order, dated 15-11-51 passed by the Cachar Regional Transport Authority. He has also prayed for restraining Opposite Party 2 from plying his vehicle in the District of Cachar. The Opposite Party 1 is the State Transport Authority and Opposite Party 2 is Phani Bhushan Burman in whose favour a permit has been issued by the authority concerned.
The facts giving rise to this petition are that the Petitioner applied for a public carrier''s permit to the Cachar Regional Transport Authority in June, 1951. This application was heard along with various other applications for permits. One of the Applicants, Maniruddin, had also applied for the grant of a permit on the same route as the Petitioner. The Regional Transport Authority granted a public carrier''s permit to the Petitioner by its order dated 15-11-51 and the Petitioner was [asked by the Board to provide a Post War model vehicle. The permit so granted was for the district of Cachar and it was to be valid for a period of three years, with effect from 1-12-51. The Opposite Party, Phani Bhushan Burman, of Tikor-basti, Silchar town, in the District of Cachar, was also an Applicant for a public carrier''s permit in the same area. His application was refused by the Regional Transport Authority. Against the order of refusal, Phani Bhushan Burman filed an appeal to the State Transport Authority, Assam. It appears that Maniruddin also had been refused a permit and he also preferred an appeal praying for the grant of a permit to himself and refusal of permit to the Petitioner. The State Transport Authority deait with all these appends together and then by the order impugned it allowed the appeal of Phani Bhushan Burman granting him a public carrier''s permit in place of the Petitioner''s permit & it also granted a permit to Maniruddin. It cancelled the permit of the Petitioner which had been granted by the Regional Transport Authority. The Petitioner then filed an application on 11-6-52 for review of the order of cancellation, dated 27-5-52 but the Appellate Authority rejected the same by an order dated 23-10-52. It appears that the Petitioner presented applications before the Minister in Charge of Transport against the order of the State Transport Authority, but without any success. He has, therefore, moved the present application.
Mr. Deb on behalf of the Petitioner contends that the order of the State Transport Authority is wholly without jurisdiction. He submits that u/s 57, Motor Vehicles Act there was no representation made by the Opposite Party, Phani Bhushan Burman, against the grant of a permit to the Petitioner. Even in his appeal before the State Transport Authority, Phani Bhushan Burman raised no objection to the permit granted to the Petitioner. In these circumstances, there was no appeal against the order granting a permit to the Petitioner and it was not open to the Appellate Authority to cancel the permit already granted to him. The argument prima facie is attractive, but then it has to be remembered that the State Transport Authority was not considering only the appeal filed by Phani Bhushan Burman, but also certain other appeals which had been filed before him. One of those appeals was an appeal filed by Maniruddin in which he had questioned the grant of a permit to the Petitioner. The State Transport Authority, by virtue of the fact that there was a competent appeal before it, acquired jurisdiction to deal with the question of grant of permit to the Petitioner. The Petitioner, of course, was not a party to the appeal presented by Phani Bhushan Burman, but he had been made a party to the appeal admittedly preferred by Maniruddin and he was heard by the State Transport Authority at the time of the decision of the appeals. After consideration of all these appeals, the State Transport Authority decided to cancel the permit granted to the Petitioner and granted a permit to the Opposite Party. It cannot be, therefore, contended that the order of the State Transport Authority was without jurisdiction as it was passed without any competent appeal before it in connection with the grant of a permit to the Petitioner. In-- Nadar Transports Tiruchirapalli Vs. The State of Madras and Others, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that the appellate authority was entitled to take into consideration all the factors before refusing or granting a permit to a particular party. It is to be remembered that in such cases, no elaborate procedure for hearing or preferring appeals is provided. All that is necessary is to see that no prejudicial order is passed against a party in violation of natural justice without a party being heard or represented before the appellate authority or tribunal. Satyanarayana Rao J. in deciding the above Madras case observed as follows:
We do not thereby mean that it is open to the appellate authority to consider grounds or objections not urged by anybody before the Regional Transport Authority, but even if one person urged objections to the grant of the permit, it would be open to another person who had not urged those objections to take advantage of them and urge them as grounds of appeal before the appellate authority, and the appellate authority would be free to consider not only the representations, if any, made by the Appellant but also by other parties who were parties to the proceedings before the Regional Transport Authority. In other words, their discretion is unfettered in the sense that it is open to them to consider all the grounds which were on record when the matter received consideration before the Regional Transport Authority.
I respectfully agree with these observations of the teamed Judge. Here a question had been raised about the grant of permit to the Petitioner on a certain route, and the appellate authority was entitled to take all factors into consideration in cancelling the permit already granted to him, though the objection may not have been raised specifically by the Opposite Party Phani Bhushan Burman himself.
It is next urged by Mr. Deb that there were no reasons assigned by the State Transport Authority in cancelling the permit granted to the Petitioner. It is true that the order communicated to the Petitioner generally stated that his permit had been cancelled, but the copy of the order-sheet shows that on that date various cases were heard, including cases from the Cachar region. Item No. 3 shows that in that region the appeal of Phani Bhushan Burman was allowed and he was granted a public carrier''s permit in Cachar District in place of Sri Phani Bhushan Dam, but at the same time the order-sheet indicates that it was brought to the notice of the appellate Board that Phani Bhushan Dam, meaning the Petitioner, son of Sri S.C. Dam, Cachar, of the District Transport Officer''s office, Silchar, had come to acquire, in addition to the permit cancelled by the appellate Board, two other permits, and also another taxi permit in various names, and the Board accordingly directed the Secretary of the Cachar Regional Transport Authority to enquire and report the circumstances under which the relatives and son of the Cashier, Cachar Motor Vehicles Office, acquired those permits. It appears, therefore, that on these grounds the permit in favour of the Petitioner was cancelled. The Petitioner very strongly challenges the correctness of these grounds, while on behalf of the Authority it is alleged that the grounds are correct. Whatever the position may be, we are not concerned to decide the correctness or otherwise of the grounds on which the order of cancellation was passed. All that we are concerned with is to see whether the appellate Transport Authority had jurisdiction to make that order.
There is an affidavit on the record sworn to by Mr. K.R. Chaudhuri, I.P., Inspector General of Police and a member of the State Transport Authority, affirming and stating that the Petitioner was a pro forma Respondent in two of the appeals before the State Transport Authority--one filed by Sri Ramendra Kumar Bhattacharjee and another by Md. Maniruddin Chowdhury. These appeals were in connection with a public carrier''s permit in the district of Cachar. The appeal of Ramendra Kumar Bhattacharjee was dismissed for default, but the appeal of Maniruddin Chaudhuri was heard, and Phani Bhushan Dam, the Petitioner, was represented by a lawyer who was given a hearing. All these appeals were disposed of at one and the same sitting.
We have no reason to doubt the correctness of this affidavit. That being so we are satisfied that there was no want of jurisdiction'' in the said Appellate Authority in making the order that it did cancelling the permit in favour of the Petitioner. Nor was there any violation of principles of natural justice because the Petitioner was heard and represented in one of the appeals which concerned the grant of permits in the Cachar District.
The Rule nisi is therefore, discharged and the application is rejected.
Deka, J.
I agree.
